Showing posts with label Intel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intel. Show all posts

Saturday, March 21, 2020

YOUR TAX DOLLARS AT WORK: Justice Dept. defends foreign-owned patent trolls against Apple and Intel

Apple and Intel--two American high-tech icons--are suing Softbank-owned Fortress Investment on antitrust grounds in the Northern District of California. Their complaint admittedly raises legal questions of first impression. Fortress brought a motion to dismiss the complaint just on the basis of the legal theories it is based upon. Apple and Intel obviously oppose that motion.

Over the last couple of days, various parties filed amicus curiae briefs with the court. Apple and Intel are notably supported by

But Fortress has an ally that you wouldn't expect to back a foreign-owned patent troll group trying to extract money from some of America's greatest tech companies (having filed dozens of lawsuits against the likes of Apple, Google, and by extension, Intel): the United States Department of Justice, claiming to speak on behalf of the United States (i.e., the federal government).

Makan "Macomm" Delrahim, a former Qualcomm lawyer and now the Assistant Attorney General heading the DOJ's Antitrust Division, stops at nothing in his tireless efforts to help patent holders maximize their returns at the expense of the wider economy and actual innovation (this post continues below the document):

20-03-20 Statement of Inter... by Florian Mueller on Scribd

Mr. Delrahim and his subordinates' submission supports Fortress with respect to the claims brought by Apple and Intel under federal antitrust law. The fact that Fortress is Japanese-owned doesn't mean that the DOJ couldn't have good reasons for supporting them: it's about fundamental legal questions that also affect American patent holders. The real issue here is that even if Fortress were American-owned, it would simply be irreconcilable with the America First philosophy to back hyperagressive patent trolls (who sometimes bring dozens of lawsuits against just one defendant such as Apple or Google).

It's shocking, and I wanted to share the news. In a future post I may go into detail on the motion to dismiss (possibly after Fortress's reply brief). The case is still on my watchlist.

The ongoing coronavirus crisis--in which Fortress was about to prevent essential research, but then backtracked under public pressure, while Apple offered a major contribution--is not going to go away anytime soon. Short of a vaccine or effective and reliable cure, many restrictions will remain in force for some time, and many people's lives won't return to normal. The damage that virus is causing to the global economy is beyond belief. Governments around the world will soon face an ecomomic policy challenge of unprecedented proportions. For a swift recovery, it's advisable to support product-making and service-providing companies (like Apple, Intel, and Google) against patent trolls like Fortress and its numerous shell companies who just siphon off money from those who create many jobs. The real economy needs to highlight that simple fact to President Trump and his closest advisers. Enough is enough.

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Sunday, December 1, 2019

In filing with Ninth Circuit, Intel draws analogy between Qualcomm's business model and Dr. Frankenstein's monster

This is already the fifth post on some amicus curiae briefs filed with the Ninth Circuit in support of the Federal Trade Commission's answer to Qualcomm's appeal--and it won't be the last with at least a couple of submissions from the automotive industry still in my editorial queue.

These are the previous posts on amicus briefs supporting the FTC:

  1. 40 law and economics professors supporting FTC against Qualcomm's appeal contradict themselves just two pages apart

  2. Antitrust think tanks urge Ninth Circuit to affirm Judge Koh's FTC v. Qualcomm ruling

  3. Former Secretary of Homeland Security, former FTC chairman, and conservative think tank dismiss Qualcomm's and DOJ's "national security" arguments

  4. Former Secretary of Homeland Security, former FTC chairman, and conservative think tank dismiss Qualcomm's and DOJ's "national security" arguments

  5. Four IT industry bodies support FTC against Qualcomm's appeal: once again, The Industry v. Qualcomm

There's significant overlap between the briefs, but also unique elements to each of them. Every such filing serves a purpose, even the one that George Soros funded--as the latter makes, apart from some far-fetched theories and overregulatory ideology, a number of surprisingly reasonable points (like a limited dose of a poisonous substance potentially serving a medical purpose) and may appeal to any ultraliberal(s) on the panel (a political inclination the Ninth Circuit has a reputation for, though President Trump--the most profilic nominator of federal judges in history--has already brought some balance to that bench).

A strong showing by amici curiae was definitely needed here as Qualcomm technically has "the United States [Government]" on its side, though Antitrust AAG Makan "Macomm" Delrahim is simply a former (and presumably future) Qualcomm lawyer shamelessly--and often absurdly--acting against overall U.S. economic and national security interests in this context. That he has gotten away with this for such a long time is all the more astounding considering that his boss, Attorney General William Barr, once testified against Qualcomm and its business practices.

As I just said, each of those many pro-FTC submissions serves a purpose. For an example, the Computer & Communications Industry Association's brief, in addition to the CCIA having some members that are not involved with the three other industry bodies who made such filings, is a pretty good primer on the case (especially together with Professor Jorge Contreras's brief), while the Fair Standard Alliance brief presupposes a certain level of understanding--and ACT | The App Association made a particularly forceful submission that warns against the consequences of an acquittal.

But if forced to pick only two briefs from the 14 that have already been filed, I'd probably choose the filings that Qualcomm's victims Intel and MediaTek made, because those may be particularly impactful provided the Ninth Circuit reads them attentively. Those two briefs explain the issues very well, and they drive home a number of points on outcome-determinative legal questions (this post continues below the two documents):

19-11-29 Intel acb by Florian Mueller on Scribd

19 11 29 MediaTek Acb by Florian Mueller on Scribd

Given that those two companies have a similar perspective--Intel was forced out of the market for premium modem chips by Qualcomm, and MediaTek succeeded against Qualcomm at the lower end of the market but can't compete at the top--, it's not surprising that their stories overlap. Three examples:

  1. Both Intel and MediaTek warn against viewing the different aspects of Qualcomm's business model separately (which would make it easier for Qualcomm to downplay or deny the impact of the scheme as a whole) and urge a holistic perspective. MediaTek says "Qualcomm incorrectly compartmentalizes the [district] court's findings of its extensive, multifaceted anticompetitive conduct," and Intel says the following:

    "Qualcomm would defend the pieces of its scheme in isolation, but that is like arguing that the dismembered parts of Dr. Frankenstein's monster were harmless on the laboratory table."

  2. In that context, both filings use the verb "to reinforce" and its present participle. MediaTek puts the adverb "mutually" in front of "reinforcing," as I already did in an almost three-year-old post on the competition issues raised by Qualcomm's conduct.

  3. Intel's brief explains inhowfar Qualcomm's business model is highly unusual:

    "Qualcomm links chips and IP, and it charges separate prices for the chips and the IP substantially embodied in the chips. Qualcomm says it does this to capture the full value of its IP. Nonsense; no other patentee does the things Qualcomm does. For example, one way for SEP holders to earn revenue from their inventions is to sell products that use their inventions. The standard, efficient manner is selling products at a price that reflects both the hardware and IP. No other modem chip maker charges a separate price for chips and the IP substantially embodied in the chips. Even Qualcomm itself doesn't charge two prices for products other than its modem chips.

    "Another way SEP holders earn revenue from their inventions is by licensing them for use in others' products (e.g., licensing Qualcomm's SEPs for use in a handset with an Intel chip). The usual way to do that is to simply negotiate a royalty rate in the shadow of what a court would award as damages for infringement. No other cellular SEP holder comes to that negotiation making threats about cutting off its supply of products. In truth, Qualcomm takes a radically different approach from other SEP holders because it has a radically different purpose: to maintain its chip monopoly." (emphases in original, but not in bold face)

    MediaTek explains the uniqueness of Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" policy as follows:

    "Labeling a threat 'ordinary' does not render it any less a threat, especially where the record evidence shows that the 'ordinary' practice to which Qualcomm points is not only unique to Qualcomm, but even unique to Qualcomm's supply of monopoly chips." (emphases in original, but not in bold face)

    That is a distinction between Qualcomm's cellular baseband chips ("monopoly chips") and other chips, such as WiFi chips.

The most striking difference is that Intel's brief has a very coherent and well-structured storyline--with many rhetorical highlights--while MediaTek's machine gun type of submission looks like someone was playing Space Invaders (an arcade classic of which there are mobile-game imitations) with Qualcomm's opening brief: there are many dozens of surface-to-air missiles in that brief, each of them designed to debunk and destroy one of Qualcomm's criticims of Judge Lucy H. Koh's ruling.

There's really a ton of material that the Ninth Circuit's clerks could almost copy and paste from MediaTek's brief to compose an opinion resulting in affirmance. Intel's brief--authored by a legal team led by former U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli--takes a very strategic perspective: the FTC's case came too late for them, but they hope that affirmance will at least help with a view to future generations of mobile chips. The strength of MediaTek's brief is in the many powerful details, and what I found particularly impressive is how that amicus brief makes many detailed references to the evidentiary record (Boies Schiller was present on each day of the January trial, and that firm represents MediaTek here). In closing I'll quote how MediaTek summarizes the factual findings Judge Koh made in order to not only "infer" harm to competition (as Qualcomm claims it did) but actually identified harm to the competitive process (I'll leave out the "ER" numbers; you can find them in the PDF):

  1. Qualcomm has maintained a high share of CDMA chip sales.]

  2. Qualcomm has maintained supra-competitive pricing for CDMA chips.

  3. Qualcomm’s conduct has created artificial entry barriers.

  4. Qualcomm has maintained a high share of premium LTE chips.

  5. Qualcomm has maintained supra-competitive pricing for premium LTE chips.

  6. Qualcomm used its monopoly power to eliminate technology competition from WiMAX and ensure that the industry adopted a standard preferred by Qualcomm, thereby reinforcing its chip power.

  7. Qualcomm's refusal to offer MediaTek an exhaustive license delayed MediaTek's entry in successive generations of chips.

  8. Qualcomm's refusal to offer Samsung an exhaustive license prevented Samsung from entering the modem chip market as part of a joint venture.

  9. Qualcomm’s subsequent refusal to offer Samsung an exhaustive license prevented Samsung from selling modem chips to other OEMs.

  10. Qualcomm’s refusal to offer VIA Telecom an exhaustive license prevented VIA from reaching a large portion of the CDMA chip market and caused OEMs to view VIA as an ineffective competitor.

  11. Qualcomm's refusal to offer Intel an exhaustive license delayed Intel's entry into modem chip markets.

  12. Qualcomm's refusal to offer Huawei an exhaustive license prevented Huawei's entry into modem chip markets.

  13. Qualcomm's failure to offer an exhaustive license to Broadcom hastened Broadcom's exit from modem chip markets.

  14. Qualcomm’s chip supply threats caused VIVO to stop buying MediaTek chips that were better suited for VIVO’s handsets.

  15. Qualcomm's royalty discrimination imposed a tax on MediaTek chips that caused Wistron to stop buying from MediaTek.

  16. Qualcomm's supra-FRAND royalties on handsets incorporating non-Qualcomm chips impose an artificial surcharge on all sales of rivals' modem chips, resulting in reduced margins and exclusivity.

  17. Qualcomm's exclusivity conditions created a strong disincentive for Apple to use competitors' chips, foreclosing Intel at Apple for several years.

  18. Qualcomm's exclusivity-based foreclosure of Intel had broad market impact because of Apple's prominence as a validating customer.

  19. Qualcomm's incentive funds, which discriminatorily reduced Qualcomm royalties based on purchase of Qualcomm chips, prevented Blackberry from using competitors' chips and prompted LGE, Samsung, Lenovo, Motorola, and Huawei to shift chip purchases away from competitors, resulting in exclusivity.

  20. The cumulative impact of Qualcomm's exclusive deals suppressed sales available to modem chip competitors.

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Wednesday, November 27, 2019

Law professor claims top priority for U.S. in trade negotiations with South Korea was Qualcomm antitrust case

A Korea-based source has just drawn my attention to an article (in Korean, but I received a translation) by Kyungsin Park, Professor of Law, Korea University Law School. Professor Park accuses the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) of a failure to act forcefully in "the legal case of the century," i.e., the Qualcomm case. As I reported in March, Qualcomm could face criminal charges in Korea over its refusal to license chipset makers, but so far--and more than eight months later, it's apparently still the situation--the KFTC hasn't referred this contempt matter to the Prosecutor General's office.

Meanwhile, Qualcomm is--according to the article--spending hundreds of millions of dollars on the appeal. What Professor Park explains based on publicly available data is that it's not primarily about the 900 million dollars of fines the KFTC imposed in its late-2016 decision. The professor says it's just about 1% of Qualcomm's Korean revenues over the last 25 years, or 2% of what "Qualcomm generated through its illegal activities in South Korea." Instead, he writes, it's about the KFTC's corrective orders, which are about Qualcomm's business model.

The article talks about how Samsung ceased to complain about Qualcomm's practices after its new (early 2018) deal. Well, during the course of those Qualcomm antitrust investigations in multiple jurisdictions, Samsung was far from the only company to sign a new chipset purchasing and patent licensing agreement. Apple settled during opening statements at the April 2019 trial in San Diego--as did Korea's LG Electronics a few months later. There's no basis for pointing fingers at those companies: they're in the smartphone business, not in the antitrust enforcement business. But I do agree with the professor that Korea's competition authority (and, needless to say, the courts) have a responsibility here. (As for the companies that settled their formal or informal disputes with Qualcomm, there's plenty of testimony from the time before those deals were struck, and that testimony is still useful, as it was in the U.S. FTC v. Qualcomm case--where Samsung also filed a great amicus curiae brief.)

Professor Park argues--in other words--that South Korea's economy simply can't afford Qualcomm's sky-high patent royalties: LG Electronics, he says, has been incurring losses for 20 fiscal quarters in a row, and some Korean phone makers like Sewon Telecom, Telson, VK, Pantech, Curitel, and SKY, are no longer in business. Most mobile phone makers in the world have single-digit profit margins except for Apple and Samsung (but even Samsung isn't comfortably in the double digits, he claims).

All of that is interesting, but one claim really surprised me:

"Qualcomm is eexrting political and diplomatic pressure to influence the outcome of the appeal currently pending in the Seoul High Court. The #1 subject of the bilateral negotiations of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement that resumed in July 2019 after a seven-year hiatus was the KFTC's investigation of Qualcomm's practices. The U.S. delegation alleges that Qualcomm was denied due process though it is guaranteed under the US-Korea FTA."

I don't know what happened in that investigation, but just like Professor Park it also strikes me that the findings in Korea were simply consistent with what other jurisdictions--particularly Judge Lucy H. Koh of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California--also found.

But there's one thing I just don't understand: assuming that the claim of Qualcomm's antitrust woes being the #1 priority for the U.S. in trade talks with South Korea is true, how can Qualcomm possibly influence the U.S. Administration to such an unbelievable extent?

It obviously makes sense for any U.S. government, regardless of the party or people in power, to ensure that its companies are treated fairly abroad. There have been cases of hyperaggressive antitrust enforcement against some U.S. companies in different places at different times. But in this case, Apple and Intel--both larger than Qualcomm--were actually among the complainants, or at least respondents to questions from the KFTC whose answers played a key role in the decision against Qualcomm.

If the Seoul High Court upholds the most important one of the KFTC's decisions--that Qualcomm needs to extend exhaustive SEP licenses to rival chipset makers--, it will simply be in the mainstream of global antitrust law:

  • Judge Koh identified such an obligation first on the basis of contract law (Qualcomm's FRAND declarations), then on a duty-to-deal basis (the FTC is now pursuing an antitrust theory that relies on the contract-related finding as opposed to a contractless duty to deal).

  • Five automotive companies (Daimler, Continental, Valeo, Gemalto, and BURY Technologies) lodged antitrust complaints with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) against Nokia, and they're all about component-level SEP licensing. Just today the new European Commission was confirmed by the European Parliament (with a two-thirds majority), so I guess we will very soon see a decision to investigate those complaints.

  • Huawei is suing Nokia in a German court (Dusseldorf Regional Court), on the basis of EU antitrust law, to secure component-level SEP licenses. It's almost a given that Huawei will prevail, given that Presiding Judge Dr. Thomas Kuehnen of the Dusseldorf appeals court outlined the related legal theory in an article. Also, the Court of Justice of the EU made it reasonably clear in its Huawei v. ZTE ruling that EU antitrust law gives every implementer of a standard the right to a FRAND license.

In light of the global trend toward enforceable component-level licensing obligations, I hope Korea's courts and the KFTC won't make decisions that would disadvantage their local smartphone makers and other electronics companies compared to those based in other jurisdictions.

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Thursday, November 21, 2019

Apple joins Intel in suing Softbank-owned Fortress for anticompetitive patent abuse through web of trollish subsidiaries

Last month, Intel brought an antitrust complaint in the Northern District of California over Softbank-owned Fortress Investment's patent aggregation, obfuscation, and litigation tactics. Fortress's web of hyperaggressive patent assertion entities includes a huge and growing number of legal entities, some of whom have such names as Uniloc (which sued Apple 25 times and Google even 35 times), VLSI, DSS, Inventergy (which threatened an alleged infringer with an "IP bloodbath"), IXI, Seven Networks, and KIP CR (the CR in that name stands for "crossroads").

The good news for the trolls is that Intel withdrew its complaint. The bad news for them--but excellent news for product-focused companies who feel that enough is enough--is that the complaint came back with a vengeance as Intel and Apple made a joint filing yesterday as Reuters's Stephen Nellis was first to report (this post continues below the document):

19-11-20 Intel-Apple Antitr... by Florian Mueller on Scribd

In terms of the claims and prayers for relief, what's changed is mostly that Apple alleges FRAND violations. Uniloc is mostly or exclusively asserting--against Apple--standard-essential patents (SEPs) that previously belonged to Philips. (I've just recently become aware of a Philips patent licensing tactic in the LED segment that raises some very serious questions as well.)

The new complaint states some numbers I hadn't seen in the original one. For an example, there are estimates that tens of billions of dollars have been invested in patent litigation, and "the largest litigation investor reported having investments of $2.8 billion in 2019."

The amounts that some Fortress trolls are seeking from Apple are shocking. For an example, "VLSI claims up to $7.1 billion in connection with eight patents in the California Action and multiple billions of dollars in damages in the Delaware I Action." And that's just a small and limited part of the overall litigation activity by Fortress-controlled companies against Apple. Another group of Fortress entities, Uniloc, is seeking damages from Apple in the range of $2.6 billion to %5.1 billion from only 4 (!) of the 25 aforementioned Uniloc v. Apple cases as you can see on pages 30 and 31 of the complaint. According to Apple, "Uniloc "simply adopted the amounts that Apple sought from Samsung in litigation for Apple's patents." What Apple means is what Uniloc wants on a per-unit basis. I've criticized Apple very strongly for some of its damages claims against Samsung, but even if one agreed with what Apple wanted from Samsung at the time, it just wouldn't make sense to copy and paste an amount when it's about completely unrelated patents.

The fact that Apple has thrown its weight behind the case--in addition to Intel, which took the initiative last month--has several effects:

  • Intel's complaint already mentioned the cases against Apple, but having the target of dozens of the relevant cases directly involved raises the profile of the problem.

  • While most Silicon Valley jurors will likely have heard of Intel, Apple is more of a household brand.

  • It would presumably have been difficult for Intel to make some of the FRAND breach arguments that Apple, as a target of SEP assertions by Softbank, has brought in the joint complaint.

  • With both Intel and Apple based on the outskirts of San Jose, it should be easiser this time to keep the case in San Jose (where the complaint was filed) rather than having it reassigned within the district to San Francisco.

Now I only wish Google--another target of dozens of Fortress-funded patent lawsuits--could also join so the industry presents a united front to those industrialized patent trolls. But even if Google elected to stay on the sidelines, the combination of Intel and Apple will put Fortress and--by extension--Softbank under serious pressure.

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Sunday, October 27, 2019

Intel antitrust lawsuit takes aim at Softbank-owned Fortress Investment's patent aggregation, obfuscation, and litigation tactics

As this week draws to a close, I realize that the most important IP topic of the week was the role of financial engineering behind some of the most aggressive patent transfers and assertions. Huawei's counsel in the Unwired Planet v. Huawei case told the Supreme Court of the UK that Unwired's aggressive attempts to monetize former Ericsson patents amounted to "leveraged financial engineering." Earlier in the week, Intel filed an antitrust and unfair competition complaint in the Northern District of California against Fortress Investment and three of its subsidiaries (two of which are patent assertion entities named VLSI Technology and DSS Technology Management). Fortress Investment was in free fall until it was acquired by Japan's Softbank for $3.3 billion in 2017.

In its lawsuit filed on Monday (October 21, 2019), Intel alleges antitrust violations

  • either in the market for patents for high-tech consumer and enterprise electronic devices and components or software therein and processed used to manufacture them

  • or, in the narrower alternative, in the market for licenses to Fortress's aggregate portfolio.

Antitrust analysis generally starts with market definition. There must be a market in which someone has a dominant position and acts abusively.

Intel isn't saying that investments in patent licensing firms or large-scale acquisitions of patents by patent assertion entities would always be illegal, or that trollish litigation tactics raise competition concerns. The first couple of pages of the complaint discuss the policy implications of patent assertion entities (PAEs) at a generic level, but the specific case is about certain structural and behavioral characteristics of Fortress's industrial-scale patent acquisition and assertion business model.

Citing to what network technology company Sonus Network alleged in a case against one of Fortress's numerous shell companies, Inventergy, the complaint quotes that particular entity's CEO as telling Sonus that "Fortress[,] does not settle" in litigation and, in the absence of a license deal palatable to Fortress, Sonus would face "an IP bloodbath." The flowery language of that threat does not per se constitute an antitrust violation, and the complaint doesn't say or suggest so. It merely serves to illustrate how little Fortress's business model has to do with innovation and to what extent the business model is simply to create, and capitalize on, a patent reign of terror. Case in point, a particularly well-known Fortress entity, Uniloc, previously caught my attention because it shows up in the RPX Daily Litigation Alert very often as they've brought dozens of lawsuits against Apple and Google, as well as other defendants.

Fortress apparently sets up and shuts down patent assertion entities at an unusually high frequency. They transfer patents between them, sometimes as a result of subsidiaries being unable to meet their payment obligations to the holding company. Similarly, they just dismiss complaints in one venue to refile somewhere else. And when patent claims are found invalid, they sometimes come up with many dozens of amended claims that allegedly don't have any more merit (as they just add some meaningless terms to the claim language), but enable them to keep suing forever.

Again, vexatious and oppressive litigation tactics don't in and of themselves constitute anticompetitive conduct. The point I found particularly interesting from an antitrust angle is that Intel explains how Fortress systematically acquires, through different subsidiaries, patents covering alternative techniques so as to make it practically impossible to work around all of those patents without Fortress being able to allege (whether with or, more likely, without merit) some infringement(s) at any rate. I couldn't find the term "patent thicket" in the complaint, but that's the one that came to my mind when I read the related passage:

"23. Further, aggregating a massive portfolio of electronics patents allows Fortress and its PAEs to amass a range of patents that are both substitutes for and complements to one another. When a firm wants to build an electronic device, such as a smartphone, there are many ways to do so. Each alternative requires multiple technologies. However, the alternatives do not require the same combination of technologies. For example, Alternative 1 might require technologies A, B and C, while Alternative 2 might require technologies D, E and F. The technologies used for Alternative 1 (A, B and C) are complements: they are each needed to create the device using Alternative 1. Similarly, the technologies used for Alternative 2 (D, E, and F) are economic complements. The technologies comprising Alternative 1 are also a substitute for the technologies comprising Alternative 2, because the bundle of technologies used in Alternative 1 can be used as a substitute for the bundle of technologies used in Alternative 2.

"24. There are many possible permutations of complement and substitute technologies for electronics patents. For instance, Alternative 3 might require technologies A, C and D. In that scenario, the technologies bundled in Alternative 3 are a substitute for the technologies bundled in Alternatives 1 and 2 respectively; A, C, and D are complements in the production of Alternative 3; and technology D is a substitute for technology B. Technologies can thus be both substitutes and complements. If Alternative 4 used technologies A, B, and D, then B and D are complements for Alternative 4, and substituting D for B changes Alternative 1 to Alternative 3."

Another allegation is that Fortress requires companies to license numerous patents deemed meritless (so weak that they "never would have been asserted by their former owners") in order to license those that are not that weak. Package deals are common in many industries, and the allegation here is very much about Fortress's patent aggregation strategies. It's not about aggregation of the efficient kind where licensees would be presented with a one-stop solution: while the Fortress web of companies as a whole engages in large-scale patent aggregation, companies face royalty demands from numerous Fortress companies and are never offered a deal covering the patents held by all Fortress entities.

According to Intel's complaint, "Fortress and its PAEs foreclose the possibility—which existed before aggregation—that litigation can be an economic alternative to licensing patents." In other words, Fortress allegedly bases its monetization strategy in no small part on the nuisance value of meritless patent lawsuits that result in what I would call hard (i.e., legal fees) and soft (i.e., distraction of employees) costs to those forced to defend against Fortress's infringement actions.

The complaint mentions the following Fortress PAEs--note that any of those PAEs may itself have spawned numerous companies (in the U.S. as well as abroad):

  • VLSI Technologies allegedly discussed three alternative ways of helping NXP maximize its income from a part of its patent portfolio: Financing, Privateering, and Corporate Carve Out (an acquisition of a copany division along with its patents). Guess what--the chosen route was Privateering. Two years ago, VLSI asserted eight former NXP patents "against virtually every one of Intel's microprocessors ever sold since 2011" and sought $7.1 billion. That first case got stayed when PTAB IPRs were instituted against six of the patents-in-suit. Thereafter, VLSI brought a couple of Delaware cases, at least one of which also involved a multi-billion-dollar damages claim. But with injunctions not being realistically available in the U.S. (except from the ITC in the form of import bans), VLSI is also suing Intel in China.

  • DSS sued Intel as one of various defendants (electronics companies as well as retailers like Wal-Mart). Intel settled earlier this year, but presumably on very favorable terms as the patent claims-in-suit had been declared invalid by the PTAB.

  • Uniloc's dozens of lawsuits were mentioned above. To be precise, various Uniloc entities have so far sued Apple 25 times in the U.S. (Eastern and Western Districts of Texas), apparently mostly or exclusively over cellular standard-essential patents acquired from Philips, and over the course of only three months brought a total of 35 lawsuits against Google. That's 60 just between Apple and Google--and there have been more than 70 other Unioc infringement suits already.

  • Inventergy acquired many hundreds of patents from companies like Nokia, Panasonic, and Huawei, then sued Apple, HTC, and ZTE in the District of New Jersey and is seeking an ITC exclusion order (import ban).

  • IXI sued Samsung, BlackBerry, and Apple.

  • Seven Networks sued ZTE, Samsung, and Google, and apparently got those three companies to settle before also suing Apple.

  • KIP CR (= Crossroads) P1 has sued a number of companies including Huawei and Oracle. That entity even challenged the constitutionality of PTAB IPRs, but the Supreme Court denied that cert petition.

This problem is undoubtedly a whole lot bigger and more severe--and, therefore, more harmful to industry and consumers--than conventional "patent trolling." It will be interesting to see what else comes to light in the course of this litigation. Finally, here's the complaint:

19-10-21 Intel Antitrust Co... by Florian Mueller on Scribd

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Thursday, September 26, 2019

Cert petition, amicus brief criticize Federal Circuit for vitiating damages apportionment requirement: Time Warner Cable v. Sprint

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has always been viewed as being more sympathetic to patent holders than to alleged infringers--but not in every single aspect of patent law. For an example, some critics of former Chief Judge Randall Rader, who disparaged the PTAB as patent "death squads," acknowledged that his rulings on patent infringement damages provided some important clarifications beneficial to defendants.

Two documents that have recently been filed with the Supreme Court of the United States argue that various Federal Circuit rulings in recent years have gutted the apportionment requirement for patent damages claims:

  • On August 15, Time Warner Cable (which doesn't exist anymore in its original form, but a Charter Communications subsidiary is now continuing the litigation in question) filed a petition for writ of certiorari (request for Supreme Court review) in its patent infringement dispute with Sprint. A district court--affirmed by the Federal Circuit--found that Time Warner infringed a Sprint patent on connections between VoIP and pre-VoIP-era telecommunications networks, and awarded $140 million in damages, based on a reasonable-royalties theory that Time Warner argues failed to apportion between infringing and non-infringing features. Time Warner's petition raises two distinct issues: the one relating to apportionment and one about the written-description requirement.

  • Last week, Intel filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the first part (apportionment) of the cert petition.

Both the petition and the amicus brief place particular emphasis on a 135-year-old Supreme Court ruling: In Garretson v. Clark (1884), the top U.S. court stated that "the [prevailing] patentee [seeking damages] must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages between the patented feature and the unpatented feature." And the highest court in the land added that "such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative." In that case, the patent-in-suit read on an improved mop head, but not the cleaning device as a whole.

Interestingly, it was also in the late 19th century when it became law that a prevailing design patent holder was entitled to an unapportioned disgorgement of infringer's profits. A typical example of a design patent-infringing product at the time was a carpet. In the Apple-Samsung dispute, there was a strong policy argument that today's highly multifunctional products had to be analyzed and treated differently from 19th-century products. But in the Garretson utility patent case, apportionment already came into play even though it was a no-tech (not even a low-tech) product by today's standards. Undoubtedly, what was already warranted in the Garretson mop-head case is hugely more relevant in the smartphone era.

There's some indication that the Supreme Court may have felt last year that the question of apportionment at least potentially warranted another look: on April 4, 2018, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the federal government on the cert petition in EVE-USA, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.--but before the DOJ responded to this CVSG, the petition was withdrawn as a result of a settlement.

Yesterday, Sprint responded to Time Warner's petition and Intel's amicus brief.

With a view to any unfinished business left over from EVE-USA, Sprint argues that it was a lost-profits case, while the case pending now is about a reasonable royalty (as a damages theory). That's a weak point because the issue was and is apportionment.

Like pretty much any party opposing a cert petition, Sprint also claims that it's all about a factual determination rather than a need for important legal clarification. While I don't agree with Sprint as far as the apportionment question is concerned, they may have a point here with respect to the scope of the patent-in-suit in light of the written description. But that one is only a lower-priority second part of Time Warner's petition, and there is no support whatsoever from any amicus curiae for that part. I would have thought that more parties than one (Intel) would throw their weight behind the apportionment question, but one theory I have is that some of the organizations that typically care about such issues have business relationships with Sprint and/or work closely with Sprint on other policy issues.

The issue that Time Warner Cable and Intel complain about in their filings is that the Federal Circuit has in recent years deemed the apportionment requirement to be satisfied by other means than an apportionment in a strict sense. In a strict sense, apportionment would really mean to tell the jury what the commercial value of the non-infringing parts and features of a product is versus the deemed-infringing one(s)--and to then determine what percentage of that commercial value would constitute a reasonable royalty or lost profits. However, the Federal Circuit's disturbingly permissive approach has recently been to content itself with such alternative approaches as simply seeking a "low" royalty rate on an entire product--and there would be other examples that contrast with various Federal Circuit decisions earlier this decade or even before, all of which showed that the appeals court took the judiciary's gatekeeper role in the damages theories context very seriously.

Damages determinations are put before juries, and jurors easily get misled by damages theories based on the entire commercial value of a complex multifunctional product. Even the distinction between a mop head and the rest of a cleaning device can make a significant difference. The difference between a patent infringed by a $5, $10 or $20 chip versus the value of an entire smartphone is far more substantial. But this gets even worse when someone may assert a patent on a cup holder in a car, or on one feature of numerous computer programs shipped with a car.

Again and again and again, Sprint's opposition brief points to the fact that their trial evidence included, among other things, allegedly-comparable license agreements that should be deemed strong evidence of the market value of the patented invention--evidence that already involves an apportionment because the parties who negotiated the relevant agreements will have taken the need for apportionment into account.

Comparable license agreements bear considerable weight with judges and juries. With a view to their relevance to apportionment, Sprint's opposition brief implicitly suggests two things:

  1. Under what Sprint considers the correct standard, such license agreements should in and of themselves be deemed to satisfy the apportionment requirement. In other words, Sprint would like to use such top-down evidence to eliminate the need for a more conventional bottom-up apportionment where one attaches a part of the entire commercial value of a product to the infringing feature(s) and the remainder to the non-infringing ones.

  2. Sprint seems concerned that the apportionment standard suggested by the petitioner would make license agreements relating to entire products (and not just to particular components) inadmissible as evidence.

I disagree with #1, and believe #2 overshoots.

License agreements can't serve as a substitute for an apportionment analysis presented to the jury. The Garretson language doesn't appear to allow that kind of end-run around the apportionment requirement.

But that doesn't mean such license agreements would be inherently inadmissible under the standard proposed by Time Warner. If a jury is presented with apportionment evidence in the case before it, and if the jury is furthermore informed of how to analyze a third-party license agreement against this apportionment background, then it may still work. Let me give an example: a patent reads on a particular type of chip, and that kind of chip is commonly found in WiFi routers as well as smartphones. The patent holder negotiated a royalty of 0.5% of the end price of a WiFi router, and presents that agreement as evidence in a dispute with a smartphone maker. What clearly wouldn't make sense is to argue that a WiFi router manufacturer's decision to pay a 0.5% royalty means the same royalty rate should apply to smartphones. But the royalty can be normalized by calculating what royalty rate was actually paid with respect to the relevant component. If the relevant component in the accused smartphone is also properly identified, then the router license agreement may have a probative value that outweighs the risk of jury confusion.

It's too early to go into much detail on the merits. Right now, it's about certworthiness. The petition and Intel's amicus brief make a plausible case that the Federal Circuit has recently rubberstamped damages theories that don't appear to satisfy the apportionment requirement that one can reasonably read into the statute (35 U.S.C. § 284), the Garretson decision, and various post-Garretson decisions. Only the Supreme Court can get the Federal Circuit back on the right track by clarifying that Garretson, after 135 years, is still good law and even far more critical--in economic terms--than anyone could have imagined back in the 19th century.

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Saturday, August 17, 2019

Hot summer for Ninth Circuit motions panel: Qualcomm's motion to stay enforcement of FTC remedies still pending after more than 3 weeks

Imagine you're a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and from time to time you serve on the Motions Panel that changes every month. Motions to stay the enforcement of injunctions are the most critical ones to resolve, short of anything related to executions, but there aren't any pending in the Ninth Circuit.

Most motions, including those motions to stay enforcement, involve relatively narrow issues. But from time to time, a "monster" motion comes along. That's what happened when Qualcomm, understandably though I mostly disagree with them on substance, sought a stay of the enforcement of the injunction the FTC had obtained from Judge Lucy H. Koh of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Just the findings of fact and conclusion of law underlying the order span 233 pages. But there's also been a significant volume of briefing on the motion. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, a longstanding Qualcomm friend who represented Qualcomm while in private practice, heads the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and his subordinates made a filing in support of Qualcomm that was also backed by a couple of other Administration officials. The FTC's solid but somewhat lackluster opposition to Qualcomm's motion was supported by industry body ACT | The App Association and by chipmaker MediaTek, whose filing showed a Qualcomm-internal presentation depicting competitors' exits from the cellular baseband chipset market with tombstones.

The national security arguments made by Qualcomm and its usual allies are bogus claims from different perspectives. Not only are products, not patents, relevant to security and is Qualcomm far too profitable that a requirement to extend patent licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms could threaten the innovative capacity of a company that spent far more on stock buybacks in recent years than on research and development, but Qualcomm's national-security argument also comes down to them saying that the elimination of competition (by means that the district court found illegal) has now made them, as the sole survivor, absolutely critical to U.S. national security. Meanwhile, Apple has acquired Intel's mobile chipset division, ensuring that there still is at least one major U.S. company investing in R&D in this field.

But let's again try to look at this from the vantage point of a judge on the Ninth Circuit motions panel. You get hundreds and hundreds of pages to review, which point to lots of external documents, such as other decisions. That's why, after Qualcomm was granted expedited appellate proceedings, they found even they, with their vast resources and their intimate knowledge of the issues, needed more time. You see a submission by the federal government that urges you to grant the motion lest the world descend into chaos.

It's not easy to brush aside those concerns by giving the motion short shrift. Judge Koh denied Qualcomm's original motion to stay enforcement quickly, but the original ruling had taken even her (as famous as she is for working smart and hard) well over three months after the January trial. I still remember the laughter in her courtroom when she said: "Sadly, this opinion's gonna take some time." It did, but the result was well worth it.

It's now been more than three weeks since briefing was completed, and some knowledgeable people had actually expected a decision to come down in July.

I'm not sure about how the Ninth Circuit organizes this internally, but I presume that the July motions panel (with a Democratic majority) is still in charge, given that the motion was fully briefed before the end of July and the judges on the motions panel are, according to the appeals court's website, "assigned to consider ready substantive motions matters," and this one was ready with almost a week left in July. The August panel has a Republican majority, so should that new panel be in charge now, then the DOJ's brief would likely be given more weight unless they see that a former Qualcomm lawyer's lobbying for his past client (and possibly also future client when he returns to private practice) doesn't make the idea of healthy competition an ideological cause.

The decision will be interesting, but whatever the outcome may be, let's not overrate it. An appeals court may well stay enforcement, especially for the duration of an expedited appeal, but nevertheless affirm, in whole or in large parts, when the focus is entirely on the merits, or it may deny a stay but identify serious issues later on.

The time that it's taking them to decide can't be reliably interpreted. The only safe assumption is that they are kind of overwhelmed. It might mean that they're working on a rationale that will enable them to grant the motion without taking such a strong position that would suggest the merits panel could decide only one way. It could also mean that they've concluded the motion should be denied, but in light of governmental brouhaha about the end of the world being nigh, the appeals court wants to write up a thorough denial. Qualcomm might internally--and reasonably--view the time that this is taking as a sign that is more likely than not to be positive, especially since I guess they feared a swift denial of their motion. Contrary to Qualcomm's representations, it's not like anything dramatic would happen to Qualcomm's business in the very short term, given that any license (re)negotiations would take a lot longer at any rate.

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Saturday, August 3, 2019

Update on Qualcomm's two Ninth Circuit antitrust appeals: delays in FTC case due to complexity; consumer class responds to certification appeal

Two Qualcomm antitrust appeals are pending with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, awaiting three key decisions:

  • Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit allowed Qualcomm an interlocutory appeal of the certification of a consumer class seeking $5 bilion in damages (an average of approximately $20 for an estimated 250 million consumers who purchased a smartphone in the U.S. during the relevant period) from Qualcomm on the heels of the FTC v. Qualcomm antitrust case. Judge Lucy H. Koh of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California had certified the class, but stayed the case when the Ninth Circuit allowed the interlocutory appeal. Meanwhile, Qualcomm received support in the form of an amicus brief from its long-standing friends at the Department of Justice in this context, too. Further below I'll publish the consumers' answering brief.

  • The strategically more important one is the appeal of the FTC's antitrust victory:

    • In the shortest term, Qualcomm is seeking a stay of the enforcement of the FTC's injunctive relief (antitrust remedies). The motion for a stay has been fully briefed, and most likely we'll see a decision in a matter of days. There's a bit of anxiety on Wall Street after Qualcomm missed estimates. In this climate it's possible that the QCOM stock price will be significantly affected by the ruling on the motion for an enforcement stay, though in my opinion the question of whether or not the stay is granted is unimportant compared to the future ruling on the merits.

    • The Ninth Circuit granted Qualcomm's motion to expedite the merits appeal. On that basis, we'd have seen the opening brief next Friday, and briefing would have been complete well ahead of the end of October. However, Qualcomm's lawyers realized that the case is so complex that they (and, quite likely, the FTC) will need a bit more time than anticipated. With the FTC's consent, Qualcomm has now asked for two more weeks (i.e., until August 23) for its opening brief. Normally, the TC's answering brief would then be due October 25 (and Qualcomm's reply brief on November 15), but should Qualcomm's opening brief be substantially in excess of the defalut word-count limitation, then the FTC would also get an extra two weeks, which Qualcomm would not oppose. Here's the consent motion (this post continues below the document):

19-07-30 Unopposed QCOM Mot... by Florian Mueller on Scribd

The extension is needed not only by Qualcomm but also by persons and entities who will submit amicus curiae briefs in support of Qualcomm's appeal.

The Ninth Circuit will schedule a hearing as soon as possible after briefing is complete. For various practical reasons, it appears highly unlikely at this stage that the hearing would still be held this year. The question is probably just exactly when in the first quarter of 2020 it will take place.

In the appeal relating to the consumer class certification, the schedule also had to be extended (by a total of two months). Yesterday (Friday, August 2), the consumers' attorneys made several filings:

19-08-02 Consumer Class Ans... by Florian Mueller on Scribd

At this point I can only share some general observations regarding the appellate argument. Not only am I more interested in the FTC case but I'm also a lot more familiar with IP and unilateral-conduct issues than with class certifications.

I noticed that the consumers' attorneys place particular emphasis on why California law (which allows such class actions) should apply even though the vast majority of the consumers falling under the class definition made their purchases in other states, many of them in states that don't have similarly permissive rules. Apart from Qualcomm's legal domicile, the consumer class stresses the impact of Qualcomm's dealings with Apple and Intel, two California companies.

The recently-adjudicated Apple v. Pepper Supreme Court appeal (which also involved the admissibility of a class action, as opposed to the underlying App Store-related merits, which have yet to be litigated) is mentioned in footnote 11:

"The DOJ is joined by Louisiana, Ohio, Texas, Alaska, Missouri, and Oklahoma. Several of these states took a contrary position just months ago in Apple v. Pepper, advocating in favor of the repeal of Illinois Brick and the virtues of indirect purchaser suits. See Br. for Texas, Iowa, and 29 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, No. 17-1204."

Another key amicus curiae here is the Chamber of Commerce, which (according to the consumers' brief) "argues that applying California law violates the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Dormant Commerce Clauses." Similarly, the DOJ "suggests that 'federalism' prevents California from applying its antitrust laws extraterritorially." Those are constitutional arguments, and the consumers' attorneys say that no new issues can be raised on appeal, so any such constitionality arguments have--they say--been waived by not raising them earlier.

The consumers' lawyers present different theories based on which Judge Koh's class-certification decision could be upheld, but I'd have to conduct more research to form an opinion on how strong those theories are.

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Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Anatomy of a patent case gone awry: appeals court's order to stay enforcement of Munich fake injunction published

This is a long-overdue follow-up to a post of two months back on an order by the Oberlandesgericht München (Munich Higher Regional Court) granting a motion by Apple to stay the enforcement of Qualcomm's illegitimate (for multiple reasons) Germany-wide injunction over EP2724461 on a "low-voltage power-efficient envelope tracker"--a patent that an opposition panel of the European Patent Office revoked last month because it shouldn't have been granted in the first place, not even in a narrower form (Qualcomm can and likely will appeal that decision). And Judge Lucy H. Koh's landmark FTC v. Qualcomm antitrust ruling came down that same week.

Of all the cases I've watched since I started this blog nearly a decade ago, what went wrong in this Munich case makes it the worst non-standard-essential patent case by a wide margin, just like the district court's Oracle v. Google rulings were the worst in any software copyright case and the Mannheim Regional Court, in 2012, set a negative example for how to handle a standard-essential patent (SEP) case when it totally failed to recognize Motorola Mobility's blatant antitrust violation by seeking to enforce SEPs after initially making bad-faith out-of-this-world royalty demands (a royalty on computers that was effectively more than a 100% royalty rate since Microsoft would have had to pay Motorola more than it typically earned per copy of Windows sold to an OEM). Apart from that, I've certainly seen--and keep seeing--very bad stuff coming out of the Eastern District of Texas on various occasions, but those weren't cases I followed closely.

The regional government of the state of Bavaria published the December 2018 fake injunction ruling, but I still haven't been able to find a public redacted version of the appeals court's order that tears the fake injunction into pieces, so I'm going to publish it here and now (this post continues below the document):

19-04-09 OLG München Ausset... by on Scribd

There's a host of reasons any single one one of which would have been sufficient for the appeals court to conclude that Apple was more likely than not to get the lower court's ruling overturned at the end of the appellate procedings (which were cut short by the Apple-Qualcomm settlement). The likelihood of success of an appeal is also extremely key to obtaining a stay in the U.S., but even more so in Germany, where irreparable harm is just a requirement and given less weight. When Apple brought its motion in December (one day after the lower court's ruling), there would have been a stronger irreparable-harm argument than after a workaround involving Qualcomm's baseband chipsets became known, but again, what mattered here was just the likelihood of success of the appeal.

Apple requested not only a stay for the duration of the appellate proceedings (which was granted) but also a stay for the period during which the appeals court considered the motion for a stay. The latter was denied. The order explains that such a short-term stay is granted only under the most egregious of circumstances, and the unavailability of products due to the enforcement of a patent injunction is insufficient to justify such a short-term stay in its own right.

The order does not make reference to antitrust or invalidity arguments. I suspect that Apple did pursue its antitrust defense (which the appeals court didn't have to reach, however, after granting the stay on an infringement-related basis), while it is possible that the invalidity defense was not stressed in the motion for a stay. At the time the lower court handed down the injunction, the EPO's preliminary opinion was that the patent was valid, though the preliminary opinion did mention that certain issues would have to be discussed (and indeed, the patent got invalidated in May).

As the injunction had been granted on an agnostic basis (without an actual infringement having been ascertained), the appeals court's order to stay enforcement does not--because it does not have to--provide clarity as to whether or not there was an infringement. The stay was ordered because the appeals court concluded that the original reasoning of the Landgericht München I (Munich I Regional Court) could not stand, and in that situation the patent holder no longer has a legitimate interest in enforcement regardless of whether (such as on remand) an infringement might be identified later on. In other words, there was no right-for-the-wrong reasons analysis. But it's highly unlikely at any rate that there was an infringement, given that the United States International Trade Commission (first its most experienced Administrative Law Judge and then the Commission, which is the six-member decision-making body at the top of the U.S. trade agency) and the United States District Court for the Southern District of California (on summary judgment, which is relatively unusual on the factual aspects of an infringement) had all the evidence and testimony before them and agreed with Apple's primary non-infringement argument.

The standard of review for the different parts of the lower court's decision to deem Apple's non-infringement defense insufficiently substantiated (which is why it allowed Qualcomm to prevail even without actual proof of infringement) is either the equivalent of "clear error" or "abuse of discretion" under U.S. law--and since the appeals court adjudicated a motion for a stay as opposed to a full-blown appeal, the hurdle for Apple was to show clear error or an abuse of discretion in such a convincing way that the appeals court was enabled to reach such conclusion on a basis comparable to a summary judgment.

The combination of the standard of review and the limited scope of the analysis is the reason why some of Apple's attack vectors didn't succeed. They might have succeeded under the framework of full-blown appellate proceedings, but not at this stage.

While I can understand that the appeals court afforded the lower court some deference, there is one argument that Apple made in its motion that really should have succeeded even under the given circumstances. The lower court should not have condoned Qualcomm's German lawyers' refusal to submit to the protective order that the same firm had negotiated with Qorvo, the maker of the accused envelope-tracker chip, in the Middle District of North Carolina. The appeals court cites to an unpublished ruling it made in an earlier case, and apparently the Munich Higher Regional Court is uncomfortable with the implications of a plaintiff's lawyers being precluded from discussing a piece of evidence (here, the chipset schematics obtained through a U.S. discovery proceeding for the stated purpose of using them--though it never happened due to Qualcomm's about-face--in the Munich litigation) with their clients' engineers. There wouldn't have been a contempt-style sanction if Qualcomm had refused to do so, but the lower court could and in my view should have drawn an adverse inference.

Between the lines of the related passages the Munich appeals court appears to be concerned about U.S. discovery rules and the related opportunities for access to documents, but also the restrictions that are imposed by protective orders, playing too big a role in German patent infringement proceedings. What I find disappointing is that the appeals court would even have that concern in a situation in which the relevant party (here, Qualcomm) itself initiated a U.S. discovery proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for the specific purpose of presenting the material so obtained in Munich, and negotiated a protective order there, but then deems it opportune to keep such critical evidence out of the German case by way of the German lawyers declining to enter into the protective order. This is a matter of legal culture, of course, and I could name a number of federal judges in the U.S. (outside the Eastern District of Texas, obviously) of whom I'm sure they would never ever tolerate such extreme and obvious gamesmanship. Again, the appeals court might have decided differently at the end, but my reading of the passage relating to Qualcomm's about-face (regarding the presentation of the chipset schematics) is that there was, at a minimum, a rather strong tendency on the appeals court's part to accept Qualcomm's conduct.

Nevertheless, the outcome was the right one: the injunction got lifted. The key to this result was that the appeals court concluded Apple's initial defense (we're basically talking about the answer to the complaint) was good enough that Qualcomm would have had to do more to prove an infringement. The appeals court identified two errors on the lower court's part in this regard:

  • The court-appointed expert, the narrow scope of whose engagement was just a kind of plausibility check, had opined in the November 2018 trial that an alternative solution (without an "offset," which was the claim limitation at the heart of Apple's primary non-infringement contention) would be less efficient than the method covered by the patent. But inferior or suboptimal efficiency is separate from whether Apple met its burden of showing that an "offset" wasn't necessarily required. The lower court, however, erroneously concluded from the expert's opinion on inferiority that Apple had failed to show that the desired effect could possibly be achieved in the absence of an "offset."

  • Qualcomm's infringement theory, based on an inherently unreliable teardown report, involved the presence of a digital-analog converter (DAC). While Apple conceded that there was one around, its lawyers also stressed that it was not used in the mode of operation relevant to the alleged infringement. The appeals court has thankfully corrected the lower court's plaintiff-friendly error that consisted in a misreading and misapplication of the Rangierkatze (Shunting Trolley) ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice; the highest court in Germany for the substantive aspects of patent infringement and patent validity cases). In September 2018 I discussed Shunting Trolley in connection with another Munich Qualcomm v. Apple infringement case.

    In 2016, Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann (for whom this envelope tracker case here is really an outlier!) gave a great presentation (PDF) at a Federal Patent Court conference on predicting and applying the guidance provided by the Federal Court of Justice.In that one he discussed the difficulties involved, including threshold questions where the top court agreed with a defendant in one case and with a plaintiff in a structurally similar case. No doubt about those troublesome issues--but when it comes to Shunting Trolley, I really think it's a pretty straightforward one to understand to apply:

    In the narrowest sense, Shunting Trolley said that a manual containing a recommended mode of operation cannot cure an infringement that occurs regardless, be it by a user choosing a different mode, by environmental conditions, or even happenstance. The guidance resulting from that narrow issue is admittedly a bit broader. But even the German equivalent of a SCOTUS syllabus here still makes it clear that an infringement requires each claim limitation to be practiced. So whenever a patentee or a court suggests (as Qualcomm did in a different Apple case involving the Spotlight search) that Shunting Trolley provides a substitute for the infringement of each and every claim limitation, I would like to ask them: "Which part of 'each' don't you understand?"

    In the envelope-tracker case (unlike the Spotlight case), the issue was not the "each" but the question of whether a user could modify the product as to render it infringing. The Munich Higher Regional Court convincingly explains that Shunting Trolley does not have scope for an infringement in that Qualcomm v. Apple case, where the DAC would only come into play in the relevant mode of operation if an iPhone user modified the firmware (program code) executed by Intel's baseband chip, which then controls the Qorvo envelope-tracker chip in a certain way. Unlike the "each" question, this isn't a binary one. However, Shunting Trolley was about the manual operation of a brake, or even totally automatic events, and, therefore, lightyears away from reverse engineering and tampering with the firmware of a baseband chip (which presumably consists of millions of lines of code, by the way).

Against the background of those errors, the appeals court found that Apple's non-infringement argument was sufficiently substantiated; that Apple's request to reopen the proceedings should have been granted; and that the lower court should have allowed Mike Kay, the chief designer of the accused Qorvo chip (who waited outside the courtroom for 12 hours, in vain and possibly even in pain), to testify.

I submitted information on this extreme case of wrongful enforcement of a Germany-wide patent injunction to the government officials working on what may be an injunction-centric German patent reform bill, and I was positively surprised that they acknowledged my unsolicited input (I was not among the recipients of a related questionnaire) with a rather thoughtful answer.

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Friday, May 24, 2019

Apple and Intel just dealt Qualcomm a post-settlement blow: EPO revokes patent underlying German fake injunction against iPhone 7 and 8

On the legal front, this week was the worst ever for Qualcomm in its corporate history, due to the FTC's sweeping victory in the Northern District of California on Tuesday shortly before midnight Pacific Time. Today, Friday, Qualcomm suffered another defeat--less impactful than the other one, yet significant: a three-examiner panel of the Ppposition Division of the European Patent Office (EPO) sided with Apple and Intel by revoking, as requested by those two Silicon Valley companies, European Patent EP2724461 on a low-voltage power-efficient envelope tracker, a patent that Qualcomm temporarily enforced to prevent Apple from selling the iPhone 7 and iPhone 8 (and the iPhone X, but Apple was no longer offering it anyway) in Germany, an attempt to put pressure on Apple for which Qualcomm had to make a $1.5 billion deposit.

Quite apparently, the recent Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement, which resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of all infringement and antitrust/contract actions around the globe, did not and does not preclude Apple from continuing to challenge the validity of Qualcomm's EP'461 patent, which I just call the "Munich fake injunction patent" alluding to its enforcement history. (This is not the time and place to speculate on whether that agreement will have to be renegotiated; suffice it to say that a hedge fund manager with formal legal training said, as a guest speaker on a Susquehanna International Group conference call yesterday, that he couldn't find anything in the redacted version of the agreement that would suggest it couldn't possibly happen, and he explained why it's actually even hard to imagine that even the most creatively-crafted clause in the agreement could deprive Apple of whatever rights it might have as a beneficiary of the FTC case.)

On Tuesday, I was first to report and comment on Judge Lucy H. Koh's antitrust ruling; today I was the only third-party person in meeting room 128 of the EPO's main building in Munich. Qualcomm had dispatched a team of eight: four Quinn Emanuel lawyers (led by two partners: lead counsel Dr. Marcus Grosch and recently-named partner Jérôme Kommer), a German professor who served as their expert witness, and three Qualcomm employees from San Diego. Apple and Intel were represented by four patent attorneys from Samson & Partner (including the name partner himself, Dr. Wolfgang Lippich, Dr. Georg Jacoby, and Dr. Martin Vetter) as well as--in an advisory, non-pleading capacity today--Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer partner Prince Wolrad of Waldeck and Pyrmont and principal associate Dr. Eva-Maria Herring, credited for numerous key court filings such as Apple's answers to several Qualcomm complaints.

Such a rock-star lineup on both sides--14 professionals in total--shows that today's hearing was hugely more important than one might have thought in light of the recent Apple-Qualcomm settlement as well as the Munich Higher Regional Court's decision to lift, pending the appeal (which was subsequently mooted by the settlement), the lower court's injunction because it came down for all the wrong reasons.

The relevance of today's ruling by the EPO's Opposition Division, which Qualcomm can and undoubtedly will appeal to a Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) of the EPO, transcends the scope of, and past and potential future harm caused by, this particular patent as the German federal government is preparing a patent reform package with a particular emphasis on access to injunctive relief. In fact, an "expert talk" (a spokeswoman for the ministry insisted it was not a "roundtable," though I think it was one by any other name) took place just earlier this week--and I'll encourage the officials in charge of drafting the bill to consider this case, which was arguably the highest-profile German patent injunction that ever came down. I'll also remind them of how German media giant Bertelsmann's Arvato services company lost a great deal of business from Microsoft earlier this decade because of the mere threat of a Mannheim injunction>.

Let's look at it this way: because of German patent law--and the way the courts apply it--effectively granting patent injunctions as an automatic conseqwuence of an infringement finding, and because defendants are deprived of a full invalidity defense (unlike in any other jurisdiction, though it's also a tall order to get U.S. juries to invalidate patents), two models of the commercially most successful high-tech product ever--the iPhone--were banned by the Munich I Regional Court even though

  • the appeals court found that the lower court erred in three ways, one of which is that the regional court should have reopened the record after the first trial instead of entering an injunction,

  • decisions in the U.S. (by the ITC and the United States District Court for the Southern District of California) very strongly suggested that Qorvo's envelope tracker chip simply doesn't infringe that patent, and

  • today we know that the patent shouldn't have been granted in the first place (though, again, Qualcomm can and presumably will appeal that holding).

It was a long day (from 9 AM to around 5 PM local time) at the EPO, and I'd rather go into details on the invalidity finding when the written decision is handed down. What I do wish to point out is that the opposition panel (chairman: Manuel Pavón Mayo; 1st examiner: Ali Hijazi; 2nd examiner: Thomas Agerbaek) chose a very well-structured and logical approach today that I really liked. They adopted Dr. Lippich's suggestion to start with claim construction (especially the pivotal term, "offset") so as not to put the cart before the horse (in the U.S., that's just normal; in Europe, it unfortunately isn't, but I hope it will be at some point); just before the lunch break, they determined that the patent was invalid as granted; thereafter, Qualcomm (whose lead counsel is generally very successful with claim amendments as I've seen on other occasions) brought what they call an "auxiliary request," which is an amended claim; Apple and Intel's first attack on the validity of the amended (narrowed) claim failed, but the second one, based on a different closest prior art reference, succeeded after extremely thorough analysis with a lot of back and forth and several breaks that were required to arrive at this well-considered decision (which I therefore believe stands an excellent chance of affirmance).

I also wish to thank the EPO's press office for their support, despite the fact that there were times when I was an enemy of the EPOnia state, though I have for several years now refrained from commenting on their internal matters. Today a highly competent and dedicated panel did some world-class work.

Finally, I'd like to get back to Judge Koh's ruling. On page 104, she also addressed this problem of Qualcomm using non-standard-essential patents such as EP'461 against Intel-powered Apple devices in order to bring Apple back into the Qualcomm fold:

"Once Apple started purchasing modem chips from Intel, Apple challenged Qualcomm’s royalty rates, as Tony Blevins (Apple Vice President of Procurement) testified at trial: 'There are court proceedings where we’re trying to establish what is a FRAND rate for royalty.' [...] In response, according to Blevins, Qualcomm sought patent injunctions around the world against Apple’s handsets: '[T]hey had filed injunctions against Apple and lawsuits on non-SEPs, again, to improve their position . . . on the SEPs.' [...]"

I remember, from watching the San Jose trial in January, how counsel for Qualcomm tried to get an FTC witness to say that Qualcomm's royalty demands would be validated by Qualcomm being able to shut Apple out of a major market like Germany. So much for that one.

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