Showing posts with label Standard-Essential Patents. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standard-Essential Patents. Show all posts

Friday, April 16, 2021

DOJ downgrades Delrahim letter to IEEE on standard-essential patents: inter-agency rapprochement with FTC on SEP enforcement?

The language of diplomacy and other governmental communications is very nuanced, like the British Queen's spokespersons saying she's "not amused" when she's actually outraged. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ-ATR") has taken this concept to a higher level. In what could be described as a digital form of body language, the Biden Administration's DOJ has unequivocally dissociated itself from the Trump Administration's position on standard-essential patent (SEP) enforcement without saying or writing a single word: just by relegating a link to a document (with the PDF remaining in the same place as before) to a long list of links that is, for the most part, merely an archive. Parts of that archive are little more than the dustbin of DOJ-ATR history.

Look at it this way: if a colleague of yours had a picture of her sweetheart on his desk, but all of a sudden decided to put it into a dark storage room, wouldn't that tell you something?

On September 10, 2020, less than two months before the election Donald Trump lost, Qualcomm-aligned Antitrust Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim tried to use his remaining time in office--he was going to leave anyway, and he knew what the polls said--tried to deal one final blow to net licensees of SEPs. He supplemented, updated, and appended the DOJ-ATR's 2015 Business Review Letter (BRL) to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). An IEEE standard all of us use in our everyday lives is WiFi (IEEE 802.11). IEEE has been a strategically important forum at the forefront of how standard-setting organizations could set more specific rules governing SEP enforcement than, for example, ETSI, whose FRAND pledges (which must be interpreted under French law wherever in the world they are enforced) come with a lack of clarity that is fully intended (though some interpretations are still clearly less reasonable than others).

Mr. Delrahim's BRL 2.0 was meant to make the IEEE change course by giving companies like Qualcomm--which in all fairness is a tremendous WiFi innovator--ammunition for IEEE-internal discussions. Qualcomm executives publicly predicted on various occasions that the IEEE was going to make its rules more patentee-friendly under pressure from the federal government. Last month, MLex's Khushita Vasant reported on a recent clash between Qualcomm, Apple, Huawei, and other companies at an IEEE patent policy meeting. It was a clash between the progressives like Apple--who wanted to continue on the path of setting implementer-friendly rules--and those seeking a revision, led by Qualcomm.

What I mentioned at the start of this post obviously doesn't apply to the Trump Administration. Mr. Delrahim's letter to IEEE suggested that the Obama Administration's 2015 BRL to IEEE had been misinterpreted. But Mr. Delrahim also disparaged his predecessor's work by claiming that "[t]he Department's assessment in 2015 of the 'direction' of U.S. law interpreting FRAND commitments on royalty rates and damages assessments was not well-supported and has not proven accurate."

In late March, I was wondering whether the DOJ and the FTC would continue to fundamentally disagree on the application of antitrust law to SEP abuse, given that the FTC didn't seek a Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's FTC v. Qualcomm ruling and mentioned its coordination with the DOJ. But that was just a question, not speculation. Also, the Solicitor General would have had to represent the FTC before the Supreme court, not DOJ-ATR.

Apparently, the Biden Administration is inclined to undo at least some of Mr. Delrahim's SEP policy initiatives. The full extent will become clearer with time. But it's already certain that change has come to DOJ-ATR.

Currently, DOJ-ATR is being run by Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard Powers. Just like we've recently seen quadruple-antisuit injunctions, which I abbreviate as A4SIs and others as AAAASIs, Mr. Powers has a quadruple-A title: he's the Antitrust Acting Assistant Attorney General. What an alphabet soup.

Mr. Powers could have done his own "update" to the 2020 Delrahim letter. That update could simply have stated that the 2020 letter was an aberration, and the 2015 letter was in full force and effect again. But doing so would have required a communication style closer to that of the Trump Administration.

That's where the hierarchical structure of the DOJ-ATR website came in handy. There's one section where one can find the currently valid BRLs. From that one, Mr. Delrahim's letter has been silently removed. His letter to the Avanci patent pool is still there, and it remains to be seen what--if anything--will change in that context. But the 2020 IEEE letter is no longer there. The 2015 BRL to IEEE can still be found on that page. That makes it the one that currently counts.

The original and now-restored BRL tends to strengthen those favoring component-level SEP licensing.

The Delrahim letter to IEEE is now on the page listing "comments to state and other organizations". That page is hidden deep down in the hierarchical structure of the DOJ-ATR website. The dark storage room I mentioned further above.

This move has been clearly interpreted by the tech industry. Cisco's Senior Director, Antitrust and Competition, Gil Ohana, replied to a tweet of mine that this marked the "end of an error":

A nice wordplay. Few people in California would refer to the Trump years as an "era" not only because #45's reelection bid failed but also for substantive reasons.

But let's also be realistic that there'll be a lof of wrangling over SEP issue now. The downgrade of the Delrahim letter to IEEE is a significant first step.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

Fortress-funded VoiceAge suing Apple, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, HMD in Munich over standard-essential patents: next hearing scheduled for April 28 (Apple)

Intel is currently defending itself against another case brought by a Fortress-funded non-practicing entity (NPE) in the Western District of Texas, and last month the chipset maker filed a second amended antitrust complaint against Fortress in the Northern District of California. There's one particular Fortress entity that brought (literally) dozens of patent infringement complaints against Apple: Uniloc, whose former CEO is now running WSOU (doing business as Brazos), an entity that brought about 200 patent lawsuits last year in the U.S. alone (plus an unknown but likely staggering number in other jurisdictions). Whatever policy positions I've expressed on the NPE business model doesn't prevent me from recognizing that Fortress Investment has financed a number of different NPEs, and they aren't all like Uniloc.

I've done some research on NPE activity in Germany, and found out that VoiceAge EVS--which has offices in Newport Beach as well as Ratingen (near Dusseldorf)--is a big fan of the Munich I Regional Court (Landgericht München I). Munich has become the best forum choice for patent plaintiffs seeking injunctions.

The patents VoiceAge is asserting in Munich are

  • EP2102619 on a "method and device for coding transition frames in speech signals" and

  • EP3132443 on "methods, encoder and decoder for predictive encoding and decoding of sound signals upon transition between frames having different sampling rates."

Both have been declared essential to 3GPP TS (technical specification) 26.445, Codec for Enhanced Voice Services (EVS) (thus the "EVS" at the end of VoiceAge's company name).

Last June, the Munich court held an early first hearing in two cases (case nos. 7 O 14091/19 and 7 O 15350/19) against HMD, a company that makes phones with a Nokia trademark license (but is otherwise independent from Nokia). Rumor in the German patent litigation community has it that it went pretty well for VoiceAge. The second hearing--the actual trial--will be held on June 24. HMD has raised a FRAND defense.

On the same day, the court's 7th Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Matthias Zigann) will also hear VoiceAge's cases over the same patents against Apple, Lenovo, and Motorola Mobility (which Lenovo acquired from Google). The case numbers are 7 O 8369/20, 7 O 11111/20, 7 O 7366/20, 7 O 8367/20, 7 O 10318/20, and 7 O 8368/20).

The court's 21st Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Tobias Pichlmaier) scheduled an early first hearing in a VoiceAge v. Apple case (case no. 21 O 13503/20). It remains to be seen whether that hearing can be held. The Munich court postponed at least one other case scheduled for the week before that VoiceAge hearing (as you might have guessed, due to the pandemic). Whether it is responsible to go forward with patent hearings and trials depends on a number of factors. I'm far more concerned about automotive patent cases like Nokia v. Daimler, as they typically involve numerous suppliers and really have the potential to become superspreader events. If the room is large enough, ventilation is ensured, and people have to wear N95 masks, a hearing like VoiceAge EVS v. Apple might be possible.

Wildanger represents VoiceAge in Germany (see Juve Patent). I heard that Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer represents Apple (Freshfields is Apple's go-to patent litigation firm in Germany).

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Samsung replies to Ericsson's response to its Federal Circuit anti-antisuit injunction appeal only three days after amicus curiae briefs

The lawyers representing Samsung in the U.S. part of its patent dispute with Ericsson must have had a very busy weekend. On Friday, five amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of Ericsson's responsive brief, one of which was a joint filing by Senator Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel, and the Trump Administration's USPTO Director Andrei Iancu. But around mignight Eastern Time on Monday, Samsung already filed its reply brief (this post continues below the document):

21-04-12 Samsung Reply Brief by Florian Mueller

Other than sharpy disagreeing with a couple of aspects of one amicus brief, I have yet to comment on the merits of Ericsson's and its amici's arguments. Antisuit injunctions are one of my favorite topics, and I've been invited by one of the world's leading political institutions to speak about that topic next month (can't announce the details yet, but will do so on this blog well ahead of the event). I fully intend to share my opinions sooner or later, but I've been largely nonjudgmental so far and may need a few more weeks to reflect.

The preliminary injunction that Samsung is appealing here is a narrowed version of a temporary restraining order. I considered parts of the TRO completely out of line, a position that Judge Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas validated by denying the related parts of Ericsson's PI motion.

The remaining questions are not that clear-cut. I've recently spoken with two U.S. lawyers whose positions on standard-essential patent (SEP) enforcement I consider to be pretty balanced. They've made some points that I need to think about, and they relate to situations in which antisuit injunctions from other jurisdictions (not necessarily China) could disadvantage net licensees (like Samsung) even though in this case, a net licensor (Ericsson) obtained the anti-antisuit injunction at issue. And it's interesting that only one company has filed an amicus brief: InterDigital supports Ericsson, but InterDigital may have nothing to lose in China and is presently embroiled in litigation with Xiaomi, which obtained an antisuit injunction like the one Samsung got against Ericsson. Other companies and their industry bodies prefer not to alienate any particular jurisdiction, at least for the time being, and/or they're afraid of situations in which the shoe will be on the other foot and whatever they'd say now would be held against them.

What makes the situation so complicated is that in one way, China and the U.S. have something in common (a multifactorial antisuit injunction framework, which a jurisdiction like Germany lacks (and in my view should develop)--but at the same time, there's an asymmetry because Chinese courts are prepared to determine global FRAND rates even without the non-moving party's consent, while U.S. courts will make decisions on foreign patents only if both parties agree (and even in at least one such case that I heard of, a U.S. court has declined to do so). The root cause of the whole multi-antisuit mess is territorial overreach, particularly the UK Supreme Court's Unwired Planet ruling and the similar practice by German courts (allowing the enforcement of injunctions unless the defendant takes a global portfolio license). If you wish to share your thoughts on this, please contact me, and I'll be sure to keep your input confidential.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Monday, April 12, 2021

European Court of Justice assigned case numbers to preliminary references in Nokia v. Daimler and Phoenix Contact v. Harting patent cases

In November, the Dusseldorf Regional Court decided to refer to the European Court of Justice certain questions of component-level licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) as well as questions regarding the application of the Huawei v. ZTE SEP injunction framework. In February, Nokia withdrew its interlocutory appeal of that order.

In January, the Munich I Regional Court's 21st Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Tobias Pichlmaier) identified a different patent-related question that it would like the top EU court to answer. The Munich court, which is clearly the most popular patent injunction venue in the world by now, would like to enjoy broader discretion in preliminary injunction decisions than its appeals court (which decides patent PI cases consistently with the appeals courts in Dusseldorf and Karlsruhe) allows. I translated that order.

Both preliminary references have been assigned case numbers by the CJEU:

  • C-44/21 for the preliminary injunction matter (Phoenix Contact v. Harting, Munich case no. 21 O 16782/20), and

  • C-182/21 for the SEP case (Nokia v. Daimler, Dusseldorf case no. 4c O 17/19).

It may seem counterintuitive that the earlier preliminary reference (the one from Dusseldorf) has a significantly higher case number than the later-filed one (the one from Munich). I've asked the Dusseldorf Regional Court's press office, and that court actually sent the preliminary reference to Luxembourg on November 26, 2020--about two months before the Munich court's preliminary reference. But apparently the CJEU, in an effort to avoid a potential waste of time, firstly awaited what would come out of Nokia's interlocutory appeal.

From what I heard, the translations in the automotive case will be sent to the governments of the EU member states and the parties later this month, with a likely deadline for the European Commission's, the EU Member States' and the parties' observation in early to mid August. I have not been able to find out about the timeline in the preliminary injunction case.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Saturday, April 10, 2021

Amicus briefs in support of Ericsson against Samsung by Sen. Tillis, former Fed. Cir. CJ Michel, former USPTO Director Iancu, InterDigital, NYIPLA, and 13 professors

After former NIST Director Dr. Copan (whose amicus brief I criticized harshly), some other "friends of the court" have made filings in support of Ericsson against Samsung. Other than noting that there are multiple references in those filings to Munich antisuit case law, I don't intend to comment right now and will just publish those documents below.

Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel, and former USPTO Director (now again a partner at Irell & Manella) Andrei Iancu:

21-04-09 Tillis Michel Ianc... by Florian Mueller

Professors Jonathan Barnett, Daniel R. Cahoy, Ronald A. Cass, James Gerard Conley, Richard A. Epstein, Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, Bowman Heiden, Adam J. MacLeod, Adam Mossoff, Lateef Mtima, David Orozco, and Kristen Osenga:

21-04-09 Professors' Am... by Florian Mueller

New York Intellectual Property Law Association (NYIPLA):

21-04-09 NYIPLA Amicus Brief by Florian Mueller

Patent licensing firm InterDigital:

21-04-09 InterDigital Amicu... by Florian Mueller

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Sunday, April 4, 2021

Pursuit or threat of antisuit injunction gives rise to strong presumption of implementer's unwillingness to take FRAND license: Munich I Regional Court

This is a follow-up to yesterday's post, which mentioned that Ericsson is peddling Munich case law on antisuit injunctions in a U.S. appeals court, but even more so to my March 10 post on the recent quadruple-antisuit injunction in InterDigital v. Xiaomi, a judgment in which the Landgericht München I (Munich I Regional Court) laid out a rather inclusive list of criteria entitling standard-essential patent (SEP) holders to A2SIs and A4SIs in Munich (for the AxSI notation, see an earlier post).

The part of the InterDigital v. Xiaomi decision that has the industry even more concerned than the wide availability of (even pre-emptive) A2SIs and A4SIs is a dictum by the Seventh Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Matthias Zigann) according to which someone moving for an ASI or threatening to do so may effectively lose their FRAND defense in Munich. As I've reported in connection with other cases, German SEP case law took a negative turn last year with Sisvel v. Haier, which the Federal Court of Justice reinforced a few months later in Sisvel v. Haier II. At least in Munich and Mannheim (both patent litigation divisions in either case), the Huawei v. ZTE FRAND analysis is practically limited to the question of whether the implementer (i.e., the alleged infringer) is a willing licensee. Practically, that hurdle is presently insurmountable in Munich, and the only safe harbor in Mannheim is an Art. 315 offer, i.e., a binding offer to take a license on FRAND terms subject to judicial determination if the parties can't agree. Thankfully, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court's patent litigation division under Presiding Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German) overruled the Mannheim court in that regard.

The second part of the Dusseldorf Regional Court's preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice in Nokia v. Daimler could restore the status quo ante, under which an implementer merely had to express a general willingness to take a license in order to obligate the SEP holder to make a FRAND-compliant offer (which in my view was the correct application of Huawei v. ZTE). There is no guarantee, however, that the second part will be reached in Nokia v. Daimler.

Let's assume that the characterization of licensees as "unwilling" will be the norm in Munich until either the CJEU or the Munich Higher Regional Court (which may very well restore the Art. 315 safe harbor) bring about change. And that's why the unwillingness part of the Huawei v. ZTE analysis will be immensely important at least in the near term. Here's a passage on the bearing the pursuit or threat of an antisuit injunction has on the (un)willingness analysis--first in German, then my unofficial translation:

"Wenn aber diese Patentbenutzer wirklich lizenzwillig sind, so werden sie sich weiterer, über die bereits begangenen und andauernden Benutzungshandlungen hinausgehenden rechtswidriger Eingriffe in die eigentumsähnlich geschützten Rechtspositionen der Patentinhaber enthalten. Oder anders ausgedrückt, ein Patentbenutzer, der einen Antrag auf Erlass einer ASI stellt oder dies androht, kann in der Regel nicht als hinreichend lizenzwillig im Sinne der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union und des Bundesgerichtshofs (vgl. EuGH GRUR 2015, 764-Huawei v. ZTE; BGH GRUR 2020, 961 - FRAND-Einwand; Urteil vom 24.11.2020 - KRZ 35/17 - FRAND-Einwand II; z.B. LG München I GRUR-RS 2020, 22577; 21 O 13026/19 bei juris) angesehen werden. Mithin kann von dem Patentbenutzer auch gefordert werden, dass er nach Erhalt des Verletzungshinweises nicht nur seine qualifizierte Lizenzbereitschaft erklärt, sondern auch, dass er keine ASI beantragen wird."

Unofficial translation:

"But if implementers are truly willing licensees, they will refrain from further violations of the property-like rights of SEP holders beyond the committed and ongoing use [of the patented inventions]. Or, to put it differently, a patent infringer bringing or threatening with a motion for an ASI can generally not be considered a sufficiently willing licensee within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Unoin and the Federal Court of Justice (cf. Huawei v. ZTE, Sisvel v. Haier, and Sisvel v. Haier II; e.g., [citing to a Munich decision]. Therefore, one can expect the implementer not only to respond to the infringement notice by declaring a willingness to take a license, but also to refrain from seeking an ASI."

The wording doesn't make it 100% certain that the pursuit of, or a threat with, an ASI renders an implementer an unwilling licensee. The expression "in der Regel" (meaning "generally" or "normally") leaves room for exceptions. However, the ruling does not indicate under what circumstances the Munich court would make an exception. Unless the regional appeals court revives the Art. 315 safe harbor, it may be practically impossible to be deemed a willing licensee after moving for, or threatening with, an ASI.

While I totally understand the companies who are profoundly concerned about this situation, it's a logical consequence of the German zero-deference approach to antisuit injunctions vis-à-vis courts in countries that are not EU member states. Furthermore, it's consistent with the Munich court's strategy to create a Nash-like equilibrium in which parties would be discouraged from pursuing foreign ASIs against German patent injunctions in the first place. The judges in Munich seek to make it a losing strategy to try this at all. However, there is a risk of escalating contempt sanctions. We need to find another way out of the current mess. German courts aren't peacemakers in the antisuit context: they're part of the problem themselves by requiring implementers to take a global portfolio license (in order to avoid an injunction) as opposed to limiting their jurisdiction to German patents--and by offering pre-emptive A2SIs and A4SIs, which gives the Munich court a "unique (forum-)selling proposition" in marketing lingo, but may lead courts in other countries to look for new ways to protect their own jurisdiction.

The antisuit situation continues to spiral out of control on at least three continents, and I'll keep watching it. This blog has been commenting on antisuit injunctions since Judge Robart's Microsoft v. Motorola ASI (affirmed by the Ninth Circuit), which in my opinion is still the best SEP-related ASI ever.

Finally, I'd like to highlight an academic paper on antisuit injunctions that provides a useful overview of key decisions in different jurisdictions, and discusses some of the issues arising from the proliferation of that type enjoinder: The Use and Abuse of Anti-suit Injunctions in SEP Litigation: Is There a Way Forward? by Professor Damien Geradin and Dimitrios Katsifis.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Saturday, April 3, 2021

In response to Samsung's Federal Circuit appeal, Ericsson points to Munich anti-antisuit case law

On February 22, Samsung filed the opening brief in its Federal Circuit appeal of Ericsson's anti-antisuit injunction from the Eastern District of Texas. Yesterday, Ericsson responded (this post continues below the document):

21-04-02 Ericsson Response ... by Florian Mueller

Those 80 pages from Ericsson are probably just the tip of the iceberg. Come Friday, the Federal Circuit may very well be inundated with amicus curiae briefs in support of Ericsson's position, as there will be no shortage of U.S. companies and academics with an interest in maximizing the number of patent lawsuits brought in the U.S., including in the Eastern District of Texas, which has lately been eclipsed by the Western District.

I believe it makes more sense to go into detail when not only Ericsson's brief but also the anticipated slew of amicus briefs are on the table. But I wanted to be of service and make the document available immediately.

Just a couple of observations:

  • Ericsson definitely likes the Munich case law on anti-antisuit injunctions:

    "Courts worldwide recognize the legitimacy of defensive injunctions against foreign efforts to restrict domestic relief. Appx1116; see, e.g., Nokia v. Continental, Oberlandesgericht München [Munich Higher Regional Court], Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19 (Ger.), translation at 8 (Appx1858-1867) (granting anti-interference injunction 'as a defense against' interference with enforcement of German 'patent rights in Germany').

    "See also InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Commc’ns Co., Landgericht München [Munich Regional Court I], Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20 (Ger.), translation at 39 (Appx1868-1922) (confirming anti-interference injunction to ensure patentee is not 'deprived of his right[s]' to 'enforcement'); [...]"

    Unlike the U.S. framework for antisuit injunctions, however, German courts afford literally zero deference to courts outside the EU.

  • Ericsson argues that Judge Gilstrap's misconception (believing that Samsung was seeking an ITC import ban against Ericsson over its own SEPs, when in reality those ITC complaints involved only non-SEPs on both sides) doesn't matter because Samsung could still do so and, in any event, "Samsung has attacked Ericsson 4G and 5G SEPs through IPRs in the U.S., see Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, IPR Nos. 2021-487, -447, -446, -486 (Jan. 29, 2021), -730 (Mar. 26, 2021)."

    Challenging the validity of another party's patents couldn't be much further from seeking an import ban over one's own patents...

    Less than 24 hours before Ericsson filed its response brief with the Federal Circuit, IAM (Intellectual Asset Management) wrote about "the extent of the assault Samsung has launched at the PTAB against Ericsson as the Korean company pursues a strategy that few can afford." Interestingly, the Unified Patents report IAM cites to notes that Samsung "is the most prolific PTAB filer (49 filings) and at the same time are the most targeted defendant in patent litigation (19 cases as first-named defendant)," while "Ericsson was the most attacked patent owner at the PTAB with 30 petitions filed against them." The passage I just quoted from Ericsson's response brief merely lists a handful of Samsung v. Ericsson IPR petitions targeting SEPs. This means that only about 10% of Samsung's IPR petitions in the first quarter relate to Ericsson SEPs, and only one in six IPR petitions against Ericsson was brought by Samsung over a SEP. All in all, Unified Patents lists 30 Samsung v. Ericsson IPR petitions, most of them relating to non-SEPs. This just a consequence of Ericsson, a notoriously aggressive enforcer, having elected to sue Samsung over a large number of patents.

    The "strategy that few can afford" (bringing many IPR petitions) presupposes a patent holder asserting many patents, which is also a "strategy that few can afford." It's also an indication of how far apart the parties' positions on a reasonable license fee must be: otherwise Ericsson wouldn't be suing so aggressively, and Samsung would consider it cheaper to accept Ericsson's terms than to litigate in multiple jurisdictions in parallel.

There would be a lot more to say about Ericsson's filing, but for the reason stated above (I predict an avalanche of amicus briefs on Friday), I'd like to leave it at that for now.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Tuesday, March 30, 2021

Will the FTC/DOJ divide over antitrust enforcement against standard-essential patent abuse persist under President Biden?

Yesterday, the Federal Trade Commission's Acting Chairwoman Rebecca Kelly Slaughter issued a statement on the fact that the FTC did not file a petition for writ of certiorari (Supreme Court review) in the Qualcomm case. On the decision itself I had already commented a few days ago, with a particular emphasis on the fact that Qualcomm's lawyers are now representing Epic Games against Apple and Google.

The FTC's press release is now the first high-profile statement by a federal government agency on standard-essential patent (SEP) matters since President Biden took office, deserving a closer look.

I totally agree with Mrs. Slaughter that the agency's "staff did an exceptional job presenting the case" at the trial stage. And it's a good thing to give Judge Lucy H. Koh credit. It obviously looks strange that the trial court agreed with the FTC all the way (except for a duty-to-deal theory that the FTC didn't defend on appeal) while the appeals court reversed everything it could and vacated the remainder (the FRAND contract interpretation) as moot. Judge Koh deserved better. The Trump presidency was really bad for her. She had already been nominated to the Ninth Circuit, but her confirmation got derailed by the 2016 presidential election. And then the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, under Trump appointee Antitrust Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, fought hard against her ruling--and against the FTC.

It's often easy to be wise after the event, but if there's only one aspect of trial management that Judge Koh could have done better in retrospect, it's that she could have allocated more time to a discussion of the law with counsel. This was a complex case with multiple claims and theories. After all the witnesses had been heard, some more extensive back-and-forth between judge and counsel, partly in writing perhaps, might have helped to reach more solid conclusions--maybe the same result in the end, even on the duty to deal (for a component-level license), but on a more appeals-proof basis. Instead, the parties were basically just viewed as delivery boys: they had to present the facts, but the judge thought she knew all about the law. Then, I also sometimes disagreed with Judge Koh in the Apple-Samsung context (as did the appeals court, the Fedreal Circuit in that case), but all in all she is and remains an impressive judge especially on technology industry issues.

The FTC's Acting Chairwoman didn't concede the battle to Qualcomm without a stern warning to SEP abusers:

"I am particularly concerned about the potential for anticompetitive or unfair behavior in the context of standard setting and the FTC will closely monitor conduct in this arena."

Maybe the automotive SEP licensing and enforcement context would provide the FTC with another bite at the apple that is called component-level licensing. Tesla has apparently just been coerced into an Avanci license. Obviously, Tesla itself would find it hard to enforce the antitrust laws against those who sued it over patents, after just signing a settlement agreement. But the FTC could step in and investigate what happened, and possibly take action. If the FTC won, the Avanci-Tesla agreement might be annulled. Tesla wouldn't have to violate any enforceable agreement because it would simply have a legal obligation to answer the FTC's questions.

In the automotive context, SEP holders can't argue that the industry they're dealing with has traditionally taken licenses at the end-product level. The opposite is the case. And it's a multi-tier supply chain: baseband chips get incorporated into network access devices, which in turn are incorporated into telematics control units, and the TCUs are finally built into cars.

Addressing the component-level licensing issue in the SEP context would help not only Tesla but also other U.S. car makers such as Ford and GM. And, by extension, it would benefit Apple.

But there is a significant roadblock: under the aforementioned Mr. Delrahim, the DOJ cleared Avanci's business model by means of a non-binding business review letter.

That roadblock isn't insurmountable, and as a side effect of helping Tesla, GM, Ford, Apple and especially consumers, a victory over a licensing model designed to coerce OEMs into end-product-level SEP license agreements would be the best way to dedelrahimize U.S. SEP policy.

But what about the Biden DOJ? That question already came up in my podcast a couple of months ago, where I asked DC-based antitrust attorney Jay Jurata of Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe for his thoughts on how U.S. SEP policy might evolve after the transition of power.

Mrs. Kelly Slaughter's statement starts by acknowledging "the significant headwinds facing the Commission in this matter." That passage may or may not hint at a continuing FTC-DOJ divide over this case.

My most optimistic scenario would be that the "new" DOJ will pick up where the Obama Administration left off in terms of SEPs, and the same would ideally happen at the USPTO as well, in which case we could soon return to a better SEP licensing and enforcement framework. In that case, the term "headwinds" might have been limited to the fact that the outcome before the Ninth Circuit was obviously disappointing for the FTC and Qualcomm (through its allies) had succeeded in portraying FTC v. Qualcomm as an Obama case, which wouldn't help when you face a Supreme Court with a 6-3 conservative majority.

A moderately optimistic scenario would be that the FTC talked to the DOJ, as the Solicitor General (the second highest-ranking DOJ official) would represent it before the Supreme Court, and the DOJ discouraged a cert petition not because it still shared Delrahim's positions but because it genuinely believed that chances were slim (such as for the "Obama case" reason I just mentioned, and/or because of the significant challenge that it would have been to come up with a couple of good questions for review).

The pessimistic scenario is that DOJ-ATR and FTC are still far apart on the issue.

It won't take long before we find out. For example, if DOJ-ATR again supported Fortress Investment against Apple and Intel (who recently brought a second amended complaint, with Mr. Delrahim having played a key role in enabling Fortress to get earlier versions dismissed), then there would clearly be the same divide as before.

As an app developer, I'm personally most interested in the FTC and the DOJ combating the abuse of mobile app store monopolies. The decision to abandon the Qualcomm case freed up agency resources.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Saturday, March 27, 2021

FTC apparently decided not to seek Supreme Court review of Ninth Circuit ruling in Qualcomm's favor

In October, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc by the United States Federal Trade Commission in its Qualcomm case. The FTC could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, but it was already reported a couple of weeks ago that this probably wouldn't happen. That's what the Wall Street Journal learned at the time.

Tech industry analyst Prakash Sangam, whom I saw at the FTC v. Qualcomm (San Jose, January 2019) and Apple v. Qualcomm (San Diego, April 2019) trials, kept an eye on developments and tweeted the following a few hours ago:

A different source had told me that the deadline would be March 27, i.e., Saturday, and I haven't been able to verify whether a cert petition deadline falling on a weekend would automatically be extended to Monday. I trust Mr. Sangam had checked on this before he tweeted.

Assuming that Qualcomm's acquittal is now definitive, just a few comments:

  1. With respect to component-level licensing of SEPs, Judge Lucy H. Koh's contract interpretation stands as persuasive authority if anyone else claims rights under Qualcomm's or other parties' FRAND pledges to ATIS and TIA.

  2. I'd have liked the case to establish an antitrust duty to deal to the effect of exhaustive component-ölevel SEP licenses, but the FTC's own theory on appeal was just about an alleged antitrust violation based on a breach of contract. Only a successful attempt to shoehorn this duty to deal into the Aspen Skiing doctrine would have helped. Judge Koh tried, and it was worth trying, but Qualcomm had very strong legal arguments on appeal, unlike the FTC and its amici.

  3. In an alternative universe where the appellate judges had listened to all the trial testimony, the outcome might have been different.

  4. For Apple and Intel's antitrust complaint against NPE conglomerate Fortress Investment, the primary challenge is going to be to distinguish that case from Qualcomm, which is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit at this stage.

  5. There will also be other patent-related antitrust matters with respect to which it will be key to mitigate the damage former U.S. Antitrust Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim dealt to those complaining about anticompetitive patent-related business models.

  6. The UK class action lawsuit against Qualcomm over the same business model can't really be distinguished, so the argument there will focus on a different jurisdiction with different statutes (UK antitrust law is still essentially EU antitrust law, though it will diverge with time) and different case law.

  7. Apple itself will try to get as much mileage out of this outcome in its defense against Epic Games' and some class action plaintiffs' U.S. antitrust lawsuits over the App Store. But only because the App Store, like everything in tech, has some connection with IP doesn't mean it's beyond reach for antitrust law. I actually think Epic's lawyers, some of whom represented Qualcomm by the way, are in a perfect position to distinguish the cases, and the differences are really structural.

  8. Epic can actually take courage in the fact that those Cravath lawyers have previously proven, in such a high-profile antitrust case, that they know how to play and win the long game. In one or more of my comments on the January 2019 FTC v. Qualcomm I already noted that Qualcomm's lawyers had at some point appeared to look past the trial, which they probably knew they were going to lose, and on to the appeals court, where they teamed up with another firm and rocked the boat. Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, who is presiding over the Epic case, stressed in the summer that the case could go either way, and while she has more of a track record of letting Apple off the hook (Pepper, and now probably also Pistacchio), I don't think Epic will have to go into that trial based on the assumption that it's all merely about preserving arguments for an appeal. But what I'm absolutely sure of is that Epic will proceed very foresightfully. Unless lawmakers open the App Store, it will ultimately be up to the Supreme Court--and in that case the deadline for a cert petition, whoever has to bring it (Epic or Apple), won't just pass without a filing.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Wednesday, March 24, 2021

Component-level licensing of standard-essential patents most controversial subtopic of European Commission webinar on FRAND licensing and valuation

The conflict between monetization-focused standard-essential patent (SEP) holders and implementers (the latterg group also including major SEP holders who are nevertheless primarily interested in making products) appears to be everlasting. At times it even looks like both sides are ever more deeply entrenched. But at least they're still talking to each other, and not just about each other.

Yesterday the IP policy unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) held a webinar on "FRAND licensing & valuation" with a very balanced roster of high-profile speakers and a sizable worldwide audience. The webinar took place via Microsoft Teams and was moderated by DG GROW official Elena Kostadinova, who might have been a TV news anchor in a former life.

You can find the detailed agenda on this webpage. If time permitted, I could have done a post on each of the three parts.

A survey by the Commission crystallized what SEP holders and implementers are primarily interested in. Among implementers, "license to all" was by far the most popular subject. I know I'm a bit difficult to please with terminology, and in my recent commentary on the SEP Expert Group report I explained why I oppose the terms "access for all"/"license to all" as "access for all" paints too rosy a picture while "license to all" sounds like built-in redundancy (though it's actually about giving the implementing side the choice of the level at which to take a license). But I recognize I'm the only one out there to criticize those terms, so to my dismay they're here to stay.

The component-level licensing panel--the third and final part of yesterday's webinar--was indeed the one where the different views of the two camps became clearest, not only in the webinar itself but also in the parallel Q&A chat.

Professor Damien Geradin, founder of the Geradin Partners antitrust boutique, acknowledged that both sides of the debate make interesting arguments. In his experience, "most reasonable people" agree that license agreements shouldn't be concluded at multiple levels of a given supply chain--but there are divergent views on which level it should be.

Qualcomm licensing chief Alex Rogers accused those advocating the smallest salable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) as the royalty base of just seeking to "devalue technology" with the effect of "disincentivizing from doing this extraordinarily important research" that enables a $4.8 trillion value of all cellular technology worldwide, while SEP royalties are on the order of just $8-13B.

His concern was well-stated, but not well-founded in my opinion. The problem is that the multi-trillion-dollar value he referred to involves gigantic investments of various sorts, and everyone else could also point to that total value and complain about being undercompensated. I'm not worried about Qualcomm or other major SEP holders laying off talented engineers anytime soon.

Bird & Bird partner Richard Vary, formerly Nokia's litigation chief and now its outside counsel in connection with automotive SEP licensing matters, equated the concept of patent exhaustion with a "windfall" for downstream members of a supply chain. In my view, the opposite is true: the reason courts around the globe adopted patent exhaustion was to avoid "double dipping"--in other words, an ill-gotten windfall for patent holders. Mr. Vary is extremely knowledgeable and persuasive, but I don't agree with his agenda in the SEP licensing context. I'll give you another example in a moment.

Marianne Frydenlund of Nordic Semiconductor discussed SEP licensing from her company's perspective, and Nordic Semi is pretty successful, but nowhere near as large as Qualcomm.

Munich University of Technology professor Joachim Henkel explained from an economic perspective why small and medium-sized IoT companies are not really equipped to deal with SEP licensing at the level of their own end products--and better off if their suppliers take care of it. Professor Henkel just published a paper on this subject, and yesterday's presentation was like a summary of that paper.

It's unfortunate that some major SEP holders just don't care about the collateral damage those IoT startups suffer from a refusal to license component makers and from the practice of privateering (providing patents to trolls, which no one does on a larger scale than Nokia and Ericsson, and some of the trolls they feed then shake down every implementer they find even some very small companies). Mr. Vary, whose opinions in this context are materially consistent with--or even 100% identical to--Nokia's, was dismissive of those concerns over IoT startups' ability to deal with the SEP licensing challenge. However, when small organizations without much of a legal department receive demand letters listing hundreds of declared-essential patents (the fewest of which are actually essential), that is a problem. Patent trolls taxing innovative startups is economically and politically undesirable.

This takes us full circle back to the official long-form name of the organizer of yesterday's conference: it's not DG Patent Monetization or DG SEP Overleveraging. It's the DG for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. It's unfortunate that IoT startups aren't even 1% as active in Brussels as Nokia or Ericsson. But I hope the Commission will take their concerns in mind when shaping its policies in this field, and when crafting its input to the European Court of Justice with respect to component-level licensing of SEPs.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Monday, March 22, 2021

Three fateful decisions will drive up Tesla's patent licensing costs: Avanci license, Austin factory, and German Gigafactory

I've criticized those old-fashioned German car makers on numerous occasions, and chances are there'll be more reasons further down the road. Now I can't help but offer the prediction that Tesla is going to far outspend, on a per-car basis, everyone else in the automotive industry, and that's because of three decisions its management took without fully considering the ramifications it has for future patent licensing negotiations and infringement disputes.

As the saying goes, you can't argue with success. But Tesla's market capitalization doesn't mean that the company doesn't make mistakes in its operational business that a company like Apple, with its far greater experience in--and more sophisticated and strategic approach to--patent licensing and litigation, would avoid. Tesla is going to pay hefty tuition fees before it will learn how to play this game like the pros in Cupertino.

Avanci license

As IAM (Intellectual Asset Management) reported, industry observers believe that the new Avanci licensee (whose name the patent pool firm behind Avanci, Marconi, hasn't disclosed yet) is none other than Elon Musk's electric vehicle maker.

What gives rise to this speculation is that several lawsuits by Avanci members against Tesla have recently been dismissed in different U.S. federal districts.

Last year, Tesla settled with Conversant (as IAM reported), which was suing Tesla in the Western District of Texas. Actually, Conversant appears willing to license automotive suppliers, as its settlement with Huawei shows. So Tesla should have insisted on Conversant extending a license to its component makers. Then, Conversant's patent portfolio is pretty old and weak, so it might just have appeared cost-efficient to take a direct license, just like Daimler thought when it settled with Sharp. Both settlements--Tesla/Conversant and Daimler/Sharp--unnecessarily endorsed the concept of licensing cellular SEPs at the level of a car. Just like I criticized Daimler's decision in no uncertain terms, I didn't like Tesla's deal with Conversant because of what it means for other automotive SEP disputes. But Daimler has, at least so far, declined to take an Avanci license. Tesla apparently has done just that, and that means it has opened a can of worms and will have to pay off countless patent trolls, but also major operating companies holding patents it infringes.

I've looked up a few U.S. dockets and been able to verify that apparently there are no more cases pending between Avanci members and Tesla. Here's an Optis Wireless v. Tesla stipulation of dismissal from the Eastern District of Texas (this post continues below the document):

21-02-26 Optis v. Tesla Sti... by Florian Mueller

The following screenshot shows a Sisvel v. Tesla dismissal, dated March 2, in the District of Delaware (click on the image to enlarge):

After taking an Avanci license, Tesla is not going to be able to credibly defend itself against other SEP holders by arguing that those patent holders should insteasd talk to Tesla's suppliers.

Austin factory and relocation to Texas

Earlier today I mentioned that the Western District of Texas is the world's #1 hotspot for patent damages, and that is so because companies with a presence there (as opposed to merely having resellers offer its products) can't just move patent cases out of that district under TC Heartland.

Texas is building an Austin factory and even plans to move its HQ to Texas. It's understandable in political terms, because even though I predict Texas will become a blue state in the not too distant future, Texas Democrats may be as centrist as California Republicans, at least in fiscal policy. However, the Western District of Texas effectively imposes a huge patent tax on business.

Gigafactory Berlin-Brandenburg

From a marketing point of view, it made a lot of sense for Tesla to build a "Gigafactory" in Germany. "Made in Germany" has always been, in no small part, about cars. It's a major market. And maybe Tesla hoped to generate political goodwill in the largest EU member state.

However, Germany is exactly the jurisdiction to which patent holders flock in pursuit of injunctions. The judicial district in which you're based there doesn't matter: there's no forcible venue transfer, thus no TC Heartland equivalent either. The problem is that a patent injunction in Germany will not only disrupt Tesla's sales in that particular market, but will force it to halt production in its Gigafactory. Also, Tesla wouldn't be able to circumvent an injunction by exporting the products it makes in Germany to other markets.

Tesla could have built a factory somewhere else in Europe. Just a little bit to the east of its Berlin-Brandenburg site there's Poland. In that jurisdiction it's likely that politicians would immediately take action and protect a major foreign investor against patent injunctions, should the Polish judiciary follow the German example. But in Germany there's no chance: even local players like Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW have failed (partly because their IP lobbying expertise is lacking and wanting) to persuade lawmakers to address the issue. As I explained in my most recent post on the subject, the proposed reform will not affect patent holders who make a licensing offer by the trial date. There won't be a proportionality analysis in such cases. And those are the cases Tesla will be dealing with.

The best cross-jurisdictional patent litigation strategy against Tesla will be to sue them for damages in the Western District of Texas and to seek an injunction in Germany. Maximum leverage.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Nokia's opportunistic patenting and forum-(s)hopping failed: Federal Patent Court invalidates patent asserted against Daimler

Even the best companies may lose a patent case. But there's a right way and a wrong way to do it. While it can always happen that a plaintiff acting in good faith overrates the strength of a patent or the merits of an infringement contention, some defeats come with a fishy smell--such as Nokia's latest defeat in Germany against Daimler and its suppliers.

Last Wednesday (March 17, 2021), the Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court of Germany) invalidated Nokia's EP1929826 on an "apparatus, method and computer program product to request a data rate increase based on ability to transmit at least one more selected data unit."

The title of that patent all by itself shows that it's a software patent--and should never have been granted under the European Patent Convention--, but other companies obtain and assert such patents as well, so the problem is EPO-related and not specific to Nokia. The former handset maker's conduct in connection with this patent is doubly troubling for other reasons:

  1. As I already reported in December, Nokia withdrew the related case (and another one) in Dusseldorf only to refile immediately in Munich. This practice goes beyond forum-shopping: some call it "forum-hopping." But the Munich case is not going to go forward anytime soon after last week's nullity decision.

  2. The ethically most problematic part is this: the Federal Patent Court's ruling was based on the claimed invention already having been in the relevant standard specifications as of the correct priority date. As a result, the court invalidated not only the patent in its granted form but also rejected all attempts by Nokia to salvage the patent by narrowing the claims. Nokia had originally claimed an earlier priority date, but the court held that there wasn't a legitimate claim to that earlier date.

    This suggests that Nokia tried to obtain a patent--a monopoly enabling it to tax the tech industry--over something it hadn't actually "invented" (in quotes because, seriously, what that patent describes doesn't deserve being called an invention even as per the priority date Nokia claimed).

    The practice of "opportunistic patenting" by participants in standard-setting processes is a known issue. Researches such as Rudi Bekkers have written about it and have shown that there's a conspicuous--or even suspicious--uptake in the filing of patent applications around ETSI meetings and other standardization-related events.

This EP'826 story is anything but conducive to Nokia's credibility.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Thursday, March 18, 2021

The French Connection: Thales is third industrial giant from France to intervene in Nokia v. Daimler standard-essential patent dispute

The Dusseldorf Regional Court's preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice asks the top EU court to opine on certain questions of antitrust law with respect to the availability of standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses to component makers. Daimler argues that Nokia actually owes its suppliers an exhaustive license that would, by extension, cover the Mercedes maker.

In late 2018, Daimler filed with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) a complaint over Nokia's refusal to license its suppliers. About two years ago, Nokia started a patent infringement litigation campaign against Daimler that has so far failed to give the former handset maker decisive leverage.

Daimler notified its tier 1 (direct) suppliers of those cases and the possibility of indemnification claims. Certain suppliers such as Peiker, a German subsidiary of a French company named Valeo, intervened (in support of defendant Daimler) early on. Last year it became known that even French automotive company Renault is technically a supplier to Daimler, by virtue of making a car for Daimler under a cooperation agreement. Renault may not have intervened in all Nokia v. Daimler cases, but in at least a couple of Munich lawsuits.

By now, Valeo and Renault are no longer the only two French companies to have skin in the Nokia v. Daimler game: I've recently found out that Thales, a French industrial giant with 80,000 employees, finally elected to intervene in the Dusseldorf case that gave rise to the ECJ referral. Almost two years after the filing of the complaint, Thales apparently didn't want to miss this opportunity to try to influence the proceedings in Europe's highest court.

Thales is not a direct supplier to Daimler, but a tier 2 supplier (one degree removed) through its customer TomTom. Similarly, Huawei is a tier 2 supplier through such telematics control unit (TCU) makers as Continental and Harman (a Samsung subsidiary).

With a belated filing on February 20, 2021, Thales--represented by Simmons & Simmons antitrust attorney Dr. Jens Steger--attempted to persuade the Dusseldorf court to refer a set of alternative or additional questions to Luxembourg. As far as I can see, the Dusseldorf court shows no signs of being inclined to do so. It will stick to its original set of questions.

In addition to unilateral-conduct issues under Art. 102 TFEU, Thales sought to raise a couple of cartel questions (Art. 101 TFEU):

  • In one of its proposed questions, Thales points out that the FRAND licensing pledge companies like Nokia made to ETSI was key to the European Commission's approval of "the ETSI agreements"--and on that basis suggests that Nokia violates Art. 101 by refusing to license component makers.

  • In another question Thales takes aim at an Avanci contract clause according to which that patent pool reimburses its members' SEP enforcement costs. Thales calls into question that a pool covering more than 60% of the patents essential to a given standard. Apart from the fact that this percentage is merely based on Avanci's own estimates (which are inconsistent with various independent studies), collective ownership percentages of SEPs aren't relevant from a competition law point of view as even a single truly essential patent confers market power upon its holder.

While it's important never to forget that what makes SEPs so powerful is horizontal cooperation, which would raise serious cartel issues without a FRAND licensing obligation, I welcome the fact that the focus will remain on unilateral conduct (monopoly abuse) questions. After all, that's what makes this preliminary reference a seamless continuation of Huawei v. ZTE with a special focus on component-level licensing. Thales aspired to make creative contributions to the process, but the new theories it espouses aren't quite so compelling as to warrant a modification of the referral order, much less at this procedural stage.

Where Thales does, however, still have every opportunity to make a positive impact is by lobbying the French government--which will have the opportunity to submit written observations (comparable to an amicus curiae brief, except that the ECJ doesn't allow private non-parties to make submissions). Thales could also lobby the French EU commissioner, Thierry Breton, who has so far been more sympathetic to Nokia and Ericsson's patent monetization interests than the concerns of the automotive and wider IoT industry over SEP abuse. As internal market commissioner, Mr. Breton has responsibility for the European economy at large (and European consumers), but that doesn't mean he has to act forever as if he were Finland's permanent representative (ambassador) to the European Union. Europe has far more to gain from component-level SEP licensing: its strong automotive sector is reason enough all by itself, and its growth potential in IoT makes it an even smarter choice for the future.

Thales declined to sign Nokia's non-disclosure agreement, and I applaud them for that. However, the need to withhold certain confidential business information from them may slow down its lawyers' access to the record. Unfortunately, German litigation procedures are antiquated, so Thales can't just be provided with access to digital documents. Instead, the court has to provide the original paper documents, and the formal referral to the ECJ can take place only after Thales has had its opportunity to make copies or scans.

Subsequently to the formal referral, the CJEU can start the translation process. The deadline for the written observations to be filed by the European Commission and the governments of the EU member states (to the extent they do so) will be a couple months later--in the late summer, presumably.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Wednesday, March 17, 2021

Huawei's announcement of 5G license fee structure favors Apple, Samsung, while countering Nokia/Ericsson-style patent royalty stacking

To focus on just one number--$2.50 (per-unit 5G SEP royalty cap)--doesn't do justice to a bilingual event (video) that lasted more than two hours and featured such speakers as former WIPO Director General Francis Gurry. On the same occasion, Huawei released a 47-page White Paper (PDF). Among other things, it was interesting to hear that Huawei is one of the top three contributors to the Linux kernel. Yet we live in a world of ever shorter attention spans, so what made headline news yesterday was the announcement that "for every multi-mode 5G smartphone, Huawei will provide a reasonable percentage royalty rate of the handset selling price, and a per unit royalty cap at US$2.5."

Many of the questions reporters asked Dr. Song Liuping, Huawei's Chief Legal Officer, and Jason Ding, Huawei's IP chief, also focused on 5G licensing.

Due to a trade war started by the previous U.S. president, with Nokia and Ericsson constantly stoking the flames through lobbying, Huawei is restricted in its ability to serve customers in several major markets. Against that backdrop, I was a bit concerned that the Chinese company would become more aggressive in its patent licensing business. Figuratively speaking, I breathed a sigh of relief when I saw that--regardless of the political landscape--Huawei is still clearly in the camp of product-focused innovators. Rather than align its IP policies with those of Qualcomm, Ericsson, Nokia, or InterDigital, it's clear now that Huawei wants IP to be licensed in ways that enable innovation in smartphones, connected cars, and the wider IoT field.

Huawei is considered to own more actually-essential 5G patent families than any other company. I would summarize the message from yesterday's Forum on Innovation and IP Prospects in 2021 and Beyond as striking a balance: while Huawei doesn't have a "free lunch" or "zero-zero" cross-licensing strategy, it agrees with companies like Apple and Samsung that

  • the aggregate royalty burden on device makers should not be inflated by "royalty stacking" (a big part of that problem is, by the way, the excessive "privateering" practiced by Nokia and Ericsson, who feed the trolls all the time), and

  • cellular SEPs should not be used to tax other valuable components of innovative products, which is why Huawei's per-unit royalty cap is relatively low compared to the license fee demands made by companies with less (and sometimes much less) valuable portfolios. That cap suits makers of high-end smartphones, such as the two organizations I just mentioned.

Non-practicing entity InterDigital, which isn't even among the top contributors to 5G, wants up to $1.20 per 5G device (0.6% of a royalty base capped at $200). In connection with the Federal Trade Commission's and Apple's antitrust cases against Qualcomm, I've frequently criticized the chipmaker's royalty demand: for its SEPs, Qualcomm seeks to be paid up to $13 per unit (3.25% of a royalty base capped at $400). Nokia's cap is at €3.00, and Ericsson has been vague, potentially seeking a lot more than even Nokia.

Ex ante disclosures of maximum royalty rates provide much-needed transparency. Standard-setting organizations could require them, but patent monetization-focused member companies typically oppose making such disclosures mandatory.

Huawei's announcement definitely has policy implications. If a company with few 5G SEPs of its own took a position on royalty rates, it would be suspected of merely being interested in bringing down licensing costs (case in point, Qualcomm pointed to an Apple-internal presentation that made it a strategic goal to "devalue" SEPs). Huawei's IP chief Jason Ding said that Huawei wants to be a top contributor, but not ask for top royalty rates. This attitude is compatible with Apple's IP policies. It's also good news for the automotive industry (to which Huawei is a very significant supplier).

I offer a prediction: Huawei's $2.50 per-unit royalty cap will be mentioned a lot in the years ahead in 5G royalty disputes. I would not be surprised if, for example, Samsung pointed to that figure in its ongoing dispute with Ericsson. And if I were a device maker who'd have to defend against InterDigital, I'd argue that a reasonable per-unit royalty cap for InterDigital's patents is but a fraction of the $1.20 it wants, for a pretty small portfolio compared to Huawei's.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Friday, March 12, 2021

Antisuit follow-up: deference to foreign jurisdictions ranges from 'never' to 'always'; and what role could standard-setting organizations play?

Having received some initial feedback to yesterday's post that outlined seven hypothetical approaches to the current multi-antisuit mayhem, I've identified a couple of aspects of this complex topic that I should address.

First, for the sake of completeness I must point out that the German zero-deference doctrine (sanctity of patents beats everything and warrants self-defense) and the multifactorial analysis performed by U.S. and Chinese courts are not the only two frameworks. There's a spectrum, and the longer it takes to resolve the current antisuit crisis, the more variants we will see.

The extent to which courts in one country defer to injunctions or ongoing SEP-related proceedings in another can range from 0% to 100%. I'll use four words without any intent to allude to a movie title:

  • "Never": Munich Higher Regional Court in Nokia v. Continental (while this regional appeals court didn't rule out that some foreign antisuit injuncions may be tolerable, the impact that an antisuit injunction preventing the enforcement of a potential SEP injunction has on the relevant German case is deemed unacceptable as it's a property right, period)

  • "Rarely": UK Supreme Court in Unwired Planet v. Huawei (that was not an antisuit injunction case, but the top British court took the extreme position that even a defendant who generates only 1% of its worldwide sales in the UK could be forced by a British court into a global portfolio license agreement; while the British standard for antisuit injunctions is structurally similar to the U.S. Gallo/Unterweser framework, such as by requiring that the enjoined foreign action by "vexatious and oppressive," the UK judiciary appears to consider its own country the proper venue for pretty much any SEP litigation, making it hard to imagine that an antisuit injunction obtained by Huawei against Unwired Planet in China would have been deemed acceptable by the judges in the UK)

  • "Sometimes": the U.S. and Chinese approach; comity does play a role, limiting but by no means precluding the grant of antisuit injunctions; while Judge Robart's Microsoft v. Motorola antisuit injunction was affirmed without the slightest concern, a subsequent Samsung v. Huawei antisuit injunction by Judge William Orrick might have been overturned (based on how the appellate hearing went and in light of a question the court asked post-hearing) had the parties not settled

  • "Always": European Court of Justice in Turner v. Grovit (courts of EU member states cannot order antisuit injunctions interfering with the jurisdiction of other member states' courts; the principle of "mutual trust" between EU member states rules this out "even where [the non-moving] party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings")

In Germany it's now an all-or-nothing proposition: "never" with a view to other EU member states because of EU law, and "always" if the goal is to combat an antisuit injunction that has been or may be obtained in a non-EU member state. If someone brings a vexatious and oppressive case in a court of a relatively poor EU member state that normally doesn't get many patent cases, courts in other EU countries must have "trust"--but not if the other case is pending in the Northern District of California?

The EU should do something about Turner v. Grovit because sooner or later that carte blanche will be abused with terrible consequences. In that case, which didn't involve SEPs, the top EU court thought it would be OK to live with contradictory rulings. But what if courts in two (or more) EU member states set different royalty rates between the same parties for the same global SEP portfolio? Or possibly not just different royalty rates, but also other material terms? Then you get inconsistent rulings that could make it impossible for a party to comply with all those orders. On the other end of the range, German courts should further develop their case law and not rule out that a foreign court may make the right decision by prohibiting the enforcement of a German SEP injunction during a rate-setting proceeding that may legitimately resolve the entire global dispute.

As for a way out of the current mess, a loyal reader with a strong professional interest in this subject wrote me that the industry could "potentially" solve the problem at the level of standard-setting bodies. With a strong emphasis on "potentially" I would agree, given how hard it is to build consensus within standard-setting organizations, and only with respect to future standardization processes. The enforcement of whatever patents have been pledged under older FRAND policies would not be affected. Furthermore, implementers are merely third-party beneficiaries, so except in cross-licensing situations (reciprocity), the SEP licensing policies of SSOs could not prevent implementers from seeking antisuit injunctions. They could just deprive implementers of some of their rights if they did so, or authorize certain kinds of retaliation by SEP holders.

Antisuit and especially multi-antisuit injunctions are presumably an interesting topic for standard-development organizations to discuss, and they could, for example, require SEP holders to litigate country by country if they wanted. If.

There'll be more on that front this year. There's Samsung's pending Federal Circuit appeal of Ericsson's anti-antisuit injunction from Texas. Maybe Xiaomi will appeal, or has appealed, Interdigital's German A4SI to the Munich Higher Regional Court. And I would expect a lot of additional antisuit and anti-antisuit filings throughout this year, presumably too many that I could comment on every single one of them, but I'll try to keep an eye on those that could really make a difference.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn: