Showing posts with label Google Books. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google Books. Show all posts

Friday, October 16, 2015

Appeals court deems Google Books 'fair use' but standard helps Oracle in Android-Java case

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has just published its appellate opinion in the Google Books case.

Early last year I wrote that I had initially been rather skeptical of Google's "fair use" argument relating to Google Books, but ultimately I found myself in agreement with Google. Today's appellate opinion says: "This copyright dispute tests the boundaries of fair use." So the appeals court also didn't find this one a clear and simple case. But all things considered it sided with Google.

I use Google Books quite frequently, but for the purpoes of this blog, "fair use" is of particular interest in connection with only one case: Oracle v. Google, the Android-Java copyright infringement case (in which Oracle yesterday brought a motion to disqualify the court-appointed damages expert).

The Second Circuit won't hear an appeal in Oracle v. Google, but this high-profile case might be cited in the further proceedings, and I don't think it helps Google against Oracle in the slightest. Much to the contrary, the standard the Second Circuit outlines is one that Google cannot possibly meet in the Android-Java case. For example, here's a key passage from today's Google Books ruling:

"Google's division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show the searcher just enough context surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether the book falls within the scope of her interest (without revealing so much as to threaten the author's copyright interests). Snippet view thus adds importantly to the highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher. With respect to the first factor test, it favors a finding of fair use (unless the value of its transformative purpose is overcome by its providing text in a manner that offers a competing substitute for Plaintiffs' books [...]"

(emphasis added)

In a nutshell, the above passage says:

  • If what Google does basically just has a promotional effect, right holders can't complain that Google helps them make more money.

  • But forget about "fair use" if there is a substitutive (rather than promotional) effect.

If one applies that standard to Oracle v. Google, it means that the "fair use" defense won't even survive the summary judgment stage: neither the device makers who have adopted Android nor the end users who (like me) have bought Android devices have looked at Android and then decided to use mobile Java. Instead, Android has displaced mobile Java all the way, with Java licensees like BlackBerry and Nokia having gone down the tubes while Android attained market dominance.

There are various differences between Google Books and the Android-Java case, and rather than talk about all of them at once, I just wanted to highlight the key difference in terms of commercial impact. But I also find the discusssion of "transformative use" interesting. The Second Circuit explains that the strongest fair use cases involve "copying from an original for the purpose of criticism or commentary on the original or provision of information about it." Android does none of that with respect to Java. Google Books is not about criticism or commentary, but one can search for books that contain certain terms, which is also information about the copied books:

"We have no difficulty concluding that Google's making of a digital copy of Plaintiffs' books for the purpose of enabling a search for identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a highly transformative purpose, in the sense intended by Campbell."

Android's use of the Java APIs had no transformative effect: Java already was available on mobile devices.

Google Books is not the clear case of fair use (and, as one of the "fair use" factors, transformative use) as, for example, a rap parody of a Roy Orbison song (that's what Campbell was about). But compared to the Android-Java situation, it's a very solid case. And if a fair use case that is far stronger than any "fair use" argument could ever be in Oracle v. Google "tests the boundaries of fair use," then there is no way a reasonable jury could find in Google's favor in the Android-Java case.

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Sunday, January 26, 2014

Why Google Books is probably fair use but Android's hijacking of Java is clearly not

While the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit gave every indication at a December hearing that the grossly erroneous non-copyrightability holding in Oracle v. Google will be reversed, it's simply not possible to predict whether the appeals court will resolve (through judgment as a matter of law) or remand (with the potential need for another jury trial) Google's "fair use" defense. I really believe the Federal Circuit has all the facts in the case record that it can enter JMOL because no reasonable jury (and that 2012 jury simply wasn't reasonable, except for its smart foreman) could have found otherwise. But appeals courts tend to defer to juries on a lot of things even if they disagree with a jury's conclusions. So we don't know. With a view to the upcoming ruling I'd like to talk a little more now about the concept of fair use and its reasonable boundaries.

In May 2012 I already stated in no uncertain terms that I didn't buy Google's "fair use" defense in the Android-Java case. Nothing has changed about that assessment, nor is there a need to reiterate that position. I would, however, like to look at it from a different angle this time around. The highest-profile pending case centered around fair use (while Oracle v. Google is also very high-profile, the make-it-or-break-it question of the appeal was copyrightability) is the "Google Books" case, The Authors Guild, Inc., et al., v. Google Inc., which was dismissed on November 14, 2013 by United States Circuit Judge Denny Chin, sitting by designation on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had remanded the case to the Southern District of New York with the instruction to adjudicate the fair use defense first (Second Circuit opinion, commentary by Professor Grimmelmann), Circuit Judge Chin -- acting as a district judge -- entered summary judgment in Google's favor on the basis of fair use (summary judgment ruling).

I'm in favor of reasonably strong copyright, and I wrote a dozen books (most of them while in high school). So I used to be somewhat sympathetic to the cause of the Authors Guild, especially since my own experience in using Google Books was that I was amazed at the amount of third-party content it provides for free and on an unlicensed basis. But having looked at the case in more detail (with a view to the further proceedings in Oracle v. Google), I now tend to agree largely -- apart from some nuances -- with Circuit Judge Chin's summary judgment ruling, for reasons that relate to the fundamental difference between the parameters of the Google Books case on the one hand and the Android-Java case on the other hand.

At first sight, I found it troubling that the judge found the publication of scanned books "highly transformative". And one of the nuances I tend to disagree with is the term "highly". But after some reading and further thought I actually think it is appropriate, all things considered, to describe as "transformative" a type of use of copyrighted works that is not content-transformative such as a rap parody of a rock ballad. Thumbnail images of copyrighted photographs have previously been deemed "transformative", such as in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (Google was Amazon's co-defendant). So this holding is not based on a narrow, content-centric understanding of transformation, but that's consistent with the statute (17 U.S.C. § 107), which defines the first "fair use" factor as follows:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes

As inclusive as the statute may seem, I find it easiest to see the point in allowing transformative use in connection with a case like Campbell v. Acruff-Rose Music, which was about the 2 Live Crew's rap parody of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman. It matters a lot to me that these are two distinct music genres. I really like the following description of "transformative" use in the Supreme Court's Campbell ruling:

"The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation, Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348; accord, Harper & Row, supra, at 562 ('supplanting' the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.' Leval 1111. Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, Sony, supra, at 455, n. 40, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, see, e. g., Sony, supra, at 478–480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."

I prefer transformation of the kind that is very distinct from copying, but I also understand that technological progress may in some contexts justify types of use that are less creative than, for example, a parody. Google has clearly been pushing the envelope in terms of deriving benefits from § 107 (1) through technology-centric rather than content-centric interpretations of the first factor. In the thumbnail images context, I'm definitely in favor: it's the only way to make image search work. On Google Books, I also come down on Google's side, though not without some reservations remaining. It's true that Google Books "uses snippets of text to act as pointers directing users to a broad selection of books" and that it enables "substantive research, including data mining and text mining in new areas, thereby opening up new fields of research" (for example, the decision mentions that "researchers can track the frequency of references to the United States as a single entity ('the United States is') versus references to the United States in the plural ("the United States are") and how that usage has changed over time". I wouldn't necessarily call it "highly transformative" and, as a user, felt that the "snippets" Google makes available are rather long considering that this is unlicensed use (by the way, Circuit Judge Chin concluded that the third factor "weights slightly against a finding of fair use", sharing my concern even if not to the same degree). That said, I'm glad that Google Books exists.

Google's defense of innovative business models has in some areas done the world a great service and I applaud it. But too much of a good thing can be a total disaster, and Google's positions on Android's use of Java are far outside the scope of any reasonable definition of fair use.

In Java's case, since it was already available for mobile devices, it wasn't really "transformative" to make it available on an unlicensed basis in yet another mobile platform. This is closely related to the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use in question on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Circuit Judge Chin noted that "Google does not sell its scans, and the scans do not replace the books". It takes only this one sentence to distinguish the Google Books case from the Android-Java case. While Google may not "sell" Android in the most straightforward sense, it uses it directly for the generation of revenues, as opposed to the snippets displayed by Google Books, which are advertising-free. Also, it appears that Google does actually charge license fees for certain Android components. But the most important part is that "the [Google Books] scans do not replace the books", and Circuit Judge Chin takes it even further where he concludes that "a reasonable factfinder could only find that Google Books enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright holders". Android, however, did replace -- actually, displace -- Java on mobile devices. And while Circuit Judge Chin determined that a reasonable jury couldn't identify anything other than a bottom-line benefit to copyright holders, District Judge William Alsup found in 2011 that "[o]n the present record, a reasonable fact finder could disagree with Google's rosy depiction of Android's impact on the Java market".

Google Books points potential customers to shops like Amazon where they can buy the full books. There's nothing like that in the Android-Java context. No end user will buy a Mobile Java phone (or tablet) after buying an Android phone (or tablet) because of a promotional or whatever other, even indirect, effect.

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Thursday, May 6, 2010

European Union agenda concerning intellectual property rights

I participated in the KnowRi§ht conference in Vienna, Austria, where I was invited on ultrashort notice to give a speech on "Software Patents, Standards & Competition".

The big controversy at that conference clearly related to the future of the European patent (and patent court) system. I will report on that in a later post. Previously I'd like to summarize the outline of intellectual property rights matters on the EU agenda that a European Commission official gave at the conference.

Before I get into details of Dr. Jens Gaster's comments, I have to mention that he pointed out at the beginning of his speech that he was not acting as a spokesman of the institution that employs him (the European Commission) but instead in a personal capacity as a lecturer. It was an academic conference and Dr. Gaster continues to pursue an academic career in addition to his work for the Commission.

Dr. Gastner mentioned the fact that the EU's data retention directive had been considered "at least indirectly unconstitutional" by certain national courts of EU member states, which raises interesting questions.

Without mentioning Google Street View by name, he hinted that there may be a need for related legislation at the EU level to define everyone's rights.

He outlined various intellectual property issues with a competition dimension, describing the current phase as "the aftermath of the Microsoft case" and mentioning an impact assessment concerning pharmaceutical patents.

Concerning open standards, Dr. Gaster's take was that royalty-free standards are "fine" if all of the right holders agree.

The EU's broadbased Digital Agenda initiative was launched only recently, which is why Dr. Gaster could not offer a prediction as to what its outcome would be.

There might be a Commission initiative related to online content, possibly as part of the Commission's next working program. Rights management per se has been under examination by the Commission "for decades". According to Dr. Gaster, the Google Books case has "repercussions" throughout all of Europe, not only its mainly English-speaking countries.

Dr. Gaster was a driving force behind two Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directives (IPRED 1 and 2). The first one related to civil law and was passed. The second one, related to criminal law, fell through. Apparently the entry into force of the new European treaty, which gives the EU broader competencies and may lead to a revival of that initiative to harmonize rules for criminal prosecution of intellectual property rights violations.

With a view to ACTA (on which I commented recently, Dr. Gaster admitted that the initiative "has been criticized" and that "there was a lack of transparency". He believes there is now transparency "on the substance of the negotiations" (this probably meant to state that there would still not be complete transparency, such as a disclosure of the positions taken by different countries or procedural steps). Dr. Gaster claimed that ACTA would not go beyond IPRED 1, the existing EU directive on enforcement of IPRs under civil law.

On trademarks, the Commission has just launched a study concerning trademark law and its application by national trademark offices and the EU's own trademark authority, the Alicante, Spain-based OHIM.

Still in the trademark context, Dr. Gaster referred to the March 23 ruling by the European Court of Justice on Internet advertising links related to trademarked keywords (Google AdWords case). The highest-level French court, the Cour de Cassation, had referred this question to the ECJ. The result was that under the EU's E-Commerce Directive the search engine (in that particular case, Google) would be liable for trademark infringement while Internet access providers would benefit from a liability exemption.

After those other topics, Dr. Gaster then turned to what he called his "favorite subject": patent reform. As I said before, I will address this in my next post.