Saturday, October 24, 2020

Epic Games ignores Apple's property rights and technical contributions as it reinforces motion for judgment on pleadings against counterclaims

Before I talk about Epic Games' latest filing in the antitrust dispute with Apple in the Northern District of California, here's a follow-up to what I posted one month ago when I wrote that the political clout of the newly-founded Coalition for App Fairness (Epic Games, Spotify, the Tinder company, and others) would depend on its ability to attract more members. This week, the CAF announced the addition of 20 members, and claimed that more than 400 other app developers have applied for membership. The names of the would-be members awaiting approval of their request to join aren't known, so I can't tell how credible and significant they are.

There are at least a couple of shady ones among those who have been allowed to join. It appears that Prepear's real issue with Apple is a trademark dispute, and I think Apple made a reasonable and responsible decision when it disallowed Eristica's "challenge" system as such challenges can indeed be quite dangerous.

But at least the majority of the CAF's members appear legit. Should this group continue to grow at a similar pace, it may at some point be in a position to claim that there's widespread disagreement with Apple's App Store and Google's Google Play business terms. A few dozen companies can't claim to speak for those who make millions of apps--but Apple will have to keep an eye on the CAF's momentum going forward because at some point it could become an influential organization and lend credence to Epic's and Spotify's narrative.

Now, on to Epic's latest court filing (this post continues below the document):

20-10-23 Epic Games' Re... by Florian Mueller

In order to eliminate the risk of punitive damages, Epic seeks to limit the dispute with Apple to an antitrust case if Epic wins and a contract dispute in case Epic's antitrust claims don't succeed. For that purpose, Epic brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings (somewhere between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment) against Apple's non-contract counterclaims, which Apple opposes. Late on Friday, Epic filed the above reply brief in support of that motion.

Philosophically, Epic Games v. Apple is in no small part about the relative value of the contribution each party makes to, for instance, Fortnite's commercial success on iOS. While it's obvious that there wouldn't be a Fortnite on iOS without Epic or without Apple, either party's counsel is now trying to convince the court that their respective client is the more important contributor. And that leads them to paint a self-centric picture.

Last month I agreed with famous and vocal iOS app developer Marco Arment that Apple shouldn't reduce to its 30% commission the value that we developers (my next title is slightly delayed, but we'll apply for TestFlight beta distribution in a matter of days) add to iOS. But the introductory part of Epic's latest filing makes a very one-sided statement: "Consumers who choose to make in-app purchases in Fortnite pay for Epic's creativity,innovation and effort—to enjoy an experience that Epic has designed." The fact of the matter is that Epic is standing on the shoulders of giants; Fortnite does not exist in a vacuum; and without the mobile revolution (which the iPhone sparked), app developers would today have fewer viable platform options.

The question of what actually belongs to Apple is relevant to certain counterclaims Apple brought against Epic. Apple wants to hold Epic responsible for having defrauded its app reviewers by sneaking a prohibited alternative payment system past the review process, and Epic argues that Apple isn't entitled to anything other than what Epic owes on a contractual basis. Apple, however, argues that only because it's protected itself against fraudulent acts through contractual provisions doesn't mean it doesn't have claims against Epic under tort law. Epic acknowledges that a breach and a tort can co-exist, but insists that the tortious act must be "independently wrongful." And that is, in my opinion, ultimately a question of whether one takes Epic's perspective, which is that they have every right to provide apps to iOS users and it's just Apple that restricts this right by uniterally imposing contract terms, or whether one primarily views Apple's App Store and the iOS platform as Apple's property, giving Apple the right to decide which apps become available via the App Store (and, therefore, to review those apps).

The "property" question is even more central to Apple's "conversion" claim (the civil law equivalent of theft). Epic argues that it's not theft to take money from Fortnite users on iOS, as opposed to "stealing cash from a vault in Apple Park, or raiding Apple's bank account."

My feeling is that the part about defrauding the app review process is not ripe for decision at this point; some of what Epic says may be valid, but not sufficient to defeat the counterclaims at this early stage. Conversion, which requires a possessory interest, may be ripe for judgment.

As for the question of whether Epic's offering an alternative payment mechanism (which Epic did in order "to illustrate that competition could exist on iOS, and that consumers would welcome and benefit from it") constitutes interference with Apple's customer relationships, Epic points to a passage in Apple's agreement with end users (Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions) that says "Apple acts as an agent for App Providers in providing the App Store and is not a party to the sales contract or user agreement between you and the App Provider." On that basis, Epic describes itself as the "principal" in the relationship with end users, and Apple as an "agent" at best and "an outright non-party" at worst. However, iOS users have a relationship with Apple that goes beyond Fortnite.

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Friday, October 23, 2020

Conversant wins Germany-wide standard-essential patent injunction against Daimler in Munich: third court loss for Daimler in as many months

Today the 21st Civil Chamber of the Landgericht München I (Munich I Regional Court) granted Conversant Wireless, a notorious standard-essential patent (SEP) troll, a Germany-wide injunction against Daimler over EP2934050 on an "apparatus and method for providing a connection" (a divisional of a patent Nokia once gave to Conversant).

While Daimler will presumably appeal, the injunction is immediately enforceable--absent an enforcement stay that the appeals court might order--if Conversant posts a bond or makes a deposit of a negligible amount. The Munich court bases the amount of the prequisite collateral not on the economic damage resulting from enforcement, but on the SEP holder's royalty demand. In a parallel case, Nokia is now enforcing a SEP injunction on that basis against computer maker Lenovo.

In the EP'050 case, Daimler had conceded essentiality, but disputed the validity of the patent-in-suit. Let me refer you to my report on the September 23 trial. Daimler's FRAND defense was futile because the Munich court turns the CJEU's Huawei v. ZTE on its head by focusing on the implementer's counteroffer and typically never reaching the SEP holder's licensing offer, apart from a less than cursory look. And the court believes that this follows from the Federal Court of Justice's recent Sisvel v. Haier decision, which dealt (among other things) with the question of whether an implementer was a willing licensee.

This is already the third German SEP injunction against the Mercedes maker in as many months:

One of the key legal issues here is the right of component makers to a SEP license on FRAND terms. With the Dusseldorf Regional Court still being very likely (irrespectively of a Qualcomm initiative) to refer a set of component-level licensing questions to the Court of Justice of the EU on November 12, the Munich appeals court might be reluctant to let Conversant enforce its injunction against Daimler on a basis that the top EU court might later find to contravene EU competition law.

The fact that Conversant has now joined Nokia and Sharp in obtaining a Germany-wide Mercedes sales ban may have policy makers in Berlin concerned. The Federal Cabinet has patent reform on its agenda for next week. I haven't seen the draft injunction statute of the proposal they're probably going to adopt. So far, SEP injunctions weren't really the focus, but the pro-reform camp should raise the rapidly deteriorating situation on the SEP front with the Federal Parliament and try to have the bill amended so that proportionality considerations would apply to SEP cases on top of the antitrust-based FRAND defense.

In closing I'd just like to note that today's decision is yet another disgrace for the European Commission, which is totally responsible for what is going wrong in the automotive patent wars because of its regional protectionism favoring Nokia and Ericsson over Europe's automotive industry.

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Thursday, October 22, 2020

Qualcomm proposes non-solution to automotive component-level patent licensing conflict: only courts can provide much-needed clarity now

For a long time, Qualcomm had kept a surprisingly low profile in the automotive patent wars. But it was always active behind the scenes. The San Diego-based chipmaker is a member of some of the same lobbying groups as Nokia and Ericsson. And more recently, Qualcomm has been lobbying the European Commission and the German government directly in order to garner support for an automotive standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing proposal that must be rejected all the way.

The exact political dynamics aren't clear, but it is disconcerting that Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy will host a closed-door workshop on November 17 to discuss Qualcomm's proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU). There is a possibility that the German government is simply doing a favor to the epitome of incompetence in the SEP policy context--EU internal market commissioner Thierry Breton, who wasn't his country's first choice for the job and recently made himself totally ridiculous by repeating himself like a broken record that European companies' leadership in 5G "is a fact" (when even the only report that ever said so has been corrected in that regard). It might also have helped Qualcomm that the ministry is advised by a (non-cellular) SEP troll--Fraunhofer--in the patent policy context. In any event, Germany's automotive industry is no match for Qualcomm when it comes to IP-related lobbying.

There are several structural issues with Qualcomm's proposed MOU. I'll just highlight the three that I consider to be the most fundamental flaws:

  • Just like Nokia's recent and comparably deficient proposal, Qualcomm's proposed MOU would extend licenses only to tier 1 suppliers (which sell telematics control units (TCUs) to car makers), not to tier 2 (network access device, or connectivity module) and tier 3 (baseband chipset) suppliers. But the higher up you go, the more likely those companies are to hold cellular SEPs that enable them to cross-license with the likes of Qualcomm and Nokia.

  • Another Qualcomm-Nokia parallel is that the proposed MOU wants an entire car to be the royalty base, as opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU). That means Qualcomm and Nokia seek to overcharge. And it's economically prohibitive to TCU makers, given that those TCUs sell at not much more than what, for instance, the abusive Avanci pool tries to charge car makers for its patents (up to 4G and not even including 5G, which will be several times more expensive).

  • Qualcomm is also attempting to derive non-monetary value from the MOU by having companies support its own self-serving (mis)interpretation of ETSI's FRAND policy (giving SEP holders the choice at what level of a supply chain they grant a license). Qualcomm would likely leverage that in its efforts to get the IEEE to revise its SEP policy.

Also, some of the leading 5G SEP holders are actually tier 2/3 automotive suppliers and therefore unlikely to be willing to accede to the MOU. That's just another reason for why this is a non-solution.

Qualcomm's initiative started earlier this year as far as I've been able to find out. At this point, however, part of the agenda appears to be that Qualcomm--just like Nokia--would like to dissuade the Dusseldorf Regional Court from referring to the top EU court a set of key legal questions concerning component-level access to SEP licenses. But Qualcomm's proposed MOU doesn't obviate the need to have questions clarified on which even some German courts (Mannheim/Munich and Dusseldorf) agree. The referral, which is still expected to happen on November 12, would resolve the question with respect to all levels of the supply chain. If anything, the fact that Qualcomm and Nokia are now trying to somehow distinguish tier 1 from tiers 2 and 3 underscores the need for judicial clarification.

My advice to the German automotive industry would be to decline to participate in the November 17 event as Qualcomm's proposed MOU is simply not a constructive contribution to the debate. Qualcomm has opposed component-level licensing for a long time because it's "humongously more lucrative" (as Qualcomm once told the IRS) to license only end-product makers.

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Tuesday, October 20, 2020

Nokia enforcing video codec patent injunction against Lenovo in Germany: standard-essential patent case law diverging from CJEU's Huawei v. ZTE guidance

Bloomberg reported earlier today, and Lenovo has meanwhile confirmed to me, that Nokia is enforcing a standard-essential patent (SEP) injunction it obtained from the Munich I Regional Court against computer maker Lenovo after posting collateral to the amount of 3.25 million euros (less than $4 million). Lenovo has asked the Munich Higher Regional Court to stay the enforcement of the injunction.

Munich has evolved into the world's most unbalanced patent litigation venue, leaving even the Wac(k)o Division of the Western District of Texas far behind:

  • While the Court of Justice of the EU made it pretty clear in its 2015 Huawei v. ZTE decision that a SEP holder's royalty demand needs to be analyzed prior to the implementer's counteroffer, the Munich I Regional Court prefers to put the cart before the horse, not because it would be appropriate but simply for the purpose of "forum selling."

    The Federal Court of Justice of Germany has an antitrust panel whose presiding judge is a longstanding patent extremist, and its Sisvel v. Haier ruling is pretty bad, but the Munich court already reversed the sequence of the Huawei v. ZTE analysis long before Sisvel v. Haier and is now taking it to an extreme that basically puts all implementers at a SEP holder's mercy: if you don't accept an offer (unless it's completely crazy, such as demanding 50% of a company's sales), you're simply considered an unwilling licensee.

  • One of the two patent infringement panels of the Mannheim Regional Court, the Second Civil Chamber, adopted the Munich line under competitive pressure (again, "forum selling"). But at least the Mannheim court has a traditional approach to the determination of the collateral that must be posted if an injunction is to be enforced during the appellate proceedings, basing the amount on the wrongful-enforcement damages that would actually be done if, for instance, Daimler's production were to grind to a halt. In Munich, however, they just take the perspective that an unwilling licensee should simply have taken a license (without the court even ascertaining that the royalty demand is FRAND), and therefore sets ridiculously low amounts for the security to be provided, such as 5.5 million euros in a Sharp v. Daimler case and, as I already mentioned above, a measly 3.25 million euros (less than $4 million) in this Nokia v. Lenovo case. (It's another story that Daimler is a 19th-century company with a 20th-century corporate culture and will end up paying a hefty price for its decision to cave to Sharp.)

  • It fits into the overall picture that the Munich court relies on plexiglass shields to protect judges and counsel against COVID-19, even though experts agree that such shields are useless and even "absurd."

The first two of those problems could be solved at least in part by the patent-specialized senate of the appeals court, the Oberlandesgericht München (Munich Higher Regional Court). That panel of appellate judges is, however, regrettably slow, hesitant, and it appears at times that they don't take much of an interest in the economic realities of the world outside their ivory tower. In December 2019, the lower Munich court granted Qualcomm a non-SEP injunction against Apple that was wrong for at least three independent reasons as the appeals court concluded, in an order to stay enforcement, more than three months later. In the meantime, Apple had already come under pressure to re-incorporate Qualcomm chips into the iPhone models in question. And if the appeals court had taken another week or two, its decision would never have seen the light of day as the global dispute between Apple and Qualcomm would already have been settled by then.

If the Munich appeals court wanted to prevent reversible lower-court decisions from causing irreversible economic harm, it could do what its equivalent in Karlsruhe did in a Nokia v. Daimler case this year. Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German), who presides over the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court's patent-specialized panel, gave Nokia a pretty clear indication that if they didn't commit to refrain from enforcement, he'd order a micro-stay for the period during which his court would weigh Daimler's motion for a stay during the entire appellate proceedings. But in that Apple v. Qualcomm case, the Munich appeals court said that a micro-stay was only an option if, essentially, a company would go out of business.

Nokia's SEP enforcement campaign against Daimler has hit a snag with the Dusseldorf Regional Court poised to refer certain legal questions relating to component-level SEP licensing to the CJEU. Nokia even tried a Hail Mary pass by making a new round of licensing offers to some of Daimler's suppliers. That lack of success on the automotive front makes it all the more important for increasingly trollish Nokia to demonstrate to the wider tech industry that it will vigorously enforce any injunctions unless the amount of security is unaffordable and/or an appeals court takes swift and decisive action.

Presumably those advocating patent injunction reform in Germany will point policy makers to the Nokia v. Lenovo mess.

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Saturday, October 17, 2020

Fortnite users continue to make in-app purchases on iOS that bypass Apple's payment system: court filing says "Epic is stealing money from Apple"

Two weeks after Fortnite maker Epic Games brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings against some of Apple's counterclaims (particularly the ones that might give rise to punitive damages), Apple filed its opposition brief on Friday evening Pacific Time (this post continues below the document):

20-10-16 Apple's Opposi... by Florian Mueller

One of the disputed theories is called conversion, which Apple describes as follows:

"Stated simply, Epic is stealing money from Apple. Theft is a crime, and 'conversion' is its civil-law analogue. The victim of theft has always had the right to sue for conversion to get its property back from the thief—irrespective of the technical means by which the conversion is accomplished. If, for example, Epic sent an agent into Apple Park and stole cash from a vault, a conversion claim could properly be pleaded. If Epic hacked an Apple bank account and stole cash electronically, a conversion claim could properly be pleaded. And if Epic bypassed IAP to funnel funds that include Apple's revenues and commissions into Epic's coffers, a conversion claim can be—and has been—properly pleaded." (emphases added)

In yesterday's filing, Apple says it has the right to sue Epic not only for breach of contract but also for tort, given that Epic would face tort liability "if [t]c had never executed the contracts with Apple and had instead found another way to smuggle Fortnite and its 'hotfix' payment mechanism into the App Store." Apple argues that a company protecting itself against such behavior through contracts must not be in a weaker legal position than one that doesn't. What Apple does clarify is that it won't seek "multiplicative recovery" if the same conduct on Epic's part constituted both a breach of an agreement and fraud. In other words, Apple would then content itself with only the greater of the two alternative amounts.

It appears that the "hotfix" was just a simple data point on Epic's servers--not program code, but merely a trigger. When the iOS version of Fortnite checked on that data point, it offered an alternative payment mechanism to end users in circumvention of Apple's in-app payment rules.

After the "hotfix" that Apple says became Epic's hot mess, Fortnite was removed from the App Store. That means it cannot be downloaded to iOS devices right now, and Epic has already failed twice (with a motion for a temporary restraining order as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction) to get a court to force Apple to tolerate an iOS version of Fortnite that bypasses Apple's in-app payment system.

At least so far, Apple has not removed Fortnite from the devices of iOS users who downloaded it prior to its removal from the App Store. Those users can't get updates, and they wouldn't be able to reinstall Fortnite if they (the users) deleted it. But so far the battle royale game has remained on tens of millions of devices.

What I didn't know (because I didn't have Fortnite on any of my iOS devices when it was removed from the App Store) is that Epic continues to offer in-app purchases that bypass Apple's system. Yesterday's filing says the following:

"{...] Epic's refusal to deactivate its hotfix makes this a continuing tort, as Epic's bank accounts continue to grow daily with additional stolen amounts. While Epic has repudiated its contractual obligations through its lawsuit, and its claims will be tested in time, Epic's continued siphoning of sales from IAP is just theft, plain and simple."

"[...] Epic's acts of conversion continue to this day [...]"

"[...] Epic to this day is stealing definite, ascertainable sums of money from Apple, and the tort of conversion provides a civil remedy for such conduct."

"The amount stolen by Epic from Apple can be fixed with certainty; the fact that this amount increases with every day that Epic continues its wrongdoing does not relieve Epic of tort liability."

Epic had various reasons for sneaking that alternative payment system past Apple's review process. From an antitrust angle, Epic appears to believe that any purchase made by a user of Fortnite on iOS that bypasses Apple's payment system can later serve as proof that there is "demand" for such alternatives. Epic also wants to make the case for how such alternatives save end users money.

After Fortnite was removed from the App Store, Epic could simply have deactivated that trigger it calls a "hotfix" and resubmitted a version of Fortnite to Apple's app review that would have complied with Apple's rules. But Epic doesn't want to de-escalate. Instead, it takes the position that it's simply allowed to breach an agreement with Apple that Epic claims to be a violation of the antitrust laws and, therefore, illegal and unenforceable.

From the get-go, Epic has viewed its dispute with Apple as a combination of litigation and public relations. When Epic CEO Tim Sweeney declared war on Apple by way of a 2 AM email, he announced that the two companies would be in conflict "on a multitude of fronts – creative, technical, business, and legal" (and possibly "for many years"). By continuing to generate in-app purchasing revenues on iOS without Apple getting its contractual share, Epic demonstrates its determination to fight. But it can't necessarily count on support from the courts.

On Monday, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California will hold a case management conference relating to multiple App Store antitrust cases pending before her.

Epic Games v. Apple is the highest-profile battle in the App Store Antitrust Wars, but far from the only one as my App Store Antitrust Battlemap shows (click on the image to enlarge):

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Thursday, October 15, 2020

Nokia's latest standard-essential patent licensing offer to automotive suppliers is too little, too late to obviate referral of key questions to CJEU

Earlier this year, Nokia made mediation talks with Daimler and various of its suppliers of telecommunications components fail by refusing to grant exhaustive component-level standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses that would have provided suppliers with the operational freedom they need in order to go about their business. This was not only a disappointment but also a major embarrassment for the European Commission, which continues to be driven by regional protectionism rather than consistent enforcement of competition law and had urged the parties to negotiate even though it was a total waste of time, as anyone knowledgeable about the issues would have predicted.

Roughly eight months later, I have to grant Nokia and its attorneys that they have made some limited adjustments to their position, and that fact appears attributable to last month's Dusseldorf trial more so than to anything the EU Commission has done. Some key players in Brussels are beholden to Nokia, even to the extent that postfactual commissioner Thierry Breton parrots some outdated Nokia-funded propaganda by making an incorrect claim (of Europe being the #1 continent in 5G SEP ownership) from which Nokia's lawyers had already distanced themselves by way of an updated study.

The Dusseldorf Regional Court's strong inclination to refer certain component-level licensing questions to the top EU court--Daimler's lead counsel in the Nokia infringement cases, Quinn Emanuel's Dr. Marcus Grosch, told the Munich I Regional Court last month that he'd be very surprised if it didn't happen--appears to be scaring the living daylights out of Nokia. The decision is scheduled to come down on November 12, and at least the German appeals courts--the lower courts in Mannheim and Munich are too obsessed with forum-selling to do the right thing--will then likely be hesitant to enjoin end-product makers if their suppliers were denied SEP licenses on FRAND terms.

In an apparent effort to dissuade the Dusseldorf court from that CJEU referral, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court (which hears all appeals of Mannheim judgments) from staying the enforcement of ill-gotten injunctions against Daimler, and to further encourage the Munich I Regional Court to grant Nokia an injunction against Daimler, Nokia sent new licensing offers to several Daimler suppliers (including BURY Technologies, Continental, Valeo/Peiker, Huawei, Harman, and Renault, which builds an entire vehicle for Daimler) about two weeks ago. At the time Nokia also intended to make such an offer to Bosch, but was waiting for a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) to be concluded.

NDAs didn't prevent all sorts of information to leak from the failed mediation process, and I've been able to find out more about its current maneuvering than Nokia would have liked me to.

The structure of Nokia's latest offers still comes with significant field-of-use restrictions that cannot be reconciled with the principle of the free movement of goods in the EU's Single Market and the fact that under the CJEU's Huawei v. ZTE case law, Nokia owes implementers a license on FRAND terms.

Furthermore, Nokia wants to charge royalties based on the value of the end product--a car--as opposed to a reasonable royalty rate. As a result, component makers simply couldn't afford such a license.

But even if one elected to ignore those major issues, Nokia still refuses to extend licenses to certain levels of the supply chain. Its current offers are limited to telematics control units (TCUs) and don't cover network access devices (NAD, often also referred to as connectivity modules) and baseband chips. By contrast, Sharp granted Huawei a license covering all three tiers (tier 1: TCUs; tier 2: NADs; tier 3: baseband chips.

Huawei is a tier 2 supplier to Daimler and suing Nokia in order to secure an exhaustive component-level SEP license on FRAND terms. That case is also pending before the Dusseldorf Regional Court. I don't think Nokia's latest round of offers would obviate a referral of component-level licensing questions to the Court of Justice of the EU with respect to Nokia v. Daimler, but a tier 1 license would certainly not moot the legal issues in Huawei v. Nokia.

Not only is it urgent to refer the question of component-level licensing to the top EU court but there are some worrying developments in SEP case law in Germany that actually require the referral of further questions to the CJEU. One of the two patent infringement panels of the Mannheim Regional Court has recently decided to gut Huawei v. ZTE by focusing on the implementer's counteroffer; the Federal Court of Justice of Germany held in Sisvel v. Haier that SEP holders no longer need to present claim charts to implementers (which particularly disadvantages small companies, but the last thing a dogmatic judge in Germany would care about is the economy); and the Munich I Regional Court applies the Sisvel v. Haier guidance in such extreme ways that it's hard to see how any implementer could actually defend itself there short of simply capitulating and taking a license on the terms dictated by the SEP holder. Most recently, the Munich I Regional Court has practically waived the requirement to provide collateral (bond or deposit) if an injunction is enforced during the appellate proceedings. They still determine an amount that needs to be posted, but it's typically negligible. I'll talk about that some more on another occasion. For now I merely wanted to underscore the necessity to get certain German courts overruled by the CJEU before more damage is done to innovation and competition.

If Nokia keeps improving its offers at the snail's pace we've seen from the failed handset maker in recent years, the CJEU will likely provide further clarification before Nokia ever makes a truly fair and reasonable licensing offer to automotive suppliers.

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Wednesday, October 14, 2020

App Store Battlemap: all antitrust investigations and complaints targeting Apple's App Store and Google Play from around the globe in one chart

Battlemaps are a signature element of this blog. Ten years ago I created a number of them to visualize the smartphone patent disputes between the likes of Microsoft, Apple, Google's Motorola, HTC, and Samsung. Two years ago to the day I published a new one featuring Apple, Huawei, Intel, Qualcomm, and Samsung. And now I proudly present what is--unless I missed something--the first chart to show the global app distribution antitrust landscape--all players and all cases--as a one-pager (click on the image to enlarge; this post continues below the image):

I intend to update this chart from time to time. And here's the PDF version, which comes with two additional pages of explanations and information:

20-10-14 App Store Antitrus... by Florian Mueller

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