Showing posts with label Delaware. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Delaware. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 17, 2023

Sisvel subsidiary 3G Licensing wins jury verdict against HTC in Delaware: per-patent per-unit royalties of 37 and 43 cents; pool license would have been cheaper

[PRELIMINARY NOTE] Let me note upfront that this is one of the last articles--possibly the penultimate one--that I'll ever publish on FOSS Patents. That doesn't mean FOSS Patents will disappear immediately: it remains available as an archive for a limited transitional period and may very well be used by others than me in the future. Nor will I personally disappear, but in the nearest term I will focus on writing a book about the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger saga, which became the most spectacular turnaround in merger regulation history and gave rise to a decision by a U.S. federal judge that communications between Microsoft and me were not a legitimate subject of pretrial discovery (as I mentioned toward the end of this recent post). I am going to remain interested in patent litigation and patent policy, as I have been for almost 20 years by now, but I have various new ideas and have to decide which ones to pursue, how, and when. I'll say something more in my final FOSS Patents post. As I'm also in the midst of relocation, this is a time of change and fresh new starts for me. [/PRELIMINARY NOTE]

Damages verdicts over standard-essential patents (SEPs) are rare because most SEP licenses are granted without litigation and in the few cases where infringement actions are filed, settlements typically occur ahead of any damages trial. But yesterday was one of those exceptional days: 3G Licensing, a subsidiary of patent pool administrator and licensing firm Sisvel, prevailed in the District of Delaware on two--based on the company's name, guess what--3G patents over mobile device maker HTC.

On a per-patent per-unit basis, the damages figure that was awarded shows that SEP infringement can get a lot costlier than licensing. 3G Licensing prevailed on two patents-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,995,091 on a "mixed media telecommunication call manager" and U.S. Patent No. 6,856,818 on a "data store for mobile radio station." The damages verdict is so granular that it makes a distinction for the '818 patent between "Verizon Accused Products" and "Google-Fi [a mobile virtual network operator] Accused Products":

  • For the '091 patent, 3G Licensing was awarded $0.37 per product, amounting to $7,228,042.13 for a total quantity of 19,535,249 infringing products.

  • For the '818 patent, the royalty is again $0.37 per product with respect to 2,551,265 units of the Verizon Accused Products (a total of $943,968.05), and $0.43 for each of 1,84,295 infringing products that are Google-Fi Accused Products (a total of $795,196.85).

  • In total, that's almost exactly $9 million.

  • 3G Licensing obviously participates in Sisvel's 3G/4G mobile communications patent licensing program, and the published "compliant rate" (for willing licensees) that applies to 3G UMTS is just €0.35. That's $0.37 for the entire pool (all relevant patents from multiple patent holders)--but here it's the amount that the jury now found HTC owes on a per-patent per-unit basis, with the number being even higher for the Google-Fi Accused Products. The complaint mentioned that 3G Licensing was open to bilateral as well as pool licensing.

That litigation has been going on since 2017, following (according to the complaint) extensive but fruitless efforts to work out a negotiated agreement. I wasn't following it, but now that this interesting verdict has come out, someone may wish to take a closer look at the history of the case. The dispute is also instructive with a view to the debate over the EU SEP Regulation: I've been saying since earlier this year that any attempt by the EU to encourage and enable hold-out in its own courts will make other jurisdictions more attractive, and I mentioned U.S. damages verdicts as another way for SEP holders to stop infringement. There is nothing an EU regulation could lawfully (and without violating international trade agreements) do to prevent patent holders like 3G Licensing from enforcing their rights in the United States, where damages verdicts can become costly for infringers.

For now, let me just show you the public redacted version of the jury verdict. There's actually a typo in the verdict form concerning the number of the '091 patent that I noticed, but it was easy to find the correct one based on the complaint.

3G Licensing v. HTC (case no. 17-cv-83-GBW, D.Del.): verdict form (public redacted version)

Monday, February 6, 2023

Delaware state judge lets large parts of Continental's contract case against Nokia go forward, simply ignores federal courts' practice concerning global FRAND rates for standard-essential patents

Three months after tire maker Continental gave up on its meritless federal lawsuit against Avanci and some of its licensors, particularly Nokia, its Delaware case under state contract law largely survived Nokia's motion to dismiss. I've had the chance to read the decision and would like to share only a few high-level observations here.

Conti was lucky that the case got reassigned to the Delaware Chancery Court's Vice Chancellor (= judge) Nathan A. Cook. According to his bio on the court's website, Mr. Cook's entire professional life has revolved around that particular state court. He clerked for a vice chancellor of that court, and then "was the managing partner of Block & Leviton LLP’s Delaware office, where he focused his practice on litigation before the Court of Chancery" before being sworn in as a judge last summer. There is no indication (neither in his bio nor in his order on Nokia's motion to dismiss) that he has the slightest experience with patent law, and someone who dedicates his entire career to this particular court was obviously hard to persuade of jurisdictional arguments for dismissal.

Here's a passage that clearly reflects a lack of sophistication and, especially, of restraint:

"Nokia has argued at various points that the relief Continental seeks as part of its FRAND Claims is something no federal or state court has ever granted. [The footnote quotes Nokia more specifically: 'Continental is asking this Court to do something that no United States court, no U.S. Federal court, no U.S. state court, has ever done without the consent of all the parties, namely set a global FRAND rate.'; 'Courts have recognized they should not attempt to impose global license terms absent mutual consent in the context of FRAND disputes.'] However, the basic premise of this argument—namely that Continental seeks extraordinary relief—is contradicted by Nokia’s prior litigation against Qualcomm, where Nokia sought comparable relief. Given Nokia's own conduct, its argument is not compelling."

That state judge should have asked himself whether all those federal judges--who frequently deal with patent law and previously declined to set global FRAND rates for standard-essential patent (SEP) portfolios over the objection of one party--may simply have been right. Instead, he points to "Nokia's own conduct" of roughly 15 years ago. But whatever Nokia sought from Qualcomm in a Delaware Chancery Court case a decade and a half ago was just a litigant's wish as opposed to a final judicial decision.

This is a really important question at the motion-to-dimiss stage. I can see why some other parts of Conti's complaint survived by virtue of the legal standard. But the question of whether the state court can order Nokia to grant Conti a worldwide license is one that can be answered--in the negative--at the motion-to-dimiss stage.

The order does not offer any substance with respect to whether a U.S. (state) court can simply order a party to grant someone else a global portfolio license including non-U.S. patents. Nothing. Nada. All that the judge tells us is that because Nokia once sought such relief, "its argument is not compelling."

If at the end of the proceeding before him Mr. Cook does actually tell Nokia to grant Conti a global portfolio license, that ruling will be appealed to Delaware's Supreme Court. The state's highest court will presumably be more interested than Mr. Cook in understanding why no other U.S. court has done what Continental is demanding here. There'll be a panel of judges, not just one. And there'll be amicus curiae briefs, possibly even from the U.S. government. It's very hard to imagine that the Delaware Supreme Court would not understand the serious implications of extraterritorial overreach.

I remember a conference in Munich a few years ago where Judge James Robart of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington--who shaped U.S. FRAND case law in a couple of important respects--said very clearly that U.S. courts don't do this against the will of one party, and he mentioned that U.S. courts have even declined to adjudicate foreign patents in some cases where both parties asked for it.

That Continental v. Nokia case in Delaware involves a license agreement between Qualcomm and Nokia that has since expired (which means Conti can no longer enforce it), and it is somewhat related to the Nokia-Daimler dispute that got settled almost two years ago.

Between the lines it seems that Mr. Cook is somewhat sympathetic to Conti, which brought its case in the Chancery Court and always wanted to keep it there, while Nokia sought its removal to federal court.

The order says Conti "submitted a sworn declaration committing to accept the terms of any license adjudicated by [the Chancery Court]." I agree that this means Conti is not merely requesting an advisory opinion. But it still doesn't justify judicial overreach with respect to foreign patents.

Another part of the decision that I find really odd is that he disagrees with Nokia's argument that "end user" (a term in that meanwhile-expired Nokia-Qualcomm agreement) unambiguously means drivers that operate automobiles as opposed to car makers that incorporate Conti's telematics control units (TCUs) into their products. Nokia pointed to federal court rulings that had to resolve similar questions concerning the very same term, but it appears that only some Chancery Court precedent would have impressed Mr. Cook. All those federal courts are--from his perspective--not really important, so he came up with excuses for not relying on those decisions and instead looked to dictionaries. He found that some dictionaries "define 'end user' as the ultimate consumer or user of a product," but others as "a person or organization that uses something rather than one that makes or sells it."

It is a total non sequitur to me that Mr. Cook says "the second definition would tend to align with Continental’s asserted meaning." Give me a break. How is Daimler "a person or organization that uses something rather than one that makes or sells it"?

At least parts of Mr. Cook's decision are deeply flawed. But Nokia may be able to get Conti's complaint--or at least its most important parts--thrown out by summary judgment, which will be an opportunity for Mr. Cook to correct some of the mistakes in his order on the motion to dismiss, just that Conti will in the meantime be able to conduct discovery, which is a waste of resources.

Thursday, November 3, 2022

Continental gives up antitrust battle against Avanci patent pool--no cert petition filed--but keeps pursuing long-shot case against Nokia in Delaware Chancery Court

While the automotive industry has by now overwhelmingly adopted the Avanci patent licensing model, some clean-up on the litigation front is still needed.

In the summer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Continental's second petition for a rehearing en banc of its "antitrust" case against the Avanci patent pool and some of its key licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis). Conti had until Halloween to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, and I actually thought they would, given that they had been impervious to reason throughout that multi-year litigation that never went anywhere.

Surprise, surprise: a partial cure has been found for Continental's procedural incontinence. Whatever pill the tire maker has taken, by now nothing has surfaced along the lines of a cert petition, so Conti v. Avanci et al. is a case that has ceased to be. It may have cost tens of millions of dollars to get there--and for Conti to get nothing.

I have a theory as to what the magic pill was: Conti's outside counsel would presumably still have wanted to give it a try, and Conti's in-house counsel, too--but at least they knew they would have needed a critical mass of support from amici curiae. There would basically have been two pools from which to enlist amici: automotive industry players (but it would have seemed strange if companies like Ford, just a few months after taking the Avanci license, had signed anti-Avanci amicus briefs) and the Apple-led movement pursuing the devaluation of standard-essential patents (SEPs), particularly through the proposal of a Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit (SSPPU) royalty base. Apple is very experienced in litigation and presumably recognized--and I'm sure never had to read this blog to figure out (though my commentary may indeed have helped some other potential amici)--that Conti's case was going nowhere. The Fifth Circuit had designated the opinion as non-precedential. Since the original filing in the Northern District of California in 2019, no judge ever believed that Conti had a case. From the Supreme Court's perspective, it would have been easy to see that even if the top U.S. court--in a purely hypothetical scenario--had reversed the Fifth Circuit, the case would just have been a waste of court and party resources anyway.

So there came a point when Conti had to call it quits. I took a critical perspective on that case from the beginning as those who already read my commentary on Conti v. Avanci back in 2019 may well remember. But Conti's in-house counsel relied on bad advice instead of listening to people like me. I'm not a habitual naysayer in the antitrust context. For instance, I'm very optimistic that Epic Games will win at least a partial reversal and remand in the Ninth Circuit on "November Fortnite." But Conti should never have brought that case in the first place, or at least they should have given up after the Ninth Circuit's FTC v. Qualcomm ruling.

Conti and the organizations it would have wanted to support the cert petition that was never filed are still trying some other things.

At yesterday's Munich Auto IP conference, a Conti exec misleadingly claimed that Avanci's licensors had to bring 51 lawsuits against car makers, but Qualcomm's Fabian Gonnell was quick to correct him by pointing out that there were only six disputes (I should add that three of them were extremely short-lived), but in Germany each patent assertion is filed as a separate case (or gets severed by the courts).

There is one other Conti case over automotive patent licensing that is still pending, and while Avanci is not a party to that one, Nokia still has to defend itself. In early 2021, Conti brought a complaint in the Delaware Chancery Court (the same court that would presumably have ordered Elon Musk to consummate the Twitter acquisition if he hadn't given up getting out of that deal):

21-01-25 Continental v. Nok... by Florian Mueller

The issues in that case partly even mirror some of the claims in what used to be the case against Avanci et al., and the remaining issues were closely related. It's all about making sure Conti's telematics control units (TCUs) would be covered by a Nokia patent license, be it an old Nokia-Qualcomm license (a theory that appears next to implausible) or a new license that Conti would want the court to force Nokia to extend.

I found out that the parties had oral argument concerning Nokia's motions to dismiss, and a U.S. subsidiary of the German Continental Group continues to push for their claims to move forward in the Delaware Chancery Court at this time. I'm confident that the state court will draw its conclusions from the now-definitive failure of Conti's federal claims.

There's more. A group of academics and former government officials sent a letter to U.S. antitrust chief Jonathan Kanter, urging the Assistant Attorney General to modify, nuance, or downgrade his predecessor's Business Review Letter regarding Avanci's future 5G patent pool. That is something Conti would like to see happen (as would Apple), though it would come too late for its federal lawsuit anyway. Also, there's an obscure Thales v. Avanci & Nokia case pending in the Munich I Regional Court. The court told me that the original hearing date had been vacated and on October 11, a spokeswoman for the court said that no new hearing date had been scheduled. I'm sure that case will be thrown out, even if only after wasting some more time and money.

Thursday, March 31, 2022

Hold-up or hold-out? Philips, Thales accuse each other of abusive tactics in standard-essential patent dispute before Federal Circuit, ITC, courts in Delaware and Paris

It almost appears to be a ritual in standard-essential patent (SEP) disputes that the patent holder faults the implementer for hold-out while the accusation flying in the other direction is hold-up. They can't both be right at the same time. On a case-by-case basis, I try to deduce from publicly available information which of the two is more likely in its right to blame the other side, also factoring in what I've previously learned about certain parties' behavior.

When Thales and Philips are the parties, I frankly have reservations concerning either one. Thales is pursuing an ill-conceived antitrust case in Munich over automotive SEP licensing. You can't blame a patent pool for offering a certain license but not another as long as it doesn't contractually prevent its licensors from entering into whatever bilateral license they wish to grant. As for Philips, I've clearly seen a pattern of hold-up from that organization in more than one context, and its positions on patent enforcement always seem oblivious to the fact that even Philips is still making products (though it's lost market share in some product categories and exited other segments, such as mobile phones).

The two companies are now entangled in an interesting cross-jurisdictional web of partly interdependent SEP cases:

  • Philips is seeking an exclusion order (import ban) from the ITC, with ALJ David Shaw's final initial determination due tomorrow, April 1. "Final" isn't "final-final": the truly final ITC determination is made by the Commission, the trade agency's top decision-making body, and even that one is appealable to the Federal Circuit.

    Thales--along with its Gemalto and Cinterion subsidiaries--is not the only respondent to that ITC complaint, which also targeted (back in December 2020) Thales's competitors Telit, Quectel, CalAmp, Xirgo, and Laird.

    The accused Thales products appear to be identity/security components used in various products, even including airplanes, and implement cellular standards, especially 3G and 4G.

  • There's a case in the United States District Court of Delaware where apparently both Thales and Philips agreed that the court should set a global FRAND rate for a license agreement between them. Thales says Philips should just let the Delaware court do its job instead of seeking leverage from the ITC in orer to unilaterally impose its preferred terms on Thales.

  • The Delaware court denied a Thales motion for a U.S.-internal antisuit injunction (an instrument of which some United States Senators are, or pretend to be, blissfully ignorant) that would bar Philips from enforcing a U.S. import ban. But Thales appealed that decision. The preliminary-injunction appeal has been fully briefed and will be heard in the coming months.

    It's just laughable that ACT | The App(le) Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the appeal--as if small app developers cared about a U.S. import ban on telecommunications modules incorporated into airplanes and similar products. And three other Thales amici--Honda, Continental, and u-blox--first failed to file mandatory paper copies of their brief and then even their paper vesion was out of compliance with the appeals court's rules. But those stories don't mean that the appeal itself doesn't raise interesting questions. I haven't formed an opinion on the merits yet as I just downloaded the documents from the Federal Circuit docket this morning.

  • Either party would be interested in arbitration, but they disagree on the parameters, with Thales insisting on its rights under the ECJ's Huawei v. ZTE case law to challenge the essentiality and validity of Philips's declared-essential patents.

  • Meanwhile, Thales has become the third party--following in the footsteps of TCL and Xiaomi--to name the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) as a co-defendant in a FRAND antitrust case primarily targeting Philips. Philips filed the original complaint with the Tribunal juidiciare de Paris and an ex parte motion for the seizure of documents from a French Philips patent licensing executive (Sophie Pasquier), along with (obviously unofficial) English translations, with the ITC in late December, arguing that this was an attack on the U.S. case (as the seized documents also include communication between Philips and its U.S. outside counsel in the Thales dispute) with the help of a foreign court--and which Philip characterizes as typical of a party engaging in hold-out.

    For now, Thales is seeking €13.5 million from Philips--an antitrust damages claim based on U.S. litigation expenses. But the amount will go up should Philips actually obtain and enforce an ITC import ban. Thales criticizes ETSI for not having sanctioned Philips for its alleged FRAND breaches, and is seeking nominal damages (€1) from the standard-setting organization.

    I haven't formed an opinion on the merits of the French case either, for the same reason that I have yet to fully understand the parties' arguments in the Federal Circuit.

For now, let me just show you Philips's 272-page filing with the ITC that includes documents from the French case and English translations thereof:

21-12-23 Philips Motion to ... by Florian Mueller

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Friday, March 18, 2022

Ford's patent exhaustion defense to Sisvel's Delaware claims fails plausibility test: time hasn't stood still since 2008 Qualcomm-Nokia deal, others' similar defenses went nowhere

In early February, Ford filed its answer to patent licensing firm Sisvel's Delaware complaint, which is just one of several cases brought by Avanci licensors against the iconic U.S. automaker (case in point, IP Bridge is increasingly likely to obtain a Munich injunction against Ford next month). The part that stood out from Ford's Delaware submission was the claim that the former Nokia assets among the patents-in-suit were exhausted under a 2008 Qualcomm-Nokia license agreement that predated the 2012 transfer of those patents to Sisvel.

Two weeks later, Sisvel replied to multiple exhaustion-related paragraphs from Ford's counterclaims as follows:

"Paragraph [...] contains conclusions of law to which no answer is required, To the extent that an answer is required, Plaintiffs deny the allegations in Paragraph [...]. Plaintiffs are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph [...] and deny same."

Sisvel obviously doesn't know what exactly the Qualcomm-Nokia agreement says. Neither do I. But it is possible, just based on publicly accessible information, to make the reasonable inference that Ford's supposedly dispositive get-out-jail-free-card (with respect to some--not all--of the patents-in-suit) is just a Hail Mary pass:

  • Ford's theory is more of a fishing expedition than based on reliable facts. The wording is already odd: "[T]he assignment of the [...] patent to Sisvel in 2012 was subject to the July 2008 agreement between Nokia and Qualcomm" (emphasis added)

    If the assignment was "subject to" an agreement, that one would have been the transfer agreement between Sisvel and Nokia. What Ford means to imply here, but can't really claim, is that a certain encumbrance traveled with the transferred patents. But what encumbrance are they talking about? They don't seem to have any information beyond a 2008 press release that says "Nokia has agreed not to use any of its patents directly against Qualcomm." One can deduce from that passage that Nokia didn't grant Qualcomm a license. But everything else is unclear.

  • According to the press release, it was a 15-year deal. But the assumption that Nokia and Qualcomm would never have amended their 2008 agreement despite earth-shaking subsequent case law such as TransCore (a 2009 Federal Circuit decision according to which an unconditional covenant not to sue triggers exhaustion), and despite Nokia later exiting the mobile device business, flies in the face of all I know about industry practice and from following the FTC v. Qualcomm and Apple v. Qualcomm antitrust cases in granular detail. It is a typical human fallacy to assume that something (here, the Nokia-Qualcomm agreement) forever remains static. It's even worse when people believe that one factor is static while others are dynamic, only because that particular combination of static and dynamic elements would benefit them.

    As one of the attendees of the 2019 FTC v. Qualcomm trial in San Jose, I know that Qualcomm reacted to case law developments by changing the structure of its agreements.

  • If Ford was right, Nokia's licensing business couldn't possibly be as successful as it is given Qualcomm's market share. Sophisticated hardball-playing licensees like Apple wouldn't have paid nearly as much as they have. The best example may be the 2011 Nokia-Apple agreement, which fell into place only a few months after Apple's February 25, 2011 "Transition Agreement" with Qualcomm. It became known as a result of certain antitrust cases (such as this European Commission decision) that Apple agreed to buy all of its 4G/LTE chipsets from Qualcomm until the end of 2016. What triggered that spring 2011 settlement was the threat of two Mannheim injunctions (a hardware patent and one targeting the App Store), which had nothing to do with Qualcomm's chipsets. But the royalty was largely justified with the strength of Nokia's cellular SEP portfolio. Even when Apple renewed the Nokia deal in 2017, it was still using Qualcomm chips, though no longer exclusively. Analysts estimated that Nokia was making approximately $1 per iPhone. A huge upfront payment was made.

  • Another way to look at it is that it wouldn't make sense for Qualcomm to support Avanci (as a licensor) if it could simply provide car makers with a license to the largest portfolios in the Avanci pool through the sale of its chipsets.

  • The Qualcomm-Nokia agreement has come up in various other patent disputes over the years. Never once has an exhaustion defense centered around that particular agreement succeeded, no matter the jurisdiction.

    More than ten years ago I personally attended a preliminary-injunction hearing in Paris where Samsung was denied a PI because of a patent exhaustion defense by Apple involving Qualcomm chipsets. But that was about the Qualcomm-Samsung (not Qualcomm-Nokia) agreement, and part of the discussion there was whether Samsung had the right to terminate that agreement with respect to (only) Apple. Also, it was not a full trial: just a denial of a PI. That case is an outlier, and again, about a different Qualcomm contract.

    By contrast, every single defense according to which Nokia's patents were exhausted by Qualcomm's chips has failed:

    HTC tried this in the ITC and the England and Wales High Court (over non-SEPs, but exhaustion doesn't work differently for SEPs than for non-SEPs). This amicus brief by HTC in the Lexmark case (in which the Supreme Court expanded the concept of patent exhaustion in cross-border scenarios) summarizes its failure in the UK (before Justice Richard Arnold). The full October 2013 decision is available here. On May 2, 2013, the ITC's Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Pender entered Order No. 13 in investigation no. 337-TA-847 of a Nokia request for an import ban on HTC products. That order was the equivalent of a summary judgment in district court and threw out HTC's exhaustion defense because it was meritless even when viewed in the light most favorable to HTC. In those U.S. and UK decisions, the extraterritorial nature of the sale was dispositive. HTC settled with Nokia right before a final ITC decision, which shows that HTC presumably expected to lose.

  • The German SEP case at this stage is Sisvel v. Haier, and the regional appeals court in Dusseldorf (which did not make the famous final decision; that one was handed down by the Federal Court of Justice) dismissed Haier's patent exhaustion defense. The redacted version of the decision (in German) doesn't name Qualcomm, but it's anyone's guess.

    The same conclusion was reached by the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court in a Sisvel v. Wiko case (English translation published by Kather Augenstein, a law firm whose clients include Ericsson).

The bottom line is that in order for Ford to prevail on its patent exhaustion defense in the Sisvel Delaware case, it would have to be way smarter than smartphone makers including but not limited to Apple, who paid for a license to Nokia's patents despite using Qualcomm chips, and it would have to benefit from the Supreme Court's expanded patent-exhaustion doctrine under the 2017 Lexmark decision, presupposing (unrealistically) that Nokia and Qualcomm never amended their 2008 agreement--of which it is not even clear whether it ever could have helped Ford.

There were rumors in Germany that Volkswagen was going to raise a similar defense in Acer v. Volkswagen (not involving former Nokia patents, but another Qualcomm agreement). However, VW upgraded its Avanci license to 4G and thus never answered to the complaint: the complaint has been voluntarily dismissed.

The Ford case and the rumor about VW's plans show that the topic will surface from time to time. I don't have hard evidence that they're all wrong, but there's a mountain of indicia pointing in the direction of meritlessness.

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Friday, February 4, 2022

Ford responds to Sisvel's Delaware complaint with denial of actual 4G compliance, claims Nokia patents exhausted under Qualcomm contract

Ford is fighting a multi-front war against a couple of Avanci licensors:

  • In December, European patent licensing and pool administration firm Sisvel sued Ford in the District of Delaware over patents declared essential to the 4G/LTE standard. The parties stipulated to an extension of time for Ford's answer to the complaint. The new deadline passed yesterday, and after this introductory part I will show you and discuss Ford's responsive filing.

  • Sisvel has never asserted standard-essential patents exclusively in the United States without also doing so in Europe. And indeed, the Munich I Regional Court confirmed to me the pendency of two German Sisvel v. Ford SEP enforcement actions.

  • Japan's national patent licensing firm IP Bridge is suing Ford in Munich as well. Interestingly, IP Bridge has also lost its patience with Volkswagen, which unlike Ford has a 3G Avanci license for its high-volume brands (but actually needs a 4G license).

So here's yesterday's answer by Ford to Sisvel's Delaware complaint (this post continues below the document):

22-02-03 Ford Answer to Sis... by Florian Mueller

Ford's lawyers definitely did a thorough job. They've identified a minor (though repeated) oversight on Sisvel's part, alleging in the complaint that on certain dates Ford received information regarding certain patents that Sisvel actually acquired only later. But that's not going to be dispositive.

There are three aspects of Ford's defense strategy that I find interesting and will keep on eye on as the litigation unfolds:

  1. Ford's consistent answer to Sisvel's representation that "[Ford] advertises [a given product] is compliant with the 4G cellular network standards" is: "Denied."

    Ford says so even though its advertisements apparently do mention 4G. So Ford is saying what Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German), then sitting on the Mannheim Regional Court and now on the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, once told a defendant to an IPCom lawsuit: "First you say the patent doesn't read on [3G] UMTS, then you say 'we're not really doing UMTS.'" Different parties, different (newer) standard, but same thing here: Ford "denies that its Accused Instrumentalities [are] necessarily infringing [a given] patent" (emphasis added) because "Sisvel relies solely on 3GPP specifications without any substantiation that the accused modem chipsets practice the specific sections of the standard on which Sisvel relies on to alleged infringement by those modem products."

    It's a "Show me, I'm from Missouri" defense that rejects infringement contentions based on a mapping of the asserted patent claims to the specification of the standard. It may also have to do with Ford's strategy for denying that it received a proper infringement notice.

    In Germany, that won't work for Ford at the merits stage, but if Sisvel obtained a Munich injunction based on the specification of the standard, it would still have to prove at the enforcement stage (when seeking contempt-of-court sanctions) that an actual infringement occurred.

  2. Ford's answer to the complaint does not elaborate on, but hints at, a supply-chain licensing-based defense:

    "16. To the extent suppliers to Ford of any accused (i) baseband chipset, (ii) Network Access Device incorporating a baseband chipset, or (iii) Telematics Control Unit ('TCU') incorporating a Network Access Device make or sell products conforming to the applicable cellular standards, the ETSI IPR Policy requires a license be made available to those makers and sellers, i.e., the supply chain."

    The answer to the complaint doesn't specifically allege that Sisvel denied such a license to suppliers, but Ford's requested judicial declaration that "Sisvel has breached its contractual obligations under the ETSI IPR policy to license the Patents in Suit, on FRAND terms" is broad and vague, so the supply-chain licensing question may come up. (Note, however, that Ford does not mention the Avanci pool at all.)

  3. Ford raises a very specific supply-chain-based patent exhaustion defense concerning the '803, '443, and '070 patents, which belonged to Nokia until they were assigned to Sisvel in 2012. In July 2008, however, Nokia entered into a "15-year agreement" that involved a covenant not to sue, which Ford says exhausted those patents under Quanta with respect to "a Qualcomm baseband modem chipset installed in a Ford vehicle." And the answer to the complaint says that all TCUs on Ford production vehicles "use Qualcomm baseband modem chipsets and associated binary files."

    Sisvel does not claim that the two remaining patents-in-suit (from LG and BlackBerry) are exhausted under a contract with Qualcomm.

Patent exhaustion may also play a role in Acer v. Volkswagen. Many if not all of Volkswagen's cars come with components from LG that incorporate Qualcomm baseband chips. VW's answer to Acer's complaint (in the Eastern District of Virginia, the "rocket docket" for U.S. patent cases) is due on Monday (February 7).

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Tuesday, December 14, 2021

Sisvel becomes third Avanci licensor to sue Ford Motor Company over cellular standard-essential patents

The ink isn't dry yet on the Biden Administration's draft policy statement on standard-essential patent (SEP) enforcement, and an American industrial icon is already facing yet another SEP infringement lawsuit as Ford Motor Company got slapped yesterday with a complaint by Italian (but globally present) licensing firm Sisvel in the District of Delaware (this post continues below the document):

21-12-13 Sisvel v. Ford Com... by Florian Mueller

This makes Sisvel the third contributor to the Avanci pool to tell Ford that enough is enough, and hold-out must come to an end. Previously, L2 Mobile Technologies (a Longhorn IP subsidiary) also sued Ford in the same federal district, and Japan's IP Bridge is going after Ford in Munich.

Last year it became known that Ford had entered into a short-term patent license agreement with Nokia--sort of a covenant not to sue during a standstill period. A few months ago, Nokia announced a deal with an unnamed car maker, and one possibility is that Ford might have acceded to Nokia's royalty demands and taken a "real" license. The Avanci pool does not preclude its members from entering into bilateral license agreements with car makers or automotive suppliers. But when a car maker needs licenses from dozens of Avanci members, it may indeed find it more cost-efficient to take a pool license rather than engage in piecemeal resolution.

The complaint says Sisvel first made Ford a licensing offer in January 2017, and properly identified its 3G SEPs. There was some further correspondence, and in 2018 Sisvel made Ford another offer, which included 4G SEPs. While Ford continued its unlicensed use, Sisvel acquired further patents, which it specified in a 2019 letter. Four of the patents-in-suit were finally identified t Ford in a June 2021 letter. But "Ford refused to take a license to Sisvel's patents," the complaint states. And that's why Sisvel felt forced to bring the complaint shown further above.

The patents-in-suit were originally obtained by Nokia, BlackBerry (formerly known as Research In Motion), and LG Electronics:

Sisvel is represented in this case by the Delaware-based Devlin Law Firm.

I'll try to find out about any European cases. Sisvel has a history of enforcing patents in Germany, a major market in which Ford might be enjoined next year as the U.S. complaint's account of the history of licensing negotiations between the parties makes it fairly likely that German courts would consider Ford an unwilling licensee...

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Friday, October 22, 2021

L2 Mobile Technologies claims Qualcomm chips in Ford, Lincoln cars infringe 3G standard-essential patents originally obtained by ASUSTeK

Ford Motor Company appears to have a history of standard-essential patent (SEP) hold-out. It was unwilling to take an actual long-term license from Nokia a few years ago, so the parties entered into what was more of a standstill than license agreement. Last week I found out about an IP Bridge v. Ford infringement action in Munich. An injunction looms large, and just today Germany's chief patent judge said that a recent amendment to the patent injunction statute was merely "a clarification and consolidation of the case law". One of his side judges told another audience that any proposals to soften patent enforcement should be directed to the legislature. Therefore, Ford can expect to be enjoined in Germany unless it agrees to take a FRAND license or is cleared of infringement of any valid SEP.

Three weeks ago, L2 Mobile Technologies, a subsidiary of a Texas-based non-practicing entity named Longhorn IP, sued Ford in the District of Delaware over a handful of 3G SEPs (this post continues below the document):

21-10-01 L2 Mobile Technolo... by Florian Mueller

L2 announced the complaint on its website, on which it also recently reported a favorable validity determination on one of its Chinese patents and, about six months earlier, an infringement lawsuit against Google. Against Ford, L2 is not seeking an injunction, at least not at this stage, but treble damages. In order for such willfulness enhancement to be awarded, L2 must prove an objective and a subjective prong. The latter is about whether Ford actually had knowledge of its infringements of these patents. It appears that the underlying theory is based on Ford's decision not to take an Avanci pool license:

ATTEMPTS TO LICENSE FORD

17. L2MT is a member of the Avanci LLC patent pool. On information and belief, Avanci LLC made Ford a FRAND offer to patents that are essential to the 3G wireless communications standard. On information and belief, Ford declined to take a license to the Avanci LLC patent pool.

The Avanci pool contains the cellular SEP portfolios of dozens of companies, a number of which are way bigger than L2. If L2 prevailed on this objective-willfulness theory, all car makers with significant U.S. sales would have to be extra cautious when rejecting an Avanci licensing offer as they might be liable for treble damages when any Avanci licensors sue them in the United States.

A willful infringer and an unwilling licensee are the same type of market actor, just from different angles. In Germany, courts increasingly deem implementers unwilling licensees if they decline to take a pool license. Therefore, I wouldn't be surprised if a U.S. court considered Ford a willful infringer of any patents in the Avanci pool that the iconic car maker hasn't licensed bilaterally either.

L2's infringement allegations involve Qualcomm chips. Qualcomm is an Avanci contributor as well, but apparently does not have a license from L2. The patents-in-suit were originally obtained by ASUSTeK, a subsidiary of Taiwanese device maker ASUS, and later assigned to a non-practicing entity named Innovative Sonic (also based in Taiwan). That one brought some infringement litigation many years ago, such as against BlackBerry, and in 2018 joined Via Licensing's LTE pool. Via welcomed Innovative Sonic as an innovative leader. Somewhere along the way, Innovative Sonic assigned a bunch of former ASUSTeK SEPs to L2. Maybe Qualcomm had a cross-license in place with ASUSTeK, but Innovative Sonic and L2 obviously never needed a license or chipsets (which wouldn't be available without taking a license first) from Qualcomm.

These are the patents-in-suit:

  1. U.S. Patent No. 7,266,105 on a "method for determining triggering of a PDCP sequence number synchronization procedure" (PDCP means Packet Data Convergence Protocol)

  2. U.S. Patent No. 8,179,913 on a "method and apparatus of handling variable of RLC reset procedure during receiver-side-only re-establishment in wireless communications system" (RLC means Radio Link Control)

  3. U.S. Patent No. RE47,200 on "preventing shortened lifetimes of security keys in a wireless communications security system"

  4. U.S. Patent No. 8,054,777 on a "method and apparatus for handling control PDUs during re-establishing receiving sides in a wireless communications system" (PDU means Protocol Data Unit)

  5. U.S. Patent No. 8,064,460 on a "method and apparatus of delivering protocol data units for a user equipment in a wireless communications system"

The complaint correctly describes these patents as 3G-related. However, its third paragraph confuses 2G (GSM) and 3G--an unusual (but merely clerical) error in a wireless SEP complaint:

"The wireless communications devices in Ford's connected vehicles comply with the GSM wireless communications standard. This standard is also referred to as the '3G' wireless communications standard."

The costs of patent infringement litigation in the U.S. add up, and in the German IP Bridge case, Ford faces the threat of an injunction. It could take an Avanci pool license, but so far appears to have been opposed. It can also enter into bilateral license agreements.

Avanci itself doesn't hold patents and can't assert them, nor does it have the power to direct its licensors to enforce. Patent pools always have an obligation to inform their contributors (licensors) of any license agreements they conclude, and normally also keep them updated as to ongoing negotiations. For example, if Ford had been close to signing a deal with Avanci, L2 and IP Bridge would presumably have known and might then have waited instead of suing. But ultimately those companies are in the licensing business, and they can't let all car makers get away with unlicensed use forever. By suing Ford, they send out a clear message to others.

No coordination is needed for an independent patent holder to decide to sue the same entity after someone else decided to do so. Those companies do not mean to drive Ford out of business; they merely want to get paid. The more patent cases a given company has to defend against, the greater the incentive to settle at least some of them. A company like Apple or Samsung has to deal with numerous NPE cases in parallel, so one more wouldn't make a difference--but Ford is much smaller, and has much less expertise in the field of cellular SEP litigation. To me it just seems a logical choice that companies holding patents in the same field (regardless of whether they're even contributors to the same pool) would be more inclined to sue someone who is already embattled than pick another target.

For that reason alone, I would not attribute to malice (such as conspiracy) what can be adequately explained with natural litigation choices--and which Ford may have had coming because it apparently passed on licensing options of any kind, be it the Avanci pool or bilateral licenses such as with Nokia. Also, Qualcomm is a far bigger contributor to the Avanci pool than L2 (in fact, Qualcomm's portfolio dwarfs L2's), so the mere fact that L2's case against Ford accuses Qualcomm chips of infringement makes it impossible to imagine that Avanci would have orchestrated anything here.

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Tuesday, January 26, 2021

Continental brings complaint against Nokia in Delaware state court: new U.S. FRAND litigation strategy may protect Daimler

Automotive supplier Continental brought FRAND litigation against the Avanci pool and several of its contributors, particularly Nokia, in 2019. But its federal lawsuit was transferred from the Northern District of California to the Northern District of Texas (i.e., Dallas), and in September it was dismissed. Continental has appealed the dismissal to the Fifth Circuit. But "Conti" (as the company is commonly referred to in the automotive industry) isn't just waiting for the appellate proceedings to unfold (a decision will likely take about a year from now). Instead, Conti has now brought a new complaint specifically against Nokia in Delaware state court, and that one has the potential to become one of the most interesting FRAND cases worldwide (this post continues below the document):

21-01-25 Continental v. Nok... by Florian Mueller

Conti issued a press release about this case, which says the automotive supplier is "seeking to hold Nokia to its promise to license telecommunications patents based on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms" and nevertheless pursues antitrust claims against Avanci, Nokia and others in its federal case that is on appeal, "upholds its complaint with the European Commission against Nokia's abusive refusal of a FRAND license," and they're looking forward to the Court of Justice of the EU's decision on Nokia's obligations to grant exhaustive component-level SEP licenses (Nokia appealed the referral, but unsuccessfully so far).

The first question I asked myself was whether there was any overlap between this separate Delaware action against Nokia and the case that got dismissed in Texas, but might still be revived by the Fifth Circuit. It turns out that the FRAND contract claims (based on Nokia's FRAND pledges to ETSI, ATIS, and TIA) do, but in order to understand what that means, a clear distinction is key: the case dismissed in Dallas involves a mix of federal (antitrust) and state (mostly contract) claims. What the Dallas court dismissed with prejudice was the federal part--and that dismissal basically took the state law claims with it because a federal court won't hear a state claim unless there's a related federal claim in the same case. Should Conti's appeal succeed (too early to tell, but I don't expect it to be a cakewalk for them), some claims might be brought back to life, but by then the Delaware proceedings would already be fairly advanced and Conti could just drop such claims from the Texas action.

Should Conti obtain a FRAND license, its customers such as Daimler would be protected against Nokia's patent assertions.

Facing a FRAND case in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware is a blast from the past for the Finnish company, which sued Qualcomm there more than a decade ago in order to obtain a SEP license on FRAND terms, taking positions diametrically opposed to where it stands now that it's exited the handset business. Later, Nokia sued Apple in federal court in Delaware (not only, but also, over SEPs). In its dispute with Apple, Nokia described Delaware as its "corporate home in the United States," which Conti's complaint mentions in what might be a pre-emptive strike against any objections by Nokia to that particular venue.

I just mentioned Qualcomm, and the agreement that resulted from Nokia's Delaware action against Qualcomm could now set a ceiling for Nokia's FRAND royalty demands. First, a covenant not to sue triggers patent exhaustion in the U.S. under the Supreme Court's Quanta decision, and Conti is a Qualcomm customer. Second, "Nokia promised to offer certain royalty rates to Qualcomm’s customers." That license agreement didn't explicitly mention telematics control units (TCUs) like the ones Conti supplies to Daimler. So there'll have to be some discussion about whether Nokia's maximum-royalty promise applies. If it does, Nokia won't be able to base its royalty demands on the price of a car (or the value Nokia claims cellular connectivity adds to a car).

The question of whether a TCU is the equivalent of a mobile handset for SEP licensing purposes is also going to come up in the CJEU case over component-level licensing.

After California and Texas, Delaware--also known as The First State--is now the third U.S. state in which Conti is going after Nokia. Geographically speaking, the dispute has traveled from coast to coast, eastbound. I disagreed with some of what Conti did in California; I didn't follow the Texas case in detail, and the dismissal wasn't totally surprising; but this Delaware action--in what is probably the best state court in the U.S. to focus on commercial litigation--looks truly interesting. They're making good use of the time that it takes in the Fifth Circuit to defibrillate (which may or may not work out) the original Avanci case. And its own history in that venue will now come back to haunt Nokia, potentially resulting in royalties far below what it's seeking from Daimler.

Just looking at the extreme lengths to which Conti has to go to obtain a license from Nokia, I can't help but find it absurd how any German judge could deem a Conti customer like Daimler to be an unwilling licensee. There's an unwilling licensor here, Nokia, and figuratively speaking, Conti is chasing that one across the USA. Delaware may be the final destination in that regard.

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Saturday, September 14, 2019

Looney Coons meets resistance to ill-conceived STRONGER Patents bill that would increase patent troll litigation, harm high-tech innovators

Over at IPWatchdog they have a summary of this week's Senate Judiciary Committee hearing (video recording) on the STRONGER Patents Act, a bill primarily (but not exclusively) put forward and promoted by Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.). They place a little more emphasis on quotes from those supporting the bill, but they do acknowledge a "sharp split on injunctive relief, IPR [PTAB inter partes reviews] fixes."

The bill's name stands for "Support Technology & Research for Our Nation's Growth and Economic Resilience," but there's nothing positive to say about its content other than recognizing the creativity that went into the derivation of this marketing-friendly acronym and the fact that there is widespread consensus one should end USPTO fee diversion. While the tertiary item on "assisting small businesses in the U.S. patent system" sounds good, it's useless and amounts to diversionary tactics.

Like many--if not most--legislative proposals, "STRONGER" is a misnomer, and those opposing the pillars of that reactionary and harmful proposal stressed that stronger enforceability of patents doesn't mean a stronger innovation economy. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation accurately stated, that bill "would make bad patents stronger than ever." In a Washington Examiner op-ed, the R Street Institute's Charles Duan proposes that "Congress should look for solutions that enhance not the strength of patents, but the strength of patent correctness."

At its core, "STRONGER" is an

  • anti-America Invents Act,

  • anti-Supreme Court,

  • anti-Federal Circuit,

  • anti-PTAB,

  • anti-eBay v. MercExchange

basket of pernicious idiocies and boon for litigators, companies with products involving only one or a very few patented inventions, and above all, patent trolls. "MONGER" would be a more suitable name, in the sense of a warmonger (in this case, litigation, not literal war). The modified acronym could be resolved like this:

"Monetization Of Non-judiciously Granted Exclusionary Rights"

In a follow-up post I'll talk about the substantive points the witnesses (three in favor, three against) made at the hearing and in submissions (the record is open for a few more days). Before I get there, I'd like to discuss the two key players in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chairman Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) and, especially, the zealot behind the bill, Sen. Coons.

Should anybody ever have believed that quick passage was an option for the MONGER bill, those hopes should have been dashed by Sen. Tillis's efforts to distance himself from (at least) the proposed overruling of the eBay v. MercExchange standard for injunctive relief as well as the "one bite at the apple" approach to petitions for PTAB inter partes post-grant reviews.

It's regrettable that Sen. Tillis joined Looney Coons (I'll explain the reasons for that pejorative nickname toward the end of this post) in writing a letter to USPTO Director Andrei Iancu--a letter that the recipient had likely requested, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly--ahead of the PTAB rule changes I've previously criticized. But Sen. Tillis appears to have second thoughts, or at least wants to see how things evolve before taking the next steps and perpetuating and/or exacerbating anything.

Sen. Tillis has an IT background. Whether his previous role as a "partner" (with respect to the consulting business that used to belong to PricewaterhouseCoopers) with IBM makes him particularly receptive to Big Blue's pro-monetization patent policy ideas is another question, but at least this background contrasts nicely with Looney Coons's (according to Wikipedia) sole real-economy job experience as in-house counsel at W.L. Gore & Associates, the company known for Gore-Tex and other materials, a business in which you have pretty much a one-to-one relationship between patents and products.

Looney Coons has a very, very special relationship with the Gore-Tex company, as this archived Delaware Online article, which I found through a keywiki.org page summarizing information about Coons that Wikipedia presumably prefers to remain silent about, reveals:

"Soon after those tough times, Coons' mother, Sally, married again, this time to Robert Gore, the wealthy chairman of Newark-based fabrics-maker W.L. Gore & Associates. Coons was 14 at the time."

At W.L. Gore, Coons was responsible for ethics training, federal government relations, e-commerce legal work and for general commercial contracting. To be fair, as a Yale graduate (though it's unclear to what extent he owed his admission to his wealthy stepfather's connections) who clerked for a Third Circuit judge Coons could have had job opportunities outside the family business, but that's where he spent the only eight years of his real-economy professional life, with a political focus (albeit a non-exclusive one).

W.L. Gore was among the top contributors to Coons's 2010 Senate bid, which was the critical one: a special election to fill then-VPOTUS Joe Biden's seat. Conventional wisdom would have said that the Democratic primaries were the real challenge as Delaware has elected only Democratic senators since 1994, and has also been firmly blue for about as long. However, as the great Rush Limbaugh noted then, Obama presumably wouldn't have gone to Delaware to campaign for Coons if Republican candidate Christine O'Donnell hadn't had a prayer. Democratic leaders might have been more concerned than they admitted that an article in which Coons described himself as a bearded Marxist (I'll link to it and discuss it further below) posed a serious risk in the general election.

Other major donors included Skadden Arps and the second-largest Delaware law firm, Young Conaway. Law firms obviously stand to gain from more patent litigation. The latter has also been Coons's top donor in the second half of this decade, just like lawyers and law firms (with Paul Weiss and K&L Gates, both also known for patent lawsuits, among the top 5) were by far and away the top "industry" supporting him. Then there was Amgen, a biotech company, a type of business that in terms of the patents-to-products ratio is similarly situated as the Gore-Tex company. Pharma is the top three industry supporting him. Lobbyists are fifth on the list.

Prior to this post, I had mentioned Coons only once: back in July 2012. But I had noticed on different occasions that the then-freshman senator took very extreme pro-patentee positions. He appeared to be highly motivated (by whatever or whomever) to promote a pro-troll agenda, but others were more influential at the time. He's now approaching the end of his second term (the first full term), and has positioned himself as the stalwart of making patents stronger at the expense of companies that create highly multifunctional products.

Delaware's nickname is The First State, but it's also a tiny state, though a great place for registering companies. Compared to the size of the local economy, patent litigation is a significant business there. Last year, IP Watchdog reported that "patent litigation shifts towards Delaware." It's like the East Coast equivalent of the Eastern District of Texas, and Coons presumably seeks to incentivize patent litigation because the local economy of a dwarf state like his significantly benefits from travel by patent litigators and more jobs at local litigation firms. The state is so small that its district court could fund a substantial part of its operations just by collecting pro hac vice fees from lawyers coming there from other districts to assert or defend against patents.

Coons is still what they would call a backbencher in the UK, so while I follow U.S. politics very closely (far more closely than the politics of any other country), one doesn't hear about him too often. On the few occasions his positions on non-patent policy items made news, I typically disagreed with him, but I've researched his voting records and statements and, contrary to his youthful sin of calling himself a bearded Marxist, he actually tries very hard to position himself as a centrist on some issues, though he's most accurately labeled a "liberal populist" (according to OnTheIssues.org). Interestingly, he's now facing an attack from the far left with a view to next year's Democratic primaries as he gets blamed for not having opposed certain judges nominated by the Trump Administration. Those ultraliberals aren't satisfied with his efforts to delay and derail the Gorsuch and Kavanaugh nominations (which he tried very hard), and even his assertion that Justice Gorsuch occupied a "stolen seat" isn't sufficient for their taste. They wanted him to be radically opposed to anybody President Trump would nominate. While I don't agree with those guys, from a patent policy point of view I wish them luck.

One huge problem in the patent policy context (though I hope the MONGER bill is still going to die) is that Coons has a style and certain views that give him great access to Republican colleagues. He does reach out across the aisle, though his anti-wall collusion with McCain means nothing, as the Arizona senator even betrayed his own electorate on Obamacare because he had only one goal in his final years: to oppose President Trump, who had offended him not only by what he said (by the way, McCain was ranked 894th out of 899--or fifth from the bottom in a group of almost 1,000 people--when he graduated from the Naval Academy) but even more so by winning with a politically-incorrect campaigning style that McCain mistakenly rejected when he had the chance. But many other Republicans respect Coons for his leadership role in a Capitol Hill prayer group. There are indications that he's well-liked by a number of Republicans, not all of whom are RINOs, and fellow Democrats probably don't view him as an exceedingly electable rival for higher office.

So they let him advance a patent policy agenda that amounts to pandering to the law firms among his donors, the family business W.L. Gore, similarly-situated patent holders, lobbyists, and to promoting his thumbnail state's economic interest in patent litigation, especially since it's not easy for Delaware-registered companies to get a troll case moved out of that district.

His centrist reach-out-across-the-aisle initiatives largely appear to be like the joint anti-wall effort with McCain: people who don't understand the issues may be misled to believe that they're a compromise, when in reality they don't solve the problem they purport to tackle. The MONGER bill is very much like that, and hopefully other Democrats, but especially the Republican Senate majority, won't be fooled. Again, Senator Tillis's reservations are excellent news for innovation and economic growth.

Coons's rhetoric at the hearing came down to platitudes like Miles's Law ("where you stand depends on where you sit") and the desire to appear as an open-minded moderator of different views, but a leopard can't change its spots and Looney Coons is the best friends patent trolls have had in the United States Senate in years.

No matter how level-headed he may pretend to be, the terrible nature of his patent policy proposals in and of itself justifies calling him Looney Coons. A 1985 article that he wrote for The Amherst Student raises serious concerns over his reasonableness and, generally, his judgment: Chris Coons: The Making Of A Bearded Marxist" (in order to distance himself from that self-attached label, he now stresses he's a fiscal conservative, and the record in his county actually does support that claim)

It's about how his African experience made him switch allegiance from the GOP to the Democratic Party. While my Trumpian views are well-documented, there are Democrats whom I consider reasonable and with whom I agree on some issues--even with Bernie, who every once in a while raises a valid point or at least asks questions that nobody else asks though they warrant further thought. So the problem is not that Coons found himself in agreement with Democrats on more important issues than with Republicans.

Looney Coons wrote that he "spent the spring of [his] junior year in Africa on the St. Lawrence Kenya Study Program" even though his "friends, family and professors all advised against it." He simply felt an urge to "see the Third World for [himself] to get some perspective," and in Kenya he "saw [...] poverty and oppression more naked than any in America, and [he] studied under a bright and eloquent Marxist professor at the University of Nairobi." While he wrote that he was still "thankful for [America's, and I guess also the Gore-Tex family's) wealth and freedom," he "questioned Amherst, and America." It sounds like he somehow felt guilty for his better fortune, which would be stupid but looks like a plausible explanation.

The question here is judgment. He's just one of countless people from the Northern Hemisphere who feel attracted to impoverished countries, be it in Africa (even my otorhinolaryngologist spent some time at an Ethiopian hospital) or Hispanoamerica. But while I respect people's choice to do that, and know that some of them may nevertheless become successful entrepreneurs I'd be happy to do business with or great lawyers I'd be happy to hire in a non-ideological context, I don't want people like that to hold political office because there's a very high risk that they'll then impose such irrational choices on everyone else.

That kind of decision just doesn't make sense if one preserves a healthy degree of selfishness--which is why everyone told Coons not to go there. If you want to see a different part of the world, there's plenty of safer, healthier and more prosperous choices than a place like Kenya. Presumably the facts were similar at the time Coons went there: at this stage, more than 140 (!) countries in the world have a higher per-capita GDP than Kenya (according to Wikipedia), and 115 (!) countries are safer. Why would an American student, from an ultra-high-net-worth family, possibly go there instead of, say, Oxford (as Bill Clinton did), or maybe France, Japan, China. And if he wanted to be indoctrinated with Marxist propaganda, Moscow at the time would have been one of the safest cities in the world.

It was an irrational choice because he irresponsibly prioritized one goal over other valid considerations. A social justice warrior who at some point decided to be too good for his own good. If it's only about his own good, let him do that. If he had never returned, we'd never have heard about it. But a decision like that is, in my opinion, a symptom of a partial derangement. Human beings aren't computers, and it's not rational to be 100% rational; we don't operate exclusively on the basis of economic considerations and game theory. But it is irrational to take huge risks for no good reason. Without the slightest need. And it's also crazy to see problems in a far-away part of the world and to feel bad about having a better life.

Looney Coons wants weak patents--patents that the USPTO grants after an average of only approximately 20 hours of net examination time, large parts of which have nothing to do with prior art searches--to survive even challenges that have merit. And not just to survive, but to succeed in court or, with injunctions being very likely if he got his way, to be used by trolls and their lawyers to extort companies that make real products. Whether he does this for W.L. Gore, some pharma companies, the litigation firms and lobbyists among his top donors, for the local Delaware economy, or simply because he's irrationally obsessed with an idea of "STRONGER" patents that makes as little sense as his decision to go to Kenya and to blame America for Africa's problems, he doesn't deserve any support. The MONGER stuff should never even go to a vote. We'll talk about the dangerous substance of that proposal next time.

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Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Escalation: Nokia files new ITC complaint against Apple (plus a corresponding federal lawsuit)

Two days ago I just reported on an ITC judge's "final initial determination" (not a definitive ruling) to dismiss a complaint filed by Nokia against Apple over 7 patents back in December 2009. I also updated my battlelines diagram. Now the next update is already due: Nokia just filed another ITC complaint against Apple over seven patents -- and a complaint (over six of those seven patents) with the US District Court for the District of Delaware.

Today Nokia issued this press release. It's the most aggressive one Nokia has issued in this dispute, and probably the most aggressive one since its epic battle with Qualcomm.

Seven more patents asserted, virtually all Apple products accused

In its headline, Nokia "[a]lleges Apple infringes additional Nokia patents in virtually all products". The first paragraph of the announcement describes that product range as "virtually all of its mobile phones, portable music players, tablets and computers." Nokia's lists of accused products for the various patents are interesting. When the iPhone is named, some patents are claimed to be infringed by "at least Apple's iPhones for the AT&T network" and others by "at least Apple's iPhones for the Verizon network."

According to Nokia, the seven patents-in-suit relate to inventions "in the areas of multi-tasking operating systems, data synchronization, positioning, call quality and the use of Bluetooth accessories" (more details on the patents further below). Paul Mellin, Nokia's intellectual property VP, stresses Nokia's role as a pioneer by stating that "many [of those patents were] filed more than 10 years before Apple made its first iPhone."

It's actually not new for Nokia to attack a host of Apple product lines simultaneously. If you look at my reference lists on the previous complaints Nokia and Apple filed against each other (pages 24 to 34 of this document), you can see that Nokia already did this on other occasions. Some examples: page 27 contains a matrix that shows Nokia's first ITC complaint already accused products from the iPhone, iPod, Mac and MacBook lines. On page 31, you can find a similar table for a complaint that related to different iPhone, iPad, iPod and MacBook products.

Figuring out Nokia's motivation to do this

It's not a coincidence that Nokia takes this step so shortly after Friday's unfavorable determination. Preparing such a complaint always takes time, but Nokia probably knew it had an unfavorable determination coming, and Nokia must have been searching for some time for patents that it can assert against Apple. If you already know which patents you wish to assert against which products and have the claim charts (tables describing the language of the patent claims and the relevant characteristics of the allegedly infringing products) in place, you can also put together a complaint within a few days.

Many observers and analysts will now try to form an opinion on whether this latest action by Nokia is a sign of strength or weakness. I have thought about this and concluded that there is a significant degree of frustration shining through Nokia's announcement because things take so long, but more than anything else, Nokia is sending out a strong and unambiguous message that at the end of this epic battle Apple is going to have to send royalty checks to Finland.

Nokia's patent portfolio is roughly five times larger than Apple's. They both operate in the same industry resulting from the convergence of computing and communications technologies. Theoretically one "killer patent" can be stronger than a thousand other patents, and there are indeed significant quality differences between the patent portfolios of major high tech companies. But it's hard to imagine that Nokia's patents are, on average, so much weaker than Apple's that the outcome could be anything else than Apple being required to pay.

We haven't yet seen the end of this. If Nokia wants to, it can probably bring many more patents into position against Apple. I'm sure Apple also has the potential to make some more allegations, but at some point Apple will run out of patents that Nokia needs.

Trying to understand both parties' perspectives

I can very well understand Apple's perspective. Apple looks at the innovative breakthroughs it achieved in recent years -- a period during which Nokia was poorly managed. But Apple has always and especially recently been a proponent of a strong patent system, and you just can't have your cake and eat it. Those patents are valid for up to 20 years, a long time in this industry. It's the name of the game that patents give a pioneer like Nokia a strategic advantage over a late entrant like Apple.

There are no signs of Nokia trying to drive Apple out of business with its patents: between two players of that kind, destruction would be mutually assured. The question simply comes down to who will be the net payer. Nokia appears to be very convinced that it brings the more powerful patent portfolio to the table.

Strategically, Nokia would have a lot to gain from requiring Apple to take a royalty-bearing license. As I mentioned in my previous post, Nokia's management plans to monetize the company's patent portfolio more proactively now. Even if Nokia couldn't charge Apple royalties, it could probably still find many others in the industry who are weaker than Apple and have to pay. But if Nokia can show that it has the strength and the determination to bring Apple to its knees, most other device makers will think very, very hard before ever picking a fight with those Finns.

This is a total power play. I will soon update my visualization of the battlelines.

[Update] The patents-in-suit

I have now obtained a copy of the Delaware complaint (filed yesterday, case no. 1:11-cv-00259), so I can list the six patents Nokia asserted there:

All seven patents asserted in the ITC complaint are listed by law360.com. According to that list, the ITC complaint relates to the six patents listed above, plus the following one:

  • US Patent No. 7,558,696 on a "method and device for position determination" (that must be the patent Nokia meant by "positioning" in the list of technology areas in today's press release)

Nokia asserts the three database patents (the three first ones on the list) specifically against "Apple's iPhones for the AT&T network, iPads, iPod Touches, and MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air computers". The fourth patent ('932) is asserted against that same list except the MacBooks. The fifth and sixth patent are asserted against "the Apple iPhone 4 for the Verizon network".

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