Showing posts with label Senator Chris Coons. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Senator Chris Coons. Show all posts

Thursday, July 27, 2023

U.S. government steps up resistance to proposed EU SEP Regulation: USPTO director Vidal voices concerns at Senate hearing, announces 'all-of-government approach ... data-driven by feedback'

There are policy areas in which the European Union cannot vigorously defend the EU economy's interests without some transatlantic antagonism. Subsidies are an example. Standard-essential patents (SEPs) are not. Much to the contrary, a couple of major European SEP holders generate very significant revenues from licensees based in the United States.

But the EU's proposed SEP regulation is so fundamentally flawed that voices of reason from outside the EU are needed. One of them is the UK IPO with its very careful approach. Another example is the Biden Administration, and I just can't see why an initiative that harms European SEP holders is worth a rift between the EU and the United States.

Almost three months ago I reported on U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo having said at a Senate hearing that the U.S. government has officially commited "concerns" over the proposal to the European Commission. Yesterday (Wednesday, July 26) the Senate's Subcommittee on Intellectual Property (chairman: Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.)) held a USPTO oversight hearing, toward the end of which the following was said:

SENATOR COONS: This is my last question. ... I've been following with genuine concern recent proposed regulations by the European Union for what would essentially be an SEP rate court. That regulation, I'm concerned, validates China's practices ... and I had shared those concerns ... and [Secretary Raimondo] agreed the proposal is problematic. What steps has the USPTO taken to communicate concerns to our European colleagues and what steps do you think the Administration can and should take to guard against restrictions on SEP licensing in the EU and globally?

DIRECTOR VIDAL: As I mentioned in my opening remarks, that's one of the things that I'm keenly focused on: it's standards, because I think it's critical to our economy. I will say that when we withdrew the 2019 policy statement around SEPs with NIST and DOJ, it was because we see standards as an international issue that individual countries weighing in in these ways could be extremely problematic. So what we've done when it comes to the EU directorate is I've met with the EUIPO in Geneva [presumably a WTO/WIPO meeting] just a week and a half ago. I've also spoken to other stakeholders in Europe about this. We also are issuing soon an FR notice, a Federal Register notice, to seek feedback from U.S. stakeholders on international SEP policy so that we can inform an all-of-government approach. That's gonna be not just the USPTO. I'm doing that with NIST, our standards and technology group, and ITA, our international group within [the Department of] Commerce, so that we can get an all-of-government approach that's data-driven by feedback.

Thursday, May 4, 2023

U.S. Secretary of Commerce expressed Biden Administration's 'concerns' over EU SEP regulation proposal, also communicated them to EU Commission: Senate hearing

Not only former U.S. government officials have criticized the European Commission's proposal for a regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs) that was formally put on the table a week ago. I've obtained a transcript of a hearing that took place in the United States Senate last week, and it's now clear that the Biden Administration--represented at the hearing by Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo--considers the proposed SEP regulation to be harmful to U.S. patent holders.

The hearing obviously had a broader focus, and when he was already running out of time for his intervention, Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.)--the new chair of the Senate's IP Subcommittee--started to talk about "China's abusive practices with respect to standard essential patents, SEPs which are critical for advances, things like 5G." In U.S. political debates, China is the preferred bogeyman, and that is a bipartisan thing. Oddly, the European Commission, too, is playing that game. The Commission brought a WTO complaint over Chinese SEP case law, and at last week's presentation of the SEP proposal, Chinese companies' increasing SEP share also came up. While U.S. politicians are consistent in terms of viewing China's role as that of an implementer--conveniently ignoring the innovation that comes out of China--the EU contradicts itself by justifying an attempt to devalue SEPs with China's strength in SEPs and at the same time accusing China at the WTO level of weakening SEP enforcement.

Sen. Coons went on to criticize the EU proposal for the very opposite reason (Chinese implementers' interests) that EU commissioner Thierry Breton gave when he presented the legislative measure (Chinese SEP holders' strength):

"I have real concerns about the European Commission's new SEP regulations, which I understand are set to publish today. And if it goes in a certain direction, that resolution will just validate China's abuse of royalty setting practices and harm our patent owners. There may be room to engage with the European Commission to discuss the unintended, let's hope, consequences of their regulation. I just wondered what your position is on this regulation and whether you'll work with me to communicate the potential harm to our global competitiveness if this is adopted by our European partners." (emphases added)

It is moderately diplomatic to suggest that the negative consequences for the U.S. are hopefully ("let's hope") not intended. Between the lines he's expressing the concern that the EU may even be implementing an anti-IP scheme that is to at least some extent designed to harm U.S. innovators.

Secretary Raimondo's response indicates that the Biden Administration essentially agrees with Sen. Coons:

"Yeah, we share your concerns. I think we very much share your concerns and I will follow up with you. I had a team in Brussels last week expressing our concerns. And I'll be in Sweden in a few weeks for the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. I will put this in our discussion. So, we should get together before that."

Thanks to that hearing transcript, we now know that

  • the U.S. government has concerns over the proposed EU SEP regulation's negative impact on patent holders,

  • U.S. diplomats relayed those concerns to the EU (presumably the Commission, but at some point they may also talk to other EU institutions), and

  • the EU-US Trade and Technology Council will meet soon (in LuleĆ„, Sweden, on May 30th and 31st), on which occasion the U.S. will bring up the proposed SEP regulation as an issue that has negative implications for the transatlantic partnership.

Later today there'll be an official presentation of two studies commissioned by the EC's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW). I've already mentioned that three of the companies on whose input the EC primarily relied upon are actually conflicted (one because of advocacy of implementers' interests, and the other two because they just want to grow their patent data services business). The positions taken by the current U.S. government, the chair of the U.S. Senate's IP subcommittee, and previously by former U.S. government officials (Republicans and Democrats alike) suggest that whoever was working on the proposal never cared to clarify beforehand how the most important trading partner would react. In 2020, China overtook the U.S. as the EU's largest trading partner for goods, but "when services and investment are taken into account, the US remains the EU’s largest trading partner by far."

Tuesday, March 15, 2022

'Defending American Courts Act' presently looks more like PR stunt than serious and well-thought-out legislative proposal to combat foreign interference in U.S. patent enforcement

The "Defending American Courts Act" is by far and away the lowest-quality piece of work I've ever seen from U.S. lawmakers in an IP context. It's so poorly done that even if one totally agreed, for the sake of the argument, with its sponsors' objective as laid out in that jingoistic press release, it still wouldn't make sense. That is remarkable.

The world definitely has a problem with standard-essential patent (SEP) rulings that encroach on other jurisdictions. Patents are meant to be territorial rights, strictly country-by-country (with the upcoming Unitary Patent treating the EU's Single Market as a country), but SEPs involve questions under contract and/or antitrust law. Contracts, or even just offers to enter into contracts, can have global scope, and relevant antitrust markets or determinations on whether a party's conduct was fair can be global, too.

I discussed the problem of extraterritorial overreach last May and published the slide deck I used for my contribution to a European Commission webinar on SEP enforcement.

So I'm definitely not a denier--I just advocate symmetry and rationality. It's key to understand that some extraterritorial decisions are actually just a reaction to what previously went wrong in other places. Also I've consistently praised the restraint that American courts exercise: if one party declines to be bound by a global FRAND rate-setting decision, they don't force it into such a license agreement; and even if both parties ask a U.S. court to set a global rate for them, U.S. courts don't necessarily devote time to such an effort.

The EU is complaining about Chinese antisuit injunctions. Its pending request for consultations, which is a complaint by any other name, is soon going to be put before a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) panel as it's a given that the EU won't be satisfied with China's response no matter the content. The United States could advocate its approach--being the last major jurisdiction not to force SEP holders or implementers into global license agreement--at the WTO level and/or through bilateral talks. If everyone exercised the same restraint as American courts, there wouldn't be a problem left to be solved by the proposed bill. There would be no more global rate-setting decisions in China, no more UK patent injunctions that become enforceable unless a defendant takes a license on court-ordered terms, no more German patent injunctions that come down because all that an implementer is prepared to do to avoid a German sales ban is to take a license to the German part of a given SEP portfolio.

To be fair, SEP holders do have a point when they argue that negotiated license agreements are almost always global, and piecemeal resolution requiring litigation in numerous jurisdictions isn't practical. That's a very valid policy concern. Hold-out is a serious issue in the technology industry, and there are implementers who would have to lose in maybe five or ten (if not more) jurisdictions before they would come to reason and finally take a global license. I'm not denying that part either.

Let's not spend too much time on the press release, which is replete with anti-Chinese rhetoric. Just one observation: Those "so-called 'anti-suit injunctions'" are not a Chinese legal innovation. The first Chinese SEP-related antisuit injunction came about a decade after the Microsoft v. Motorola antisuit injunction in the Western District of Washington that (for good reason) barred Motorola Mobility from enforcing a pair of Mannheim SEP injunctions. Maybe the concept of an antisuit injunction is part of the "American Intellectual Property" that Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tom Cotton (R-AR), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), and Rick Scott (R-FL) accuse "the Chinese Community Party" of "stealing"--though America inherited it from the UK as a common law instrument.

It just doesn't come across as very sophisticated and thoroughly-researched when a press release makes it sound like China had contrived something strange and the reality is that it's part of American legal tradition.

Now let's finally turn to the proposed statute (S.3772). The plan is to add an additional § 274 to U.S. patent law (35 U.S.C.) relating to "foreign interference." It then defines "anti-suit injunction" as "an injunction issued by a foreign tribunal that purports to restrict the rights of a person to file or maintain [...] a claim of infringement of any claim of a United States patent in a tribunal of the United States [or the equivalent in the form of an ITC complaint]" as well as the related appeals. Those of you who have litigated SEP antisuit (and anti-antisuit) cases may already have noticed a major flaw: it's a narrow definition of an "anti-suit" injunction that doesn't--or at a minimum does not with sufficient clarity--cover "anti-enforcement" injunctions. For instance, the Microsoft v. Motorola antisuit injunction that Judge James Robart ordered in Seattle (and which the Ninth Circuit upheld) was not strictly an antisuit injunction: Motorola remained free to litigate the case (as it did) and to seek damages. It just wasn't able to enforce an injunction.

The language of the proposed statute refers only to "claims of infringement" but not to the enforcement of injunctive remedies. I've looked up various legal dictionaries. Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute explains the term "claim" extremely well:

"A set of operative facts creating a right enforceable in court."

That dictionary also clarifies that "'claim' is slightly broader [than 'cause of action']," but in my understanding--please let me know via my contact form if you find evidence to the contrary--that does not mean it's a synonym for the enforcement of remedies.

The way those SEP antisuit injunctions typically work--and again, we don't have to look to China but can find examples in the U.S., especially the seminal one from Seattle--is that the enforcement of injunctive relief (as it has the potential to force someone into a global license deal, which would resolve a global dispute, thereby depriving all other courts of jurisdiction) is barred until the enjoining court has decided its case, which may then lead to a global license agreement that does away with the foreign infringement action.

Not only does the bill wrongly focus on "claim" (rather than the enforcement of remedies based on a claim) but it then also envisions the wrong sanctions--and especially sanctions that make no sense with respect to those alleged Chinese infringers. Just when you think it can't get worse...

The sanctions for someone leveraging a foreign antisuit injunction would be that:

  • § 274 (b) Civil Action Presumptions:

    • "(1) the infringement is willful when determining whether to increase damages under section 284; and

    • "(2) the action is exceptional when determining whether to award attorney fees under section 285"

  • § 274 (c) PTAB: discretionary denial of IPR petition

If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is a need to prevent China from stealing U.S. intellectual property, what Chinese company would really be impacted or deterred by this? Where are those Chinese companies that sell tons of smartphones and similar devices in the U.S. so that treble damages would hurt? Americans sure buy lots of China-made phones, but those are mostly iPhones...

Even if it's not about China, but say, you have a dispute between Samsung and a U.S. patent holder, it still wouldn't make sense on the bottom line. Samsung does a lot of business in the U.S., sure. So damages could be costly (though Samsung would never actually have to pay them if a foreign court meanwhile forces the patent holder into a global license agreement, which resolves the global dispute). But what would be the point in Samsung (which obtained a Chinese antisuit injunction against Ericsson about a year ago) not getting a PTAB review of the U.S. company's patents-in-suit? If the PTAB upholds those patents, great. If it doesn't, then those patents are invalid, and invalid patents aren't property. But Samsung would also do U.S. defendants a favor by eliminating patents that shouldn't have issued in the first place. Samsung and Ericsson settled quickly, but Apple is now actually recycling Samsung's 2021 PTAB petitions.

A few constructive suggestions:

  • Instead of taking ill-conceived unilateral action through legislation, U.S. Senators should have more confidence in their country's courts. In this context, U.S. judges are probably in a better position to come up with solutions than the legislature. For example, Judge Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas granted Ericsson an anti-antisuit injunction against Samsung's Chinese antisuit injunction. It was appealed to the Federal Circuit, but then they settled.

  • As I said further above, the U.S. does stand on higher ground with respect to extraterritorial patent rulings. Its antisuit injunctions come down only in exceptional cases (and interestingly, Chinese courts perform a multifactorial analysis that is far more similar to the U.S. approach than what you see in the UK or Germany). With the EU and China having a WTO dispute over the issue, the United States could and in my view should call on all other jurisdictions (including the EU and the UK) to refrain from patent rulings, including patent injunctions, that effectively force one party or the other to take a global license.

  • If you want to enact a Defending American Courts Act, just make it easy--or, in fact, mandatory--for American courts to decline to recognize unilaterally-imposed global patent license agreements with respect to U.S. patents. If a UK court forces Apple to take a global portfolio license, a German court threatens to enjoin Ford unless it caves to a SEP holders demands on a global basis, or a Chinese court orders a patent holder like Dolby at an implementer's request to grant a global portfolio license--just don't recognize the U.S. part of those contracts. Let the patentee enforce those U.S. patents as if that foreign-imposed contract didn't exist in the first place, or let the implementer (such as an Apple) ask a U.S. court to set a FRAND rate for the U.S. part of the portfolio and potentially seek a refund if the foreign-imposed license agreement requires the implementer to overpay. If in the next step a party avails itself of the foreign court to impose contempt sanctions on the other party only because it wants American courts to rule on U.S. patents, the sanctions in the U.S. should be draconian so they truly deter bad behavior.

However, if it's a mid-term election year and you just want to fire some cheap shots at China, the current legislative proposal may be good enough. But only if the objective has nothing or very little to do with actually defending American courts' jurisdiction over U.S. patents.

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Saturday, September 14, 2019

Looney Coons meets resistance to ill-conceived STRONGER Patents bill that would increase patent troll litigation, harm high-tech innovators

Over at IPWatchdog they have a summary of this week's Senate Judiciary Committee hearing (video recording) on the STRONGER Patents Act, a bill primarily (but not exclusively) put forward and promoted by Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.). They place a little more emphasis on quotes from those supporting the bill, but they do acknowledge a "sharp split on injunctive relief, IPR [PTAB inter partes reviews] fixes."

The bill's name stands for "Support Technology & Research for Our Nation's Growth and Economic Resilience," but there's nothing positive to say about its content other than recognizing the creativity that went into the derivation of this marketing-friendly acronym and the fact that there is widespread consensus one should end USPTO fee diversion. While the tertiary item on "assisting small businesses in the U.S. patent system" sounds good, it's useless and amounts to diversionary tactics.

Like many--if not most--legislative proposals, "STRONGER" is a misnomer, and those opposing the pillars of that reactionary and harmful proposal stressed that stronger enforceability of patents doesn't mean a stronger innovation economy. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation accurately stated, that bill "would make bad patents stronger than ever." In a Washington Examiner op-ed, the R Street Institute's Charles Duan proposes that "Congress should look for solutions that enhance not the strength of patents, but the strength of patent correctness."

At its core, "STRONGER" is an

  • anti-America Invents Act,

  • anti-Supreme Court,

  • anti-Federal Circuit,

  • anti-PTAB,

  • anti-eBay v. MercExchange

basket of pernicious idiocies and boon for litigators, companies with products involving only one or a very few patented inventions, and above all, patent trolls. "MONGER" would be a more suitable name, in the sense of a warmonger (in this case, litigation, not literal war). The modified acronym could be resolved like this:

"Monetization Of Non-judiciously Granted Exclusionary Rights"

In a follow-up post I'll talk about the substantive points the witnesses (three in favor, three against) made at the hearing and in submissions (the record is open for a few more days). Before I get there, I'd like to discuss the two key players in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chairman Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) and, especially, the zealot behind the bill, Sen. Coons.

Should anybody ever have believed that quick passage was an option for the MONGER bill, those hopes should have been dashed by Sen. Tillis's efforts to distance himself from (at least) the proposed overruling of the eBay v. MercExchange standard for injunctive relief as well as the "one bite at the apple" approach to petitions for PTAB inter partes post-grant reviews.

It's regrettable that Sen. Tillis joined Looney Coons (I'll explain the reasons for that pejorative nickname toward the end of this post) in writing a letter to USPTO Director Andrei Iancu--a letter that the recipient had likely requested, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly--ahead of the PTAB rule changes I've previously criticized. But Sen. Tillis appears to have second thoughts, or at least wants to see how things evolve before taking the next steps and perpetuating and/or exacerbating anything.

Sen. Tillis has an IT background. Whether his previous role as a "partner" (with respect to the consulting business that used to belong to PricewaterhouseCoopers) with IBM makes him particularly receptive to Big Blue's pro-monetization patent policy ideas is another question, but at least this background contrasts nicely with Looney Coons's (according to Wikipedia) sole real-economy job experience as in-house counsel at W.L. Gore & Associates, the company known for Gore-Tex and other materials, a business in which you have pretty much a one-to-one relationship between patents and products.

Looney Coons has a very, very special relationship with the Gore-Tex company, as this archived Delaware Online article, which I found through a keywiki.org page summarizing information about Coons that Wikipedia presumably prefers to remain silent about, reveals:

"Soon after those tough times, Coons' mother, Sally, married again, this time to Robert Gore, the wealthy chairman of Newark-based fabrics-maker W.L. Gore & Associates. Coons was 14 at the time."

At W.L. Gore, Coons was responsible for ethics training, federal government relations, e-commerce legal work and for general commercial contracting. To be fair, as a Yale graduate (though it's unclear to what extent he owed his admission to his wealthy stepfather's connections) who clerked for a Third Circuit judge Coons could have had job opportunities outside the family business, but that's where he spent the only eight years of his real-economy professional life, with a political focus (albeit a non-exclusive one).

W.L. Gore was among the top contributors to Coons's 2010 Senate bid, which was the critical one: a special election to fill then-VPOTUS Joe Biden's seat. Conventional wisdom would have said that the Democratic primaries were the real challenge as Delaware has elected only Democratic senators since 1994, and has also been firmly blue for about as long. However, as the great Rush Limbaugh noted then, Obama presumably wouldn't have gone to Delaware to campaign for Coons if Republican candidate Christine O'Donnell hadn't had a prayer. Democratic leaders might have been more concerned than they admitted that an article in which Coons described himself as a bearded Marxist (I'll link to it and discuss it further below) posed a serious risk in the general election.

Other major donors included Skadden Arps and the second-largest Delaware law firm, Young Conaway. Law firms obviously stand to gain from more patent litigation. The latter has also been Coons's top donor in the second half of this decade, just like lawyers and law firms (with Paul Weiss and K&L Gates, both also known for patent lawsuits, among the top 5) were by far and away the top "industry" supporting him. Then there was Amgen, a biotech company, a type of business that in terms of the patents-to-products ratio is similarly situated as the Gore-Tex company. Pharma is the top three industry supporting him. Lobbyists are fifth on the list.

Prior to this post, I had mentioned Coons only once: back in July 2012. But I had noticed on different occasions that the then-freshman senator took very extreme pro-patentee positions. He appeared to be highly motivated (by whatever or whomever) to promote a pro-troll agenda, but others were more influential at the time. He's now approaching the end of his second term (the first full term), and has positioned himself as the stalwart of making patents stronger at the expense of companies that create highly multifunctional products.

Delaware's nickname is The First State, but it's also a tiny state, though a great place for registering companies. Compared to the size of the local economy, patent litigation is a significant business there. Last year, IP Watchdog reported that "patent litigation shifts towards Delaware." It's like the East Coast equivalent of the Eastern District of Texas, and Coons presumably seeks to incentivize patent litigation because the local economy of a dwarf state like his significantly benefits from travel by patent litigators and more jobs at local litigation firms. The state is so small that its district court could fund a substantial part of its operations just by collecting pro hac vice fees from lawyers coming there from other districts to assert or defend against patents.

Coons is still what they would call a backbencher in the UK, so while I follow U.S. politics very closely (far more closely than the politics of any other country), one doesn't hear about him too often. On the few occasions his positions on non-patent policy items made news, I typically disagreed with him, but I've researched his voting records and statements and, contrary to his youthful sin of calling himself a bearded Marxist, he actually tries very hard to position himself as a centrist on some issues, though he's most accurately labeled a "liberal populist" (according to OnTheIssues.org). Interestingly, he's now facing an attack from the far left with a view to next year's Democratic primaries as he gets blamed for not having opposed certain judges nominated by the Trump Administration. Those ultraliberals aren't satisfied with his efforts to delay and derail the Gorsuch and Kavanaugh nominations (which he tried very hard), and even his assertion that Justice Gorsuch occupied a "stolen seat" isn't sufficient for their taste. They wanted him to be radically opposed to anybody President Trump would nominate. While I don't agree with those guys, from a patent policy point of view I wish them luck.

One huge problem in the patent policy context (though I hope the MONGER bill is still going to die) is that Coons has a style and certain views that give him great access to Republican colleagues. He does reach out across the aisle, though his anti-wall collusion with McCain means nothing, as the Arizona senator even betrayed his own electorate on Obamacare because he had only one goal in his final years: to oppose President Trump, who had offended him not only by what he said (by the way, McCain was ranked 894th out of 899--or fifth from the bottom in a group of almost 1,000 people--when he graduated from the Naval Academy) but even more so by winning with a politically-incorrect campaigning style that McCain mistakenly rejected when he had the chance. But many other Republicans respect Coons for his leadership role in a Capitol Hill prayer group. There are indications that he's well-liked by a number of Republicans, not all of whom are RINOs, and fellow Democrats probably don't view him as an exceedingly electable rival for higher office.

So they let him advance a patent policy agenda that amounts to pandering to the law firms among his donors, the family business W.L. Gore, similarly-situated patent holders, lobbyists, and to promoting his thumbnail state's economic interest in patent litigation, especially since it's not easy for Delaware-registered companies to get a troll case moved out of that district.

His centrist reach-out-across-the-aisle initiatives largely appear to be like the joint anti-wall effort with McCain: people who don't understand the issues may be misled to believe that they're a compromise, when in reality they don't solve the problem they purport to tackle. The MONGER bill is very much like that, and hopefully other Democrats, but especially the Republican Senate majority, won't be fooled. Again, Senator Tillis's reservations are excellent news for innovation and economic growth.

Coons's rhetoric at the hearing came down to platitudes like Miles's Law ("where you stand depends on where you sit") and the desire to appear as an open-minded moderator of different views, but a leopard can't change its spots and Looney Coons is the best friends patent trolls have had in the United States Senate in years.

No matter how level-headed he may pretend to be, the terrible nature of his patent policy proposals in and of itself justifies calling him Looney Coons. A 1985 article that he wrote for The Amherst Student raises serious concerns over his reasonableness and, generally, his judgment: Chris Coons: The Making Of A Bearded Marxist" (in order to distance himself from that self-attached label, he now stresses he's a fiscal conservative, and the record in his county actually does support that claim)

It's about how his African experience made him switch allegiance from the GOP to the Democratic Party. While my Trumpian views are well-documented, there are Democrats whom I consider reasonable and with whom I agree on some issues--even with Bernie, who every once in a while raises a valid point or at least asks questions that nobody else asks though they warrant further thought. So the problem is not that Coons found himself in agreement with Democrats on more important issues than with Republicans.

Looney Coons wrote that he "spent the spring of [his] junior year in Africa on the St. Lawrence Kenya Study Program" even though his "friends, family and professors all advised against it." He simply felt an urge to "see the Third World for [himself] to get some perspective," and in Kenya he "saw [...] poverty and oppression more naked than any in America, and [he] studied under a bright and eloquent Marxist professor at the University of Nairobi." While he wrote that he was still "thankful for [America's, and I guess also the Gore-Tex family's) wealth and freedom," he "questioned Amherst, and America." It sounds like he somehow felt guilty for his better fortune, which would be stupid but looks like a plausible explanation.

The question here is judgment. He's just one of countless people from the Northern Hemisphere who feel attracted to impoverished countries, be it in Africa (even my otorhinolaryngologist spent some time at an Ethiopian hospital) or Hispanoamerica. But while I respect people's choice to do that, and know that some of them may nevertheless become successful entrepreneurs I'd be happy to do business with or great lawyers I'd be happy to hire in a non-ideological context, I don't want people like that to hold political office because there's a very high risk that they'll then impose such irrational choices on everyone else.

That kind of decision just doesn't make sense if one preserves a healthy degree of selfishness--which is why everyone told Coons not to go there. If you want to see a different part of the world, there's plenty of safer, healthier and more prosperous choices than a place like Kenya. Presumably the facts were similar at the time Coons went there: at this stage, more than 140 (!) countries in the world have a higher per-capita GDP than Kenya (according to Wikipedia), and 115 (!) countries are safer. Why would an American student, from an ultra-high-net-worth family, possibly go there instead of, say, Oxford (as Bill Clinton did), or maybe France, Japan, China. And if he wanted to be indoctrinated with Marxist propaganda, Moscow at the time would have been one of the safest cities in the world.

It was an irrational choice because he irresponsibly prioritized one goal over other valid considerations. A social justice warrior who at some point decided to be too good for his own good. If it's only about his own good, let him do that. If he had never returned, we'd never have heard about it. But a decision like that is, in my opinion, a symptom of a partial derangement. Human beings aren't computers, and it's not rational to be 100% rational; we don't operate exclusively on the basis of economic considerations and game theory. But it is irrational to take huge risks for no good reason. Without the slightest need. And it's also crazy to see problems in a far-away part of the world and to feel bad about having a better life.

Looney Coons wants weak patents--patents that the USPTO grants after an average of only approximately 20 hours of net examination time, large parts of which have nothing to do with prior art searches--to survive even challenges that have merit. And not just to survive, but to succeed in court or, with injunctions being very likely if he got his way, to be used by trolls and their lawyers to extort companies that make real products. Whether he does this for W.L. Gore, some pharma companies, the litigation firms and lobbyists among his top donors, for the local Delaware economy, or simply because he's irrationally obsessed with an idea of "STRONGER" patents that makes as little sense as his decision to go to Kenya and to blame America for Africa's problems, he doesn't deserve any support. The MONGER stuff should never even go to a vote. We'll talk about the dangerous substance of that proposal next time.

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