Showing posts with label Xbox. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Xbox. Show all posts

Monday, June 26, 2023

Economics of platform owners' exclusive deals with third-party game makers in light of Microsoft-Activision merger reviews

The prize for the economically most nonsensical question I've ever heard an attorney ask a witness in an antitrust case goes to an institution that I hope will recover--the sooner, the better--from its current crisis: the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC). There's an FTC v. Microsoft & Activision Blizzard preliminary injunction hearing ongoing, and at about halftime it's already clear that the FTC is losing and short of the greatest miracle in any comparable situation is not going to turn this around. On Day 2 (Friday, June 23), the presently misguided agency's Chief Deputy Trial Counsel asked Microsoft Gaming (Xbox) CEO Phil Spencer how Microsoft could afford a $70 billion acquisition if, based on what Mr. Spencer had testified before, it could not afford (from a profitability point of view) making third-party games exclusive to the Xbox the way Sony can by virtue of its dominant market position.

To explain why that comparison is not even apples to oranges but completely nuts would not take a blog post. A family may not be ale to afford a night in a presidential suite of a big-city 5-star hotel for tens of thousands of dollars even if it can afford buying a $1 million house. That's the difference between consumption and investment: the money spent on the luxury accomodation for one night is gone, while buying a house either saves rent every month (if the owners live in it) or generates passive income.

The FTC's desperation in that merger case makes its lawyers go off the deep end. It's a major embarrassment. Obviously lawyers aren't economists or business administrators, but that entire litigation department's focus is on antitrust case, and antitrust is at the intersection of economics and law. Mr. Spencer noted that the premise of the question was "incorrect" and that was a diplomatic way of putting it. Then the headline of my previous post on that case, which noted the "evidentiary and intellectual bankruptcy" of the FTC's "case" against Microsoft-Activision was also rather mild: an argument can be intellectually bankrupt, or even a naive fallacy or miscalcuation, without being completely crazy. Here, foreclosure with respect to a title like Call of Duty is not an option regardless of whether it would be compensated for by means of an exclusive agreement between independent companies or results from an acquisition.

The purpose of this post is to explain the economics of third-party exclusives, from the perspectives of platform owners and app (game) makers. And to do so in light of the Microsoft-Activision merger reviews.

I'm going to explain this in simple and general terms, unlike economist who would of course transform all of those considerations into multi-line formulae with plenty of Greek letters.

What makes this relevant in connection with that particular merger is more than the FTC's least logical question. It's also that the San Francisco hearing (which I'm attending in person) revealed that the impetus for Microsoft to acquire ZeniMax (best known for its Bethesda Softworks game label) came from a clear and present danger of that company's then-upcoming and much anticipated Starfield game otherwise having become a PlayStation-exclusive title.

In a couple of days, the FTC's economic expert witness, Harvard professor Robin Lee, is going to testify (via video deposition, apparently), and he may contradict his own papers on the effects of content exclusivity on competition between platforms, including but not limited to a 2013 paper that focused specifically on videogame consoles. Microsoft doesn't want to withdraw Call of Duty from the PlayStation anyway, but in the past Robin Lee argued that content exclusivity enabled new entrants to gain a foothold in a platform market by overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem that customers won't buy consoles without games and game makers won't make games for consoles without an installed base.

While the 2013 Lee paper correctly argued that exclusive content may enable a new entrant to compete with the incumbent(s), or smaller players to attract enough users to keep their platforms alive, it is also a fact--and a huge problem--that a dominant player can strike exclusive content deals at a lower cost, thereby increasing its market share: exacerbating the impact of increasing returns, and serving as an accelerant of network effects that could ultimately burn down competition in a given area.

Mr. Spencer explained in his testimony that "compensating [a game maker] for skipping a platform" is cheaper when the one who secures the exclusive is the dominant market leader. Let's look at the various reasons for why that is so, and while I've never personally done a deal like that, I launched an iOS-only trivia game in 2017 and experienced the problem of not being on a platform with a larger installed base (Android). So in a way I'm speaking from experience here, not just from a theoretical vantage point of a litigation watcher with an interest in a functioning competitive process.

While the discussion here is about deals between platform makers and a third party, the logic can be applied mutatis mutandis (meaning with the required adjustments) to first-party titles that are made by a game maker itself. It's just easier to understand the dynamics when the game maker is an independent economic operator as opposed to a division of one of them.

1. Direct opportunity cost of unavailability of title on other platform(s)

Let's start with the simplest model--and his oversimplifies it, but holistic analysis actually makes the problem even worse. Assuming we have a two-horse race (like Android and iOS) and one platform represents two thirds of the market and the other one third. Let's assume that purchasing power is the same on either platform (which is definitely not the case in mobile, but may be the case with consoles), and that a given game for which an exclusive deal is being negotiated is equally appealing to the user bases of either platform. In practice, the latter is rarely the case: for instance, a game may be more appealing to Asian than European customers, and platform market share distribution may vary from continent to continent. But let's keep it simple.

Let's simply assume that customers have either platform A (the 66% player) or B (the 33% player). In practice, there will be some users who "multihome" and then the question is whether they are equally willing to buy a game on either platform. And there may be a different type of platform, such as gaming PCs, so if Player A acquires an exclusive only with a view to consoles, Player B's customers may then have a third way of playing a game, even if not on their preferred device type for gaming.

Player A owns 66% of the market (sort of "our Sony" for the purposes of this analysis) and has to compensate a game maker for skipping, with respect to a given title, the Xbox; conversely, if we adopt Sony's and the FTC's market definition and have a two-horse race before us, Player B ("our Xbox") has to compensate the same game maker for skipping the PlayStation.

In this simplest of all models, Player A has to pay only half as much for an exclusive deal as Player B, given that it must compensate for the opportunity cost from forgoing only 33% of the market opportunity versus 66% if Player B strikes the exclusive deal.

Now, if we assume Player A capitalizes on this cost advantage not just with respect to one title, but in many cases, then after a cycle (for instance, five years), its market share may--not necessarily only, but in no small part also due to those exclusive content deals--have grown from 66% to 72%, and that of Player B may have shrunk from 33% to 27%. Then the relative cost advantage of Player A increases form a factor of 2.0 to one of 2.7. The result would be even more exclusive deals, and after a few cycles, the market would not just be dominated but plainly monopolized by Player A.

Player A has twice the revenue opportunity with a given game to generate--just from game sales, not even counting console sales and the revenues involving other content (than that particular game) those device sales entail--the income to pay for what will cost only half as much: an exclusive deal.

The solution to this competitiveness problem is not that one looks at whether Player B has other business units (in Microsoft's case, that would mean Windows, Office, or Azure) that can cross-subsidize the platform we are focusing on here. For a short period, that may be an option, but it's not sustainable and a publicly traded company sooner or later comes under pressure not to operate a bottomless pit. Even Meta, despite Mark Zuckerberg's preferential voting rights, ultimately felt forced to cut costs in some loss-making areas.

2. Partial exclusives (also including exclusive marketing rights)

The FTC and its sole ally in this context, the UK CMA, are certainly right that partial exclusives can also have anticompetitive effects. It's just a non-issue here as a 10-year total-parity promise has been offered. And if the FTC and CMA are truly concerned about that, they should be investigating Sony's dealings with game makers and clear, with or without commitments, a deal that is actually meant to result in less content exclusivity on the bottom line.

Sony negotiated certain preferential rights with Activision Blizzard. PlayStation gamers get some digital goodies that Xbox gamers do not receive. And as Xbox VP Sarah Bond explained in her testimony on Thursday, Microsoft faced various restrictions concerning its ability to reference or showcase the Xbox version of CoD in its marketing efforts--due to Sony's deal with Activision.

For partial exclusivity, the cost is much lower. Here, the product remains, in principle, available on both platforms. There isn't a simple opportunity cost calculation anymore. It's more about abstract goodwill on the part of consumers and the maker of the other platform. Some gamers may be annoyed that those using a different console get experience points (the primary criterion for progress in many games) twice a fast, but how many will dislike the game for that reason? Hard to tell. Marketing restrictions like the ones explained by Mrs. Bond mean that some free promotion (or cooperative advertising) opportunities are foregone, but that, too, is not easily quantifiable.

What is, however, ridiculous is any suggestion that--as Sony told the CMA and probably regulators around the globe--Microsoft might purposely inject bugs (program errors) into the PlayStation version of CoD or not thoroughly test and bug-fix that version of the game. In that case, it's actually easy to imagine that the damage to the reputation of not only that title but also Microsoft as a whole would far outweigh the benefits, particularly since end users who experience issues with a given game on one platform aren't likely to assume they'll get better results on the other platform. Sometimes even the opposite is the case: some people claim that Google apps for iOS are sometimes of higher quality than their Android versions, though Google makes Android.

3. Single-platforming existing titles vs. upcoming ones

For a game maker--or an acquirer of one--it is a far, far more difficult decision to single-platform an existing title, thereby alienating if not infuriating many gamers who suddenly can't play the game anymore on the platform they own. The cost in terms of customer goodwill is high.

4. Multiplayer matchmaking

In our 66%:33% scenario, there would probably be a critical mass of gamers for random matchmaking on either platform around the clock. However, if people don't just want to play against random opponents but wish to play with particular friends, then the problem of friends not having the device that is required to play the game is only half as big for a title that is exclusive to Platform A as for one that is exclusive to Platform B. This, of course, presupposes for simplicity's sake that everyone's circle of friends has, on average, the same distribution between the two platforms. With consoles that may be the case in a given geographic market, but there could also be correlations (for instance, low-income consumers having mostly low.-income friends, who may in turn share a preference for a less expensive type of device).

The fact that a person can play with only a minority as opposed to majority of their friends has implications for user engagement and customer satisfaction, reducing the likelihood of in-game purchases and future purchases (new versions). It also relates to the next item, word of mouth.

5. Word of mouth and viral marketing

Multiplayer functionality is only one of the reasons for which someone who already plays a game may invite or otherwise encourage friends to play it as well. Even single-player games get word of mouth if people believe their friends may be interested in playing it and show it to them.

Word of mouth works far more effectively for a game that is exclusive to the larger platform than one that is available only on the smaller platform. Word of mouth is a degressive but exponential formula. Think of all the people who used to promote Candy Crush or Farmville to their friends via Facebook messages (at a time when that marketing method used to work). Those games were accessible over the web. If one had needed a particular device, then many recipients of those messages would not have been able to download the respective game.

From the game maker's perspective, word of mouth is extremely valuable as it brings down the average User Acquisition (UA) cost. If word of mouth is weakened by an exclusive deal with a small platform, and if the platform maker cannot compensate for that with money and/or special marketing support, that fact alone makes an exclusive deal with the larger platform maker--or not entering into any exclusive arrangements at all--more attractive.

6. Mainstream media advertising and PR

In our hypothetical 66%:33% example, there probably are websites and other media (YouTube channels etc.) for either platform. So if a game succeeds on one platform, then there will be media outlets that will take note and generate additional demand through their reporting.

But with a view to mainstream media, a game that is available only on a platform with a 33% share (let alone with a, say, 20% or 25% share) is much less likely to get press coverage than one that is available on all platforms or on the dominant platform. In one case, a mainstream media outlet knwos that 66% of its readers can play the game if they like; in the other case, only 33%.

The same problem exists with respect to the economic viability of mainstream media advertising. Imagine a TV commercial for a game: if the game is available only on a platform with a low market share, the game maker pays for 100% of the reach but only 33% of the audience will be able to buy the product at all.

7. Mind share and other long-term considerations

A game maker who enters into an exclusive arrangement with a smaller platform forgoes a larger part of the "mind share" opportunity. That is more of a long-term consideration, but one that major game makers will also take into account. Market share between platforms may shift; new platforms may emerge. That is why game makers are interested not only in revenues but also in having a large user base.

8. Merchandising and other ancillary revenue opportunities

A successful game franchise can also tap additional revenue opportunities such as merchandise or novelizations, possibly even movies based on the game. For example, Fortnite merchandise is quite popular. Those opportunities are either a linear function of the size of the user base or the likelihood of, for instance, Netflix wanting to make a movie based on a game will be drastically diminished if a game is available--even if maybe very popular--on a platform with low market share.

Conclusions

As the FTC's own economic expert already wrote a decade ago, if the choice is between exclusive content being generally prohibited or generally allowed, there are some ways in which smaller platforms and new entrants can benefit from the option of having exclusive content. In fact, Sony's acquisition of Psygnosis was key to the launch of the PlayStation.

The Xbox needs some exclusive titles in the current environment, but that is in no small part the case because of Sony's aggressive "IP" strategy. Given those market realities, one cannot blame Microsoft making at least some titles exclusive, including titles made by acquired companies such as Bethesda. Removing existing titles, especially very popular ones and even more so if they are multiplayer games that people may wish to play with friends, from a much larger platform is, however, clearly not a viable path. Even the UK CMA had to recognize so. The regulators in charge of 40 countries have ruled out that this would make sense for Microsoft to do with respect to CoD, leaving the FTC as a sort of flat-earth society.

The acquisition of Activision Blizzard King is primarily about mobile games, and in the console space it will actually result in less--not more--content exclusivity. Part of the reason Sony opposed the deal is because Sony, for the reasons explained herein, knows it would be in a strong position to negotiate at least partial exclusivity with respect to Call of Duty, if not even total exclusivity at some point.

If one focuses on just the PlayStation-Xbox rivalry (as Sony and the FTC propose), there is a clear and present danger of the videogame market already having reached a tipping point of increasing returns and Sony being able to engage in ever more vertical input foreclosure to the detriment of consumers. In the short term, certain "console warriors" (gamers with a passion for their platform and a desire to see their platform making its rivals disappear into oblivion) may consider this a victory, but in the long run the only thing that protects them is healthy competition between platforms.

What restrictions has Sony imposed? Has Sony precluded game makers from fully exploiting the capabilities of rival hardware? Those questions are more deserving of regulatory scrutiny than a procompetitive merger that creates opportunities for game makers large and small, and for cloud streaming providers of all sizes, too.

Wednesday, April 26, 2023

UK Competition & Markets Authority radicalizes itself by blocking Microsoft's purchase of Activision Blizzard based on misconceptions and speculative concerns: parties will appeal

What is at stake now after the UK Competition & Market Authority's unbelievable decision (summary (PDF)) to block Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard King (ABK) is not just the credibility of that particular regulatory agency and its leadership. The more fundamental question that will have to be answered now is whether the rule of law is intact. Can a government agency that appears to be out of control post-Brexit, and to make decisions even when it doesn't seem to understand the technologies involved, do whatever it wants?

On September 1, I saw the CMA on the wrong track (UK antitrust authority gets basic facts wrong as it declines to approve Microsoft's purchase of Activision Blizzard on fast track: extensive review was expected, but reasoning is nonsensical). Almost eight months have passed since then, and what looked just like misconceptions in the beginning now actually appears to indicate a radical agenda as well as a lack of technological competence.

There was hope. Temporarily. The CMA recognized a little over a month ago that there was no vertical foreclosure concern with respect to the console market (as withholding Call of Duty from the PlayStation would be grossly unprofitable for Microsoft even if a few gamers switched consoles). The CMA had made a mistake when calculating the costs and benefits of foreclosure--a mistake that it corrected, which was actually honorable but changes nothing about the fact that the CMA does not appear to do top-notch work as a competition regulator, at least with respect to complex technology industry cases.

To be fair, the CMA didn't even get major cases as long as the UK was an EU Member State. All major tech competition matters were decided in Brussels, where the CMA basically just had an observer status. Post-Brexit it has more power than before, but that power may just be too tempting for some people--a temptation that leads them to make bad decisions at times. The CMA may just have acquired too much additional power overnight, and maybe the politicians who decided on the appointments did not always choose persons who would protect UK consumers but also have a modicum of regulatory humility.

The CMA doesn't understand technology (a cloud service like Azure is a commodity, most major games actually run on the Google Cloud Platform anyway), didn't understand foreclosure economics well enough to avoid the mistake I just mentioned, and there are also signs that the CMA doesn't correctly apply the legal framework. The CMA got overruled by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) last month for blatantly disregarding certain statutory time limits in a case involving Apple.

The CAT is where Microsoft and Activision Blizzard are headed. Shortly after the CMA published its outrageous decision, Microsoft and Activision Blizzard announced via Twitter that they would appeal:

Microsoft's announcement says "the decision appears to reflect a flawed understanding of this market and the way the relevant cloud technology actually works." I, too, struggle with some of the CMA's arguments. I'll analyze and comment on the CMA's decision in future posts, but for now let me just give one important example that relates to what Microsoft indicates will be a key issue on appeal:

"Microsoft [...] has other important strengths in cloud gaming from owning Xbox, the leading PC operating system (Windows) and a global cloud computing infrastructure (Azure and Xbox Cloud Gaming)"

The Xbox has a small market share compared to Sony, and the CMA is apparently more sympathetic to the dominant market leader, Sony, than to competition and consumer interests. Windows is a totally open system, and in order to offer games over the cloud that run on Windows, one doesn't even need Windows (the server can simply run on Linux as I already stated on September 1, 2022). And Azure is a commodity as I've said before. It's not like cloud operating costs are a huge factor: content is king when it comes to cloud gaming. Cloud services are, from a cloud gaming perspective, just a limited cost of doing business.

The CAT's standard of review is very deferential, but not infinitely deferential. In the Apple case, the CMA made a procedural error that was overruled rather quickly. Microsoft's announcement today mentions nothing procedural, though it's too early to tell whether the appeal will raise procedural issues as well. The CMA's substantive findings are reviewed under the "irrationality" standard. The CMA's position on cloud gaming--and its decision to block a merger over a nascent market (where there are new entrants all the time) after actually recognizing that its key concern (foreclosure in console market) was based on its own mistake--is irrational even in a literal sense. The way the CAT applies the term, the CMA will have a hard time explaining to the CAT that its decision was reasonable.

The CAT will see that the people working for the CMA on this deal weren't even capable of correctly calculating foreclosure costs when they wrote up their provisional findings (a very important document in the CMA process). That's not going to look good, though in a strictly legal sense it's not going to be relevant, just like it shouldn't be relevant (and hopefully wasn't relevant to the CMA) that Sony Interactive Entertainment CEO Jim Ryan is a Brit.

The bigger issue is this: the CAT will easily see that the CMA's reasoning concerning Microsoft's "other important strengths" is nonsensical, and it will particularly see that if a regulator could just block a deal based on totally speculative concerns about a nascent market, many more mergers would have to be blocked.

The CMA decision is so utterly unreasonable that only a successful appeal--or a settlement along the way--has the potential to restore my faith in the UK as an antitrust jurisdiction. It is now about the rule of law. Otherwise the CMA will know that it can get away with whatever arbitrary and capricious decisions it makes. This will also have political implications, and regardless of what happens here, UK politicians should see now that the so-called "judicial review" standard in the UK may lead to institutionalized regulatory excess.

The deal was cleared by other jurisdiction (in chronological order: Saudia Arabia, Brazil, Serbia, Chile, Japan, South Africa). It will be cleared by others in the weeks and months ahead. And I still believe it will ultimately be cleared in the UK. Maybe they'll work out a settlement soon. Otherwise Microsoft and Activision Blizzard will have to agree on an extension of the merger agreement. Some activist shareholders may now push Activision Blizzard to take the $3B breakup fee, but given that the CMA's decision is nonsensical, an extension would be logical.

For roughly a decade, Microsoft had been more cooperative with regulators than any Big Tech company in history. The CMA decided not to reward a cooperative and solution-oriented attitude. Now Microsoft has no other choice but to fight back, and to fight back really hard. In the alternative, it would become the target of regulatory overreach on multiple fronts.

What about other pending reviews and cases?

Let's look at the implications quickly, jurisdiction by jurisdiction:

European Union: The European Commission has a deadline on May 22. EC antitrust chief Margrethe Vestager stated in an interview a few months ago that different outcomes in different jurisdictions are possible. I still believe the EC will clear the deal on one basis or another next month. That will weaken the CMA's position.

United States (FTC): For FTC chair Lina Khan, the CMA's decision isn't really good news. Political pressure will grow because the FTC has done damage to two U.S. companies--to the benefit of Asian rivals--by bringing a frivolous complaint instead of working out a reasonable solution. More and more people will now say that Lina Khan is a liability for the American economy. In purely procedural terms, the probability of the August trial before the FTC's in-house judge is now rather high. If the deal had been cleared by the CMA today, and subsequently by the EU, I believe Microsoft would have consummated the transaction, the FTC would not realistically have obtained a preliminary injunction, and then the FTC would have given up just like in the Meta-Within case.

United States (private lawsuit): At this point, closing is not imminent, so Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California doesn't have to resolve the motion for a preliminary injunction in the near term. The motion was filed on Monday, and Microsoft's opposition brief would normally be due on Friday, May 5, but I guess the briefing process will either be put on hold or at least the briefing schedule will change. I doubt that there will still be a PI hearing on May 12.

Australia and New Zealand: The regulators in those jurisdictions wanted to await the outcome in other jurisdictions. Their historical ties with the UK don't mean that they're necessarily going to agree with the CMA. I believe they'll more likely clear the deal after the EU has done so.

The saga could have been over soon, but instead it looks like it could take longer than expected, if not much longer. That is a shame, but I still hope to see Microsoft's plans for a universal mobile app store materialize. That is one of the important procompetitive benefits of the transaction that the CMA, for whatever reason or no reason, doesn't seem to care about.

I'll be sure to comment on the CMA decision in more detail in the coming days. Please note that I comment more rapidly and frequently via Twitter.

Sunday, April 9, 2023

For more than a decade, Sony's patent applications have been disparaging Microsoft and Nintendo as 'inferior manufacturer[s]' of video game consoles: gratuitous, childish, unprofessional

Since last year I've been observing that Sony is an unreasonable--or, to use a word with which Sony was threatening the UK CMA with an appeal and which a journalist thought might describe Sony itself: irrational--complainant over Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard King. Today I learned that Sony's conduct as a patent applicant also raises serious psychiatric questions.

It was actually not another patent blog but GameRant that drew my attention to it:

Sony Throws Shade at Microsoft and Nintendo in Newly Published Patent

A newly published Sony patent oddly refers to Microsoft and Nintendo home entertainment consoles as 'inferior' to its products.

Hat tip to GameRant, but this is NOT NEW. It's long-standing Sony practice. They've been doing this since at least 2011!

Sony has incorporated that side swipe at Microsoft's Xbox and at Nintendo's consoles like the Switch for a dozen years in dozens of different patent applications.

It's amazing that no one has discovered this "tradition" before, and that no patent office told them a long time ago to stop doing that once and for all. Patent applications are not meant to be propaganda instruments for console warriors.

Here's the relevant language from the patent application GameRant discusses (WO 2023/055447, PCT/US2022(034277)):

"For example, an end user device may be a personal computer, a home entertainment system (e.g., Sony PlayStation2(R) or Sony PlayStation3(R) or Sony PlayStation4(R)), a portable gaming device (e.g., Soy PSP(R) or Sony Vita (R)), or a home entertainment system of a different albeit inferior manufacturer." (emphasis added)

GameRant is correct that "home entertainment system" is clearly defined by Sony's patent applications as video game consoles (or hypothetically multifunctional devices that come with video game console functionality). A patent is always its own dictionary. Therefore, saying that other home entertainment systems come from "different albeit inferior manufacturer[s]" is--as GameRant correctly notes --"obviously targeted at Microsoft and Nintendo."

GameRant is furthermore right that it's "strange for this language to appear in a patent." What is common and legit in patent applications is to explain why the claimed invention is superior over the state of the art (i.e., over technology existing at the time a patent application is filed). In that context, there is nothing wrong with discussing specific technical drawbacks (such as inferior performance, higher power consumption, greater memory footprint) of particular prior art (earlier inventions).

But calling competitors generally "inferior" is gratuitous, stupid, childish, and unprofessional. Even if those manufacturers were inferior, it would not mean that whatever invention a given Sony patent purports to describe--here, a "universal controller"--is by definition innovative and deserving of patent protection.

Sony is obviously the kind of client many patent attorneys want. If a small company went to the same patent attorneys and wanted them to file patent specifications that contain such an outrageous passage, most patent attorneys would decline to attach their names to it.

If Sony wants to engage in comparative advertising, it can do so elsewhere. Gamers are not going to make purchasing decisions based on the language Sony uses in its patent applications.

In November, Video Games Chronicle (VGC) quoted the same language from a different Sony patent application (PlayStation has been working on NFTs and blockchain technology, Sony patent reveals).

I've run some searches of patent databases--after almost 13 years of commenting on high-stakes patent litigation, that's obviously a routine activity for me--and found dozens of Sony patent applications that use the same idiotic language. I believe the oldest one of them--unless I missed an even older one, which can happen--is this one (PDF):

Redeemable Content Specific to Groups

Assignee: Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC

Filed: August 29, 2011

Appl. No.: 13/220,315

Don't get confused by the fact that the publication number is US 2013/0054689: that's the publication date. For the first 18 months, patent applications are in "stealth mode": they're in the database, but not publicly available. Then they get published and are assigned a date. But the filing date was August 29, 2011, and the following image shows the same idiocy as in the much more recent patent application that GameRant discovered (click on the image to enlarge):

Here's just a sample of other Sony patent applications that contain the words "different albeit inferior manufacturer" with (dis)respect to competing video game consoles:

GameRant was wondering whether "the offhanded remark" was related to Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard King, given that the filing GameRant discusses was made in June 2022, "about six months after Microsoft announced" that deal. The above list shows Sony has been doing this systematically for more than a decade. This is not attributable to pride in inventorship. It's just insane.

Friday, April 7, 2023

Discovery closes today in two antitrust matters involving Activision Blizzard (FTC merger case and In Re Google Play Antitrust Litigation) while UK CMA is preparing remedies working paper

Coincidentally, today is the cutoff date for fact discovery in two disparate antitrust actions involving Activision Blizzard King (ABK):

  • the FTC's adjudicative proceeding (in-house lawsuit) over ABK's acquisition by Microsoft, and

  • the In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation in the Northern District of California, where Epic Games and Match Group are pursuing a per se violation claim against Google based on its "Project Hug" agreements with game makers. ABK received $360 million, which ensured its loyalty to the Google Play Store for several years. In this particular case, ABK is a third party, but an important one. Because of this new theory, fact discovery in that litigation was reopened.

The purpose of this post is to discuss the next steps in those cases, also in United States et al. v. Google--a case pending in a court on the other coast (D.C.) but with factual overlaps--and the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger review in the UK, where some filings were released yesterday and an important new document is expected to be sent to Microsoft and ABK next week. Let's start with the merger-related parts.

  1. FTC adjudicative proceeding enters expert phase

  2. CMA remedies working paper expected while Sony is panicking

  3. Curative sanctions--and trial date and format--to be determined in Google Play case in N.D. Cal.

  4. Implications for sanctions motion in United States et al. v. Google (D.C.)

FTC adjudicative proceeding enters expert phase

After today's fact discovery cutoff, the focus in the FTC's Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard process shifts to the experts:

  • The FTC is to provide its expert witness reports within four weeks (May 5).

  • A week later (May 12), the FTC has to provide to Microsoft's and ABK's lawyers its final proposed witness and exhibit lists with a view to the August trial.

  • Another two weekslater (May 26), Microsoft and ABK have to provide their expert witness reports.

  • By May 30, the deal parties have to provide their final proposed witness and exhibit lists.

  • June 9 is the deadline for the FTC's rebuttal expert reports that respond to Microsoft's and ABK's expert witness reports.

  • The deadline for expert depositions is two weeks later (June 23).

The most important question, however, is how much taxpayers' money the FTC really intends to waste on this. It's not even going to achieve its objective of moving the legal goal posts.

I've previously argued (mostly on Twitter) that the close of fact discovery is a point at which the FTC could--and in my personal opinion should--think hard about at least that PlayStation theory of harm. It would not be a sign of weakness, but of rationality, to recognize that Sony's theory is unsupported by any facts. There is no shred of evidence, and the numbers just don't work out.

The theory has been rejected or abandoned by a U.S. court and at least seven other regulators so far (Japan's JFTC having been the latest) as I discussed in a recent post. That's 8-0 against the theory. A recent report on the Phase III investigation in China suggests that it's also just about cloud gaming, in which case the score would already be 9-0. It's furthermore highly likely that Australia's ACCC and New Zealand's ComCom will agree with the UK CMA rather than the U.S. FTC. And decisions in some other jurisdictions could also come down anytime.

There could soon be a point at which a dozen or more regulators will have rejected the theory, and the FTC would come across as the "Flat Earth Society" in this regard. That would be bad, especially because America's consumers need a strong FTC to tackle the real issues facing them.

Why produce expert reports when a theory of harm is so clearly untenable? It doesn't even give the FTC any meaningful leverage in remedies discussions because it's just so very weak. Of course, it would be even better if the FTC could settle the entire case. In that case, the expert reports would not just be more focused but they wouldn't be needed anymore at all. If that is not possible in the very short term, I think a voluntary dismissal of Sony's theory--assuming that after today's fact discovery cutoff there simply won't be any evidence to build a foreclosure case--would be a logical thing to do.

Structurally, those FTC adjudicative proceedings are not entirely dissimilar to ITC Section 337 investigations, which I follow all the time. It is common and expected that parties narrow their ITC cases through voluntary dismissals. It's simply necessary to keep those ambitious schedules, and the ITC's ALJs even want to see periodical reports on efforts to streamline a given case. Could there be a clearer case for streamlining an FTC in-house lawsuit than this present situation?

CMA remedies working paper expected while Sony is panicking

The UK Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) amended its provisional findings on March 24 based on a consideration of all of the evidence and arguments before it, and consigned the PlayStation theory of harm to the dustbin of merger review history.

There was a deadline on March 31 for responses to that update, and it appears that Microsoft obtained an extension by a few days. Yesterday the CMA published the public redacted versions of the feedback it received from Microsoft (PDF), Sony (PDF), and UCL researcher Joost Rietveld (PDF).

I commented quickly in the form of a four-part Twitter thread and provided further observations in subsequent tweets.

Microsoft argues that even the updated provisional findings still overstate the incentive for foreclosure (though the result is now that foreclosure is unprofitable), and that the "residual" concerns over cloud gaming are based on a foreclosure theory that isn't any "stronger" only because it has not undergone a similar revision. In any event, Microsoft points to its access deals with Nvidia, Boosteroid, and Ubitus. So even though Microsoft continues to argue for unconditional clearance, remedies are on the table.

Professor Rietveld lays out a "typology" of cloud gaming services, and disputes that such services even constitute an antitrust market. In the following tweet he explained his decision to chime in (and thankfully shared the first tweet of my thread on those submissions):

Sony's submission is the clearest sign yet of the PlayStation maker staring into the jaws of defeat without any realistic chances of snatching victory from them. By calling the evolution of the CMA's take on the console market theory of harm (which was a rational decision in recognition of hard facts) "irrational", Sony invokes the standard for appellate review (by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal).

While some Microsoft submissions throughout the process have also reminded the CMA of the applicable appellate case law, there's a difference between saying at an early stage that a certain potential theory of harm would not be appeal-proof and doing what Sony did on March 31, which is to call an actual procedural step--the fact that the CMA amended its provisional findings-"irrational".

Sony can't prevent the merger from closing through an appeal. It won't achieve a subsequent divestiture either.

I couldn't resist but to do a "how it started / how it's going" tweet (a popular format on social media) to juxtapose Sony's earlier take on the CMA's work and its new aggressive stance. Let me show you the two annotated screenshots here (click on an image to enlarge):

There are five months and three days between those documents. But even at the beginning of March, Sony's position was still that it "welcome[d] the CMAs comprehensive review of the evidence in reaching this conclusion" and "agree[d] with the CMA's findings."

Now Sony slams the methodology and the conclusions, though the CMA had already previously--and rightly--rejected some of Sony's "evidence" for obvious deficiencies.

Sony's "Hail Mary" involves hyperbole so outlandish that parts of the internet are already ridiculing it:

"Any degradation in the price, performance, or quality of play on PlayStation or any delays on release would quickly harm SIE’s reputation and cause a loss of engagement and of players. As SIE’s CEO, Jim Ryan, explained to the CMA at the Remedies Hearing, if PlayStation received a degraded version of Call of Duty, it would 'seriously damage our reputation. Our gamers would desert our platform in droves and network effects would exacerbate the problem. Our business would never recover.'"

How can Mr. Ryan say that with a straight face? He should recognize his error and preserve his reputation. Right now he appears to be doing neither.

It's obviously clear that there would be no irreparable harm. Microsoft's Xbox has a much smaller market share than the PlayStation, and CoD has given Sony's customers some exclusive benefits for a while, yet there are no signs of irreparable harm to the Xbox, as the CMA also indicated in its findings.

Seeking Alpha has picked up a Deal Reporter story according to which the CMA is expected to issue its remedies working paper (the article mistakenly uses the singular form, "remedy") next week. This is what the CMA's guidelines (PDF) say about that document:

4.64 A remedies working paper, containing a detailed assessment of the different remedies options and setting out the CMA’s provisional decision on remedies, will be sent to the merger parties for comment following the response hearings. This paper will also set out the CMA’s views on whether the merger gives rise to RCBs, and if so, whether the proposed remedy should be modified in order to preserve those benefits. The merger parties will typically have at least five working days to respond to the remedies working paper. Third parties may also be consulted about the proposed scope of remedies and their views on any RCBs, and the remedies working paper may in some cases be published on the CMA website, but only if the CMA deems wider consultation to be necessary. In most cases, the remedies working paper is not published.

4.65 Following consultation on the remedies working paper and any further discussions and meetings with parties that the CMA considers necessary, the CMA will take its final decision on both the competition issues and any remedies.

Will this be one of the minority of cases in which the CMA does publish the remedies working paper and allows non-parties to comment?

There would obviously be a lot of curiosity due to the high profile of the case. But there has been so much discussion about remedies already, and why should the CMA invite Sony--especially after its unreasonable and unrealistic March 31 response to the updated provisional findings--to waste more time and insult human intelligence? Given that its console market theory of harm is dead, Sony is no longer important to the remedies process.

So while I would love to see that remedies working paper, I couldn't blame the CMA for concluding that it's now just for the CMA to hammer out the details with the deal parties. Sony may try to appeal clearance decisions in whatever jurisdictions if it wants to waste time, money, and energy, and be ridiculed. I think Sony won't want to do any of that.

Curative sanctions--and trial date and format--to be determined in Google Play case in N.D. Cal.

What makes the fact discovery cutoff in the Google Play Store (Epic Games et al. v. Google) case particularly important is the fact that Judge James Donato of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has already determined that there will be non-monetary sanctions on Google for its automatic deletion of sensitive chats (on top of some reimbursement of fees, which won't move the needle). So Google's wrongdoing will have consequences for the adjudication of the case. There will have to be some jury instructions that up the ante for Google. But Judge Donato wanted discovery to be completed first so that there would be the most solid factual basis for determining the extent of the prejudice that the plaintiffs have suffered.

We can expect a huge fight over the non-monetary sanctions, and it will be one of the most difficult decisions a federal judge could have to make in commercial litigation. The wrongdoing is massive, but the case should still be decided correctly.

A case management decision will also have to be made in that litigation, and while it's just about the trial format, it involves a complex set of overlaps and interdependencies.

The procedural background is that the Ninth Circuit granted Google's petition for an interlocutory appeal of the certification of a consumer class seeking $4.7 billion in damages over the Google Play app tax, and on that basis, Google argues that the trial (scheduled to begin in early November) should be postponed because the consumer damages theory might not survive, at least not in its current form. As I mentioned in a tweet, which I also incorporated into a blog post, Google's position is not unreasonable.

Meanwhile, there has been further briefing. Epic Games and Match Group (Tinder) oppose Google's motion because the trial has already been pushed back four times (not once because of those plaintiffs) and they argue that in Epic Games v. Apple the consumer claims were also put on a different schedule and will be tried separately:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-2981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Epic and Match's Joint Opposition to Google's Motion for a Stay

Epic and Match's desire to go to trial as soon as possible is understandable. While Epic's case was never consolidated into the Pepper consumer class action the way those Google Play Store cases were combined (because it was only about injunctive relief; by contrast, those Google cases are all going to a jury trial), it is true that Apple will now have to deal with some overlaps between those cases.

But there are potential issues because of the relationship between the different claims in the Google cases:

  • The plaintiff states' theory is also about consumer harm. According to Google, the theory is structurally similar to what the Ninth Circuit may overturn now.

  • While Epic's focus is (like in the Apple case) on injunctive relief, Match additionally seeks a damages award. Google is right that Match and consumers (by extension, also the plaintiff states) represent two sides of a two-sided market, and that's why it makes sense to address those claims together so as to avoid inconsistencies. For every cent that was paid, the question is whether it belongs to Google, developers, or consumers.

So there are four types of claim sets: Epic (developer harm, but no damages for now), Match (developer damages), consumer class actions (consumer damages), and plaintiff states (consumer harm). The potential legal ramifications involve that in one or more of the proposed formats, the consumer class may get its day in court without all of them actually having suffered injury (an Article III standing issue), and that there could be Seventh Amendment (right to jury trial in civil litigation) issues because of factually related issues being addressed by different juries in different trials.

For Match this is all about money, while Epic has a more strategic and principled perspective. Let's put it this way: Match is not the perfect match for Epic. But it's the only other major developer at this stage to be prepared to join Epic in suing a gatekeeper.

Google raises potential issues about the proposed formats that can't just be ignored. In my opinion, the only alternative to a complete postponement would be to try Epic's case separately from all others (plaintiff states, Match, consumer class)--and that could actually be done in a bench trial ("injunction prohibiting Google’s anti-competitive and unfair conduct and mandating that Google take all necessary steps to cease such conduct and to restore competition"; "declaration that the contractual restraints complained of herein are unlawful and unenforceable").

I wonder whether Google will also seek appellate review of a sanctions order, and what would happen if such a petition succeeded to the extent that the appeals court would wnt to take a look, but it's too early to tell.

Here's Google's reply in support of its motion to postpone the trial, which will be heard on April 20:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-2981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Defendants' Reply in Supprot of Motion to Defer or Stay Trial

Implications for sanctions motion in United States et al. v. Google (D.C.)

This here is just a minor update. The motion for sanctions over Google's spoliation of evidence in the search engine case in the District of Columbia was inspired by the sanctions motion in California, and the United States' reply brief very heavily relies on evidence from the California case.

Judge Amit P. Mehta in D.C. will have to make some procedural decisions now, such as whether (or, more likely, when) to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Any upcoming filings in California concerning the extent of the prejudice could also be used in the D.C. case. Prejudice is issue-specific, but the search engine case also has an Android component, which is why "Project Hug" was discovered there first (while the California case is ahead with respect to spoliation sanctions).

The final document to show in this post is the plaintiff states' reply in support of their motion for sanctions, which is structurally similar to the DOJ's argument but tackles the issue from partly different angles:

State of Colorado, et al., v. Google LLC (case no. 1:20-cv-3715-APM, D.D.C.): Plaintiff States' reply in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions Against Google, LLC and an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Appropriate Relief

Tuesday, April 4, 2023

Xbox fan's forum post on 'rapid fire mod' may save Valve (Steam) $4 million in patent infringement damages over handheld videogame controller: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

This post here will be of interest to two parts of my audience: the patent litigation community as well as videogamers (including game industry professionals), many of whom have recently started following me on Twitter because of the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger reviews. With a view to the latter group, I'll explain things in more basic terms, but the ruling by a U.S. appeals court that I'm discussing in this post is definitely of interest to patent professionals as well.

Yesterday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--which is based in Washington, D.C., and the only appeals court in the entire U.S. to which district court judgments in patent infringement cases can be appealed--handed down its decision in Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corporation (PDF). The (precedential) ruling and the case are interesting for more than one reason.

In 2015, Ironburg sued Valve--known for the Steam storefront (Wikipedia) and certain Steam-branded hardware--over U.S. Patent No. 8,641,525. The case was ultimately transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (Seattle), where Steam is based. The title of that patent is Controller for video game console.

The patent-in-suit purports to improve video game controllers as they were known at the time (2011) by "remov[ing] the need for a user to remove his or her thumb from the left or right thumb stick in order to operate additional actions controlled by the four buttons and/or the direction pad." The controller is described as "having a hard outer case and a plurality of controls located on the front and top edge of the controller" and being "shaped to be held in both hands of the user such that the user's thumbs are positioned to operate controls located on the front of the controller and the user's index fingers are positioned to operate controls located on the top edge of the controller." In addition, the patented controller "includes one or more additional controls located on the back of the controller in a position to be operated by the user's other fingers."

If you wish to take a look at that Xbox forum post that may now decide the case (that Valve originally lost in 2021) in Valve's favor, just click here and you can always come back and read eveything else.

The Federal Circuit takes note of how the trial was conducted. Normally, jurors only see the evidence (including actual products) in a jury room. But in the trial in this case, which was held in January 2021, it worked differently:

"Due to the global pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus, the trial proceeded virtually, with each juror attending trial remotely through videoconferencing technology. Before closing arguments, the parties and the district court agreed that each juror should have the accused product in hand, and that device – a hand held controller for playing video games – was mailed to each juror."

If there were any gamers among the members of the jury, this means they got a Steam Controller--the accused device--for free to play around with until they had to return it by mail.

The jury determined that Valve infringed the patent and that Valve owed the patent holder $4 million in damages for past infringement. As Valve's infringement was furthermore found to be willful, that amount could have been increased ("enhanced damges"), possibly up to $12 million. Valve appealed because it wants to pay nothing; Ironburg cross-appealed because it wants the bill to increase to $12 million. In fact, the $4 million award won't exceed Ironburg's litigation expenses by much (if at all). But no: the Federal Circuit says that even though Valve's infringement was willful (because Valve had been made aware of the patent and infringed it nonetheless), Judge Thomas S. Zilly in Seattle didn't abuse his discretion when he found that this was a "garden variety" patent infringement case where even a finding of willfulness does not have to result in an enhancement of the damages award. That is a very defendant-friendly position (which some other U.S. judges would probably not have adopted), but justifiable in the appeals court's opinion.

While Valve's appeal failed to make the case go away at this stage (for the most part, its appeal was unsuccessful), yesterday's appellate opinion is good for Valve in two respects. The first one is what I just mentioned: the damages award won't go up from $4 million to a potential maximum of $12 million. The other win for Valve involves what I mentioned in the headline:

Valve still has the chance to defend itself by proving Ironburg's patent invalid. That is not going to be easy because U.S. juries typically have greater respect for the fact that a patent office--a government agency--granted a patent than the United States Patent & Trademark Office's own PTAB (Patent Trial and Appeal Board) judges when they make their post-grant review decisions. The invalidation rate in jury trials is low, while it is fairly high when the PTAB decides. Still, Valve has another chance to defend itself, so it may now be able to negotiate a settlement with the patent holder.

If they don't settle, there'll be further proceedings in Seattle where an Xbox fan's forum post could make a key contribution to a decision in Valve's favor.

On appeal, Valve wanted to resurrect various of its invalidity arguments, which the district court had decided Valve was "estopped" from raising.

There are/were three sets of invalidity arguments:

  1. arguments that Valve presented in its petition for an inter parties review (IPR) and which the PTAB found worth looking at (though it ultimately didn't result in a complete invalidation of all claims of the patent-in-suit; only some claims were deemed invalid);

  2. arguments that Valve presented in that petition, but which the PTAB did not consider worthy of a closer look; and

  3. arguments that a third party, a Canadian company named Collective Minds Gaming (Twitter account), raised in its own attack on Ironburg's patent and which were distinct from Valve's arguments. Collective Minds brought its petition later than Valve.

With respect to the second and third groups, the district court granted an estoppel motion, meaning he threw those invalidity arguments out because Valve was not allowed to make them at the time because of things that had already happened. The relevant statute says this (just skip it if you're not interested or already know it):

"The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review."

Valve asked the Federal Circuit to overturn that decision so it would get another bite at the apple, i.e., another chance to strike down Ironburg's videogame controller patent. With respect to the second group, Valve's appeal failed: the Federal Circuit essentially says Valve made the mistake of not appealing the PTAB decision to the effect of obligating the PTAB to analyze all of Valve's invalidity arguments as opposed to only a subset.

Valve could indeed have done so. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu--a decision on which I commented at the time--that it's all-or-nothing for a PTAB decision to review a patent: if only one of the arguments made by the petitioner (the party challenging the patent) looks meritorious, the PTAB must analyze them all.

The Federal Circuit decided that Valve has no one to blame but itself for not insisting on a review based on the entirety of its arguments. The appeals court rejects Valve's legal argument that estoppel doesn't kick in until the actual review starts. Instead, the decision on Valve's petition was already relevant.

But with respect to the third group--the Collective Minds arguments--Valve's apppeal succeeded.

The district court placed the burden of proof on Valve that it could not have reasonably identified those arguments back when it brought its own PTAB petition. The Federal Circuit says that the onus is on the patent holder, Ironburg.

If Ironburg can show that Valve could reasonably have raised those arguments years ago in its PTAB petition, then it's game over for Valve and it must pay $4 million. Otherwise, those Collective Minds invalidity arguments will be revived. In that case, Valve can ask the court for summary judgment (decision without a jury trial) that the patent is invalid. If it doesn't do that, or if the judge declines to invalidate the patent, then the case will be put before a new jury in a retrial--and this time around they won't get Steam Controllers sent to their homes but will have to carry out their duty at a federal courthouse.

The Collective Minds arguments involve a combination of different prior art references. Prior art--material that shows the claimed invention was either now new at the time or (which is the argument here) not inventive (because one could have easily combined what already existed at the time) can be an earlier-published patent application but also other publications.

The Collective Minds prior art reference that I wish to highlight is named (after its author) "Jimakos":

Jimakos Sn, Rapid Fire Mod for Wireless Xbox 360 Controller, Step by Step Tutorial with Pictures, (July 9, 2008), http://forums.xbox-scene.com/index.php?/topic/643928rapid-fire-mod-forwireless-xbox-360-controller/page-23 (posts 341 to 346) (“Jimakos”)

That forum post is no longer online, which is why I purposely didn't "linkify" it. But that doesn't matter: the information is in the record of the case anyway.

In that July 8, 2008 posting, a user named "Jimakos Sn" described how he modified an Xbox 360 controller. Here's an excerpt from the Collective Minds petition as well as images that were actually found in that forum post and show the modified controller (click on an image to enlarge or read the text below the image):

IV. THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS OF THE ’688 PATENT ARE UNPATENTABLE

A. Ground 1 Claims 1, 9, 10, 21, 26, 28, and 30 of the ’688 Patent are Obvious Under Jimakos in View of the Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art

i. Jimakos

“Rapid Fire Mod for Wireless Xbox 360 Controller” is an online forum discussion, where user “Jimakos Sn” posted details of his modification to an existing Xbox 360 controller. [...] The forum entry was posted in an active thread, with the substance relied upon in this Petition coming from a July 8, 2008 posting.

In its petition, Collective Minds also argued as follows:

"Like the ’688 Patent, Jimakos is based on a standard video game controller. It includes a case with controls located on the front and top of the case shaped to be held in the hands of the user such that the user’s thumbs operate the controls on the top of the case, and the user’s index fingers operate the controls on the front end of the case."

The PTAB never decided on the Collective Minds petition because the parties settled. That, however, may also mean that Ironburg was afraid of those challenges to its patent--including that Xbox forum post.

I think the district court may actually conclude--now that Ironburg, not Valve, has the burden of proof--that Valve couldn't reasonably have raised those arguments. That argument is particularly strong with a view to Jimakos: it was just a forum post, not a major industry publication or patent document.

Should Valve win the case thanks to that forum post, I hope they'll be able to find Jimakos Sn and reward that gamer!

Saturday, March 25, 2023

UK CMA determines (as did DG COMP) that Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard presents no risk of vertical foreclosure in videogame console market: where do we go from here?

Yesterday the UK Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) announced an update to its provisional findings relating to Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard King. Based on new evidence--the most important part of which simply flagged an error in the economic analysis--the CMA has "now provisionally concluded that the Merger may not be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition in the market for the supply of console gaming services in the UK."

This means that just like in the EU (see my previous post on this merger), the focus is now exclusively on cloud gaming. Sony's claim that Microsoft was buying ABK to pull Call of Duty from the PlayStation is no longer relevant. Theoretically, Sony can try to persuade the CMA to change mind again. There's a deadline for that (next Friday, 5 PM UK time). But that's not realistically going to happen.

It was a major surprise that made the ATVI stock go up by about 6% to reach a new high since the announcement of the merger. I commented quickly in the form of a Twitter thread (condensed thread view). But in some other way, it was not surprising. When the CMA's original provisional findings were released on February 8, I saw "major progress" and also found the agency's remedies notice "constructive." I know from my contacts in the financial services industry that fear of the CMA blocking the deal--and such a decision being difficult to overturn--accounts for the largest part of the spread (the difference between ATVI's stock price and Microsoft's offer). But in public statements as well as in private conversations, I've consistently rejected the notion of the CMA being irrational or ideological, despite having disagreed with them on certain questions at different points.

The CMA deserves great respect for this correction, for which it was not too late. What's next? Let's first focus on the UK process and then about implications for other jurisdictions (EU, U.S.)--and for Sony, the sole vocal deal critic.

What's next in the UK?

The console-related part of Microsoft's remedy offer to the CMA is no longer needed:

It all comes down to cloud gaming, where the fact that Microsoft has already concluded multiple access deals (with Nvidia, Boosteroid, and Ubitus) must be given considerable weight. The cloud gaming theory is about a very dynamic and "nascent" market, thus inherently fraught with uncertainty. That has implications for proportionality: compared to a theory of harm in an established market, any remedies based on a nascent market theory will normally be less aggressive.

At this stage an appeal is really just a theoretical scenario, but it's a fact that the narrowing of the case also makes any decision easier to appeal. The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) affords the CMA a lot of deference, but not infinite deference. When there are different theories and the CMA says that in the aggregate of those theories there is an apprehension of a substantial lessening of competition (SLC), then the CAT will affirm unless it identifies procedural errors or anything downright irrational. The narrower the case, the less room there is for an opaque amalgamation of probability assessments. Here, it would come down to just cloud gaming--again, a nascent and dynamic market--and decisions by market participants of different sizes (Nvidia, Boosteroid, Ubitus; and Valve's statement that it doesn't need a deal with Microsoft because it trusts them) would make a blocking decision irrational in my opinion.

The CMA has said that it's on schedule. As the timeline chart toward the end of my previous post on this merger shows, that deadline is April 26. I've seen someone comment that the CMA now has more work to do because there'll be responses to the update to the provisional findings. I don't think so. Those responses are a formality, and the case is now smaller and simpler.

What's next in the EU?

I'm sure the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) is pleased to see that after four jurisdictions that cleared the deal on the fast track (Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Serbia, Chile), one of the more hesitant ones has also concluded that there is no PlayStation foreclosure risk. It also means that there is now an increased likelihood of a consistent set of remedies to be agreed upon in the two European jurisdictions.

DG COMP sent out questionnaires to market actors as Politico reported (I retweeted Samuel Stolton's tweet). The Commission still has almost two months left. I guess they'll more or less exhaust this deadline unless Sony saves everyone time, as I'll discuss further below.

What's next in the U.S.?

There are two litigations pending in the U.S.: the FTC's in-house adjudicative proceeding and a class-action-style lawsuit in San Francisco.

Technically, Sony's PlayStation foreclosure theory has been dismissed seven times by now. Besides the clearance decisions in Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Serbia, and Chile, and the EU Commission's and CMA's rejection of that theory, there was also an order on a motion to dismiss in the Northern District of California. United States District Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley didn't deem that theory plausible when she ruled on the so-called "gamers' lawsuit" that is actually a lawyers' lawsuit, or one might even say losers' lawsuit given their track record (click on the image to enlarge):

With the greatest respect, I don't understand why one of the world's best news agencies--Reuters--takes such serial losers seriously and mindlessly describes that lawsuit as a complaint brought by gamers when everyone can figure out that the driving force here are the lawyers. The worst-case scenario that those gamers face based on the complaint would come down to buying an Xbox and spending a little more money on a few games, and no one would profitably bring an antitrust lawsuit over that. I can see that any legal challenge to a merger of this magnitude is potentially newsworthy, but it should be possible to put things into perspective, even more so when lawyers have such a pathetic track record in challenging mergers. Ars Technica also talked to them, but they obviously don't play in the same league as Reuters when it comes to legal reporting (they have other strengths).

The class-action lawyers intend to file an amended complaint soon, but the news from the UK doesn't make things easier for them. Their next complaint is not going to plausibly allege a reasonable probability of foreclosure either.

Now, what about the FTC?

The FTC's Chief (and only) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) D. Michael Chappell largely granted a motion to compel that the FTC brought against Microsoft and Activision Blizzard. But that's not going to change much because the FTC already received plenty of information before it brought that complaint. Its case is not going to improve now.

The FTC would be in good company if it joined the EC and the CMA in recognizing that there is no console-related theory of harm. It would be the right thing to do. It would be honest and honorable. And it would show that the FTC is not "ideologically blinded" as has been alleged. The FTC would emerge stronger from a partial withdrawal of its complaint. In a subsequent step it could then also accept cloud gaming-related access remedies and everything would be resolved without the FTC suffering another loss.

If the FTC voluntarily dismissed the console market theory, that would leave those losers in California as the "Flat Earth Society" with respect to PlayStation foreclosure...

What should Sony do?

Earlier this week I tweeted that Sony had lost control over the narrative, an observation that was picked up by GameRant, Windows Club (Brazil), and Game Eperience (Italy). With all that has happened since, it has been validated.

Sony's problem is that its own practices are now potentially coming under scrutiny. The question of whether Sony maintains a monopoly in the Japanese market (if one adopts its own preferred market definition of "high-performance videogame consoles") came up in the United States Senate:

Sony imposes very restrictive rules on game makers. Many of those who support Sony in the public debate over the acquisition of Activision Blizzard don't even have an idea and that's because Sony, also through contractual restrictions, prevents people from finding out. I quoted several passages from the Epic Games v. Apple judgment in a Twitter thread. Let me quote them again here:

"[F]or all Fortnite transactions via the PlayStation Store, Epic Games agreed to make additional payments to Sony above this commission rate based on the amount of time that PlayStation users play Fortnite cross-platform."

"Sony, for instance, enacts a cross-play policy that compensates Sony where players spend on other platforms but primarily game on Sony’s PlayStation platform. Meanwhile, Sony and Switch have enacted policies that limit the cross-wallet functionality across platforms."

"Cross-purchases allows Fortnite users to buy V-Bucks, or virtual currency, on one platform and spend them on another platform. Cross-purchases are not available on Sony or Nintendo platforms."

"Epic Games believed so strongly in cross-platform play that it threatened litigation against Sony for using policies and practices to restrict the same ..."

As many of my readers know, I've been following Epic v. Apple very closely and have read the ruling multiple times, word by word.

It is at least debatable whether Sony should ever have lobbied and campaigned against Microsoft's purchase of Activision Blizzard King, given that the positions Sony was forced to take to contrive a console theory of harm that is now dead in the water could be held against Sony--market definition included. But even if one were to conclude that it was worth trying in the beginning, the problem is that the traction it appeared to get made Sony unrealistic:

After the European Commission's Statement of Objections and the UK CMA's provisional findings, Sony should have worked out a deal. Instead, its lawyers probably told Sony to keep spending money--and it's not just that, but also that they'd like to try the long shot and maybe make history by blocking a huge merger.

Sony and its lawyers from Cleary Gottlieb have already lost quite some credibility with competition regulators now. They complained about Meta-Within, and the FTC lost in court. They presented an insane Call of Duty foreclosure theory, and it's been rejected in seven jurisdictions by now. The common pattern: Sony--despite its unique combination of assets and incredible market power--is indiscriminately afraid of Big Tech competitors, be it Microsoft or Meta. On Twitter I commented on Sony's rare combination of an inferiority complex and hubris:

While Sony missed the best opportunity for contributing to an amicable resolution of the issue, it would still make sense to simplify things for the EC, the CMA, and the FTC now by working out a deal and endorsing the acquisition on that basis (just like Nvidia did). Better late than never, and the window of opportunity is potentially closing fast now.

Wednesday, March 8, 2023

UK Competition & Markets Authority publishes Microsoft filing that makes case for 'self-executing' access remedies to preserve relevant customer benefits while Sony's naysaying borders on libel

This is my rapid response to two documents published today by the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) of the United Kingdom: Microsoft's and Sony's responses to the notice of possible remedies relating to Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard King (ABK).

Those documents were originally submitted on February 22. Today the CMA released the public redacted versions.

When I commented on the CMA's remedies notice, I viewed it as more open-minded than many other commentators did. Since then, the CMA's CEO, Sarah Cardell, has given speeches that I interpreted as the CMA being principled and pragmatic at the same time. Mrs. Cardell clarified that the CMA "is not anti-mergers" (last week's Keystone conference in Brussels) and that behavioral remedies are considered, provided that any concerns are properly addressed.

Meanwhile it has also become known that the European Commission (EC) is apparently inclined to clear the transaction on the basis of access remedies, and won't insist on any divestiture.

I'll start with a couple of quotes from Sony's submission to the CMA (which I instantly shared on Twitter):

  • In para. 28, Sony acknowledges that "Microsoft’s conduct in relation to the ZeniMax acquisition" was "not a violation of a behavioural commitment." The only alleged violations of such commitments that Sony alleges in its filing are not merger-related, and go back a long time when Microsoft was like a different company.

  • Sony goes off the deep end where it outlines a scenario in which Microsoft would intentionally produce "bugs and errors":

    "For example, Microsoft might release a PlayStation version of Call of Duty where bugs and errors emerge only on the game’s final level or after later updates."

    Let that sink in. It's a theory according to which some decision makers at Microsoft, all the way down some command chain, would have to instruct programmers to purposely create (or at least not to fix) bugs and errors. Activision's testers would obviously detect and report those errors, but people would be ordered not to do anything about them because of an anticompetitive agenda. The notion that the world's largest software maker would do this, regardless of the impact on its credibility across all business segments should someone blow the whistle or find out through U.S. pretrial discovery, is an insult not only to Microsoft--as it borders on libel--but also to human intelligence.

So, what does Microsoft propose and what are its arguments?

To some extent, Microsoft's submission on remedies pokes holes into the CMA's theories of harm. That is not the focus of the submission, but it does matter in the remedies context whether a theory of harm is rock-solid or highly debatable. In this context, it's worth taking note of what Axios reported this week: "A YouGov survey commissioned by Microsoft in January found that just 3% of all PlayStation users would switch to buying an Xbox if Microsoft pulled Call of Duty from PlayStation."

The question of whether access or divestiture remedies are warranted in this specific case has three key determinants:

  • the loss of relevant customer benefits (RCBs) that would result from a divestiture (or prohibition),

  • the efficacy of the proposed access remedies (and the extent to which any of the typical concerns over that type of remedy are eliminated in the current context), and

  • the disproportionality of any of the potential divestiture remedies outlined by the CMA.

Other factors that inform the proportionality analysis here are international comity (meaning respect for foreign jurisdictions) as the merging parties are based outside the UK and generate the vast majority of their revenues elsewhere, and the fact that Sony is the market leader. But for the most part it's about finding the sweet spot in light of the three key determinants I mentioned:

Relevant customer benefits: As an app developer who has filed formal complaints over Apple's and Google's mobile app distribution terms, I've been very much interested for more than a year in Microsoft's cross-platform mobile app store plans. The UK is contemplating new legislation that would empower the CMA's Digital Markets Unit (DMU) to tackle the mobile duopoly problem. I'm happy to see that Microsoft's submission discusses plans for an Xbox Mobile Platform. The document explains that Microsoft needs not only King's games (like Candy Crush) but also very much Activision Blizzard's mobile games (CoD: Mobile, Warzone Mobile, Diablo Immortal, Hearthstone, and Warcraft Arclight Rumble) to make it happen.

Microsoft's filing discusses not only those mobile plans but also the fact that the deal has the potential to bring Call of Duty to 150 million more gamers. The submission explains why CoD will benefit Nintendo and its customers, and that currently CoD is not available on any cloud gaming service, but even without the access remedy Microsoft proposes (and Sony rejects because it just doesn't want to be constructive as long as it believes it can delay and potentially derail the deal), it would already be ensured to become available on two such services (Microsoft's own service and Nvidia's GeForce Now as a result of a recently signed agreement).

Efficacy of access remedies: Microsoft notes that parity commitments (regardless of Sony's naysaying) are common contractual provisions in the console industry. What is particularly key here from a practical (enforcement) point of view is that Microsoft's proposal is designed to be "self-executing" by virtue of Microsoft paying for a monitoring trustee, an objective third party assessor, and a fast-track dispute resolution mechanism (arbitration that will lead to swift results).

Disproportionality of divestiture (or prohibition): Microsoft says that even if the deal as a whole was not prohibited, but a divestment of Call of Duty or Activision was required, it would "still effectively involve the largest divestment ever required by the CMA." And it would, which takes us full circle back to the relevant benefits, "have severe adverse effects on the development of competition because it would prevent Microsoft from achieving its key strategic objective, namely building a mobile gaming business with sufficient scale in order to challenge Google and Apple."

There's a lot more to say about the filings that became available today. For now I just wanted to provide a high-level overview. It appears that the CMA's criteria for access remedies can be met, and there isn't a case for prohibition or divestiture, which would be preferred by Sony but not benefit consumers.