Showing posts with label Optis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Optis. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 7, 2023

BREAKING: Mr Justice Marcus Smith has made his Optis v. Apple FRAND determination: only $5M per year for global standard-essential patent license covering all Apple products, even hypothetical Apple Car

BREAKING: Apple has effectively prevailed over the Optis Wireless patent licensing firm in the High Court of Justice (formerly known as the England & Wales High Court, still commonly abbreviated as EWHC). Optis will receive only approximately US$5 million per year from Apple, and we're talking about a worldwide standard-essential (SEP) portfolio license covering all Apple products implementing cellular connectivity, even "a hypothetical Apple car, retailing at a hypothetical US$100,000 and using the Standard for Cellular Connectivity."

Let's face it: London is not the city of milk and honey for SEPholders. After the Unwired Planet v. Huawei decisions by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and UK Supreme Court, some thought the United Kingdom would become one of the world's most attractive SEP enforcement destinations. In March, Mr Justice Mellor--also almost one year after the related trial--handed down his InterDigital v. Lenovo decision, which overwhelmingly favored the interests of the defendant. One could have a debate over whether InterDigital or Optis is now likely more disappointed, but neither of them can be pleased with the amounts.

The decision already came down on May 10, but it has not been published yet. I've been able to obtain some basic information and snippets from a source I must protect. I had no idea that the judgment had already been entered when I wrote on May 27 that it could be further delayed by Mr Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority, over the $68.7B acquisition of Activision Blizzard King). He not only hears patent cases but is also the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal of the United Kingdom. I live-tweeted about the initial case management conference last week and subsequently blogged about that case. I'll also comment on next Monday's second case management conference, and I'll be speaking about the application of competition law to SEPs at a London conference on Tuesday that is keynoted by Mr Justice Smith and organized by Concurrences together with King's College London. I look forward to meeting some of my readers there. I very rarely attend in-person events.

Getting back to Optis v. Apple:

It's possible that Optis will appeal the decision. If it standards, Apple gets a global lifetime license (including backroyalties) to that patent portfolio for roughly $60M (including interest). Optis wanted a lot more--in fact, so much more that Apple even threatened with leaving the UK market should the UK part of the dispute result in an obligation to take a worldwide license at a rate Apple would have deemed excessive. Apple withdrew the threat, but it shows that they were afraid of a worst-case scenario far in excess of what the High Court has now decided.

Some of Apple's arguments for bringing down the royalty rate were rejected, and that includes Apple's favorite SEP devaluation argument, which is that the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) should serve as the royalty base. Mr Justice Smith authored an entire section "to explain why the SSPPU approach is, in [his] judgement, indefensible." Wow. "[I]ndefensible."

Interestingly, Mr Justice Smith even agreed with Apple that the baseband chipset "does contain the relevant technology." And Optis did not really dispute that the market value of that one is approximately $25. Then Mr Justice Smith notes that--at that price--"[t]he product is, however, unlicensed." And he rejected the idea that if a baseband chipset maker generates a profit of maybe $5 on the $25 component, it "should pay for the licence out of the US$5 profit, and that this therefore constituted the absolute limit that ought to be paid by anyone."

Mr Justice Smith did not mince words as he criticized Apple's SSPPU argument:

"Indeed, it is quite absurd to presuppose that the manufacturer of a baseband chipset would forego any part of their profit unless absolutely compelled to do so. It is much more likely that baseband chipset manufacturers would increase the price of their product to reflect the added value to purchasers of that product of having a licence to the SEPs comprising the stack. Absent extremely clear market evidence, the assumption that the baseband chipset manufacturer would absorb the costs of the licence and not pass them on is almost certainly both unsafe and wrong. Certainly, it cannot be assumed."

Mr Justice Smith made adjustments to Optis's share of the 4G SEP stack, and (presumably because not all of Optis's infringement assertions succeeded) based that patent owner's share of the total royalty stack on an even lower percentage (we're talking about less than 1%) than its ownership share. He did not find Apple to have been an unwilling licensee who would no longer be entitled to a FRAND license.

One key overlap between Mr Justice Smith's approach in Optis v. Apple and Mr Justice Mellor's in InterDigital v. Lenovo is that the patent holder's proposed comparable license agreements were rejected because the respective licensees were smaller players:

"[G]iven the nature of Optis’ counterparties to the Optis Comparables – generally small players in the market, with low or at least not massive sales volumes – there is a question whether these licences properly reflect a FRAND rate for a counterparty like Apple."

By contrast, all of the comparable license agreements that Apple asked the court to rely on where agreements between Apple and other parties:

"The Apple Comparables are all licences where the common factor is Apple. Apple sought and obtained licences to different portfolios with different counterparties. This means there is no direct comparable with the portfolio in issue before me (which is a factor pointing away from the usefulness of the Apple Comparables), but some insight is gained into the value of the Stack as a whole, and the value attributed (at least so far as a company the size of Apple is concerned) to different portfolios held by different counterparties. The size and commercial “clout” of the licensee may be (I do not say is) a relevant factor in terms of royalties in any event."

The decision spans almost 300 pages, and I have yet to obtain and digest the document in its entirety. I did, however, want to share some of the most important and interesting aspects of the ruling now--not least also with a view to the Tuesday conference (The Innovation Economics Conerence for Antitrust Lawyers), where Mr Justice Smith may also say something about the valuation of FRAND-pledged SEPs.

As I mentioned in a recent post, several FOSS Patents blog posts were discussed at the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year.

Saturday, May 27, 2023

Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard); GenghisComm sues Toyota over SEPs; updates on Nokia-OPPO, KPN-Ericsson

This is a roundup post that discusses four different standard-essential patent (SEP) disputes and multiple jurisdictions. Quick links:

  1. Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard)

  2. GenghisComm (not an Avanci licensor) sues Avanci licensee Toyota over SEPs

  3. Nokia invalidated OPPO patent-in-suit

  4. KPN defended one of patents-in-suit against Ericsson earlier this month

1. Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard)

It's been almost a year since the Optis Wireless v. Apple trial in the High Court of Justice in London, but no decision has come down yet. In a similar case, InterDigital v. Lenovo, it took Justice Mellor similarly long as those FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) rate-setting cases are incredibly labor-intensive for the courts adjudicating them.

The judge presiding over the FRAND part of the Optis v. Apple case is Mr Justice Marcus Smith, whose reputation extends not only to patent but also competition law: he is the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CATribunal, or just CAT) of the United Kingdom.

It is not unusual for judges to divide their time between two courts. In fact, numerous European patent judges are doing so now between national courts and the Unified Patent Court (UPC). Since a few days ago, Mr Justice Smith is presiding over an antitrust case that is by far the biggest in the CAT's history, not only in terms of what's at stake (Microsoft's $68.7 billion purchase of Activision Blizzard) but also the enormous public and media attention--and on top of all of that, it's a matter that the UK's Prime Minister (who stressed the CMA's responsibility for growth and investment), Chancellor of the Exchequer, and its Parliament's Business and Trade Committee are concerned about.

Microsoft filed its appeal of a Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) merger-blocking decision on Wednesday evening UK time. Mr Justice Smith published the summary of the grounds of appeal (PDF) approximately 48 hours later and scheduled a case management conference for Tuesday (May 30). I already predicted at the beginning of this month that he would personally preside over that ultra-high-profile appeal. After yesterday's publication of the summary of the appeal, I commented on the grounds of appeal in a 40-part Twitter thread and added some further commentary on the comity part.

I'll live-tweet about the case management conference on Tuesday.

The deal has been cleared by the regulators who decided the matter for 38 countries (30 of them European Economic Area member states), with a collective population of 2.4 billion and aggregate GDP of $45 trillion, so if not for the CMA's absurd ruling, the deal could actually close now. But the CMA's leadership would like their agency--which the CAT has to overrule fairly often if one considers the deferential standard of review called Judicial Review--to be the world's policeman for major mergers, especially major tech mergers. There is profound concern in the UK over the CMA's eccentricities and regulatory overreach, and the CAT is now called upon to restore sanity and curb megalomania.

The CMA is now an outlier on the global stage. The only regulator to agree with them is the FTC, which under its current leadership opposes virtually any merger it gets to review and openly admits it doesn't care about losing in court all the time. The CMA decision is so clearly biased and incorrect that more and more people are wondering whether the reason is not just regulatory hubris or a lack of understanding of the technology markets involved, but whether it is even attributable (at least in part) to bad faith. My personal opinion is that a good-faith merger decision where the regulator looks at all of the evidence with an open mind and strives faithfully to apply the law to the facts definitely looks different.

There are mistakes that can be adequately explained with a lack of diligence (the CMA totally embarrassed not only itself but the UK and its government when the provisional findings--the equivalent of the Statement of Objections in the EU--subtracted only one year of costs from five years of benefits. The CMA corrected that mistake after Microsoft pointed it out, and revised the provisional findings. That was almost certainly just a lack of diligence. But the final decision just showed that before the merger review even started in earnest they must have been hellbent on blocking the merger. After they had to give up their primary theory of harm (vertical foreclosure affecting Sony in the videogame console market) and even prior to that realized they had to drop a "conglomerate" theory (involving Windows (an open platform), Azure (an easily substitutable commodity), the Xbox, and Activision Blizzard's games), they simply shoehorned those failed theories of harm into a "cloud gaming" theory of harm.

Weeks before Microsoft filed its appeal, the gamer community had already identified and discussed plenty of issues on Twitter and discussion boards. The decision is not just flawed or extremely wrong. It's a lot worse than that.

Against that background, gamers and other observers of the process can't be blamed for asking questions about the impartiality of the person who according to what a reporter from a major news agency told me "basically made the decision for the CMA": the agency's Senior Director of Mergers, Colin Raftery. Only because I wanted my many Twitter followers with an interest in that merger topic to understand that an unbalanced panel might respond to a historic speech by EU antitrust chief Magrethe Vestager on the same day, I mentioned--and proved based on a LinkedIn screenshot--that Mr. Rafferty started his career and spent seven years at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, a firm that has been consistently adverse to Microsoft for decades and is representing the most vocal critic of the Activision deal--Sony Interactive Entertainment--in its worldwide complaints, also in the UK. Cleary also advises Google, the other (and less vocal) complainant, but not in this context it seems. That factoid was picked up by Windows Central, and other media reported as well. On social media (Twitter, TikTok etc.) there was widespread outrage. My personal opinion is that none of us knows what Mr. Raftery's personal relationship with the Cleary lawyers opposing the deal on Sony's behalf--and with Sony's executives--is, so the truth could be anything from reassuring to mildly disconcerting to problematic.

It turned out that Mr. Raftery was previously instrumental to a merger-blocking decision that favored a former client. And it doesn't look good that the CMA takes an extreme position on a vertical merger now (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard) while it allowed Sony to make a horizontal acquisition of particular relevance to the UK market.

It now befalls Mr Justice Smith and his CATribunal to ensure a legally correct outcome and to restore the general public's confidence in the UK regulatory process. The fact that the first case management conference already takes place a few days later suggests that he wants to adjudicate the matter as swiftly as possible, which is in everyone's interest except Cleary and two of its clients, and CMA officials who may hope that the merger will be abandoned before their mistakes and their abuse of power won't be exposed.

People are already talking about a novelization or a documentary about that merger, given that some of what has happened here amounts to truth being stranger than fiction. I guess some of my blog posts and tweets about the case will come in handy if and when that happens. Those of you who have practiced law before Mr Justice Smith, or know him as a colleague, can already think about which Hollywood actor might play him.

2. GenghisComm (not an Avanci licensor) sues Avanci licensee Toyota over SEPs

There isn't much happening anymore in terms of automotive SEP litigation. Avanci has licensed the vast majority of car makers, Continental finally gave up its U.S. federal antitrust litigation against Avanci and some of its licensors (continuing only its Delaware state law action against Nokia), and Telit dropped a lawsuit that had been brought by Thales in Munich against Avanci and Nokia.

While the European Commission doesn't seem to appreciate the contribution of patent pools to the licensing process the way it used to do, Avanci's success has made it part of the solution. Recently even Samsung--one of the world's largest implementers of cellular standards--joined Avanci as a licensor at no extra cost to licensees.

A few SEP holders--some of which are non-practicing entities--still aren't Avanci licensors. One such company is GenghisComm Holdings, which on Wednesday filed a SEP infringement lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas against Toyota:

When it comes to comparable licenses, Toyota will be able to point to the license it has taken from Avanci, paying $15 per car for the vast majority of 4G SEPs. GenghisComm is presumably suing for the purpose of extracting a substantially higher royalty rate relatieve to the strength of its portfolio. Maybe the plan is to benefit from the unpredictability of patent damages verdicts.

3. Nokia invalidated OPPO patent-in-suit

About two weeks ago I reported on the (appealable) revocation of two Nokia patents as a result of OPPO's challenges. For the sake of complete reporting, I'd like to add that this month a written decision (PDF) also came down in an opposition proceeding in which Nokia has achieved the (equally appealable) revocation of an OPPO patent-in-suit: EP3563600 on "separate configuration of numerology-associated resources." the oral hearing took place on March 23.

4. KPN defended one of its patents-in-suit against Ericsson earlier this month

Here's a follow-up to the post of a few days ago on Ericsson obtaining the invalidation (by the USPTO's PTAB) of one of KPN's patents-in-suit. I hadn't previously commented on that dispute, so now I'd like to provide a bit more context.

Of the three patents-in-suit from KPN's first case against Ericsson in the Eastern District of Texas,

  • one (RE'089) was invalidated as I reported,

  • one was never challenged through an IPR petition (U.S. Patent No. 8,881,235 on "service-based authentication to a network"), and

  • a third one, U.S. Patent No. 9,253,637 on a "telecommunications network and method for time-based network access", was deemed valid by the PTAB in a May 12, 2023 decision (IPR2022-00069).

A second KPN v. Ericsson case is also pending in the same district (i.e., before Judge Rodney Gilstrap):

Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson and Ericsson Inc. (case no. 2:22-cv-282-JRG): July 25, 2022 complaint

According to the docket, the trial will begin on April 1, 2024 with jury selection.

Monday, May 1, 2023

Antitrust & patent judge Mr. Justice Marcus Smith will hear Microsoft's appeal of UK CMA's irrational decision to block Activision Blizzard purchase: Apple, Optis waiting for his FRAND ruling

Chances are you've heard of Mr. Justice Marcus Smith--at minimum, of some of his decisions--whether you read FOSS Patents primarily for its coverage of patent litigation (the original focus), its commentary on select antitrust matters, or a combination of both. At least two of his cases will be of particular relevance to this blog in the near term:

  • The standard-essential patent (SEP) ecosystem is anxiously awaiting his Optis v. Apple FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms) judgment in Optis v. Apple (Claim No. HP-2019-000006). That part is called Trial E. Most of the trials were technical, and Trial E is about license fees. While that case is at the intersection of patent and antitrust law, Justice Smith also hears purely technical patent cases (see this article by law firm Simmons & Simmons).

    In addition to Oxford, he studied at the University of Munich. Munich is now a major patent litigation hotspot.

  • It is a given that Justice Smith will preside over a three-judge panel that will adjudicate the impending Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority appeal of what is probably the most illogical decision not only the CMA but any competition authority of a civilized country ever made in a merger case. That ruling came down on Wednesday. Based on what Activision Blizzard CEO Bobby Kotick told CNBC, I wouldn't be surprised to see that appeal lodged even before the end of this week, though Microsoft has time until later this month.

Justice Smith is the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CATribunal" or "CAT"), which he has been since 2021, as well as one of the judges of the Patents Court, which is part of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice (previously known as England & Wales High Court, thus still abbreviated as EWHC).

There is another UK judge with a dual antitrust/patent focus many of my readers know--and some even personally know as a former colleague (patent litigator)--Mr. Justice Richard Meade. He is the judge in charge of intellectual property, but he's also a member of the CAT bench. While it's almost inconceivable that Justice Smith would not be involved with the "ABK" (for "Activision Blizzard King") case, Justice Meade may or may not be on that panel as well.

It bodes well for Microsoft's appeal that at least one judge with patent expertise will be involved. That's because the CMA's decision gets technology and technology markets completely wrong. The CMA's Inquiry Group was biased, incompetent, and did not even get basic math right (which is why they had to amend their provisional findings and drop the primary of theory harm after Microsoft pointed out they had subtracted only one year of costs from five years of foreclosure benefits). The members of that group--mostly with a financial services background--don't understand technology in the slightest. Some of what they've written in their ruling has made the CMA the laughing stock of gamers on social media and discussion boards. Patent-specialized judges are jurists, not engineers, but they develop a good understanding of technology and that's why it would be great if not only Mr. Justice Smith as the President of the Court but also Mr. Justice Meade became involved. I don't think any CAT judge will buy the Inquiry Group's absurd vision of the future of cloud gaming, but judges with a strong grasp of technology will find it even easier to see that the CMA ruling is plain stupid.

In September 2021, I commented on Justice Meade's presentation at a Chinese conference and noted that "Justice Meade stole the other European judges the show in terms of content, structure, and presentation (despite not switching into full-screen mode): low-key but world-class."

Justice Meade is also involved with the remedies part of the Optis v. Apple dispute. Equally in September 2021, he ordered an injunction that will, however, not be enforced if Apple takes a license to the Optis portfolio on the FRAND terms that are being determined as we speak by Justice Smith. I commented on a remark by Justice Meade on Apple's threat to exit the UK market depending on the global terms to be set in the UK (I expressed an understanding for both his and Apple's views).

In the Microsoft-ABK context, no one has threatened to leave the market, but the CMA decision has apparently forced Microsoft to ask the UK government for a ministerial override of the CMA decision. Microsoft's relevance to the UK economy and national security is key in that context because at least one of three statutory criteria for such an override (impact on financial stability, security, or media plurality) must be met. I discussed that in an #UnblockABK blog post, which outlined various possible ways forward for that transaction. For now there is every sign that Microsoft wants--and is highly likely--to get the CMA decision overturned. There can be no reasonable question whether the CMA's blocking decision is wholly unreasonable, just how close it is to an act of malfeasance or whether the CMA merely suffers from institutional schizophrenia (contradicting itself even within a one-page statement) or megalomania.

We're not at the point where an Illumina-Grail approach--closing the deal without regulatory approval--would merely be contemplated. That scenario is not on the agenda here, but Illumina did it, and Apple, in a SEP context, said that at some point it would be unprofitable to operate in the UK. Only if Microsoft decided to disregard the CMA's unlawful decision, they would face sanctions that based on my research could theoretically reach about $20B, though that would clearly be disproportionate when Microsoft's entire UK sales are just a fraction of that number and the theory of "harm" is about roughly 1% of the total gaming market. While the CMA's bizarre approach to enforcement has not yet forced a company to leave the UK, the agency is increasingly a liability comparable to a Disinvest in Britain campaign:

  • Microsoft's president told the BBC that the English Channel never seemed wider as there is greater legal certainty and a better climate to do business in the EU. As a result of the CMA's blatant abuse of power, he found it increasingly difficult to grow a technology business in the UK.

  • Activision Blizzard's CEO also indicated that the CMA's outrageous behavior would impact his company's job creation in the UK.

  • Not only the parties (Microsoft and ABK) but also some of their "coopetitors" (rivals, but also partners) find the CMA decision nonsensical and counterproductive in terms of having anticompetitive effects as opposed to defending competition. While I'm sure British Telecom subsidiary EE is also angry, it's a bit more difficult for them to call out the CMA. But other cloud-gaming providers who entered into agreements with Microsoft (subject to the condition precedent that the acquisition is closed) are at liberty to speak out. The most important one of them is Nvidia, the world's leading Artifical Intelligence chipset maker and also the market leader in cloud gaming. Clearly, Nvidia is hoping the CAT will swiftly reverse the CMA:

    Nvidia had to cancel its own acquisition of UK-based semiconductor design company Arm, but in that context the CMA had a UK-specific reason to be particularly concerned (unlike in the ABK case) and, more importantly, it was simply in the global antitrust mainstream. But Nvidia--I repeat, the world's leading AI chipset maker--can now see that the CMA will also make crazy decisions when other jurisdictions simply clear the deal (apart from the U.S., but the FTC doesn't matter because they can't block without a court ruling).

  • Arm is now going public in the U.S., not on the London Stock Exchange. A dual listing would have been difficult due to special circumstances, but the signal that this sends out is terrible for "the City": London's financial district. It's not just that Arm, a logical candidate for the LSE, is not going public in London. There are companies that are delisting from the LSE in favor of the U.S. stock market. Just on Friday, Reuters reported that "Kingspan plans to quit London listing in latest blow for LSE." The post-Brexit situation for the UK's financial services industry is difficult enough, and the CMA's anti-business stance and its current legal philosophy, characterized by contempt for logic if not even for the law, further complicates the situation.

  • A British games journalist told GBNews (videos embedded in tweet below) that the UK is now officially closed for business and this is terrible for its games industry:

  • By coincidence, just one day prior to the CMA's ABK insanity, the founder of Deliveroo told the Business Studies podcast that his company had to lay off 30% of its staff a few years ago because the CMA (whose current and irresponsible CEO was the agency's General Counsel) delayed a foreign minority investment (13% with no special rights) for 18 months. He is still so angry he called "total bullshit" on the CMA and used the F-word.

  • In a decision in which Mr. Justice Smith participated, he saw that the CMA broke the law in a case against Apple. While I actually agreed with the CMA's objective in that case, I also saw the problem with clear statutory deadlines. The CAT was able to quickly overrule the CMA.

  • One of the oldest technology companies--the one that created the world's first mobile phone--is Motorola. A few weeks ago, Motorola Solutions announced the intent to appeal an "unprecedented final decision" by the CMA. Right below the headline, Motorola says that "the CMA’s egregious overreach cannot be justified on competitive, economic or legal grounds." I don't know the details of that case (Mobile Radio Network Services market investigation). But I read announcements of antitrust appeals all the time, and a mature company like Motorola wouldn't use language like "egregious overreach" in an average case.

There are only two ways in which Sarah Cardell's CMA, which is currently out of control, can be reined in. The government could override CMA decisions and replace people. And the CAT can quash CMA decisions or parts thereof. The standard of review is way too high. That was no problem as long as the CMA didn't go off the deep end, but now the CMA behaves as if it's above the law, only because of the legal framework. In the Microsoft-ABK case, however, the CMA decision is simply nuts and that's why the "irrational or unlawful" standard will be easily met by the forthcoming appeal.

The CMA will learn now--or, depending on whether the UK government has made its presence felt, may already have realized--that Microsoft-ABK is not a case like Meta-Giphy, where the CMA made an aggressive decision (though easily distinguishable) that the CAT--again with Justice Smith presiding--quashed and referred back. On remand, the CMA arrived at the same conclusion, and the deal fell through. But in the Microsoft-ABK case, there's just one laughable theory of "harm" left, and if that one is quashed for fundamental reasons, the CAT may be able to resolve the case right away. It's interesting to see that the CMA doesn't really respect the CAT: in its Microsoft-ABK decision, it cites all sorts of input from industry players making predictions for how important cloud gaming will be in "7-10 years" or in "10-15 years" despite the CAT clearly having told the CMA the following in the Meta-Giphy case:

105. Assessment of impairment to dynamic competition will almost always involve consideration of expectations (i.e. an outcome with a more than 50% chance). Clearly, that outcome will involve consideration of multiple factors, but we doubt very much (although of course every case must turn on its facts) if an impairment to dynamic competition that is not thought to manifest itself within five years at the outside can be considered to be an expectation. The world is simply not that predictable.

The CMA just tries to navigate around the Giphy decision without admitting that they don't respect it:

"Based on this evidence, we consider that cloud gaming will continue to grow and is likely to become profitable in the next five years. Although it is difficult to predict exactly how big cloud gaming will eventually become, the evidence supports the conclusion that it is a growing and promising market in which several market participants are investing considerable amounts."

"[...] cloud gaming users and revenue will increase substantially in the next few years."

The mere fact that cloud gaming could become profitable still doesn't mean it's a reasonably large market (it's tiny and it's going to remain small in the years ahead) based on which a UK regulator can reasonably block a global acquisition that is much more about mobile gaming than the cloud. While the CMA claims it has to protect competition in the cloud gaming market, the real players like Nvidia or European startup Boosteroid are for the deal and against the CMA decision.

This case will be the most important one in the CAT's history. It's going to be an easy one to decide, though. By now, gamers discussing the decision and comparing the actual facts to the Inquiry Group's alternative universe have already identified utter absurdities. Let me just show you two more tweets here, both by a Twitter user named PeterOvo, one of which has a tweet of mine attached:

The FRAND rate-setting decision in Optis v. Apple that Justice Smith is working on is much more complicated. It's about what license fees Apple should pay for the use of the former Ericsson patents belonging to Optis, a group of patent licensing firms. In a structurally parallel case, InterDigital v. Lenovo, Mr. Justice James Mellor largely agreed with the defendant. But this is very much a case-by-case thing.

Justice Smith presided over the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year. It started in June 2022. I was even considering flying to London to follow it, but ultimately obtained only indirect information. During that trial, I received an email from someone actively involved with the proceedings:

"I have been sitting in on the Optis v. Apple 'Trial E' in London all this week and thought you might like to know your name and your blog has been mentioned repeatedly during the trial."

I understand that both Optis and Apple made references to different FOSS Patents posts. On June 20, 2022, another person directly involved with the case told me that "[my] Foss posts around the time of the Unwired Planet v. Huawei Sup. Ct. opinion [we]re now being discussed in the trial." My reaction was that they should actually have more important issues to sort out than discuss my posts, but pride in authorship is a fact of life and that's why I'm now particularly interested in the forthcoming Optis v. Apple "Trial E" judgment by Justice Smith. Even more so, however, I look forward to the appeal of the CMA's irrational--if not unlawful--merger block.

Friday, July 22, 2022

Fifth Circuit denies Continental's SECOND petition for rehearing en banc of its failed 'antitrust' case against Avanci, Nokia, others over automotive patent licensing

A couple of weeks ago, Continental brought--which is rather unusual--a second petition for rehearing en banc, desperately trying to revive its "antitrust" action against patent pool firm Avanci and some of its licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis). A prior rehearing petition had resulted in a modification of the panel opinion but the same outcome: there is no such thing as a case here.

There were signs of the renewed petition being viewed unfavorably by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. First, Conti's request for two additional weeks was denied. Second, the Fifth Circuit treated the tireless, tiresome tire company as a nuisance by not even ruling on its modified request for more time (other than denying it as moot--but only after the deadline Conti sought to get extended). Third, unlike in the case of the first petition, the defendants weren't invited to respond.

On Friday (July 22), the renewed petition was formally thrown out "[b]ecause no member of the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc":

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22118637-22-07-22-order-denying-contis-2nd-petition-for-rehearing

Two amicus briefs had been filed again, but they didn't cure the deficiencies of the petition.

Apart from a similarly non-promising case in Delaware state court against Nokia, the only thing left for Conti to do in its U.S. litigation campaign against Avanci and its key licensors is to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. But this case is doomed either way--while the Fifth Circuit panel's original holding that Conti lacked Article III standing went a bit far, the modified opinion affirmed the district court. Under the affirmed decision, Conti lacked antitrust standing and failed to plead Sherman Act claims. The panel opinion 2.0 didn't mention standing explicitly, but whatever the panel meant: Conti is still at least two steps away from even being allowed to begin discovery. And how can Conti tell the Supreme Court that there is a circuit split when the modified panel opinion is unpublished and non-precedential?

A smart company in Conti's place would try to preserve its credibility with the top U.S. court with a view to cases it could actually win, and which might be even more important (for example, there could be legal issues that are relevant to its core business of making rubber tires). Having watched that "case" for three years now (and having voiced skeptical opinions at all stages, though recently I've mostly been bored and annoyed by it), I guess Conti will file for cert and employ the same tactics I've seen from them lately, which means they'll take some sentences out of context. If one looks at the whole picture, Conti's complaint is utterly deficient as a matter of law, and even if--in an alternative universe--they got discovery, Conti could never establish any wrongdoing here.

Conti and its counsel should be grateful to the Fifth Circuit not imposing abuse-of-procedure sanctions.

While Conti is living in the past and appears unwilling to recognize its error, things are moving fast in the real world. Avanci announced that the window for its early-bird licensing terms is closing. Car makers have until August 31 to take a 4G license on the same terms as the very first licensee, BMW. Come September 1, the rate will go up by a third. I'd be surprised if this didn't result in the remainder of the automotive industry taking licenses. No automaker has so far had a benefit from choosing litigation over licensing. Tesla (obvious given near-simultaneous dismissals, though never officially confirmed), Daimler, Ford, and (with respect to an upgrade from 3G to 4G for its volume brands) Volkswagen all ended up taking the one-stop license rather than deal with roughly four dozen individual patent holders. At the moment, a number of standard-essential patent (SEP) assertions by Avanci licensors against Stellantis (Fiat Chrysler, Opel etc.) and Nissan are pending in Munich, but the rational thing would now be for those companies to take the license ahead of the rate increase.

Wednesday, July 6, 2022

Continental bothers Fifth Circuit again with petition for rehearing en banc and makes false representation of practical effects of Avanci patent pool agreement

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has done everything it possibly could to make automotive supplier Continental realize that its "antitrust" complaint against the Avanci patent pool and some of its licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis) is not going to be revived. The court didn't even formally deny Conti's motion for an extension of time to file another petition for rehearing en banc. The deadline was yesterday. Conti's counsel--instead of giving up a strategically lost position--worked over a long weekend (Monday was Independence Day) and filed its second petition for rehearing in the same case, even at risk of being sanctioned for abuse of procedure.

So here's the new petition, on which I'll share a couple of observations further below:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22080066-22-07-05-continentals-renewed-petition-for-rehearing-en-banc

The fundamental problem is still the same: Conti is wasting the judges' time as it won't win regardless of the "issues" the tireless, tiresome tire company purports to raise. While the panel didn't explicitly affirm the district court's holding that Conti lacked antitrust standing, it didn't reverse that part either. A lack of standing could also have been the basis--or part of the reason--for concluding that Conti had failed to state claims. All that the revised panel opinion said that was that "Continental failed to state claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act"--as opposed to saying there's no Article III standing (which is not specific to antitrust but broader) like in the first version. It's not definitively clear whether the district court was affirmed all the way or only with respect to the final part of its analysis. Therefore, Conti's interpretation is not necessarily right, and Conti would have to show in a hypothetical continuation of the process that it had antitrust standing.

Even the lack of Article III standing (the panel's original holding) could come up again, though it's less likely, given that the panel itself withdrew its original decision. At least antitrust standing continues to be a serious issue not addressed by Conti's petition. With a view to antitrust standing it's also important to keep in mind that Conti is simply not the right plaintiff.

The panel opinion 2.0 merely affirms the district court without further analysis, so the district court's decision (almost two years old by now) is all that Conti can attack. Just like after the first panel opinion, what Conti does is to take particular statements out of context--so they look really broad--and to suggest that if those statements were reversed or narrowed, Conti would all of a sudden have a case. Not so. For instance, Conti's petition ignores footnote 15 of the district court's judgment. The context is that Conti says the relevant patent holders defrauded the standard-setting process by making FRAND promises they never intended to keep in the first place, thereby excluding other technologies belonging to right holders who would have complied with FRAND. The district court found that a Section 2 monopolization claim requires an allegation of harm to the competitive process itself, not just to competitors. The district court indeed held that even if some other companies' technologies had not been included in the standard, that would not be anticompetitive unless the competitive process itself was harmed (which is simply settled antitrust law). But it also expressed doubts in a footnote about whether Conti--even if one applied a different legal standard or assumed that Conti had shown harm to the competitive process--had even made a sufficient pleading as to the exclusion of competitors:

"The Court is also skeptical that such exclusion has been properly alleged. Plaintiff only includes conclusory allegations that alternatives were presented and rejected by the SSOs for the 3G and 4G standards and that if there were no alternatives to a given technology, the SSOs would have been obligated to abandon those parts of the standard. [...]. There is no indication of what these potential alternatives were, that they were alternatives to any of Defendants’ SEPs, or that they were excluded because of Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent FRAND declarations. Even if the SSOs had known that the Licensor Defendants did not intend to comply with their FRAND obligations, the SSOs may nevertheless have adopted the Licensor Defendants’ SEPs and chosen to insure compliance based on the Licensor Defendants’ contractually binding FRAND commitments, which are enforceable regardless of any alleged deception by the Licensor Defendants."

So Conti's Section 2 claim is defective in more than one way. Conti makes it sound like the district court is fine with just any deception of an SSO, but in reality, the district court just explained that it takes more than Conti's pleadings to make it an antitrust issue. One major issue with the alleged "fraud" is that it's not about a violation of SSO rules (such as failing to disclose an essential patent): the accusation is that patent holders like Nokia never intended to comply with FRAND when they made a FRAND promise. That notion is absurd.

Conti points to three recent cases in which the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc of unpublished decisions. Still, the fact that the decision was designated as unpublished and non-precedential makes it most likely that the petition will be rejected. Last time the court asked the defendants for a reply; that may not even happen this time around.

Conti's Section 1 argument is that despite the Avanci patent pool agreement explicitly allowing contributors to grant bilateral licenses (to car makers, suppliers, anybody), licenses at the component level were not "fully" and "realistically" available to Conti--and they blame Avanci for it. The petition misrepresents the situation: it's not just that the Avanci agreement doesn't preclude patent holders from engaging in bilateral licensing, but Avanci licensors have granted bilateral licenses on various occasions. Nokia granted one to Daimler last year, and shortly thereafter announced that a second (unnamed) car maker had taken a direct license, too. Sharp and Conversant granted component-level licenses to Huawei.

Those real-world bilateral licenses belie, inter alia, the following passage from Conti's renewed petition:

"Moreover, a provision in the Avanci agreement that merely pays lip service to the possibility of individual licenses cannot defeat a § 1 claim if the provision has no practical effect."

The fact that patent pools can increase efficiency in licensing doesn't make them or their contributors antitrust offenders. There may very well be patent holders who tell a licensee that they prefer to license their patents through the Avanci pool. But that doesn't amount to a conspiracy any more than some car makers' decision to conclude a pool license rather than negotiate with (and potentially face litigation from) approximately 50 different patent holders. Licensors and licensees alike just want to reduce transaction costs.

The most likely next step is that the Fifth Circuit will reject this petition (the worst-case scenario for Conti being that the court will additionally impose sanctions for abuse of procedure). It's pretty clear that Conti is hell-bent to exhaust all appeals, so we'll probably see them file a cert petition with the Supreme Court in a matter of months...

Saturday, July 2, 2022

Fifth Circuit treats Conti as nuisance, doesn't dignify motion for extension of time with prompt decision: Continental v. Avanci 'antitrust' case over automotive patent licensing is dead end

The reasonable and rational thing for automotive supplier Continental to do now would be to recognize that its meritless "antitrust" action against Avanci and some of its licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis) is--and always has been--an error. Conti has not convinced, and never will convince, a U.S. judge that it has standing and actionable claims under the Sherman Act. It's over (as the Fifth Circuit issued a revised panel opinion that throws out the case, just on a different, more case-specific basis). The sooner Conti comes to its senses, the better.

This here is a brief follow-up to a Thursday post, Continental and its counsel risk abuse-of-procedure sanctions from weary Fifth Circuit if they file another petition for rehearing. As I mentioned, the court gave flatly denied Conti's request for a 30-day extension to file another petition for rehearing en banc--and as I explained, the Fifth Circuit's published rules make it very clear that the number one problem of abuse of procedure faced by the court are all those en banc petitions, given that the fewest cases (less than 1%) are heard by the full court (and of the few that do make it there, a large percentage get there because of a judge, not a party, making the proposal). Conti and/or its counsel may get sanctioned, and in the present case there really would be a basis for that, as a decision designated as unpublished and non-precedential can hardly satisfy the criteria for a rehearing. Moreover, even if one disagreed with the district court and at least one of the panel judges (Circuit Judge Ho) on the question of antitrust standing for lack of injury, it is fair to say, at a minimum, that Conti cannot point to a pressing problem such as on the infringement litigation front.

The denial of Conti's motion for an extension of time was already a clear sign that the appeals court has had enough of this. Unfazed, Conti just brought another motion for an extension: as counsel for Avanci and its codefendants had told Conti's counsel they wouldn't oppose a 14-day extension, Conti thought the Fifth Circuit might grant a new motion.

But there's just radio silence from the court.

The judges left for a long weekend, right after which (as Monday is Independence Day) there is the statutory deadline for a rehearing petition. Unless there was just a logistical reason and the court informed Conti by telephone that the two-week extension would be granted (whic hI doubt), this leaves Conti and its lawyers with only two choices:

  1. Act like grown-ups, enjoy the weekend, and give up a strategically lost position. If all else fails, find a good psychotherapist to help you overcome the trauma.

    Or:

  2. Go into crunch mode and produce another rehearing petition, which won't have any effect other than, potentially, sanctions and the embarrassment that goes with them.

There are strong reasons in favor of the first option. One of them is that former Chief Judge Stewart, who denied the first motion for an extension, doesn't have reading-comprehension problems, unlike Conti, which didn't even observe the court's clear instructions when filing its first rehearing petition (they had to refile in order to add some missing--but mandatory--elements). Judge Stewart saw that Avanci and its co-defendants wouldn't have opposed a 14-day extension. He could have granted a 14-day extension right away had he been so inclined.

Conti must know when it is not wanted. This here is such a case. The court is already treating Conti as a nuisance. Can't blame the judges, really.

Thursday, June 30, 2022

Continental and its counsel risk abuse-of-procedure sanctions from weary Fifth Circuit if they file another petition for rehearing: Continental v. Avanci et al.

Automotive supplier Continental's unreasonableness is getting worse by the day.

I started the headline of yesterday's Continental v. Avanci et al. post by describing Conti as impervious to reason. Meanwhile, Circuit Judge Stewart--a member of the panel that has already twice determined that Conti has no case--has denied Conti's motion for a 30-day extension for its second petition for rehearing. The court announced that the mandate would issue on July 13. So what did Conti do? They brought a new unopposed motion seeking a 14-day extension. The previous motion had already said that Avanci and its co-defendants (Nokia, Sharp, Optis) wouldn't oppose a two-week extension.

While Judge Stewart's order ("[Conti's] opposed motion for an extension of 30 days, or, to and including August 4, 2022, to file its petition for rehearing/petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.") didn't specifically address the possibility of a 14-day extension, Conti should finally see the writing on the wall: the appeals court is tired of the tire maker.

It's worth recalling that Conti didn't even manage to file its original petition for rehearing in accordance with the Fifth Circuit's published rules. Some elements, such as a statement of facts, were missing, and Conti had to refile.

People at Conti have to pull the plug on this. While Conti apparently didn't care to read the Fifth Circuit Rules (PDF) before filing the first (and failed) petition, I have taken a look at those rules. What I found shows that Conti and its counsel are taking a risk. They should accept the panel decision 2.0 as the final resolution of the case by the Fifth Circuit. Otherwise they may be sanctioned for manifest abuse of procedure:

"35.1 Caution. Counsel are reminded that in every case the duty of counsel is fully discharged without filing a petition for rehearing en banc unless the case meets the rigid standards of FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). As is noted in FED. R. APP. P. 35, en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored. Among the reasons is that each request for en banc consideration must be studied by every active judge of the court and is a serious call on limited judicial resources. Counsel have a duty to the court commensurate with that owed their clients to read with attention and observe with restraint the standards of FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1). The court takes the view that, given the extraordinary nature of petitions for en banc consideration, it is fully justified in imposing sanctions on its own initiative under, inter alia, FED. R. APP. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, upon the person who signed the petitions, the represented party, or both, for manifest abuse of the procedure." (original in italics; emphases added)

Let's start with "the rigid standards" of Fed. R. App. P. 35(a), which envisions only two circumstances under which an en banc may be appropriate:

  1. en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or

  2. the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.

If Conti and its counsel know that their petition doesn't meet at least one of those criteria, they have to refrain from bringing yet another rehearing petition lest they be potentially sanctioned.

The first criterion cannot possibly be fulfilled: an unpublished and non-precedential decision is inherently not capable of endangering the uniformity of the Fifth Circuit's decisions. Also, the panel opinion 2.0 is limited to only the Sherman Act Section 1 and 2 claims, i.e., couldn't be more narrowly case-specific at this stage.

Whatever Conti may say in its petition can't reasonably meet the second criterion either. Yes, to those Conti guys and their counsel the case may be of exceptional importance. But at this stage we're talking about an unpublished and non-precedential decision, which weighs against its importance--and a narrow decision on the specific defects of Conti's complaint. Furthermore, while the panel withdrew its holdings on Article III standing and didn't take a position on the district court's conclusion that Conti lacked antitrust standing, this here is still a case of no injury. Conti is not being sued over cellular standard-essential patents by any Avanci licensors (Avanci itself couldn't sue for lack of owning those patents). Conti is not being sued by a customer for indemnification. There is simply no harm that Conti has established, other than that it was denied a license it never really needed.

In light of all of that, this case falls far short of the exceptional and important case that warrants a rehearing en banc. Conti is not going to get that rehearing. There's no realistic upside, but a potential downside of being sanctioned.

If Conti and/or its lawyers signing the petition get sanctioned, they can't blame the Fifth Circuit for not having made it clear beforehand that this could happen. Here's another passage from the Fifth Circuit Rules:

"THE MOST ABUSED PREROGATIVE - PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC ARE THE MOST ABUSED PREROGATIVE OF APPELLATE ADVOCATES IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. FEWER THAN 1% OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT ON THE MERITS ARE REHEARD EN BANC; AND FREQUENTLY THOSE REHEARINGS GRANTED RESULT FROM A REQUEST FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION BY A JUDGE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN A PETITION BY THE PARTIES." (emphasis in original)

"The most abused prerogative"--for which we may now see one of the clearest cases ever of a manifest abuse of procedure. Conti and its counsel must finally understand that the Fifth Circuit also has other appeals, motions, and petitions to decide. It's utterly unreasonable and disrespectful for Conti to seek the attention of every active judge--all 26 of whom are listed on the appeals court's website--for a second time.

Tuesday, June 21, 2022

BREAKING: Fifth Circuit panel modifies Continental v. Avanci et al. decision but once again dismisses Conti's patent-related antitrust claims

BREAKING NEWS

At the beginning of last week, the Fifth Circuit panel that threw out Continental's appeal of the dismissal of its antitrust complaint against Avanci and some of its licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis) reacted to Conti's petition for rehearing en banc by taking charge of the case again, and announced a revised opinion. The new version of the decision just appeared on the docket, and the basic outcome is the same--Conti's case is still thrown out, just on a different basis as I'll discuss further below:

The original (February 2022) panel opinion held that Conti lacked basic Article III standing for lack of injury (as its customers--the automakers--have access to an Avanci license). That line of reasoning was supported by two of the three panel judges (former Chief Judge Stewart, and Judge Engelhardt), while Judge Ho would have affirmed the district court ruling, according to which Conti had Article III standing, but no antitrust standing and no Sherman Act claims (neither under Section 1 nor Section 2). However, Judge Ho didn't "dissent-dissent" but contented himself with a footnote voicing his different preference.

The new consensus--and now it's a truly unanimous panel decision--is that Conti fails at the third hurdle: it failed to state Section 1 or Section 2 Sherman Act claims. In that regard, the panel now affirms the district court. The revised opinion doesn't explain this further, so the district court's reasons are affirmed as they stand.

What the panel decision 2.0 does not address specifically is whether the district court rightly found that Conti lacked antitrust standing. It would have been better to have not only a castle, but a castle with a moat around it, by explicitly affirming both parts of the district court's judgment.

The panel has designated the opinion as unpublished and non-precedential, meaning that this particular litigation has been resolved (again), but others won't be able to really get mileage out of it. This ups the ante for any attempt by Conti--which I guess the automotive supplier is going to make nonetheless--to have the decision reviewed by the full court or by the Supreme Court. It's a means of minimizing the decision's impact on the development of SEP case law. Conti's amici would find it extremely hard to argue that an unpublished, non-precedential decision is of transcendental importance and absolutely needs to be reviewed by ever more judges, all the way up to the Supreme Court.

Fifth Circuit rule 47.5.4 says that unpublished opinions such as this one "are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case (or similarly to show double jeopardy, notice, sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney’s fees, or the like)." In other words, only under narrow circumstances--all of which are closely related to the case, or to any attempt to relitigate the issues between the same parties--is the decision of any relevance.

While it may be cited, the revised opinion itself doesn't contain anything worth citing: all of the substance is now in the judgment by Judge Barbara M. Lynn of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Given that the Fifth Circuit has downgraded the importance of the decision, it's conceivable that the panel just agreed on whatever it was able to build a quick unanimous consensus around. The finding of no Article III standing was a 2-1 decision even though there was no formal dissent. Knowing from Judge Ho's footnote that he'd have affirmed the district court's finding of no antitrust standing, it appears more likely than not that one of the other two panel judges would have joined him, but they didn't have to address that part.

The problem with Conti's case is that there are multiple bases on which it can be tossed even prior to any discovery--and if discovery had been conducted, I can't imagine the case would have survived summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit panel had three grounds of pre-discovery dismissal to choose from: Article III standing (the basis of the original panel opinion), antitrust standing (not explicitly addressed today, but clearly doubtful), and Sherman Act claims (it would have been enough for Conti to have either a Section 1 or a Section 2 claim, but according to the affirmed part of the district court's judgment, it has neither).

While I suspect Conti of being hell-bent to keep pushing until all appeals have been exhausted, I would encourage Conti to think really hard about the risk-opportunity ratio. The chances of getting any further review are unbelievably slim, while the risk of annoying one of the most important appeals courts in the United States and potentially the Supreme Court--by seeking a review of an unpublished, non-precedential opinion--is real. This isn't the first U.S. case to which Conti is party, and it won't be the last. Seeking review after review after review when a case has such glaring deficencies is disrespectful to the judiciary.

Psychologists say there are five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance. It seems Conti never got past the first three stages. It should leapfrog the fourth stage and finally reach the point of acceptance. Those legal fees are a sunk cost.

As a litigation watcher with a focus on U.S. cases, I can sense that all judges so far have been underwhelmed. Judge Lucy H. Koh (then in the Northern District of California, now on the Ninth Circuit) denied Conti a temporary restraining order and granted a motion to transfer the case to Texas. Judge Lynn in the Northern District of Texas disposed of the case at the earliest possible stage and on two independent grounds, though either one of them would have been enough. And now the Fifth Circuit panel has issued a revised opinion of the lowest profile (unpublished and non-precedential). Conti should face a simple fact: no judge really thinks this case deserves to go forward. Different judges may have different perspectives on the legal basis of a dismissal, but they all concur that Conti's complaint isn't deserving of discovery, much less of proceeding to trial.

Conti is still suing Nokia in the Delaware Chancery court, a state court of equity. That case hasn't made any progress. It was removed from the state court to federal court, and then remanded to the state court. It's another Conti case that isn't going to make an impact, and the only question is how--not whether--it will be tossed.

Tuesday, June 14, 2022

Apple under pressure: lost patent appeal against Optis--and Optis v. Apple FRAND injunction trial is underway in England & Wales High Court of Justice

Patent licensing firm Optis, which is part of a group that also includes PanOptis and Unwired Planet, is inching closer to the major liquidity moment that a royalty payment (including back-royalties) from Apple will represent. Yesterday, the England & Wales Court of Appeal (Lord Justices Arnold, Phillips, and Birss) affirmed an Optis win over a cellular standard-essential patent (SEP): EP2229744 on a "method and arrangement in a wireless communication network". Apple appealed the June 25, 2021 judgment by the High Court of Justice according to which that patent is valid and standard-essential, but in vain.

In the UK, a single SEP that is held to be valid and infringed is all the owner of a SEP portfolio needs to seek a "FRAND injunction": an injunction that becomes enforceable unless the implementer takes a license at the royalty rate determined by the High Court of Justice to be FRAND. And that license will have to be a global portfolio license even though the technical merits are established only with a view to a UK patent (typically, the UK part of a patent granted by the European Patent Office) and the injunction bans the accused product(s) only from the UK market. That is the law of the land there since Unwired Planet v. Huawei.

The aforementioned FRAND determination is made subsequently to a FRAND trial. And the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial started yesterday before Mr. Justice Marucs Smith. It is obviously no coincidence that the appeals court rendered its opinion on the same day, though time wasn't of the essence as Optis has prevailed on two other patents: EP2187549 and EP2690810, both on a "radio communication device and response signal spreading method (they from the same family, of which EP'744--the patent underlying yesterday's appellate decision--is not a member). A March 15, 2022 judgment by the High Court of Justice considered those patents valid in an amended form, and still standard-essential.

So Optis has overfulfilled the requirements for a UK FRAND trial, though it didn't win across the board (with the unique exception of VoiceAge EVS, I'm not aware of any SEP holder that wins each and every case). There was one case in which a former LG patent asserted by Optis was declared invalid (November 25, 2021 judgment), and another in which Optis prevailed in the High Court of Justice (October 16, 2020 judgment over EP1230818 on a "method for improving handovers between mobile communication systems"), but the appeals court overturned the decision in a November 10, 2021 decision.

Here's an overview of the six (A-F) UK parts of the Optis v. Apple dispute:

  • Trial A (EP'818): Optis won in High Court but Apple's appeal succeeded

  • Trial B (EP'744): Optis won both rounds

  • Trial C: former LG patent deemed invalid

  • Trial D (EP'549 and EP'810): valid in amended form, and infringed; Apple can still pursue an appeal

  • Trial E: the FRAND injunction trial that started yesterday

  • Trial F: Optis was denied an unqualified injunction (September 27, 2021 judgment), which would have been an extraordinary remedy in a UK SEP case, where a conditional FRAND injunction is now the norm

Optis has also won a U.S. retrial against Apple, with a $300 million damages award, and Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas affirmed that decision last month. But in the U.S. it's hard to actually get to the point of enforcing a damages award against a deep-pocketed defendant--and even more so against Apple, which according to Qualcomm has a history of coercing "low-ball agreements" with SEP holders. What Apple (and its allies) just failed to achieve, however, was the reinstatement of a 2013 U.S. government SEP policy position. And in U.S. SEP cases it's increasingly going to have to respond to allegations of hypocrisy given how its positions on App Store access fees contradict its own arguments for bringing down SEP royalties. Apple has already lost a fair amount of credibility in the 5G SEP dispute with Ericsson. I don't know if Optis will try to make any App Store-related arguments in its dispute with Apple. UK patent judges may be aware of the issues, even more so now that their country's antitrust agency, the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA), announced a market investigation into Apple's (and Google's, but primarily Apple's) strangehold on mobile browsers and cloud gaming.

By originally threatening to leave the UK market if the High Court of Justice were to set a royalty rate Apple wouldn't want to pay (a position from which Apple backtracked), Apple made itself no friends in the UK patent judiciary. The decisions there will still be fair and correct, but Apple can't expect

Apple unlikely to benefit from protracted UK litigation with Optis

The current FRAND trial will last weeks; a subsequent decision may take many months; and Apple hasn't exhausted all appeals yet. But the Optis v. Apple dispute has reached a stage at which Apple might want to settle, and here's why I think so:

As a litigation watcher who already followed Unwired v. Huawei (not every step of the way, but I did watch the entire UK Supreme Court hearing), I believe Apple is unlikely to achieve much on appeal--other than delaying the inevitable, of course. Not only is it going to be hard for Apple to get a better deal with Optis (which is not known for leaving money on the table, let's put it that way) but there is a clear and present danger of further case law--be it the High Court's FRAND determination or any further appellate decisions--cementing the principles governing SEP cases in London and exposing Apple as an unwilling licensee. That could prove costly in other cases targeting Apple, which might be brought by companies with much larger portfolios (and thus far greater royalty amounts at stake), such as Nokia and InterDigital. (As I just mentioned InterDigital, they recently had a FRAND trial against Lenovo, and a decision will come down soon.)

Lord Justice Colin Birss--before being promoted to the Court of Appeal--wrote the original Unwired v. Huawei opinion, which got affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court. He is now serving on the Court of Appeal, and would presumably be particularly influential if any new FRAND case goes up there. Since the Unwired v. Huawei/Conversant v. ZTE pair of caes that reached the UK Supreme Court, no actual FRAND determination has been made in London. In a scenario in which InterDigital and Lenovo settle, Optis v. Apple could be the first such decision since that seminal pair of cases to be appealed.

Even the UK Supreme Court--which like the top courts of other jurisdictions doesn't have an obligation to hear each and every appeal--would be unlikely to come to Apple's aid. I remember all too well how Lord Justice Kitchin gave a speech at Munich's Ludwig Maximilian University in early 2019 which was essentially just a defense of his own Unwired v. Huawei appellate opinion. By the time of that speech, he had been promoted the UK Supreme Court. He wasn't a member of the five-judge panel that heard the final appeal (it would have been awkward--and maybe not even permissible--for him to deal with the same case again at a different level of the judiciary), but he might have lobbied his Supreme Court colleagues, and he almost certainly would hear an Optis-Apple case. His views on SEP enforcement are fundamentally at odds with Apple's.

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Monday, June 13, 2022

Fifth Circuit gives short shrift to Continental's request for permission to file reply brief calling for rehearing of Avanci, Nokia antitrust case

On Thursday, Continental had the chuzpe to file a proposed reply brief in support of its petition for rehearing en banc (full-court review) of the dismissal of its "antitrust" case against the Avanci patent pool and some of its licensors, most notably Nokia. The procedural rules of the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit do not envision reply briefs in connection with a petition for rehearing, as Avanci, Nokia, Sharp, and Optis pointed out in their prompt opposition to Conti's motion for leave (request for permission) to file a reply brief.

Conti's reply brief has been rejected. Circuit Judge Carl E. Stewart, a member of the panel who held that Conti didn't even have basic Article III standing (thus never had to address antitrust standing, much less antitrust pleading standards), just entered the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that Appellant’s opposed motion for leave to file a reply to the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

It's too early to tell what this means for the petition itself. I don't think the petition is a whole lot better than the motion for leave to file a reply brief was. But the appeals court will certainly give the petition more thought, while Conti's desire to file a reply brief was just ridiculous.

Conti may have expected the denial of its motion to file a reply brief. In that case, Conti would have decided to bring a long-shot motion anyway. But such behavior comes across as desperate, and doesn't generate goodwill. Conti has to just sit back, relax, and wait for the Fifth Circuit's decision on the actual petition. If the appellate judges and their clerks quickly realize that Conti's amici are notoriously interested in the devaluation of standard-essential patents (SEPs), the focus will be on the merits of the petition, and in that regard it falls far short, not because one couldn't ask questions or raise issues (that's almost always possible), but because Conti's case is doomed one way or the other. It's a dead lawsuit walking.

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Continental's reply brief in support of petition for rehearing of SEP antitrust case not contemplated by Fifth Circuit rules, and wrong at any rate, Avanci and licensors tell appeals court

Continental continues to keep U.S. courts busy with its attempts to force companies like Nokia to extend them an exhaustive component-level license to standard-essential patents (SEPs). It would have been as reasonable as it would have been realistic for Conti to recognize that its U.S. antitrust case against Avanci and its licensors is lightyears from making the slightest commercial impact after a Fifth Circuit panel identified a third independent reason for dimissing Conti's complaint. And even if--which goes beyond stretching the imagination--Conti overcame all three reasons for dismissal at this stage, I strongly doubt it could prove its conspiracy theories even if permitted to conduct discovery. So the rational and respectful thing would be to give up. Instead, Conti filed a petition for a rehearing and then, toward the end of last week, even a motion for leave to file a proposed reply to the recent response by Avanci, Nokia, Sharp, and Optis to the rehearing petition.

But appeals courts don't consider rehearing petitions a motion that requires or warrants extensive briefing: many such petitions are resolved just based on the petition alone. By asking Avanci and its licensors to respond to Conti's petition (which I attribute to all the brouhaha by Conti's amici rather than the actual issues), the Fifth Circuit has apparently emboldened Conti to try something the appeals court's rule don't even provide for: a reply in support of a rehearing petition.

A few days ago I explained two reasons for which Conti's proposed reply brief makes no sense: Conti is trying to revive a federal antitrust case through an argument that is solely about (state) contract law, even though the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims after the federal claims had been dismissed; and the Fifth Circuit panel opinion said that even if Conti had contractual rights (which it failed to show), it wouldn't make a difference in the end.

The second one of those points is also made by Avanci, Nokia, Optis, and Sharp, who on Friday filed an opposition to Conti's motion:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22058588-22-06-10-avanci-opposition-to-conti-motion-to-reply-iso-rehearing-petition

Avanci and its co-defendants point out that the Fifth Circuit rule governing rehearing petitions doesn't even contemplate a reply brief. The above filing then explains that the appeals court simply doesn't need a reply to understand the scope of the petition on the one hand and the points made in the defendants' response on the other hand.

This case is a waste of time anyway, but at least I have hope that Conti can resist the urge to make yet another filing with the Fifth Circuit at this procedural stage, such as a reply brief in support of its motion for leave to file a reply in support of its rehearing petition...

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Tuesday, June 7, 2022

Avanci, Nokia explain why Fifth Circuit would waste its time granting Continental's petition for rehearing: issue raised by Conti can't change outcome

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is one of the nation's busiest federal appeals courts. If every appellant seeking to revive a fatally flawed complaint were to get a full-court review of a well-considered panel decision, the resolution of numerous other cases would also be delayed. At some point there must be closure. Continental's "antitrust" action against the Avanci patent pool and several of its licensors (Nokia, Sharp, Optis) is just a waste of time. Presumably owing to an entire echo chamber of amicus briefs orchestrated by those constantly advancing a notorious agenda of devaluing standard-essential patents (SEPs), the Fifth Circuit invited Avanci to reply to Conti's petition.

I'll keep this post brief because I already explained the logic of the Fifth Circuit decision--and the various other grounds on which Conti's complaint is never going to succeed--three months ago. Let me show you Avanci's reply, and then I'll share a couple of quick observations:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22053999-22-06-06-avanci-et-al-response-to-conti-petition

Conti's petition and the amicus briefs supporting it make a fuss about the Fifth Circuit panel allegedly having held that most implementers of standards aren't intended third-party beneficiaries under the FRAND pledges of standard-setting organizations. Not only do Conti's petition and the amicus briefs blow things out of proportion but the truth is that it doesn't even matter:

Avanci and its licensors explain in their reply that Conti's petition "is academic; resolution of the issue that it presents could not alter the outcome in this case." Starting near the bottom of page 11 of the panel opinion at issue, there is a passage that makes it clear the dismissal of Conti's case is independent of whether or not it's an intended third-party beneficiary:

"But assuming Continental is contractually entitled to a license on FRAND terms as a third-party beneficiary, the pleadings reflect that it has suffered no cognizable injury. Put another way, even if Continental has rights under FRAND contracts, the contracts have not been breached because the SEP holders have fulfilled their obligations to the SSOs with respect to Continental."

Simply put, Conti's petition for rehearing tells the Fifth Circuit that it may be able to get over the first hurdle, but (now quoting Avanci's reply) "pleaded no facts plausibly suggesting that"

  • "[Conti] needs to conclude direct licenses to manufacture and sell its components to OEMs"

  • "a patent owner has ever sued, threatened to sue, or is likely to sue Continental for infringement of the relevant patents"

  • "[Conti's] failure to conclude direct licenses from Avanci or its members impeded sales of its components to any OEM"

  • "[Conti's] lack of direct licenses has prevented it from pursuing any other business opportunity"

All that is left then is the hypothetical scenario of indemnification, but speculative injury doesn't count.

The above deficiencies have been understood by the district court and by all three judges on the Fifth Circuit panel. This may be slightly oversimplified, but essentially all judges who have looked at Conti's complaint so far have identified the same shortcomings, and the only question is whether the fact that Conti can sell its telematics control units (TCUs) to car makers, many of whom already have an Avanci license, means that Conti has no antitrust standing or no standing whatsoever (Article III standing).

Conti refuses to face certain realities. In late April, Conti's SEP exec Michael Schloegl ("Schlögl" in German) spoke at a Frankfurt conference and asserted that Ford was not going to take an Avanci license anytime soon. That prediction didn't age well: a few weeks later, Ford did take that license. Conti was a third-party intervenor in certain cases brought by Avanci licensors against Ford. But to date no Avanci licensor has sued Conti itself over the alleged infringement of SEPs by its TCUs. Conti may not be grateful to Avanci for what it's doing, but it has no reason to complain.

In their reply, Avanci and its licensors state in no uncertain terms that the Fifth Circuit panel opinion cannot be interpreted as "a bright-line rule automatically denying third-party beneficiary status to all component suppliers." That should give Conti and especially its amici comfort. The sky isn't falling.

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