Showing posts with label DMCC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DMCC. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 23, 2023

Competition Appeal Tribunal's role in keeping UK open for business is vastly underestimated: Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard may now be cleared on modified basis

Yesterday the UK Competition & Markets Authority closed the original Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger decision by issuing a final order based on its April 26 blocking decision, but simultaneously opened a new investigation of a modified version of the deal with a Phase 1 deadline on October 18 (which is also--and not coincidentally--the last day of the extended term of the merger agreement). The title of the new investigation is Microsoft / Activision Blizzard (ex-cloud streaming rights) merger inquiry. The long form of the parenthesis is "excluding Activision Blizzard, Inc.’s non-EEA cloud streaming rights."

The stock market views that announcement, taken together with public statements by the CMA's CEO, as a sign that the deal is now very likely to close. The spread is at its lowest. And Bloomberg is already describing this merger as (potentially) "one of the biggest comeback stories in the history of mergers" (which is an underestimated as it will indisputably be the biggest merger story ever).

This post--which may in fact be the last one on that merger before (all going well) some final comments on the closing of the deal--has three parts. In the first two parts, I want to talk about who and what is not getting enough credit so far for having--if Wall Street is right--very likely resolved an incredibly delicate situation. The third part serves the purpose of explaining more specifically what is known about the modified transaction and why I believe it should put the matter to rest, though I believe there is no legal basis for any regulator to request any behavioral or structural remedies given that this deal doesn't even get close to what a court of law--as opposed to political institutions overleveraging their hold-up powers--would consider to raise competition concerns. There are only fake concerns. Made-up stuff that is a miscarriage of justice. Most competition authorities cleared the deal unconditionally. Those regulators got it right because they faithfully and honorably applied the law, which is too much to ask for in the U.S., the EU, and the UK when a Big Tech company makes an acquisition these days...

If you wish to go straight to the part that explains the modified deal, click here.

1. Underappreciated: the Competition Appeal Tribunal's decisive action and guidance

It really annoys me to see the CATribunal (or just CAT) underestimated every step of the way. When the CMA issued its Apri 26 merger blocking decision, so-called experts described the appeal (which Microsoft announced immediately after the decision) as futile. They said that the Judicial Review standard--the applicable standard of appellate review in the UK for government agency decisions--presented an insurmountable hurdle. They said the CMA would ultimately avoid an "irrationality" holding if it just throws all sorts of "there could be an issue there" conclusions into a decision, with the CAT then supposedly being unable to find that if the CMA identified smoke in all sorts of places, it was irrational to see a 50% likelihood of fire. They said the CAT would--and allegedly (which is at least debatable) even had to--remand any decision to the CMA for further consideration, causing not only major delay but also leading to the same outcome anyway.

In this particular case here, I believe the CAT would likely have thrown out the CMA decision in such a way that it could either have found that a remand was pointless or, if it had remanded anyway, there would have been no wiggle room left for the CMA. That would have proven those "experts" wrong. They were lucky to avoid this because it appears that a solution has been found that will obviate the need for further litigation over this merger in the UK.

The CMA engaged in stalling because it wanted to avoid not only a CAT ruling but also a multi-day hearing, which I believe would have been a nightmare for the agency.

Some people wrongly believed that the CMA became interested in a constructive solution because the FTC lost its bid for a preliminary injunction. In reality, that was the expected outcome. In the other event, the merger would have been abandoned in all likelihood, and then there wouldn't have been a point in a new UK investigation of a modified deal. But if there was one thing in connection with this whole merger that definitely won't have shocked the CMA, it was the FTC's defeat in court.

The CAT clearly made its presence felt. And when the CMA and Microsoft agreed to stay the appeal of the April decision (shortly before a hearing was going to take place), the CAT's president, Mr Justice Marcus Smith, summoned both sides' counsel to his courtroom to discuss at a case management conference whether there was a good-faith basis for putting the UK appeal on hold. The day before that hearing, Microsoft announced a 10-year Call of Duty deal with Sony (obviously subject to the condition precedent of this acquisition being consummated), which Mr Justice Smith read about and suggested as a basis for clearing the merger now on the basis of a major change of circumstance (MCC).

I was live-tweeting about that hearing, and instantly supported the court's proposal. I was disappointed that counsel (on both sides) was unreceptive to that idea. But then, toward the end of July, Microsoft actually did make a filing that formally asked the CMA to clear the original deal (without a divestiture of streaming rights) in light of the Sony agreement and other key facts and developments. In my opinion, the CMA's April 26 decision was wrong, and yesterday's rejection of that MCC argument was also wrong. But I can see the CMA's institutional interests here:

They faced a dilemma. They may have realized that their April decision was completely wrong, and they must know how isolated they are on the world stage (with the greatest respect for Australia and Canada, those jurisdictions would not be able to prevent the deal from closing, especially not at this stage). There was and still is a debate over whether the UK's regulatory environment is hostile to business and a turn-off for foreign direct investment. So it would have been good in some ways for the CMA to just clear the deal yesterday.

But they also had another consideration here: their sacrosanct procedures. It is an oddity that the final report (which in this case was rendered in April) is the final "decision" (and can be appealed), but is followed by an interim order and, subsequently to that one, a final order, which is like a regulatory injunction. The final order is meant to be consistent with the final report except under the most egregious of circumstances. They just didn't want to act in a way that might encourage the parties to future merger reviews to take certain measures (such as restructuring a deal) only between the final decision and the final report. I have no doubt that this was the decisive consideration, as the CMA's CEO said in one of her interviews yesterday that what's happening here shows to merging parties that they should propose certain solutions early in the process.

If the CMA clears the deal on its modified basis, there may still be some discussion over whether the CMA is a liability for the prosperity of the UK, but it won't be too bad. Timing is also a consideration. The UK's prime minister gave the CMA a strategic steer that stressed, among other things, the need to make swift decisions so as not to hold up business. There must be due process, but they should be able to wrap up that Phase 1 investigation of the modified deal way ahead of schedule. In some other major jurisdictions, the Phase 1 timeline is closer to one month while in the UK it's closer to two.

The UK merger reform situation should be reformed in any event. There are issues. It's an opaque process, which makes it particularly unfair. The CMA should not always get a second bite at the apple when the CAT overrules it. And even though I believe the CMA's errors in this case could have been corrected even under the UK's exacting Judicial Review standard, that one should change. Even in connection with the DMCC Bill, which is the UK's equivalent of the Digital Markets Act, I believe the CMA's decisions should be subject to a full appellate review (as opposed to just "legal error" and "irrationality"). And I'm saying that even though I'm an outspoken critic of Apple and Google's app store duopoly.

If Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard is consummated in the end, the CAT will have played a key role, though in a world of two-second attention spans and "experts" who don't know what they're talking about, it would have taken a more binary outcome (such as a CAT ruling that would have quashed the CMA decision on multiple grounds) for more people to realize it. I look not only at binary outcomes but also at the first or second derivative, and that's why I think the CAT has been great here, even though it may never have to rule on the case.

2. Undervalued but (hopefully) ultimately rewarded: Microsoft's tireless dealmaking

Besides the important role that the CAT played, there is another factor here that is often overlooked. Even when many people (also including most merger arbitrageurs) deemed the deal dead, Microsoft never stopped trying to work out solutions with other market actors, including the only vocal merger opponent, Sony. And now the Ubisoft deal that creates a new merger situation.

Many other companies would have had a "fight or flight" instinct. They'd either have decided to bet on litigation ("fight"), or they'd have given up ("flight"). Microsoft was appealing the UK decision, but never stopped trying to find constructive solutions. They held on to their vision of bringing more games to more gamers through more channels.

I don't know if any acquirer has ever made such a Herculean effort on the dealmaking front to get a deal cleared--and in this case, we're talking about a deal that was legally above board regardless of any remedial agreements or other concessions.

In such dealmaking processes, there are unsung heroes. Those negotiations do not take place in public. The results speak for themselves.

A Microsoft-internal email has been leaked to the press. Microsoft Gaming CEO Phil Spencer reportedly credited Xbox VP Sarah Bond for her "exceptional leadership throughout this process." I saw her testimony at the San Francisco federal courthouse (very convincing), and I follow her on X (Twitter). We'll never know what exactly Mr. Spencer was referring to, but chances are that Mrs. Bond achieved major breakthroughs on the dealmaking front that paved the way for regulatory clearance.

3. New deal: Ubisoft acquires Activision Blizzard streaming rights

What the CMA and Microsoft announced yesterday was just a high-level summary of what makes the new merger situation different from the original one. What we know is that Ubisoft will acquire the streaming rights to all existing Activision Blizzard PC and console games as well as all the ones to be released during a period of 15 years following the closing of the deal. Whatever falls under that capture clause is then perpetually available to Ubisoft, though customer demand will obviously shift to newer games, such as new sequels.

This will not limit Microsoft's ability to offer Activision Blizzard titles as part of its Game Pass subscription service, and Microsoft will be able to stream those games on its xCloud service. However, Ubisoft will also have all of those games, and it will apparently be able to sublicense them as well. So there is simply no such thing as a foreclosure risk then.

It is an academic question of semantics whether this is a structural or behavioral remedy. There are strong arguments for it being structural as it is an acquisition: Ubisoft buys something and is then in charge. And while there is a time limit, a 15-year capture clause and perpetual rights to whatever falls under the capture clause should satisfy even the most demanding regulator.

Ubisoft is a well-resourced, sophisticated market actor. And the company has been independence for decades (it belongs to its founders, the Guillemot family).

One of the problems the CMA would have faced in the CAT is the question of comity (respecting other jurisdictions). It is unfortunate that the Microsoft-Ubisoft deal is global as opposed to UK-specific. I don't think UK politicians want the CMA to act as the world's policeman for mergers. It doesn't reflect favorably on the UK from a foreign investment point of view. It suggests that serious reform is needed. But if it allows the merger to be consummated, then so be it.

The Microsoft-Ubisoft agreement has a carve-out for the European Economic Area (which is the UK plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). That's because Microsoft had made a remedy commitment to the European Commission. While I disagree with the bogus concerns the European Commission raised in its (meanwhile published) decision, those royalty-free streaming rights were appreciated by gamers worldwide. The Microsoft-Ubisoft deal, according to what was announced, keeps that type of remedy intact for the European Economic Area. That benefits such companies as Nvidia and Boosteroid.

The EC now has to think about whether this requires a formal new merger notification. And if the conclusion was that a new review was formally necessary, I still don't anticipate major problems. In the end, all that matters is that there will be more choice and competition than otherwise. Ubisoft is not going to monopolize cloud gaming, and it is a French company, which the European Commission couldn't officially consider a reason for clearance but politically it will play a role.

All of this is unnecessarily complex, and I hope it will be over soon--with a positive outcome. The CMA's concern was all about Microsoft leveraging Activision Blizzard's games to dominate cloud gaming. The mere fact that Microsoft is now prepared to enter this deal shows that there were and are indeed other priorities (above all, mobile gaming).

Sunday, April 30, 2023

CMA issued schizophrenic statement on digital markets shortly after announcing to block Microsoft's purchase of Activision Blizzard: UK regulator contradicts own ruling

Were the CMA a person, one would really have to worry about it. As I'll show in this post, the CMA even contradicted itself on a fundamental question--competition among mobile app stores--on the very same day it tried, by means of a decision that won't stand, to block Microsoft's purchase of Activision Blizzard. Institutional schizophrenia.

I'll explain the reasons for this diagnosis first before talking about what's wrong with the CMA and the irresponsible approach taken by its current leadership, an approach that does damage without achieving anything good for UK consumers or companies in the end. Much to the contrary, the CMA's actions are counterproductive.

To be very clear, I'm not saying that any particular person is schizophrenic: there's no indication for that. It's an institutional problem. The biggest part of it is a lack of understanding of the tech industry, especially on the part of the Inquiry Group, whose members have an impressive background in other areas (mostly financial services) but are incompetent with respect to technology markets. Coupled with Mrs. Cardell's ambitions appearing stronger than her sense of responsibility, the results can be terrible, nonsensical, and in this case even schizophrenic.

In my two previous posts, I discussed why and how Microsoft can/will still close this deal (#UnblockABK) and the fact that Microsoft is not the first company to consider the CMA's actions a liability to the British economy: the CMA even tyrannizes startups and grown-ups, which a few years ago killed 30% of Deliveroo's jobs for no reason. Today's CEO was the agency's General Counsel at the time.

The CMA issued an unbelievably self-contradictory statement on Wednesday, only shortly after the merger-blocking decision:

Ensuring effective competition in digital markets, for people, businesses and the economy

A statement on mergers and digital markets from Marcus Bokkerink, Chair, and Sarah Cardell, CEO, CMA.

The one-pager argues that a legislative initiative that was introduced into the British Parliament the previous day--named Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Bill--and largely crafted by Mrs. Cardell herself and the Microsoft-ABK decision "are distinct," but "[the CMA's] existing merger control regime and the new digital markets regime can work in complementary ways to maintain effective competition in digital markets."

The opposite is true with respect to ABK:

While the DMCC as the UK's equivalent of the EU's Digital Markets Act is indeed designed to open up mobile ecosystems and free them from the Apple-Google strangehold, the insanity that is the ABK decision would (if surprisingly allowed to stand) prevent the most promising challenger--also in financial analysts' opinion--to Apple's App Store and the Google Play Store from emerging.

That fact alone would make the statement self-contradictory, but the contradiction is far more specific than that and that's why this amounts to institutional schizophrenia:

  1. The DMCC Bill as introduced into Parliament on Tuesday (April 25) will indeed--as the Cardell-Bokkerink statement says--"give the CMA the ability to work in a faster and more targeted way to improve competition and foster opportunities for innovation in digital markets where a firm is found to already have strategic market status." And yes, if the CMA uses its powers wisely (after carefully building the tech industry expertise the ABK Inquiry Group lacks), the DMCC Bill "will allow [the CMA] to set targeted and proportionate conduct requirements to ensure other businesses aren’t at risk of being exploited and excluded, and to safeguard users against unfair terms and constrained choices." (emphases added)

  2. But this means that the CMA will impose conduct requirements on Apple and Google so they cannot exclude (Apple) or hobble (Google) rival app stores. App makers are being exploited; rival app stores are being excluded; and user choices are constrained.

  3. Here's the key passage of the DMCC Bill:

    Chapter 3

    Conduct Requirements

    19 Power to impose conduct requirements

    [...]

    (7) The open choices objective is that users or potential users of the relevant digital activity are able to choose freely and easily between the services or digital content provided by the undertaking and services or digital content provided by other undertakings.

  4. Apple and Google will undoubtedly be found to have "strategic market status" (SMS). That term is also found in the Cardell-Bokkerink statement. No restriction in digital markets is strategically more important than mobile app stores monopolies: two gatekeepers controlling what apps we get, what the apps can do, and how app makers can promote their products, as well as taxing every purchase we make there (directly through the app tax, and indirectly through self-preferencing of advertising systems etc.)

  5. But here's what the crazy merger ruling says:

    "83. In relation to Microsoft expanding into mobile gaming, the chances of Microsoft succeeding seemed low in circumstances where the two largest mobile OS—Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS—either currently prohibit rival mobile gaming app stores or impose strict limits on their ability to monetise content."

  6. So the CMA's chairman and CEO--in the same April 26 statement--celebrate the DMCC Bill and the benefits it will bring to consumers and companies, but they incredibly say that the Microsoft-ABK decision is part of the same master plan, when that one flatly rejected the Relevant Customer Benefit that a universal app store run by Microsoft would bring.

  7. Here's the second sentence of that paragraph 83:

    "In any event, there seemed to be other, less anti-competitive ways, through which Microsoft could reasonably attempt to enter this market, such as by licensing mobile gaming content from publishers."

    No, there are not.

  8. The problem with the second sentence is that the Inquiry Group is (as I mentioned before) simply incompetent when it comes to technology markets. Financial analysts know that the most serious threat to the Apple-Google app store duopoly is Microsoft. That's because it takes two ingredients for a rival app store to get traction: you need to be able to compete at all (Apple) and on a level playing field (that's the current problem on Android), but also need a very attractive offering that is exclusive to your store and will drive users there. Only then will users not only rely on the default app stores (an incredibly high hurdle to overcome, especially if one understands what the Power of Default means) but also go there to discover third-party apps--from app makers large and small, including app makers from the UK.

    It's simply attributable to the Inquiry Group's incompetence with respect to tech markets that they believes there "seemed" (which should not be the legal standard for rejecting a Relevant Customer Benefit anyway) to be alternatives such as licensing: there is no way that Microsoft could solve the problem through commercial agreements with game makers like ABK, simply because those will always go not only for maximum revenues but also (for strategic reasons) maximum reach. It's not realistic that Microsoft would make those companies a sufficiently attractive offer that they would forgo the maximum reach that the default app stores will offer them. Smaller companies may do that, or even larger companies but only for low-priority titles. That, however, would not overcome the Power of Default.

    But what can you expect from an Inquiry Group that is incompetent enough to count all Game Pass Ultimate users as xCloud users--when xCloud is unavailable in numerous countries and even where it's available, only the fewest people play games via xCloud instead of locally--and that doesn't even get basic math right (comparing five years of profits to one year of costs)? They were obviously way out of their depth, which didn't prevent them from feeling like they collectively had dictatorial powers (like the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

  9. It will take time to make mobile app distribution competitive, but the CMA's sole remaining theory of harm is about cloud gaming and alternative app stores can succeed years before cloud gaming would even just hypothetically become as big as the technologically incompetent Inquiry Group asserts.

As I just referenced the Cold War days, let me adapt a famous speech by President Reagan:

Mr. Bokkerink and Mrs. Cardell:

If you want customer choice in mobile ecosystems, open the app stores.

Mr. Bokkerink and Mrs. Cardell:

If you want to create opportunities for UK companies of all sizes by giving them an alternative app store where end users will go to discover apps, allow the most promising challenger to emerge.

It's fairly likely that the CMA's CEO, Sarah Cardell, genuinely believes she's defending consumer interests even though she is not. Despite good intentions, she might be tempted to abuse her powers--powers she wouldn't have if not for Brexit (prior to which the CMA didn't get to decide major cases) and a rule-of-law deficit in the UK: regulators that have to defend their decisions in court on an a reasonably level playing field either have to act more reasonably (which usually happens) or at least they couldn't do much harm in the other event. The rule-of-law deficit could be addressed not only be changing the standard of review but simply by the government using its powers from time to time--as does the German government--to override regulator decisions when it's in the public interest.

If there's nothing that disciplines the CMA's institutionalized excess, a regulator that's out of control will additionally complicate the United Kingdom's efforts to strengthen--or at least maintain the strength of--its economy post-Brexit. Venture capital investment in the UK has recently been hit harder than in any comparable economy, and the CMA complicates investors' exits and in the Deliveroo case even complicated fundraising and killed jobs. Opening up mobile app stores would help many venture-funded startups; blocking Microsoft's purchase of ABK helps no one but Sony, Apple, and Google. More and more companies are considering delisting their stock from the London Stock Exchange (LSE)--which by the way has a partnership with Microsoft that is unrelated to whether publicly-traded companies believe they can get better valuations in New York. The crown jewel of the UK's tech sector, Arm, is going public on the U.S. Stock market. The CMA was not the only regulator to have concerns over the sale of Arm to Nvidia, but its institutional excess and its irrational decisions do nothing to advance the UK's interests.

Should the CMA consider itself--as a person interviewed by the Financial Times suggested--"the world's policeman" for competition in digital markets, then there would be an additional diagnosis of megalomania, and not necessarily just institutional megalomania. Even the European Commission--which has far more power than the CMA and especially a lot more experience with major cases--wouldn't look at itself that way.

In a matter of weeks, the European Commission will show the difference between the Champions League of intelligent, competent, and reasonable antitrust enforcement on the one hand and a second-division team that overestimated itself after it was thrust into a higher league by historical accident. The EC will also show the difference between decades of experience in dealing with high-stakes global-player cases in the technology industry and a regulatory startup. The EC's specialized tech merger review unit is here the CMA's DMU hopes to get--and where it has the potential to get, prudent leadership provided.