Showing posts with label High Court of Justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label High Court of Justice. Show all posts

Friday, July 28, 2023

Nokia v. OPPO ruling shows how UK courts would deal with EUIPO-led FRAND determination proceedings: commitments to be bound wouldn't count

This is the follow-up I promised at the end of the previous post, which put the recent Nokia v. OPPO "effect of the undertakings" ruling--which I called a "remedies roadmap"--into the context of the Mannheim court's holding that OPPO was an unwilling licensee because its counteroffer was a lump-sum royalty. It is disconcerting how the Mannheim and Karlsruhe courts forced OPPO out of the German market last year with unreasonable decisions, key parts of which have since been reduced to absurdity by decisions in other jurisdictions. But the proposed EU SEP Regulation is not the answer. Instead of tackling the real issues in a targeted way, it just creates different problems with a broadbrush approach to a highly complex and sensitive dispute resolution system that may be imperfect but is yet preferable over the proposed regulation.

EU policy makers should study Mr Justice Richard Meade's Nokia v. OPPO "Trial E" decision on remedies carefully as it serves as a preview of how the UK judiciary will deal with the types of FRAND rate proceedings envisioned by the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW). The short version is that an implementer would not be able to dissuade the High Court of Justice from granting a UK injunction by telling the court that it has already accepted to be bound by an EUIPO-led FRAND rate opinion. The London-based court would still present the defendant with only two options: make a commitment to take a global license on terms set by the High Court--or be enjoined from selling infringing products in, or importing infringing goods into, the UK.

Two SEP holders have recently been awarded royalties by the High Court that fell far short of their demands (InterDigital v. Lenovo, Optis v. Apple). In order for London to regain ground as a SEP enforcement venue, the Court of Appeal would have to move the needle in patentees' favor. I'm not taking a position on whether it should; just saying what SEP holders would want to happen. Mr Justice Meade's decision alone would not make SEP holders rich, to put it that way. But its key holding is significant at any rate:

The High Court rejected OPPO's commitment to be bound by a FRAND determination to be made by a court in Chongqing, China. Instead, Mr Justice Meade held that the only way for OPPO to avoid an injunction is to commit to a global license agreement on the terms to be set by the London-based court.

I've read the decision in detail, and various arguments made by Nokia were rejected. Mr Justice Meade noted that both parties had tactical reasons for preferring one forum over the other: Nokia wants the FRAND determination to be made in the UK while OPPO prefers China. One can't blame Mr Justice Meade for concluding that either party just does this based on its expectations of the future outcome, which in this case means that both parties believe the Chinese court will likely set a lower court than the British one.

What carried the day for Nokia was not that it could prove any fundamental deficiency of the Chinese FRAND determination process. Mr Justice Meade recognized that the risk of the outcome of the Chinese determinations not being within the FRAND range was low. It's just that any court in the world, when asked whether it believes a certain venue will make a correct decision, will naturally trust itself more than others.

That principle would also apply to hypothetical High Court decisions in situations where a defendant would have committed to be bound by an EUIPO-led FRAND determination.

In the beginning, the High Court wouldn't even have a reason to trust those EUIPO-led determinations: it would be an untested and unproven new dispute resolution mechanism.

But even at a point where those EUIPO-led determinations might have a certain track record, a patentee could still argue that a UK court should not rely on a foreign proceeding to the extent it can rely on its own FRAND determinations. Geographic and cultural proximity wouldn't make an EUIPO-led FRAND determination distinguishable from a Chinese FRAND rate-setting proceeding with a view to Mr Justice Meade's conclusions in Nokia v. OPPO. There has always been a systemic difference between British common law and continental European civil law, and the results of those EUIPO-led proceedings would not even be appealable to a court of law, a factor that in my view would even militate for considering the Chinese process a far more adequate substitute for a FRAND determination made by the London-based High Court. That deficiency has even been criticized by the President of the appellate division of the Unified Patent Court.

The idea of making a process led by an EU institution the world's FRAND arbiter is a bad one not only because the EU's international trading partners, first and foremost the United States, have concerns, but it's also just not workable:

  • The draft regulation that leaked in late March came with an antisuit mechanism. The EC itself complained to the WTO over Chinese antisuit injunctions.

  • The proposal that was put forward a month later was softened in that regard, but new flaws (such as an inconsistency between an EU-only SEP register and the determination of global royalty rates) were introduced.

The dilemma is that the EU can either try to force SEP holders to commit to its FRAND determination process, in which case the Commission would run afoul of its own interpretation of WTO rules, or SEP holders will not only retain their ability but even be strongly incentivized to enforce in non-EU venues such as the UK, which would presumably not be impressed when a defendant says it accepts to be bound by the outcome of an EUIPO-led FRAND determination. A British court will enjoin a defendant who doesn't commit to be bound by the UK FRAND determination.

EU policy makers--not only at the Commission but also at the legislative institutions (Parliament and Council)--should be realistic. There undeniably is room for improvement with the current system. But the rest of the world is not going to let the EU become the world's only FRAND forum. To improve the SEP dispute resolution system requires more international cooperation, not more antagonism.

UK FRAND judgment contains revelation casting EVEN MORE doubt on Mannheim court's treatment of OPPO: anti-Chinese judicial bias?

The longer the Nokia v. OPPO/OPPO v. Nokia FRAND dispute takes, the harder it becomes to believe that the Mannheim Regional Court's Second Civil Chamber under Presiding Judge Dr. Holger Kircher and the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court's Sixth Civil Senate under Presiding Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German) have treated OPPO in fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory ways. In fact, I can't help but suspect that some decisions were fundamentally unfair, unreasonable, and potentially even discriminatory. The latter would be consistent with anti-Asian statements by two high-profile German patent judges.

In the post I just linked to, I discussed that the first patent (of several) to be enforced by Nokia against OPPO in Germany has been held clearly invalid (non-novel, which is the worst outcome for a patentee) by the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris. And now I've found something in Mr Justice Richard Meade's Nokia v. OPPO remedies roadmap decision that also calls the Mannheim and Karlsruhe courts' fairness and reasonableness in the FRAND context into serious doubt.

A little over a year ago, I quoted certain passages from the Mannheim court's FRAND-related findings when it ordered an injunction over two cellular standard-essential patents from the same family.

The final point I quoted in that post was this one:

"In view of OPPO's substantially increased sales figures, any blanket license for the cellular portfolio on which the counteroffer is based is clearly not FRAND."

So, OPPO's counteroffer to Nokia was a lump-sum royalty. Nokia must have opposed that deal structure. That's the only plausible explanation for that sentence in the Mannheim decision. The Mannheim court then agreed with Nokia that it was within its rights categorically to reject a lump-sump license offer.

There are two things that we can learn in this regard from Mr Justice Meade's UK remedies roadmap decision (as a result of which OPPO either has to commit to take a license on FRAND terms to be set by the UK court or be enjoined). First, the previous (2018-2021) license agreement between Nokia and OPPO was also based on a lump-sum payment. The second point, however, is far more important here: when disputing OPPO's position that it was a willing licensee by virtue of a commitment to be bound by a FRAND determination by a Chinese court (Chongqing), Nokia argued that a per-unit royalty was unacceptable and only a lump-sum would be FRAND--and said that the Chinese court might (though it wouldn't necessarily) set a per-unit royalty.

Here's a screenshot of the relevant passage (click on the image to enlarge or read the text below the image):

Running royalty versus lump sum:

286. In these proceedings the FRAND valuation is in terms of a lump sum, whereas in the Chongqing proceedings the contentions are in terms of a per-unit or running royalty.

287. In the abstract, and for reasons I have given above, I think that the difference between lump sum and running royalty could be a major one with real impacts for a patentee, and if it were determined that each was FRAND then one can see why the patentee ought to be entitled to choose.

288. However, in the present context the difference is much less and may be nil. The reason is that the duration of the proceedings here and in Chongqing and the term for the new FRAND licence, expiring in 2024, mean that Oppo will not in reality work under the licence on an ongoing basis after it is put in place. The proposed licences in Chongqing do not include reporting provisions or the like and the result in Chongqing while analysed as a running royalty will in all likelihood result in a lump sum payment based on the per unit rate and Oppo’s sales.

289. Nokia argued that it could not be completely excluded that the Chongqing court will just set a per unit rate and that the parties might thereafter have to debate the relevant sales numbers. I agree that this cannot be ruled out, so the result in these proceedings could give Nokia a modest degree of extra certainty. It is a minor additional reason why Nokia’s ability to choose between the results would be one with some reality.

Nokia, like so many other litigants, will obviously make self-serving arguments. It's not illegal to make one legal argument in Germany and take the opposite position in the UK when discussing a Chinese proceeding. Mr Justice Meade notes that "Nokia has been unnecessarily obstructive in the Chongqing proceedings" (in connection with the technicalities of how OPPO affiliates OnePlus and realme would be licensed). He "stigmatised some of Nokia's steps as pretty" but stopped short of "conclud[ing] that it was playing games."

But this does call into question whether OPPO ever had a fair chance in the Mannheim court. I regret to say that it probably never had a chance there. It was going to be deemed an unwilling licensee for being Chinese, not for what it did or did not do. It was going to be enjoined even over a facially invalid WiFi patent. By contrast, Apple has gotten away with pretty much anything in Mannheim for more than a decade. Whether or not there are fanbois at work or it's just the fear of enjoining the world's richest company and public backlash, I don't believe that WiFi patent would have been considered valid if Apple had been the defendant, and I strongly doubt that Apple would have been deemed an unwilling licensee for offering a lump-sum royalty when a previous contract was based on one. In fact, there was a recent case in Mannheim where the very same division of the court took an extremely defendant-friendly position on FRAND that would likely have enabled Apple to come away unscathed. Double standards as far as I can tell.

Let that sink in: Nokia argued, and to a limited extent Mr Justice Meade agreed (in the last two sentences of the passage quoted above), that a lump-sum offer was preferable over a per-unit royalty, while the Mannheim court said that a lump-sum counteroffer (as opposed to a per-unit royalty counteroffer) was "clearly not FRAND."

Future defendants in OPPO's situation may now want to point courts in Germany (or elsewhere) to a UK SEP enforcement action by a patentee whenever that same patentee argues that a lump-sum royalty offer is unacceptable. And I believe the enforcement of those Mannheim SEP injunctions should now finally be stayed by the appeals court in light of hard evidence--in the form of the UK ruling--of Nokia itself not only considering a lump-sum royalty acceptable and FRAND, but even preferable. The WiFi patent injunction should also be stayed immediately in light of the French decision, after a full trial, that the patent is not valid (and not just for lack of an inventive step but even for non-novelty). The Mannheim-Karlsruhe axis has done major harm to OPPO on unfair and unreasonable grounds.

I'll soon do another post about the UK decision as I believe it also teaches a lesson with a view to the EU's misguided proposal for a SEP regulation.

Tuesday, June 27, 2023

Mr Justice Mellor declares Lenovo the overall winner of FRAND dispute with InterDigital, awards fee-shifting but InterDigital is awarded interest of $46 million

In March I described the outcome of the InterDigital v. Lenovo FRAND dispute before the High Court of Justice for England and Wales as a resounding victory for the defendant and predicted that other net implementers, such as OPPO, stood to gain from it. Of course, such decisions can and this one is indeed going to be appealed--which is also a safe assumption with respect to an even higher-profile recent FRAND ruling by the same court, Mr Justice Marcus Smith's Optis v. Apple decision, which I heard Optis intends to appeal.

My description of the outcome as a major win for Lenovo has been validated by a follow-up judgment. According to Lenovo's press release, the actual decision should become available later, and the court declared Lenovo "undoubtedly the overall winner," a finding that entitles Lenovo to recovery of the bulk of its litigation costs.

A press release by InterDigital highlights two other aspects of the decision: primarily the fact that the amount to be paid by Lenovo goes up from $138.7 million to $184.9 million due to interest on past royalties, and also the fact that the court granted the parties the right to appeal certain aspects of the judgment.

Mr Justice Mellor's original judgment expressed surprise over the fact that InterDigital had not sought interest on past royalties. Lenovo had been using InterDigital's IP for well over a decade without paying. In the March decision, Mr Justice Mellor invited InterDigital to seek interest now, and determined that $46.2 million was the correct amount.

I heard that the interest award must be paid now sa opposed to be placed into escrow.

The March decision was mentioned at a Brussels event related to the European Commission's proposal for a regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs). Someone close to Apple referenced it in the context of whether small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are at risk of paying supra-FRAND royalties as they lack the resources and sophistication to defend themselves as effectively as larger players. Someone from the net licensor camp clarified that SMEs were not involved in the license agreements with third parties that Mr Justice Mellor declined to accept as comparable agreements because the licensees were smaller companies than the ones that Lenovo pointed to (such as Apple, Samsung, and LG). So the ones who argue that legislative intervention is needed to shield SMEs from SEP abuse can't point to the UK InterDigital v. Lenovo ruling as evidence of SMEs being overcharged--the "smaller" licensees referenced in that decision were still pretty sizable. However, a reasonable argument can be made that if SEP holders were to go after SMEs (which is not the case yet, at least not to a noticeable extent), SMEs would likely--actually, almost definitely--end up paying supra-FRAND royalties.

InterDigital's problem remains (as the interest award changes nothing about it) that the company tends to cave to large implementers: the likes of Apple and Samsung get discounts that are not just high but next to irrational. As a result, InterDigital's headline rates have a credibility problem when companies like Lenovo or OPPO (with OPPO clearly being a high-volume implementer as well) are sued.

InterDigital has only one revenue stream: license fees, and most of that revenue comes from a small group of companies: major smartphone makers. The rest of the industry took note of the fact that Apple is not paying InterDigital more than in the past, and while litigation with Apple could have been costly and protracted, the terms of that agreement do nothing to persuade a company like OPPO (whose devices sell at a much lower average per-unit price than Apple's) to cave to InterDigital's demands. And unlike Lenovo, OPPO is in a far stronger position to convince courts that it is a willing licensee.

Wednesday, June 7, 2023

BREAKING: Mr Justice Marcus Smith has made his Optis v. Apple FRAND determination: only $5M per year for global standard-essential patent license covering all Apple products, even hypothetical Apple Car

BREAKING: Apple has effectively prevailed over the Optis Wireless patent licensing firm in the High Court of Justice (formerly known as the England & Wales High Court, still commonly abbreviated as EWHC). Optis will receive only approximately US$5 million per year from Apple, and we're talking about a worldwide standard-essential (SEP) portfolio license covering all Apple products implementing cellular connectivity, even "a hypothetical Apple car, retailing at a hypothetical US$100,000 and using the Standard for Cellular Connectivity."

Let's face it: London is not the city of milk and honey for SEPholders. After the Unwired Planet v. Huawei decisions by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and UK Supreme Court, some thought the United Kingdom would become one of the world's most attractive SEP enforcement destinations. In March, Mr Justice Mellor--also almost one year after the related trial--handed down his InterDigital v. Lenovo decision, which overwhelmingly favored the interests of the defendant. One could have a debate over whether InterDigital or Optis is now likely more disappointed, but neither of them can be pleased with the amounts.

The decision already came down on May 10, but it has not been published yet. I've been able to obtain some basic information and snippets from a source I must protect. I had no idea that the judgment had already been entered when I wrote on May 27 that it could be further delayed by Mr Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority, over the $68.7B acquisition of Activision Blizzard King). He not only hears patent cases but is also the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal of the United Kingdom. I live-tweeted about the initial case management conference last week and subsequently blogged about that case. I'll also comment on next Monday's second case management conference, and I'll be speaking about the application of competition law to SEPs at a London conference on Tuesday that is keynoted by Mr Justice Smith and organized by Concurrences together with King's College London. I look forward to meeting some of my readers there. I very rarely attend in-person events.

Getting back to Optis v. Apple:

It's possible that Optis will appeal the decision. If it standards, Apple gets a global lifetime license (including backroyalties) to that patent portfolio for roughly $60M (including interest). Optis wanted a lot more--in fact, so much more that Apple even threatened with leaving the UK market should the UK part of the dispute result in an obligation to take a worldwide license at a rate Apple would have deemed excessive. Apple withdrew the threat, but it shows that they were afraid of a worst-case scenario far in excess of what the High Court has now decided.

Some of Apple's arguments for bringing down the royalty rate were rejected, and that includes Apple's favorite SEP devaluation argument, which is that the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) should serve as the royalty base. Mr Justice Smith authored an entire section "to explain why the SSPPU approach is, in [his] judgement, indefensible." Wow. "[I]ndefensible."

Interestingly, Mr Justice Smith even agreed with Apple that the baseband chipset "does contain the relevant technology." And Optis did not really dispute that the market value of that one is approximately $25. Then Mr Justice Smith notes that--at that price--"[t]he product is, however, unlicensed." And he rejected the idea that if a baseband chipset maker generates a profit of maybe $5 on the $25 component, it "should pay for the licence out of the US$5 profit, and that this therefore constituted the absolute limit that ought to be paid by anyone."

Mr Justice Smith did not mince words as he criticized Apple's SSPPU argument:

"Indeed, it is quite absurd to presuppose that the manufacturer of a baseband chipset would forego any part of their profit unless absolutely compelled to do so. It is much more likely that baseband chipset manufacturers would increase the price of their product to reflect the added value to purchasers of that product of having a licence to the SEPs comprising the stack. Absent extremely clear market evidence, the assumption that the baseband chipset manufacturer would absorb the costs of the licence and not pass them on is almost certainly both unsafe and wrong. Certainly, it cannot be assumed."

Mr Justice Smith made adjustments to Optis's share of the 4G SEP stack, and (presumably because not all of Optis's infringement assertions succeeded) based that patent owner's share of the total royalty stack on an even lower percentage (we're talking about less than 1%) than its ownership share. He did not find Apple to have been an unwilling licensee who would no longer be entitled to a FRAND license.

One key overlap between Mr Justice Smith's approach in Optis v. Apple and Mr Justice Mellor's in InterDigital v. Lenovo is that the patent holder's proposed comparable license agreements were rejected because the respective licensees were smaller players:

"[G]iven the nature of Optis’ counterparties to the Optis Comparables – generally small players in the market, with low or at least not massive sales volumes – there is a question whether these licences properly reflect a FRAND rate for a counterparty like Apple."

By contrast, all of the comparable license agreements that Apple asked the court to rely on where agreements between Apple and other parties:

"The Apple Comparables are all licences where the common factor is Apple. Apple sought and obtained licences to different portfolios with different counterparties. This means there is no direct comparable with the portfolio in issue before me (which is a factor pointing away from the usefulness of the Apple Comparables), but some insight is gained into the value of the Stack as a whole, and the value attributed (at least so far as a company the size of Apple is concerned) to different portfolios held by different counterparties. The size and commercial “clout” of the licensee may be (I do not say is) a relevant factor in terms of royalties in any event."

The decision spans almost 300 pages, and I have yet to obtain and digest the document in its entirety. I did, however, want to share some of the most important and interesting aspects of the ruling now--not least also with a view to the Tuesday conference (The Innovation Economics Conerence for Antitrust Lawyers), where Mr Justice Smith may also say something about the valuation of FRAND-pledged SEPs.

As I mentioned in a recent post, several FOSS Patents blog posts were discussed at the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year.

Monday, May 1, 2023

Antitrust & patent judge Mr. Justice Marcus Smith will hear Microsoft's appeal of UK CMA's irrational decision to block Activision Blizzard purchase: Apple, Optis waiting for his FRAND ruling

Chances are you've heard of Mr. Justice Marcus Smith--at minimum, of some of his decisions--whether you read FOSS Patents primarily for its coverage of patent litigation (the original focus), its commentary on select antitrust matters, or a combination of both. At least two of his cases will be of particular relevance to this blog in the near term:

  • The standard-essential patent (SEP) ecosystem is anxiously awaiting his Optis v. Apple FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms) judgment in Optis v. Apple (Claim No. HP-2019-000006). That part is called Trial E. Most of the trials were technical, and Trial E is about license fees. While that case is at the intersection of patent and antitrust law, Justice Smith also hears purely technical patent cases (see this article by law firm Simmons & Simmons).

    In addition to Oxford, he studied at the University of Munich. Munich is now a major patent litigation hotspot.

  • It is a given that Justice Smith will preside over a three-judge panel that will adjudicate the impending Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority appeal of what is probably the most illogical decision not only the CMA but any competition authority of a civilized country ever made in a merger case. That ruling came down on Wednesday. Based on what Activision Blizzard CEO Bobby Kotick told CNBC, I wouldn't be surprised to see that appeal lodged even before the end of this week, though Microsoft has time until later this month.

Justice Smith is the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CATribunal" or "CAT"), which he has been since 2021, as well as one of the judges of the Patents Court, which is part of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice (previously known as England & Wales High Court, thus still abbreviated as EWHC).

There is another UK judge with a dual antitrust/patent focus many of my readers know--and some even personally know as a former colleague (patent litigator)--Mr. Justice Richard Meade. He is the judge in charge of intellectual property, but he's also a member of the CAT bench. While it's almost inconceivable that Justice Smith would not be involved with the "ABK" (for "Activision Blizzard King") case, Justice Meade may or may not be on that panel as well.

It bodes well for Microsoft's appeal that at least one judge with patent expertise will be involved. That's because the CMA's decision gets technology and technology markets completely wrong. The CMA's Inquiry Group was biased, incompetent, and did not even get basic math right (which is why they had to amend their provisional findings and drop the primary of theory harm after Microsoft pointed out they had subtracted only one year of costs from five years of foreclosure benefits). The members of that group--mostly with a financial services background--don't understand technology in the slightest. Some of what they've written in their ruling has made the CMA the laughing stock of gamers on social media and discussion boards. Patent-specialized judges are jurists, not engineers, but they develop a good understanding of technology and that's why it would be great if not only Mr. Justice Smith as the President of the Court but also Mr. Justice Meade became involved. I don't think any CAT judge will buy the Inquiry Group's absurd vision of the future of cloud gaming, but judges with a strong grasp of technology will find it even easier to see that the CMA ruling is plain stupid.

In September 2021, I commented on Justice Meade's presentation at a Chinese conference and noted that "Justice Meade stole the other European judges the show in terms of content, structure, and presentation (despite not switching into full-screen mode): low-key but world-class."

Justice Meade is also involved with the remedies part of the Optis v. Apple dispute. Equally in September 2021, he ordered an injunction that will, however, not be enforced if Apple takes a license to the Optis portfolio on the FRAND terms that are being determined as we speak by Justice Smith. I commented on a remark by Justice Meade on Apple's threat to exit the UK market depending on the global terms to be set in the UK (I expressed an understanding for both his and Apple's views).

In the Microsoft-ABK context, no one has threatened to leave the market, but the CMA decision has apparently forced Microsoft to ask the UK government for a ministerial override of the CMA decision. Microsoft's relevance to the UK economy and national security is key in that context because at least one of three statutory criteria for such an override (impact on financial stability, security, or media plurality) must be met. I discussed that in an #UnblockABK blog post, which outlined various possible ways forward for that transaction. For now there is every sign that Microsoft wants--and is highly likely--to get the CMA decision overturned. There can be no reasonable question whether the CMA's blocking decision is wholly unreasonable, just how close it is to an act of malfeasance or whether the CMA merely suffers from institutional schizophrenia (contradicting itself even within a one-page statement) or megalomania.

We're not at the point where an Illumina-Grail approach--closing the deal without regulatory approval--would merely be contemplated. That scenario is not on the agenda here, but Illumina did it, and Apple, in a SEP context, said that at some point it would be unprofitable to operate in the UK. Only if Microsoft decided to disregard the CMA's unlawful decision, they would face sanctions that based on my research could theoretically reach about $20B, though that would clearly be disproportionate when Microsoft's entire UK sales are just a fraction of that number and the theory of "harm" is about roughly 1% of the total gaming market. While the CMA's bizarre approach to enforcement has not yet forced a company to leave the UK, the agency is increasingly a liability comparable to a Disinvest in Britain campaign:

  • Microsoft's president told the BBC that the English Channel never seemed wider as there is greater legal certainty and a better climate to do business in the EU. As a result of the CMA's blatant abuse of power, he found it increasingly difficult to grow a technology business in the UK.

  • Activision Blizzard's CEO also indicated that the CMA's outrageous behavior would impact his company's job creation in the UK.

  • Not only the parties (Microsoft and ABK) but also some of their "coopetitors" (rivals, but also partners) find the CMA decision nonsensical and counterproductive in terms of having anticompetitive effects as opposed to defending competition. While I'm sure British Telecom subsidiary EE is also angry, it's a bit more difficult for them to call out the CMA. But other cloud-gaming providers who entered into agreements with Microsoft (subject to the condition precedent that the acquisition is closed) are at liberty to speak out. The most important one of them is Nvidia, the world's leading Artifical Intelligence chipset maker and also the market leader in cloud gaming. Clearly, Nvidia is hoping the CAT will swiftly reverse the CMA:

    Nvidia had to cancel its own acquisition of UK-based semiconductor design company Arm, but in that context the CMA had a UK-specific reason to be particularly concerned (unlike in the ABK case) and, more importantly, it was simply in the global antitrust mainstream. But Nvidia--I repeat, the world's leading AI chipset maker--can now see that the CMA will also make crazy decisions when other jurisdictions simply clear the deal (apart from the U.S., but the FTC doesn't matter because they can't block without a court ruling).

  • Arm is now going public in the U.S., not on the London Stock Exchange. A dual listing would have been difficult due to special circumstances, but the signal that this sends out is terrible for "the City": London's financial district. It's not just that Arm, a logical candidate for the LSE, is not going public in London. There are companies that are delisting from the LSE in favor of the U.S. stock market. Just on Friday, Reuters reported that "Kingspan plans to quit London listing in latest blow for LSE." The post-Brexit situation for the UK's financial services industry is difficult enough, and the CMA's anti-business stance and its current legal philosophy, characterized by contempt for logic if not even for the law, further complicates the situation.

  • A British games journalist told GBNews (videos embedded in tweet below) that the UK is now officially closed for business and this is terrible for its games industry:

  • By coincidence, just one day prior to the CMA's ABK insanity, the founder of Deliveroo told the Business Studies podcast that his company had to lay off 30% of its staff a few years ago because the CMA (whose current and irresponsible CEO was the agency's General Counsel) delayed a foreign minority investment (13% with no special rights) for 18 months. He is still so angry he called "total bullshit" on the CMA and used the F-word.

  • In a decision in which Mr. Justice Smith participated, he saw that the CMA broke the law in a case against Apple. While I actually agreed with the CMA's objective in that case, I also saw the problem with clear statutory deadlines. The CAT was able to quickly overrule the CMA.

  • One of the oldest technology companies--the one that created the world's first mobile phone--is Motorola. A few weeks ago, Motorola Solutions announced the intent to appeal an "unprecedented final decision" by the CMA. Right below the headline, Motorola says that "the CMA’s egregious overreach cannot be justified on competitive, economic or legal grounds." I don't know the details of that case (Mobile Radio Network Services market investigation). But I read announcements of antitrust appeals all the time, and a mature company like Motorola wouldn't use language like "egregious overreach" in an average case.

There are only two ways in which Sarah Cardell's CMA, which is currently out of control, can be reined in. The government could override CMA decisions and replace people. And the CAT can quash CMA decisions or parts thereof. The standard of review is way too high. That was no problem as long as the CMA didn't go off the deep end, but now the CMA behaves as if it's above the law, only because of the legal framework. In the Microsoft-ABK case, however, the CMA decision is simply nuts and that's why the "irrational or unlawful" standard will be easily met by the forthcoming appeal.

The CMA will learn now--or, depending on whether the UK government has made its presence felt, may already have realized--that Microsoft-ABK is not a case like Meta-Giphy, where the CMA made an aggressive decision (though easily distinguishable) that the CAT--again with Justice Smith presiding--quashed and referred back. On remand, the CMA arrived at the same conclusion, and the deal fell through. But in the Microsoft-ABK case, there's just one laughable theory of "harm" left, and if that one is quashed for fundamental reasons, the CAT may be able to resolve the case right away. It's interesting to see that the CMA doesn't really respect the CAT: in its Microsoft-ABK decision, it cites all sorts of input from industry players making predictions for how important cloud gaming will be in "7-10 years" or in "10-15 years" despite the CAT clearly having told the CMA the following in the Meta-Giphy case:

105. Assessment of impairment to dynamic competition will almost always involve consideration of expectations (i.e. an outcome with a more than 50% chance). Clearly, that outcome will involve consideration of multiple factors, but we doubt very much (although of course every case must turn on its facts) if an impairment to dynamic competition that is not thought to manifest itself within five years at the outside can be considered to be an expectation. The world is simply not that predictable.

The CMA just tries to navigate around the Giphy decision without admitting that they don't respect it:

"Based on this evidence, we consider that cloud gaming will continue to grow and is likely to become profitable in the next five years. Although it is difficult to predict exactly how big cloud gaming will eventually become, the evidence supports the conclusion that it is a growing and promising market in which several market participants are investing considerable amounts."

"[...] cloud gaming users and revenue will increase substantially in the next few years."

The mere fact that cloud gaming could become profitable still doesn't mean it's a reasonably large market (it's tiny and it's going to remain small in the years ahead) based on which a UK regulator can reasonably block a global acquisition that is much more about mobile gaming than the cloud. While the CMA claims it has to protect competition in the cloud gaming market, the real players like Nvidia or European startup Boosteroid are for the deal and against the CMA decision.

This case will be the most important one in the CAT's history. It's going to be an easy one to decide, though. By now, gamers discussing the decision and comparing the actual facts to the Inquiry Group's alternative universe have already identified utter absurdities. Let me just show you two more tweets here, both by a Twitter user named PeterOvo, one of which has a tweet of mine attached:

The FRAND rate-setting decision in Optis v. Apple that Justice Smith is working on is much more complicated. It's about what license fees Apple should pay for the use of the former Ericsson patents belonging to Optis, a group of patent licensing firms. In a structurally parallel case, InterDigital v. Lenovo, Mr. Justice James Mellor largely agreed with the defendant. But this is very much a case-by-case thing.

Justice Smith presided over the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year. It started in June 2022. I was even considering flying to London to follow it, but ultimately obtained only indirect information. During that trial, I received an email from someone actively involved with the proceedings:

"I have been sitting in on the Optis v. Apple 'Trial E' in London all this week and thought you might like to know your name and your blog has been mentioned repeatedly during the trial."

I understand that both Optis and Apple made references to different FOSS Patents posts. On June 20, 2022, another person directly involved with the case told me that "[my] Foss posts around the time of the Unwired Planet v. Huawei Sup. Ct. opinion [we]re now being discussed in the trial." My reaction was that they should actually have more important issues to sort out than discuss my posts, but pride in authorship is a fact of life and that's why I'm now particularly interested in the forthcoming Optis v. Apple "Trial E" judgment by Justice Smith. Even more so, however, I look forward to the appeal of the CMA's irrational--if not unlawful--merger block.

Monday, January 16, 2023

Nokia wins entitlement to UK FRAND trial against OPPO as High Court of Justice joins Mannheim and The Hague courts in deeming EP2981103 standard-essential

Nokia announced today that the London-based High Court of Justice (formerly England & Wales High Court (EWHC)) has found for Nokia in a patent enforcement action over EP2981103 on an "allocation of preamble sequences". It is a 4G standard-essential patent, and that part of the 4G standard is also found in 5G.

As a result, the High Court will hold a FRAND hearing. A SEP holder needs to prove at least one patent essential in order for a conditional FRAND injunction to be discussed at a dedicated hearing. Typically there is a remedies hearing first, and a large FRAND trial ahead of a court determination of a FRAND rate. Nokia is suing over multiple patents, but regardless of how the other patents fare, the question of whether the parties have discharged their FRAND licensing obligations will have to be analyzed.

In July, Nokia prevailed on the same patent-in-suit in Mannheim, and a declaratory judgment action brought by OPPO in the Netherlands (which provoked offensive counterclaims from Nokia) had the same result, though no FRAND determination was made as OPPO had waived that defense for the time being. In August 2020, the Mannheim Regional Court enjoined Daimler (now named Mercedes-Benz) over the same patent, though the injunction was never enforced before the parties settled. Nokia did start enforcement against OPPO, including a contempt proceeding, but OPPO left the German market (apparently after the first contempt order).

Nokia released an official statement, according to which "OPPO has been unwilling to renew its license on fair and reasonable terms and made no royalty payments to Nokia for eighteen months." In connection with OPPO's exit from the German market, I believe I heard something about a deposit, so the question is not whether Nokia will get paid, but how much and when. Whether Nokia's demand and OPPO's counterproposal are FRAND (they obviously won't be FRAND at the same time) is up to the courts to decide. Nokia prevailed in Germany, but German courts don't engage in rate-setting: they base their FRAND decisions on non-numerical considerations in order to be able to rule on many cases without spending much time on any one of them. That is different in the UK, and it will be interesting to see what rate the High Court will ultimately deem FRAND.

It is unlikely that European jurisdictions will give Nokia decisive leverage over OPPO. The key decisions will have to be made on other continents, absent a settlement. However, OPPO has multiple countersuits pending against Nokia in Germany. For Nokia, leaving the German market is presumably not an option.

Nokia also challenging OPPO patents

As I said last month when I published a Nokia v. OPPO/OPPO v. Nokia battlemap, this is a monumental earth-spanning dispute, and there have been wins and losses on both sides. On Friday I reported on the latest revocation of a Nokia patent-in-suit (by the European Patent Office). But this is a clash of titans, and Nokia has also taken aim at various OPPO patents:

  • Based on the Opposition Division's preliminary opinions, EP3563600 on a "separate configuration of numerology-associated resources", EP3547772 on a "data transmission method and apparatus", EP3624549 on "methods and devices for controlling rrc state", and EP3598819 on a "method, apparatus and system for transmitting periodic uplink information/signals" are invalid as granted.

  • EP'549 is not being litigated against Nokia. OPPO has similarly challenged patents beyond the ones Nokia is asserting.

  • I reported on last year's EP'819 infringement hearing. As far as I can see on the EPO Register, no amended claims have been proposed. That happens, but the EPO hearing is still several months off, so it's procedurally conceivable that there may still be amendments.

  • EP3672346 on an "information transmission method, terminal and network device" is valid according to the EPO's preliminary opinion. OPPO is asserting that one against Nokia in Mannheim, and I'm trying to find out the trial date. That case could become the first one in which OPPO wins a German patent injunction against Nokia.

Monday, June 20, 2022

Further escalation in Ericsson v. Apple 5G dispute: UK patent infringement complaints filed by Ericsson on June 6

UK court records show a couple of Ericsson v. Apple filings: on June 6, Ericsson--represented by the law firm of Taylor Wessing, which has offices in numerous European countries (and beyond Europe)--filed with the High Court of Justice for England & Wales (still frequently referred to as the "EWHC")

  • case no. HP-2022-000013 (defendant: Apple Retail UK Limited) and

  • case no. HP-2022-000014 (defendants: Apple Retail UK Limited, Apple Distribution International Limited, and Apple Inc.).

Both cases are identifiable as "Part 7" claims (patents and registered designs) and have been assigned to the Patents Court. The patents-in-suit are not known, so I don't know yet whether we're talking about standard-essential patents. Probably that's the case, but don't know yet.

The UK filings apparently came on the heels of the recent failure of a mediation effort in the Eastern District of Texas. While parties are free to make additional filings during mediation talks, they don't want to be seen as making hostile moves at a time when everyone should be constructive.

This month, the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial started in London. By coincidence, some of the patents-in-suit originally belonged to Ericsson. As I noted in the Optis context, there's considerable risk for Apple that additional UK FRAND case law--resulting from Apple's failure to strike a deal with the Optis/Unwired group--could complicate its defenses against much larger patent holders. With Ericsson's filings, that risk is clearer than before. Also, Apple is not known to have agreed on renewals yet with Nokia and InterDigital, two other major patent holders with a track record of enforcing their rights in the UK.

Apple also has to deal with a regulatory inquiry into its App Store-related terms, policies, and practicies in the UK. I mentioned the Competition & Market Authority's (CMA) market investigation (scope: mobile browsers and cloud gaming) in two recent posts (toward the end of this one, and then again in the middle of a post on a new German investigation).

There actually is a connection between apps and SEPs that ever more people have figured out: Apple claims to hold IP that is essential to making iOS apps, and wants 27% of in-app purchasing revenues (with exceptions relating to only a minuscule part of the relevant royalty base) even if it doesn't process payments (in which case it wants another 3%, which is roughly what third-party payment processors charge). In the Ericsson v. Apple FRAND litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, Apple doesn't want Ericsson to conduct discovery of certain App Store issues. Ericsson has already brought two motions to compel, and with respect to the first one, Judge Gilstrap scheduled a motion hearing for early July.

In parallel to the Texas FRAND case, Ericsson is pursuing U.S. import bans, and made some reasonably meaningful progress in that regard.

So far, Ericsson is known to have brought patent infringement complaints against Apple in (at least) a half-dozen jurisdictions: United States (ITC and district court), Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, Colombia, and now the UK, where Ericsson would firstly have to prevail on the technical merits of at least one SEP before a FRAND injunction trial would be held. It's rather likely that the dispute will actually reach a settlement point because of earlier developments in other places, such as the USITC or Germany. But Ericsson's filings demonstrate to Apple that the noose is tightening in multiple jurisdictions. At some point, the patent injunction hammer will come down somewhere.

Unless there are any unknown filings, the half-dozen of countries I listed before is still a few jurisdictions short of the nine countries in which Nokia is suing OPPO (plus OPPO is countersuing in a tenth, China). Comparing Nokia's and Ericsson's jurisdictional choices, I actually think Spain--and there, particularly the Barcelona trade court (Juzgado de lo mercantil no. 5)--would be an interesting one to consider. I've recently looked at various Spanish patent rulings, and it's a jurisdiction with greater potential for obtaining patent injunctions than most litigants appear to be aware of--an underexploited opportunity, but that's another story.

Apple and Ericsson are not only negotiating (with no result yet, but sooner or later they'll work out a renewal and back royalties) and litigating, but also rivals in the patent policy arena. While Ericsson, Nokia, and Qualcomm are the three most important players seeking to dissuade the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW) from weakening SEP enforcement in the EU, Apple is the key player constantly pursuing the devaluation of SEPs, now also with an IoT argument that is parroted by Apple-funded astroturfers. IoT is an important growth area, but as Huawei's brand new agreement with Nordic Semiconductor and a previous agreement between Nokia and Nordic show, this is not the time for regulatory intervention--especially given that there's hardly any SEP litigation over IoT end products--as the market may find more and more solutions all by itself.

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Tuesday, June 14, 2022

Apple under pressure: lost patent appeal against Optis--and Optis v. Apple FRAND injunction trial is underway in England & Wales High Court of Justice

Patent licensing firm Optis, which is part of a group that also includes PanOptis and Unwired Planet, is inching closer to the major liquidity moment that a royalty payment (including back-royalties) from Apple will represent. Yesterday, the England & Wales Court of Appeal (Lord Justices Arnold, Phillips, and Birss) affirmed an Optis win over a cellular standard-essential patent (SEP): EP2229744 on a "method and arrangement in a wireless communication network". Apple appealed the June 25, 2021 judgment by the High Court of Justice according to which that patent is valid and standard-essential, but in vain.

In the UK, a single SEP that is held to be valid and infringed is all the owner of a SEP portfolio needs to seek a "FRAND injunction": an injunction that becomes enforceable unless the implementer takes a license at the royalty rate determined by the High Court of Justice to be FRAND. And that license will have to be a global portfolio license even though the technical merits are established only with a view to a UK patent (typically, the UK part of a patent granted by the European Patent Office) and the injunction bans the accused product(s) only from the UK market. That is the law of the land there since Unwired Planet v. Huawei.

The aforementioned FRAND determination is made subsequently to a FRAND trial. And the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial started yesterday before Mr. Justice Marucs Smith. It is obviously no coincidence that the appeals court rendered its opinion on the same day, though time wasn't of the essence as Optis has prevailed on two other patents: EP2187549 and EP2690810, both on a "radio communication device and response signal spreading method (they from the same family, of which EP'744--the patent underlying yesterday's appellate decision--is not a member). A March 15, 2022 judgment by the High Court of Justice considered those patents valid in an amended form, and still standard-essential.

So Optis has overfulfilled the requirements for a UK FRAND trial, though it didn't win across the board (with the unique exception of VoiceAge EVS, I'm not aware of any SEP holder that wins each and every case). There was one case in which a former LG patent asserted by Optis was declared invalid (November 25, 2021 judgment), and another in which Optis prevailed in the High Court of Justice (October 16, 2020 judgment over EP1230818 on a "method for improving handovers between mobile communication systems"), but the appeals court overturned the decision in a November 10, 2021 decision.

Here's an overview of the six (A-F) UK parts of the Optis v. Apple dispute:

  • Trial A (EP'818): Optis won in High Court but Apple's appeal succeeded

  • Trial B (EP'744): Optis won both rounds

  • Trial C: former LG patent deemed invalid

  • Trial D (EP'549 and EP'810): valid in amended form, and infringed; Apple can still pursue an appeal

  • Trial E: the FRAND injunction trial that started yesterday

  • Trial F: Optis was denied an unqualified injunction (September 27, 2021 judgment), which would have been an extraordinary remedy in a UK SEP case, where a conditional FRAND injunction is now the norm

Optis has also won a U.S. retrial against Apple, with a $300 million damages award, and Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas affirmed that decision last month. But in the U.S. it's hard to actually get to the point of enforcing a damages award against a deep-pocketed defendant--and even more so against Apple, which according to Qualcomm has a history of coercing "low-ball agreements" with SEP holders. What Apple (and its allies) just failed to achieve, however, was the reinstatement of a 2013 U.S. government SEP policy position. And in U.S. SEP cases it's increasingly going to have to respond to allegations of hypocrisy given how its positions on App Store access fees contradict its own arguments for bringing down SEP royalties. Apple has already lost a fair amount of credibility in the 5G SEP dispute with Ericsson. I don't know if Optis will try to make any App Store-related arguments in its dispute with Apple. UK patent judges may be aware of the issues, even more so now that their country's antitrust agency, the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA), announced a market investigation into Apple's (and Google's, but primarily Apple's) strangehold on mobile browsers and cloud gaming.

By originally threatening to leave the UK market if the High Court of Justice were to set a royalty rate Apple wouldn't want to pay (a position from which Apple backtracked), Apple made itself no friends in the UK patent judiciary. The decisions there will still be fair and correct, but Apple can't expect

Apple unlikely to benefit from protracted UK litigation with Optis

The current FRAND trial will last weeks; a subsequent decision may take many months; and Apple hasn't exhausted all appeals yet. But the Optis v. Apple dispute has reached a stage at which Apple might want to settle, and here's why I think so:

As a litigation watcher who already followed Unwired v. Huawei (not every step of the way, but I did watch the entire UK Supreme Court hearing), I believe Apple is unlikely to achieve much on appeal--other than delaying the inevitable, of course. Not only is it going to be hard for Apple to get a better deal with Optis (which is not known for leaving money on the table, let's put it that way) but there is a clear and present danger of further case law--be it the High Court's FRAND determination or any further appellate decisions--cementing the principles governing SEP cases in London and exposing Apple as an unwilling licensee. That could prove costly in other cases targeting Apple, which might be brought by companies with much larger portfolios (and thus far greater royalty amounts at stake), such as Nokia and InterDigital. (As I just mentioned InterDigital, they recently had a FRAND trial against Lenovo, and a decision will come down soon.)

Lord Justice Colin Birss--before being promoted to the Court of Appeal--wrote the original Unwired v. Huawei opinion, which got affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court. He is now serving on the Court of Appeal, and would presumably be particularly influential if any new FRAND case goes up there. Since the Unwired v. Huawei/Conversant v. ZTE pair of caes that reached the UK Supreme Court, no actual FRAND determination has been made in London. In a scenario in which InterDigital and Lenovo settle, Optis v. Apple could be the first such decision since that seminal pair of cases to be appealed.

Even the UK Supreme Court--which like the top courts of other jurisdictions doesn't have an obligation to hear each and every appeal--would be unlikely to come to Apple's aid. I remember all too well how Lord Justice Kitchin gave a speech at Munich's Ludwig Maximilian University in early 2019 which was essentially just a defense of his own Unwired v. Huawei appellate opinion. By the time of that speech, he had been promoted the UK Supreme Court. He wasn't a member of the five-judge panel that heard the final appeal (it would have been awkward--and maybe not even permissible--for him to deal with the same case again at a different level of the judiciary), but he might have lobbied his Supreme Court colleagues, and he almost certainly would hear an Optis-Apple case. His views on SEP enforcement are fundamentally at odds with Apple's.

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Thursday, July 29, 2021

InterDigital's hole-in-one in UK court builds tremendous pressure on Lenovo (Motorola Mobility) to take global cellular SEP license pursuant to Unwired Planet

This the second SEP news today. The first one was Nokia's vehicle-level license deal (as industry sources meanwhile agree) with a car maker. And again, a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder has scored a breakthrough victory: InterDigital against Lenovo and its Motorola Mobility handset division.

With all that's going on, a rational analyst can't help but be bullish about the near-term and mid-term outlook for SEP holders. Car-level licensing and royalty rates consistent with the Avanci pool rate are the inevitable outcome of the "automotive SEP wars." And while Apple may be able to avoid taking a global portfolio license from non-practicing entity Optis unless the deal is right, Apple is what it is: unique. I'm a big Apple critic, but there's nothing else quite like Apple. By contrast, Lenovo's Motorola Mobility has far less brand loyalty, there's no shortage of Android-powered substitutes, and you're not going to see the likes of Vodafone lobbying the UK government for an amendment to the country's patent or antitrust laws only to bail out Motorola. They're probably not even going to inconvenience themselves and buy Moto phones abroad. If Lenovo decided to leave the UK market, it would lose almost all of its UK sales.

So I venture to guess that Lenovo will soon fold and pay InterDigital after today's ruling by Judge Richard Hacon, who is the Presiding Judge of the UK's Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) and sitting by designation on the High Court of Justice. This is a high-ranking and specialized judge whose decision will have persuasive weight in other jurisdictions.

Further to a technical trial that took place in March, Judge Hacon found that Lenovo's phones infringe InterDigital's EP2485558 on a "method and apparatus for providing and utilizing a non-contention based channel in a wireless communication system" because it is valid and essential to the 4G (LTE) cellular communications standard.

This was just "the first in a series of trials concerning five patents." A hole-in-one for InterDigital. As a Motorola Mobility (oh, the irony!) expert wrote about a decade ago, "it only takes one bullet to kill." That SEP enforcement truth now comes back to haunt Motorola Mobility's current owner, Lenovo (temporarily the company belonged to Google).

The High Court's conclusion is that "[t]he Patent is valid, essential to Release 8 of LTE and is infringed. InterDigital’s conditional application to amend the Patent falls away." As a result, a FRAND trial will take place. Thereafter, according to the UK Supreme Court's Unwired Planet case law, Lenovo will either have to take a license to InterDigital's global 4G SEP portfolio on the court-determined rate or it will be enjoined and effectively forced out of the UK market.

I learned from InterDigital's celebratory press release that the FRAND trial is "scheduled for January 2022." So an injunction will come down next spring, and the question is just what the license fee will be. The patent will remain in force until 2026, so InterDigital has ample opportunity to enforce this patent not only against Lenovo (Motorola Mobility) but also against other companies it may elect to sue over it. And again, this was just the first of the five UK technical trials in InterDigital v. Lenovo. Like a first-round knockout. I'd be surprised if the FRAND trial really had to be held next year.

The winning lawyers are Douglas Campbell QC, Joe Delaney and Maxwell Keay (instructed by Gowling WLG).

Plaintiff-friendly SEP enforcement rules are settled case law not only in the UK after Unwired Planet but also in Germany, where Sisvel v. Haier I & II is a pair of rulings that the lower courts won't challenge anymore. Case in point, just this week it became known that one of the two patent-specialized divisions of the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court (regional appeals court), under Presiding Judge Ulrike Voss ("Voß" in German), faithfully applied the Sisvel v. Haier case law in a dispute between Sisvel and TCL. German courts, like their UK counterparts, require losing defendants to take global portfolio licenses. The difference is that German courts don't set the rate, at least not beforehand.

InterDigital is embroiled in a parallel SEP dispute with Xiaomi, and that dispute involves litigation in Germany, where the U.S.-based licensing company secured an anti-antisuit injunction (and anti-anti-anti-antisuit injunction, or "A4SI") earlier this year. A web search pointed me to an SEC filing according to Item 8.01 of which the injunction patent is also one of three patents InterDigital asserted against Xiaomi in Munich this spring. The Munich court is in no way bound by the UK decision, but I do know that the Munich judges--and other German judges--are generally very interested in UK validity determinations. The fact that Judge Hacon held the patent to be valid, after a multi-day technical trial (while German infringement courts don't analyze invalidity defenses in full), makes it highly unlikely that the Munich I Regional Court would stay the German case against Xiaomi. The hurdle is basically that Xiaomi would have to convince the Munich court that the UK decision is clearly erroneous.

SEP licensing rates are going to up this year in light of 5G and favorable case law. The Biden Administration's implementer-friendly policies may make the United States less attractive a jurisdiction for SEP enforcement (though there may be zero impact on the ITC, which can order import bans and has previously given InterDigital leverage). Short of a global SEP agreement at the WTO/WIPO level, there's nothing the U.S. government can do to weaken SEP enforcement in the UK and Germany.

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