Monday, March 21, 2022

Apple submitted new proposal to resolve compliance dispute with Dutch antitrust authority ACM, whose contempt fines will hit €50 million cap next week

The Apple-ACM saga over in-app payments in dating apps continues with another €5 million ($5.5 million) weekly fine, but there's more. Dutch tech reporter Nando Kasteleijn published a note (image) from the competition enforcement agency of the Netherlands, the Autoriteit Consument & Markt (Authority for Consumers and Markets; ACM). It translates as follows:

"Apple made new proposals this morning to comply with the ACM's requirements. We are now going to evaluate whether those proposals are sufficient. We will also speak with various market actors. We hope to complete this analysis shortly. It is true [as the reporter apparently asked] that Apple failed to meet the ACM's requirements as of last weekend. Therefore, the 9th penalty payment also became due. The total amount is now at 45 million euros [$49.7 million]."

It would be interesting to know what proposal Apple has put on the table. In late February, Apple merely provided further explanations in support of its position that it was already in compliance with the decision. I realize that this may be a minority opinion, but I don't see why Apple's implementation of alternative payment methods would necessarily contravene the ACM's ruling--and I think the ACM should be more concerned about the impact on Dutch consumers from the complainant's own conduct.

Dating apps are a business built on network effects. If Apple had never imposed its 30% cut, prices would probably be roughly the same today, but the market leader would be more profitable. New entrants couldn't compete on price--for lack of those network effects. The ACM didn't pick the best segment of the app market for its case, let's put it that way.

So what's next? What the ACM indicates in that statement is a market test. It will ask dating-app makers whether they are satisfied with Apple's new proposal. Even without knowing what Apple offered, it's pretty much a given that Match Group--which operates Tinder and other dating services--is still going to complain. They want Apple to waive the 30% altogether, or at least for the largest part. Apple is not prepared to do that, and the ACM's ruling on in-app payments in dating apps isn't a basis for forcing Apple to give Match Group and others a free ride. Another disputes question is whether app makers have to submit a separate app for the Dutch market. The related requirement is neither exceedingly developer-friendly nor user-friendly, but that doesn't necessarily make it non-compliant.

By the end of this week, the ACM will have to decide on whether to impose the 10th and final weekly €5 million fine of the current enforcement campaign. The cap for the current enforcement effort is €50 million ($55 million). The assessment of Apple's latest proposal may not even have been completed by then, but it doesn't matter in practical terms because the ACM would need to make a new decision first, potentially with heftier fines, before it could fine Apple again after the first €50 million.

But before the current enforcement started, the ACM needed approval from a Dutch court. That will be the case again. Therefore, what Apple proposed today was most likely--even almost definitely--just meant to prepare the next round of litigation. The ACM will have to convince the court that Apple is not compliant. Arguably, Apple was already compliant before today's unknown proposal, but with whatever Apple put on the table today to set the stage, it further ups the ante for the ACM with a view to obtaining court approval for the enforcement of its next decision.

There's a key deadline on Thursday in Epic Games v. Apple: Apple will file its opposition to Epic's Ninth Circuit appeal (as I discussed in the final two paragraphs of this recent post) as well as the opening argument for its own cross-appeal of Epic's consolation prize under California Unfair Competition Law.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Friday, March 18, 2022

Ford's patent exhaustion defense to Sisvel's Delaware claims fails plausibility test: time hasn't stood still since 2008 Qualcomm-Nokia deal, others' similar defenses went nowhere

In early February, Ford filed its answer to patent licensing firm Sisvel's Delaware complaint, which is just one of several cases brought by Avanci licensors against the iconic U.S. automaker (case in point, IP Bridge is increasingly likely to obtain a Munich injunction against Ford next month). The part that stood out from Ford's Delaware submission was the claim that the former Nokia assets among the patents-in-suit were exhausted under a 2008 Qualcomm-Nokia license agreement that predated the 2012 transfer of those patents to Sisvel.

Two weeks later, Sisvel replied to multiple exhaustion-related paragraphs from Ford's counterclaims as follows:

"Paragraph [...] contains conclusions of law to which no answer is required, To the extent that an answer is required, Plaintiffs deny the allegations in Paragraph [...]. Plaintiffs are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph [...] and deny same."

Sisvel obviously doesn't know what exactly the Qualcomm-Nokia agreement says. Neither do I. But it is possible, just based on publicly accessible information, to make the reasonable inference that Ford's supposedly dispositive get-out-jail-free-card (with respect to some--not all--of the patents-in-suit) is just a Hail Mary pass:

  • Ford's theory is more of a fishing expedition than based on reliable facts. The wording is already odd: "[T]he assignment of the [...] patent to Sisvel in 2012 was subject to the July 2008 agreement between Nokia and Qualcomm" (emphasis added)

    If the assignment was "subject to" an agreement, that one would have been the transfer agreement between Sisvel and Nokia. What Ford means to imply here, but can't really claim, is that a certain encumbrance traveled with the transferred patents. But what encumbrance are they talking about? They don't seem to have any information beyond a 2008 press release that says "Nokia has agreed not to use any of its patents directly against Qualcomm." One can deduce from that passage that Nokia didn't grant Qualcomm a license. But everything else is unclear.

  • According to the press release, it was a 15-year deal. But the assumption that Nokia and Qualcomm would never have amended their 2008 agreement despite earth-shaking subsequent case law such as TransCore (a 2009 Federal Circuit decision according to which an unconditional covenant not to sue triggers exhaustion), and despite Nokia later exiting the mobile device business, flies in the face of all I know about industry practice and from following the FTC v. Qualcomm and Apple v. Qualcomm antitrust cases in granular detail. It is a typical human fallacy to assume that something (here, the Nokia-Qualcomm agreement) forever remains static. It's even worse when people believe that one factor is static while others are dynamic, only because that particular combination of static and dynamic elements would benefit them.

    As one of the attendees of the 2019 FTC v. Qualcomm trial in San Jose, I know that Qualcomm reacted to case law developments by changing the structure of its agreements.

  • If Ford was right, Nokia's licensing business couldn't possibly be as successful as it is given Qualcomm's market share. Sophisticated hardball-playing licensees like Apple wouldn't have paid nearly as much as they have. The best example may be the 2011 Nokia-Apple agreement, which fell into place only a few months after Apple's February 25, 2011 "Transition Agreement" with Qualcomm. It became known as a result of certain antitrust cases (such as this European Commission decision) that Apple agreed to buy all of its 4G/LTE chipsets from Qualcomm until the end of 2016. What triggered that spring 2011 settlement was the threat of two Mannheim injunctions (a hardware patent and one targeting the App Store), which had nothing to do with Qualcomm's chipsets. But the royalty was largely justified with the strength of Nokia's cellular SEP portfolio. Even when Apple renewed the Nokia deal in 2017, it was still using Qualcomm chips, though no longer exclusively. Analysts estimated that Nokia was making approximately $1 per iPhone. A huge upfront payment was made.

  • Another way to look at it is that it wouldn't make sense for Qualcomm to support Avanci (as a licensor) if it could simply provide car makers with a license to the largest portfolios in the Avanci pool through the sale of its chipsets.

  • The Qualcomm-Nokia agreement has come up in various other patent disputes over the years. Never once has an exhaustion defense centered around that particular agreement succeeded, no matter the jurisdiction.

    More than ten years ago I personally attended a preliminary-injunction hearing in Paris where Samsung was denied a PI because of a patent exhaustion defense by Apple involving Qualcomm chipsets. But that was about the Qualcomm-Samsung (not Qualcomm-Nokia) agreement, and part of the discussion there was whether Samsung had the right to terminate that agreement with respect to (only) Apple. Also, it was not a full trial: just a denial of a PI. That case is an outlier, and again, about a different Qualcomm contract.

    By contrast, every single defense according to which Nokia's patents were exhausted by Qualcomm's chips has failed:

    HTC tried this in the ITC and the England and Wales High Court (over non-SEPs, but exhaustion doesn't work differently for SEPs than for non-SEPs). This amicus brief by HTC in the Lexmark case (in which the Supreme Court expanded the concept of patent exhaustion in cross-border scenarios) summarizes its failure in the UK (before Justice Richard Arnold). The full October 2013 decision is available here. On May 2, 2013, the ITC's Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Pender entered Order No. 13 in investigation no. 337-TA-847 of a Nokia request for an import ban on HTC products. That order was the equivalent of a summary judgment in district court and threw out HTC's exhaustion defense because it was meritless even when viewed in the light most favorable to HTC. In those U.S. and UK decisions, the extraterritorial nature of the sale was dispositive. HTC settled with Nokia right before a final ITC decision, which shows that HTC presumably expected to lose.

  • The German SEP case at this stage is Sisvel v. Haier, and the regional appeals court in Dusseldorf (which did not make the famous final decision; that one was handed down by the Federal Court of Justice) dismissed Haier's patent exhaustion defense. The redacted version of the decision (in German) doesn't name Qualcomm, but it's anyone's guess.

    The same conclusion was reached by the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court in a Sisvel v. Wiko case (English translation published by Kather Augenstein, a law firm whose clients include Ericsson).

The bottom line is that in order for Ford to prevail on its patent exhaustion defense in the Sisvel Delaware case, it would have to be way smarter than smartphone makers including but not limited to Apple, who paid for a license to Nokia's patents despite using Qualcomm chips, and it would have to benefit from the Supreme Court's expanded patent-exhaustion doctrine under the 2017 Lexmark decision, presupposing (unrealistically) that Nokia and Qualcomm never amended their 2008 agreement--of which it is not even clear whether it ever could have helped Ford.

There were rumors in Germany that Volkswagen was going to raise a similar defense in Acer v. Volkswagen (not involving former Nokia patents, but another Qualcomm agreement). However, VW upgraded its Avanci license to 4G and thus never answered to the complaint: the complaint has been voluntarily dismissed.

The Ford case and the rumor about VW's plans show that the topic will surface from time to time. I don't have hard evidence that they're all wrong, but there's a mountain of indicia pointing in the direction of meritlessness.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Ericsson, Apple agree on former Eastern District of Texas Chief Judge David Folsom for mediation of 5G patent licensing dispute

This may be one of my shortest blog posts ever, but I have two pieces of news to share regarding the Ericsson v. Apple 5G patent licensing dispute:

  • I'm not aware of what exactly Chief Judge Rodney Gilstrap said at the Wednesday case management conference, but a docket entry states that he has decided to consolidate Apple's and Ericsson's dueling FRAND cases for the purpose of pretrial proceedings. The cases are scheduled to go to trial in June and July 2023. Either party still wants at least parts of the other party's complaint dismissed, and Apple is still fighting hard to give the Federal Circuit--not the Fifth Circuit--appellate jurisdiction.

  • Judge Gilstrap gave the parties a few days to agree on a mediator. Otherwise he'd have appointed one, but no need for that: Apple and Ericsson almost promptly agreed to appoint a predecessor of Judge Gilstrap as Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, David Folsom, as their mediator. Judge Folsom retired from the bench in 2012 and is now a Jackson Walker partner and based in Texarkana (the one on the Texan side of the state border).

    Court-ordered mediation rarely results in settlements of such high-stakes global disputes. Those cases do get settled, but what drives settlements of that kind is usually not that a judge referred the parties to mediation. That's why no one should expect a miracle from former Chief Judge Folsom. Maybe he can get them to agree at least on how to structure their two overlapping actions in the Eastern District.

Last week I published an overview of the key deadlines in the three Ericsson v. Apple ITC cases, the first one of which is presently scheduled to go to trial (called "evidentiary hearing") in the first half of November. I previously listed various German Ericsson-Apple hearing and trial dates. I haven't yet found out about when certain courts in Brazil and the Netherlands will hear Ericsson's preliminary injunction motions.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Wednesday, March 16, 2022

BREAKING: EU court to deliver Google Android judgment in open court on September 14, 2022 (Google's appeal of European Commission antitrust decision)

In one of the most important antitrust cases in the history of our industry, the Google Android case (one of several pending Google v. European Commission cases), the General Court of the European Union ("EU General Court")--the lower division of the Court of Justice of the European Union--will hand down its judgment on September 14, 2022 at 11 AM local (Luxembourg) time in open court. By then the decision will have taken the court (including its translators) almost a year from the hearing. I just spotted this information and a scan of an official notice by the court on LinkedIn, where Hausfeld partner Professor Thomas Hoeppner, who is representing certain key intervenors (and complainants to DG COMP), shared the information (click on the image to enlarge; this post contineus below the image):

As the list of intervenors shows, it's not a Play Store case per se, but it does concern app developers. The first listed intervenor on Google's behalf, the Application Developers Alliance, is simply a Google front just like ACT | The App(le) Association astroturfs for Apple in the App Store and standard-essential patents contexts.

The Play Store is key to that case because it's one of the essential Android components Google makes available to Android device makers (Original Equipment Manufacturers; OEMs) only if they take a commercial Android license from Google as opposed to using Android on an open-source basis. If Google's OEMs didn't have to fear subtle retribution that would disadvantage them in the marketplace, you'd see a long list of device makers as intervenors--such as Samsung--on the Commission's behalf. But they can't take that risk. They did, however, get questionnaires from DG COMP during the investigation that led to the decision Google is appealing. And it's telling that HMD (a licensee of Nokia's trademark) and Gigaset (a German company) are the only device makers to intervene on Google's behalf: they are not the most successful Android device makers to put it mildly and, therefore, in desperate need to suck up to the search monopolist.

Google allows at least some major Android device makers additionally to run their own app store on their devices, such as the Samsung Galaxy Store. Also, "sideloading" is possible on Android, though you get so many and so frightening warnings that it doesn't really matter much in practice. As Epic Games and 36 state attorneys-general are pursuing their federal lawsuits in the Northern District of California because Google still has a de facto monopoly in Android app distribution as third-party app stores can't compete on a level playing field.

Imagine how much competition there could be if, for example, Microsoft could operate a cross-platform games store (especially after consummation of its acquisition of Activision Blizzard) and offered not only its own titles but also apps from countless other developers--also addressing the problem of switching costs between mobile operating systems. That's not possible at the moment, but such a development could be one of multiple game changers in app distribution further down the road.

What's at stake for the economy and society dwarfs the €4.3 billion ($4.7 billion) fine Google is appealing. Android has 2.5 billion users in 190 countries.

I didn't attend the Google Android court hearing in late September and early October. All the information I have is hearsay, and I understand that wholesale affirmance of the Commission decision (which DG COMP achieved in the Google Shopping case in November (PDF)) is not a given. Observers whom I respect believe Google may be able to get at least a part of the Commission decision overturned. Also, either party can further appeal any unfavorable parts of a decision all the way up to the European Court of Justice, the upper chamber.

From what I heard, Google's lawyers, particularly Garrigues partner Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, delivered an incredible performance in September. I disagree with them on a number of questions, but I have the greatest respect for the quality of their work. It goes without saying that this applies to Google's antitrust counsel of choice in Brussels, Cleary Gottlieb's Maurits Dolmans. But companies and industry groups complaining about Google's conduct and supporting the European Commission also have absolutely great lawyers on their side, such as the aforementioned Professor Thomas Hoeppner ("Höppner" in German). One of Google's most forceful adversaries in the EU is Professor Damien Geradin, founding partner of Geradin Partners. His associate Dimitrios Katsifis authored this detailed blog post on the Google Android hearing, toward the end of which he clarifies he has advised clients on Google antitrust issues other than the ones in the Google Android case.

I wish the Commission and its intervenors luck. At a minimum I hope, as an app developer, that the findings relating to the Play Store will be upheld. But as I wrote further above, the upcoming ruling is hardly going to be the end of the process at any rate.

From an app distribution antitrust point of view, another key date is just about a week away: on March 24, Apple will file its answer to Epic's Ninth Circuit appellate opening brief and some powerful amicus briefs supporting Epic Games, such as the one submitted by the DOJ in the name of the United States of America (formally in support of neither party, but practically benefiting Epic and only Epic), one by 35 state attorneys-general (the same states that are suing Google in the aforementioned case, minus California, which is however widely expected to throw its weight behind the cause when it files its amicus brief on March 31 (after the other states because California is naturally very interested in the part of the case involving its state Unfair Competition Law), and a group of law professors led by Mike Carrier and including "the Dean of American Antitrust Law" Herbert Hovenkamp.

Epic's appeal is very much alive, and without that outpouring of governmental support it would be a long shot at best, but make no mistake: regardless of that support from amici, the hurdle is still very high, and just like Epic and its supporters portrayed the district court's factual findings as allowing only one legal conclusion, Apple will be at least equally selective and point to factual findings that it will claim support the lower court's decision. I agree with Epic to a greater extent than I do with Apple, but U.S. antitrust law and some of Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers's factual findings make it anything but unlikely that Apple may defend its first-round victory and even get the California UCL part (Epic's consolation prize) reversed. Just being realistic, like in the Dutch App Store antitrust case.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Tuesday, March 15, 2022

'Defending American Courts Act' presently looks more like PR stunt than serious and well-thought-out legislative proposal to combat foreign interference in U.S. patent enforcement

The "Defending American Courts Act" is by far and away the lowest-quality piece of work I've ever seen from U.S. lawmakers in an IP context. It's so poorly done that even if one totally agreed, for the sake of the argument, with its sponsors' objective as laid out in that jingoistic press release, it still wouldn't make sense. That is remarkable.

The world definitely has a problem with standard-essential patent (SEP) rulings that encroach on other jurisdictions. Patents are meant to be territorial rights, strictly country-by-country (with the upcoming Unitary Patent treating the EU's Single Market as a country), but SEPs involve questions under contract and/or antitrust law. Contracts, or even just offers to enter into contracts, can have global scope, and relevant antitrust markets or determinations on whether a party's conduct was fair can be global, too.

I discussed the problem of extraterritorial overreach last May and published the slide deck I used for my contribution to a European Commission webinar on SEP enforcement.

So I'm definitely not a denier--I just advocate symmetry and rationality. It's key to understand that some extraterritorial decisions are actually just a reaction to what previously went wrong in other places. Also I've consistently praised the restraint that American courts exercise: if one party declines to be bound by a global FRAND rate-setting decision, they don't force it into such a license agreement; and even if both parties ask a U.S. court to set a global rate for them, U.S. courts don't necessarily devote time to such an effort.

The EU is complaining about Chinese antisuit injunctions. Its pending request for consultations, which is a complaint by any other name, is soon going to be put before a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) panel as it's a given that the EU won't be satisfied with China's response no matter the content. The United States could advocate its approach--being the last major jurisdiction not to force SEP holders or implementers into global license agreement--at the WTO level and/or through bilateral talks. If everyone exercised the same restraint as American courts, there wouldn't be a problem left to be solved by the proposed bill. There would be no more global rate-setting decisions in China, no more UK patent injunctions that become enforceable unless a defendant takes a license on court-ordered terms, no more German patent injunctions that come down because all that an implementer is prepared to do to avoid a German sales ban is to take a license to the German part of a given SEP portfolio.

To be fair, SEP holders do have a point when they argue that negotiated license agreements are almost always global, and piecemeal resolution requiring litigation in numerous jurisdictions isn't practical. That's a very valid policy concern. Hold-out is a serious issue in the technology industry, and there are implementers who would have to lose in maybe five or ten (if not more) jurisdictions before they would come to reason and finally take a global license. I'm not denying that part either.

Let's not spend too much time on the press release, which is replete with anti-Chinese rhetoric. Just one observation: Those "so-called 'anti-suit injunctions'" are not a Chinese legal innovation. The first Chinese SEP-related antisuit injunction came about a decade after the Microsoft v. Motorola antisuit injunction in the Western District of Washington that (for good reason) barred Motorola Mobility from enforcing a pair of Mannheim SEP injunctions. Maybe the concept of an antisuit injunction is part of the "American Intellectual Property" that Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tom Cotton (R-AR), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), and Rick Scott (R-FL) accuse "the Chinese Community Party" of "stealing"--though America inherited it from the UK as a common law instrument.

It just doesn't come across as very sophisticated and thoroughly-researched when a press release makes it sound like China had contrived something strange and the reality is that it's part of American legal tradition.

Now let's finally turn to the proposed statute (S.3772). The plan is to add an additional § 274 to U.S. patent law (35 U.S.C.) relating to "foreign interference." It then defines "anti-suit injunction" as "an injunction issued by a foreign tribunal that purports to restrict the rights of a person to file or maintain [...] a claim of infringement of any claim of a United States patent in a tribunal of the United States [or the equivalent in the form of an ITC complaint]" as well as the related appeals. Those of you who have litigated SEP antisuit (and anti-antisuit) cases may already have noticed a major flaw: it's a narrow definition of an "anti-suit" injunction that doesn't--or at a minimum does not with sufficient clarity--cover "anti-enforcement" injunctions. For instance, the Microsoft v. Motorola antisuit injunction that Judge James Robart ordered in Seattle (and which the Ninth Circuit upheld) was not strictly an antisuit injunction: Motorola remained free to litigate the case (as it did) and to seek damages. It just wasn't able to enforce an injunction.

The language of the proposed statute refers only to "claims of infringement" but not to the enforcement of injunctive remedies. I've looked up various legal dictionaries. Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute explains the term "claim" extremely well:

"A set of operative facts creating a right enforceable in court."

That dictionary also clarifies that "'claim' is slightly broader [than 'cause of action']," but in my understanding--please let me know via my contact form if you find evidence to the contrary--that does not mean it's a synonym for the enforcement of remedies.

The way those SEP antisuit injunctions typically work--and again, we don't have to look to China but can find examples in the U.S., especially the seminal one from Seattle--is that the enforcement of injunctive relief (as it has the potential to force someone into a global license deal, which would resolve a global dispute, thereby depriving all other courts of jurisdiction) is barred until the enjoining court has decided its case, which may then lead to a global license agreement that does away with the foreign infringement action.

Not only does the bill wrongly focus on "claim" (rather than the enforcement of remedies based on a claim) but it then also envisions the wrong sanctions--and especially sanctions that make no sense with respect to those alleged Chinese infringers. Just when you think it can't get worse...

The sanctions for someone leveraging a foreign antisuit injunction would be that:

  • § 274 (b) Civil Action Presumptions:

    • "(1) the infringement is willful when determining whether to increase damages under section 284; and

    • "(2) the action is exceptional when determining whether to award attorney fees under section 285"

  • § 274 (c) PTAB: discretionary denial of IPR petition

If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is a need to prevent China from stealing U.S. intellectual property, what Chinese company would really be impacted or deterred by this? Where are those Chinese companies that sell tons of smartphones and similar devices in the U.S. so that treble damages would hurt? Americans sure buy lots of China-made phones, but those are mostly iPhones...

Even if it's not about China, but say, you have a dispute between Samsung and a U.S. patent holder, it still wouldn't make sense on the bottom line. Samsung does a lot of business in the U.S., sure. So damages could be costly (though Samsung would never actually have to pay them if a foreign court meanwhile forces the patent holder into a global license agreement, which resolves the global dispute). But what would be the point in Samsung (which obtained a Chinese antisuit injunction against Ericsson about a year ago) not getting a PTAB review of the U.S. company's patents-in-suit? If the PTAB upholds those patents, great. If it doesn't, then those patents are invalid, and invalid patents aren't property. But Samsung would also do U.S. defendants a favor by eliminating patents that shouldn't have issued in the first place. Samsung and Ericsson settled quickly, but Apple is now actually recycling Samsung's 2021 PTAB petitions.

A few constructive suggestions:

  • Instead of taking ill-conceived unilateral action through legislation, U.S. Senators should have more confidence in their country's courts. In this context, U.S. judges are probably in a better position to come up with solutions than the legislature. For example, Judge Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas granted Ericsson an anti-antisuit injunction against Samsung's Chinese antisuit injunction. It was appealed to the Federal Circuit, but then they settled.

  • As I said further above, the U.S. does stand on higher ground with respect to extraterritorial patent rulings. Its antisuit injunctions come down only in exceptional cases (and interestingly, Chinese courts perform a multifactorial analysis that is far more similar to the U.S. approach than what you see in the UK or Germany). With the EU and China having a WTO dispute over the issue, the United States could and in my view should call on all other jurisdictions (including the EU and the UK) to refrain from patent rulings, including patent injunctions, that effectively force one party or the other to take a global license.

  • If you want to enact a Defending American Courts Act, just make it easy--or, in fact, mandatory--for American courts to decline to recognize unilaterally-imposed global patent license agreements with respect to U.S. patents. If a UK court forces Apple to take a global portfolio license, a German court threatens to enjoin Ford unless it caves to a SEP holders demands on a global basis, or a Chinese court orders a patent holder like Dolby at an implementer's request to grant a global portfolio license--just don't recognize the U.S. part of those contracts. Let the patentee enforce those U.S. patents as if that foreign-imposed contract didn't exist in the first place, or let the implementer (such as an Apple) ask a U.S. court to set a FRAND rate for the U.S. part of the portfolio and potentially seek a refund if the foreign-imposed license agreement requires the implementer to overpay. If in the next step a party avails itself of the foreign court to impose contempt sanctions on the other party only because it wants American courts to rule on U.S. patents, the sanctions in the U.S. should be draconian so they truly deter bad behavior.

However, if it's a mid-term election year and you just want to fire some cheap shots at China, the current legislative proposal may be good enough. But only if the objective has nothing or very little to do with actually defending American courts' jurisdiction over U.S. patents.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Monday, March 14, 2022

Apple facing 8th non-compliance fine from Dutch antitrust authority--total amount now €40 million ($44 million)--with complainant Match Group's own conduct still not being investigated

Two weeks ago, Dutch antitrust authority ACM (Autoriteit Consument & Markt; Authority for Consumers & Markets) slapped Apple with a sixth €5 million weekly fine despite a letter with which Apple sought to explain why it believed to be compliant with a ruling requiring the iPhone maker to support alternative in-app payment systems.

That same week I expressed my view that the ACM should actually be more concerned with the complainant's own conduct: Match Group runs Tinder and other dating apps, and some Tinder users apparently had to pay (according to a Mozilla/Consumers International study) 500% more than others, largely just based on age discrimination. I want competition in app distribution, particularly third-party app stores for iOS (and a level playing field for third-party app stores on Android), but it strikes me as odd that Apple's 30% would be of a greater concern than Tinder's 500%. Moreover, there is no evidence that Dutch consumers would actually pay less in the long run (short-lived PR stunts aside) if Match Group didn't have to pay Apple its 30% commission, while Mozilla and Consumers International delivered evidence that Dutch consumers paid discriminatory premiums to the Tinder company.

Telecompaper now reports that Apple has been fined for eight weeks in a row (though this week's fine could, as far as I know, still be avoided if Apple met the ACM's demands). The aggregate amount of those fines is now €40 million ($44 million). The limit is €50 million and likely will be reached in two weeks.

I remain unconvinced that Apple is out of compliance with that decision, as I explained in earlier posts.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Acer, IP Bridge patent infringement actions against Volkswagen withdrawn following Avanci 4G upgrade while EU politician voices concern over still-unlicensed non-European car makers

This is a follow-up to last week's big standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing news, Volkswagen's agreement with the Avanci patent pool to upgrade its license to 4G for the entire VW group (as opposed to only a few premium brands being licensed up to 4G). VW's initial press release suggested that some issues (presumably relating to litigation expenses) were left to be resolved in connection with patent infringement actions pending against the car maker at the time. It appears that the clean-up has been completed:

While all German and German-owned automotive brands are now licensed under Avanci's 4G program, many car makers in the world still aren't licensed. In other words, barring the highly unlikely existence of thousands of unknown bilateral license agreements (49 Avanci licensors times numerous car makers), there's a lot of infringing products rolling on the world's roads.

This has a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) worried. Alfred Sant, a former prime minister of Malta with a long-standing interest in the EU's intellectual property policy, posed three written parliamentary questions to the European Commission last month. He's taking an interesting angle: when some companies in a given industry (here, automotive) are licensed while others are not, "competitive distortion" is indeed caused. When companies headquartered in some jurisdictions respect IP to a greater extent than their counterparts abroad, it's an issue of global trade policy.

Mr. Sant says it's "unfair to EU companies that pay for these rights when their competitors do not." To be fair, there are still some unlicensed EU companies. For example, I haven't heard of Stellantis (FIAT, Peugeot, Chrysler, Open, Citroën, Dodge, Maserati, and others) having taken an Avanci license. It's the world's sixth-largest car maker and headquartered in Amsterdam--just up the road from the EU's de facto capital of Brussels. But Mr. Sant is probably right that the degree--so many things are a question of degree rather than binary--to which EU automakers have licensed cellular SEPs is substantially greater than in other parts of the world.

All three of Mr. Sant's questions relate to measures the European Commission could take, such as raising this issue in bilateral trade talks (with "Japan, South Korea, the United States etc."). I find the second question particularly well-put:

"2. Has the Commission informed non‑EU governments that a failure by non‑EU car manufacturers to fulfil SEP licencing obligations would constitute a distortion of the competitive level playing field vis‑Ă ‑vis EU car manufacturers that have the necessary SEP licences, and what commitments has it received?"

It would be unrealistic to expect any car maker--be it American icon Ford, which is being sued by some Avanci licensors, or a Toyota or Hyundai/KIA--to be scared into action only because of those parliamentary questions. Also, the Commission rarely gives surprising or enlightening answers to such questions. The standard response to "are you doing something about it?" is "Yes, of course we do our job" without going into the specifics one would really like to hear. But what those questions do get is mind share. They draw the Commission's attention to political concern over a problem. They show that there are politicians who want the Commission to make significant progress in a particular regard. I do believe Mr. Sant's questions have the potential to raise awareness and to persuade EC decision makers to assign a higher priority than in the past to this competitiveness issue.

It's like a law of nature in patent licensing that a party that has taken a license is interested in ensuring that its competitors, too, pay for their use of the same patents (and that they don't pay less). Daimler defended itself against Nokia for more than two years (only to get a result it could have had at a much lower cost); Volkswagen was advocating "Licensing Negotiation Groups" for a long time. By now, it's not in VW's or Daimler's interest that others remain unlicensed.

Mr. Sant's official questions also serve as a signal to the governments of countries like Japan that the EU probably won't take it lightly should those jurisdictions shield their local car makers from SEP enforcement. To some degree they're all susceptible to infringement litigation in Germany. In the United States, this month's Fifth Circuit decision in Continental v. Avanci et al. also ups the pressure on car makers to license cellular SEPs. But it obviously makes a difference whether a company has to fear effective enforcement in only a couple of export markets or may even have to close down factories if all else fails.

It's high time the car industry resolved its 3G/4G SEP licensing issues as the world is moving on to 5G at a fast pace.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn: