Showing posts with label IETF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IETF. Show all posts

Saturday, June 15, 2013

German VP8 infringement cases show Google's inability to cut through the codec patent thicket

I don't think any responsible standardization body will be able anytime soon to declare VP8 a "royalty-free" codec. Everyone in the industry knows -- though a few deny against better knowledge -- that there's a whole patent thicket surrounding video compression techniques, and that all codecs implement more or less the same fundamental concepts. Only a fool could believe Google when it originally claimed that there were no issues concerning third-party rights. Google's license deal with 11 MPEG LA contributors comes with terms that Google certainly wouldn't have accepted if it had not been seriously concerned about the risk of litigation brough by those right holders. And with Nokia refusing to make its patents available for VP8 on royalty-free or even FRAND terms (Nokia reserves the right to seek injunctions, or to charge as much as it wants, no matter how much above a FRAND rate it might be), there's at least one company that is actually suing over VP8.

Nokia brought its latest patent assertion against VP8 as part of an ITC complaint and its first two infringement actions over VP8 in Mannheim, Germany, and this post is mostly about the trial held on Friday over the second one of these cases. Also, since my last post on VP8 I've had the opportunity to read the full text of the order to reopen the proceedings in the first case. As I wrote two weeks ago, that order wouldn't have come down without at least a finding of a likely infringement. It relates to the possibility of staying the case pending a parallel nullity proceeding, and German courts don't reach the question of a stay if they can outright dismiss a case for lack of infringement. The order says one can conclude that devices implementing VP8 infringe EP1206881 if the asserted claim (claim 46) is interpreted "broadly", in which case there is room for invalidity contentions (which, as the order doesn't say explicitly because it's clear to patent litigators, wouldn't be relevant to a narrower claim construction). Therefore, the court now wants to take a closer look at a particular invalidity theory. While the court could still reach a different conclusion on infringement, it would have dismissed the case immediately (to conserve court and party resources) if Google and HTC had convinced the court that Nokia's claim construction is overbroad. Absent a relatively unlikely change of mind by the court, the likely outcomes are a stay or an injunction. A stay would mean that an injunction will issue if the asserted patent claim survives the nullity proceedings in its granted form, or in a form that still warrants an infringement finding. This means that Google won't have legal certainty concerning the German part of EP'881 (courts in other European countries will not be bound by the related German decisions) for years to come.

Yesterday's patent-in-suit, EP1186177 on a "method and associated device for filtering digital video images" is less likely to be deemed infringed when the Mannheim court announces a decision on August 2, but Nokia can and presumably will appeal a dismissal, and despite the inclination indicated by the court at yesterday's trial, EP'177 is indicative of VP8's patent issues because it's within striking distance of VP8: the whole case hinges on only one claim element. All other claim limitations are considered satisfied by HTC's VP8-implementing devices. That fact reduces to absurdity all those claims that VP8 is so very original that no third party patented anything that might read on it.

While video compression techniques involve advanced mathematical operations, it's actually quite easy to explain the only claim limitation that may (and, apart from the possibiltiy of an appeal, probably will) help Google and HTC avoid an infringement finding:

Video codecs -- and this is true of H.264 as it is of VP8 -- divide an image into macroblocks (rectangular areas). Each macroblock is processed separately. End users just see the overall image and shouldn't notice the edges of macroblocks, which are only an internal thing. But they would notice those borders if certain mathematical operations resulted in artefacts (unwanted elements that appear in an image but don't exist in reality) that a codec failed to filter out. The patent relates to this filtering process. The codec looks at the overall image and identifies actual vertical and horizontal lines that were filmed (for example, a corner of a building). Only artefacts at the edges of the macroblocks are filtered out; real-world lines are preserved.

For each macroblock there are different compression methods. The patent mentions "intra coding", "copy coding", "motion-compensated prediction coding", and "not-coded coding". Google and HTC can't dispute that VP8 uses all of these. But their non-infringement argument, which the court views favorably, is that VP8 does not "determin[e] at least one parameter of the filtering operation based on the types of the first and second prediction encoding methods". They say VP8 analyzes the pixels of two neighboring macroblocks, but it does not make a determination by directly checking on which encoding methods were used for the two blocks in question. Nokia, however, says that the pixels result from processing of a macroblock using a certain encoding method, and that there are correlations between the encoding methods used and at least one parameter (they particularly stressed the number of pixel rows/columns subjected to filtering).

At German patent trials claim construction and infringement analysis usually aren't separated as systematically as in U.S. lawsuits, in which the court firstly provides interpretations of disputed terms (which are later put before a jury if a jury trial is requested, which is the case in most U.S. patent infringement cases). In a U.S. proceeding over the same patent (I couldn't find a granted U.S. equivalent of this particular one, but let's assume so for the sake of the argument), the term "determining at least one parameter [...] based on the types of the first and second prediction encoding methods" would have resulted in a claim construction dispute, with Google and HTC trying to defeat Nokia's infringement theory by inserting into the court's construction of the term a word like "directly", while Nokia would probably have argued that the plain and ordinary meaning is fine and has scope for its infringement theory, possibly also proposing an alternative like "depending on" (for "based on"), which is even broader. Additionally or alternatively, the defendant and the intervenor would have tried to have "the first and second prediction encoding methods" interpreted as "the types of the first and second prediction encoding methods".

At yesterday's German trial the question was not how to rephrase the term, but the analysis that had to be performed was the same. Both parties advanced reasonable arguments. Google's counsel pointed to items (a) and (d) in paragraph 24 of the patent specification. Item (a) is "the type of block on either side of the boundary", while (d) relates to "differences in pixel values", which are only influenced by the encoding method types. Google plausibly argues that the description of the patent therefore distinguishes between these two (and two other) criteria. So far, so good. It makes a lot of sense, but it doesn't prove beyond reasonable doubt that the disputed claim term relates to only item (a) and not item (d). Nokia pointed to other parts of the description which, such as paragraph 37, show that the patent discusses an analysis of pixel values.

In order to back up its "royalty-free" claims, Google needs legal certainty, but there are just too many patents in this field covering the same or at least very similar techniques as those used by VP8. There's clearly a lack of certainty if the outcome of a single infringement case depends on whether "based on" can or cannot be reasonably understood to have the meaning of "depending on". And as I wrote further above, the first finding of a likely infringement has already been made in connection with another Nokia patent.

Nokia and Google may also have some patent issues to sort out over Google Maps according to a TechCrunch article. At this stage I just wanted to mention this nonjudgmentally.

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Friday, May 31, 2013

German court has apparently found Google's VP8 video codec to infringe a Nokia patent

This morning -- right before an HTC v. Nokia trial over a power-saving patent allegedly infringed by Lumia phones -- Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German) of the Mannheim Regional Court announced a procedural decision in the first Nokia v. HTC lawsuit involving Google's VP8 video codec. The court has reopened the proceedings in order to take an even closer look at the validity of this patent with a view to a decision on whether to stay the case pending a parallel nullity (invalidation) action before the Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court). While Judge Voss did not explain the reasons for this decision at today's announcement other than referring to a post-trial brief on (in)validity, there's every indication that the court has identified an infringement of EP1206881 on an "apparatus and method for compressing a motion vector field" in the aftermath of the March trial.

Here's why:

Under German bifurcation rules, there is no full invalidity defense in an infringement proceeding. Defendants challenging the validity of a patent-in-suit must do so at the (Munich-based) Federal Patent Court, while infringement cases are adjudged by regional courts. Infringement proceedings are frequently adjudged ahead of nullity cases (particularly in a court like Mannheim, a rocket docket for patents), but a regional court can stay an infringement case pending resolution of the nullity action if, in its assessment, there is a high likelihood of invalidation.

Last year (well ahead of any Nokia v. HTC trial) Judge Voss personally explained after the announcement of another decision how his court proceeds in its adjudication of motions to stay infringement cases pending nullity proceedings:

  • If it finds no infringement, it dismisses a case immediately and never reaches the question of (in)validity.

  • Once it identifies a first infringement, it immediately interrupts the infringement analysis (if there are other infringement theories -- such as claims against different technologies -- at issue) and focuses on the possibility of a stay pending the nullity case.

In light of the above, the reopening of proceedings to further evaluate the question of (in)invalidity is most likely attributable to an infringement finding. At the very least there has been a finding of likely infringement. If the court disagreed with Nokia's infringement claims, it would dismiss the case rather than waste court and party resources on the analysis of a question that would never have to be reached in that scenario.

Google, to which this case is of far greater strategic concern than to HTC, is an intervenor in this case. For Google's aspirations to elevate VP8 to an Internet standard, an infringement finding by the most experienced court in the world with respect to information and communications technology patents would be a huge setback. Even if the court stayed the case over doubts concerning the validity of the patent-in-suit, an injunction could enter into force if and when Nokia successfully defends this patent in the proceedings before the Federal Patent Court. For HTC a stay would be great because it would likely settle its dispute with Nokia before a final decision on the validity of this patent -- but Google needs a dismissal, which it didn't obtain today and appears unlikely to obtain later this year.

It's unclear whether there will be a second trial to discuss the new invalidity contentions that resulted in the reopening of the proceedings. It's also possible that the court will decide after further briefing, without another hearing.

Google's problem with Nokia's opposition to VP8 won't go away anytime soon. The next VP8 trial will be held by the same court in two weeks from today, and last week Nokia brought a third patent infringement claim against VP8 through a new ITC complaint. All in all Nokia identified to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) a total of 64 patents and 22 pending patent applications that allegedly read on VP8. Nokia can't sue over the 22 applications unless and until a given application is granted, and the 64 patents don't represent 64 different inventions (it's a per-jurisdiction count). While a negative ruling (unless reversed on appeal) in one jurisdiction would make it more difficult for Nokia to prevail over the same patent in other European countries or over other members of the same patent family in non-European jurisdictions, courts in other countries (including other European countries) are still free to disagree with the first ruling.

It's not known at this stage whether there are other companies than Nokia who may assert patents against VP8 in the future. Google did a deal with 11 patent holders affiliated with MPEG LA, but there could be others. Some may be interested only if VP8 becomes an Internet standard and, as a result, is used more widely than today. And the MPEG LA deal is controversial: the FRAND-zero patent license Google proposes is not palatable to key players in the open source movement. The Software Freedom Law Center welcomes it, but the explanation it provides would equally apply to Microsoft's Android and Linux patent license deals, which Google doesn't like at all.

Unless the Mannheim court has changed its procedural approach to patent infringement cases with parallel nullity actions since the explanations Judge Voss gave last year (which is very unlikely), today is a Black Friday for VP8.

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Friday, May 24, 2013

Nokia files third patent infringement complaint targeting Google's VP8 video codec

Google's WebM/VP8 video codec faces three kinds of patent issues that make it unlikely to be adopted as an Internet standard anytime soon:

  1. While Google reached a license agreement with 11 companies that identified to MPEG LA patents they believe read on VP8, an open source community leader believes the license terms for implementers of the standard are irreconcilable with key aspects of software freedom and unworkable for open source. It's a FRAND-zero license: zero license fees, but other terms are imposed, and one needs to sign up in order to benefit from the agreement.

  2. There may still be companies holding patents that read on VP8 but which didn't identify them to MPEG LA or didn't participate in the license deal with Google. VP8 is untested in court.

  3. One company that has stated clearly that it opposes VP8's adoption as an Internet standard and is unwilling to extend a license (not even at a FRAND royalty rate, let alone as a freebie) to implementers of VP8 is Nokia. It's already suing HTC over VP8 patents, and it identified to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 64 granted patents and 22 then-pending patent applications that it believes read on VP8.

The latest news is that Nokia has now brought its third patent infringement lawsuit over VP8, in the form of a new (second) ITC complaint against Android device maker HTC. Item #3 on my list of patents asserted in that complaint is U.S. Patent No. 6,711,211 on a "method for encoding and decoding video information, a motion compensated video encoder and a corresponding decoder", which is also item #71 on the list of intellectual property rights Nokia identified to the IETF. Nokia's infringement allegations filed with the ITC specifically relate to (not only, but primarily) VP8.

This is the 37-page infringement claim chart that quotes extensively from the VP8 specifications (this post continues below the document):

Nokia VP8 Infringement Claim Chart for '211 Patent

The first Nokia patent assertion against VP8, in a lawsuit against HTC in Mannheim, Germany, went to trial in March (Google participated as an intervenor). The patent at issue in that litigation is EP1206881 on an "apparatus and method for compressing a motion vector field". A ruling had originally been scheduled for last Friday but was postponed to May 31 (next week's Friday).

The next VP8 patent trial (the defendant is HTC, again) will be held by the same court on June 14, 2013. The patent-in-suit in that action is EP1186177 on a "method and associated device for filtering digital video images".

Nokia is asserting 50 different patents against HTC in the U.S., UK and Germany, and three of them allegedly read on VP8 and are on the list of patents identified to the IETF. Nokia isn't just saying that VP8 infringes its patents -- it's actually suing to prove it in court.

In all three HTC VP8 cases, Nokia is pursuing injunctive relief. The German cases would result in sales bans (possibly along with a recall from retail and destruction of infringing goods) in that country; if Nokia prevails on its ITC complaint, there will be U.S. import ban and customs would hold infringing devices upon entry into the U.S.

With so much legal uncertainty, Google may at some point realize that VP8 does not offer a fundamental advantage over H.264 in terms of the licensing situation, but represents a questionable tradeoff: H.264 comes with predictable, limited royalties (even more so after Google's Motorola failed to convince a U.S. court of the merits of its exorbitant royalty claims), while VP8 products may get banned without any licensing obligation on the part of Nokia and possibly other patent holders.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has criticized Google for abandoning open standards in connection with chat services (Google Talk), as I just found out via Techmeme. It appears again and again that Google's commitment to openness is vey selective, and I believe VP8 is ultimately about control and cost reduction, not openness and freedom.

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Saturday, May 18, 2013

Google's FRAND-zero patent license for VP8 threatens to divide Web and FOSS communities

Google is already promoting the VP9 video codec, which may very well raise new patent issues, while pushing for adoption of VP8 as an Internet standard. But the patent license it has drafted for VP8 and just published doesn't meet the requirements of the Open Source Initiative's definition of open source, says the President of the OSI's Board of Directors, Simon Phipps, in a blog post. According to Mr. Phipps, the draft license "shows signs of unfamiliarity with the tenets of software freedom". The OSI can't speak for the Free Software Foundation, of course, but the two organizations share many values and the FSF's emphasis of software freedom ("[t]he issue is not about price") entails even stricter requirements for acceptable license terms. Simply put, if your proposal doesn't please Simon Phipps, know that Richard Stallman ("RMS") is harder to please.

Historically, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has applied its royalty-free (RF) licensing requirements in ways that ensured compatibility of HTML-related essential patent licenses with the philosophies of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) organizations, particularly the FSF and the OSI. The Web movement and the FOSS movement have succeeded symbiotically and in tandem: FOSS powers large parts of the Web and drove its adoption, while the Web has allowed FOSS to thrive and contributed greatly to its popularity. If Google wants the W3C to consider its proposed VP8 patent license an acceptable W3C RF license, it effectively asks the W3C to part ways with the FSF and the OSI, after approximately two decades of close and fruitful collaboration. This is utterly divisive.

Shortly after the announcement of an MPEG LA-Google license deal relating to VP8 I was confused about Google's intentions to comply with the W3C patent policy when I saw a Google employee link to a web page that involved FRAND licensing commitments when he said they were planning to comply with the W3C's patent policy. Now that Google's proposal has been published, the answer is that Google's proposed VP8 patent license is not a permissive RF license but a typical FRAND-zero (or, synonymously, "RAND-zero") license. Zero license fees to be paid by licensees (though Google presumably paid or pays MPEG LA) -- but reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (field-of-use restrictions, reciprocity) are imposed and, which Mr. Phipps considers the most significant issue with the proposal, "gaining benefit from the agreement requires individual execution of the license agreement".

The final two sentences of the OSI President's blog post declares Google the loser and VP8's rivals the winning camp:

"This document seems to me to be an effective outcome for those in MPEG-LA's patent-holder community who want to see VP8 disrupted. It has provoked an autoimmune response that must have Google's enemies smiling wickedly."

I don't want to speculate about the intentions of the 11 originally-unnamed, meanwhile-disclosed companies that contributed patents to the MPEG LA-Google deal, or of the MPEG LA pool firm. Frankly, it doesn't matter what company A or company B wants to achieve in this context. At least for now, Google's own license grant under Section 3 of that proposed agreement raises the same issues that Mr. Phipps criticizes with respect to the other patents involved -- Google isn't being more generous than the MPEG LA group in those respects. At any rate, conspiracy theories aren't even needed when simple business logic can explain everything. If a company believes that video codecs should be available on affordable terms, but that intellectual property holders should be compensated somehow, then it can be Google's best friend and will nevertheless attach certain conditions to a license grant. Such conditions can be monetary and non-monetary. The financial part has been resolved. While I doubt that the patent holders gave Google a freebie (considering that they don't even do this in connection with H.264, the standard they promote), Google can apparently afford those royalties without having to charge end users. There's major strategic value for Google to gain in controlling an Internet standard, as non-MPEG LA-contributor Nokia's comments on its decision to withhold a license implied. So Google picks up the bill. But the non-monetary terms shine through its proposed "VP8 Patent Cross-license Agreement".

Mr. Phipps says it's probably "unworkable" for the FOSS community, and at the very least unacceptable, that a licensee must identify itself and sign up to get a license, including downstream users since there's no right to sublicense. The FOSS approach is that someone just grants you a license and the downstream is automatically licensed, too, so you can share freely without any bureaucracy or loss of data privacy involved for anyone. But let's think about the modus operandi of those third-party patent holders, wholly apart from any theories of world domination or destruction. They want a reciprocal license (Section 5 of the proposed VP8 license). That's why Google calls this a "cross-license". It would be foolish for them to make their VP8-essential patents available when a beneficiary of their license grant can withhold a license. But they must have a reasonable degree of legal certainty that they can use the other party's back-licensing obligation as a defense to infringement claims. And that's why they need a formal cross-license agreement in place. Otherwise the licensee could later claim that it never consented to that license grant.

Google itself is a good example -- "good" only in terms of suitability, though bad in terms of behavior -- of why reciprocal-licensing commitments must be formalized. Courts in three different countries have already found Google to fail to honor grant-back obligations vis-à-vis Microsoft -- two of them formally ruled on this (England and Wales High Court, Mannheim Regional Court; both in connection with ActiveSync), and the third one (the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington) did not formally adjudge the issue because Google itself (only its Motorola Mobility subsidiary) was not a party to the relevant case, but nonetheless stated that Microsoft was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Google-MPEG LA agreement concerning H.264. And in those cases, Google had identified itself and formally signed license agreements, but it still disputed the applicability of those terms. Now imagine what would happen if someone with Google's mentality, which a U.S. judge described as "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable" , refused to honor a grant-back obligation and claimed that there wasn't even an enforceable agreement in place... especially in jurisdictions that don't even recognize the concept of third-party beneficiaries to an agreement.

As for field-of-use restrictions, Mr. Phipps criticizes that the license doesn't cover you "[i]f you're writing any multipurpose code or if the way you're dealing with VP8 varies somewhat from the normal format -- perhaps you've added capabilities". Again, let me remind you that Google's own license grant under the proposed agreement comes with the same restrictions. Google itself apparently doesn't want people to modify VP8. It wants to control it. Just the way it controls Android through its arbitrarily-applied compatibility definition. Even if Google ultimately agreed with Mr. Phipps and allowed modifications with respect to its own patents, it would still have to convince those third-party patent holders to grant an equally permissive license. But in that case, someone could use patents that also read on, for example, H.264 and call it a modification of a licensed VP8 codec. Just like Mr. Phipps considers certain aspects of the proposed license "unworkable" for open source, so would it be unworkable for patent holders who generally license their patents on commercial terms to grant a license without any field-of-use restriction (and to an unidentifiable, unlimited number of beneficiaries).

The OSI President hopes that Google will improve this license agreement. But whether it can is another question. It can probably make improvements with respect to its own patents, and I believe that's what it should do at a minimum. This would affect its ability to monetize Motorola Mobility's H.264 declared-essential patents, but those have been found to have very little commercial value anyway. At least Google would show that it respects the FOSS philosophy.

Finally I'd like to talk about what the terms of the proposed license say about the need Google saw to take a license from those 11 MPEG LA contributors. After the announcement of the license deal some people argued that Google merely wanted to avoid litigation but that the agreement didn't constitute an admission of the very third-party patent infringement issues Google had denied for a long time. In other words, they said Google was paying for peace of mind, not for essential intellectual property.

It's true that sometimes license deals are struck even though the licensee is convinced of the merits of its case. That's the nuisance-value business model of certain patent trolls: they'll sue you over meritless claims and offer a license at much less than the cost of a proper defense (which is usually not recoverable in the United States). However, I believe that when all the parties to an agreement are not patent trolls but (as Judge Robart described Google in the MPEG LA H.264 context) "sophisticated, substantial technology firm[s]", then I believe there must be a strong presumption that a license deal doesn't just involve bogus claims. And that presumption is further strengthened if a licensee insisted over the years that certain claims had no merit.

Granted, a presumption, even a very strong one, still isn't proof. One needs to know the actual terms of an agreement to have clarity. None of them were announced two months ago. It's just clear that whatever Google pays is enough that Google can just absorb the costs for the downstream. The amount of money involved could be more, or even much more, than what is needed to prove that Google took those infringement allegations seriously, but if Google pays for it silently (because it can afford it), we won't know. Now at least some of the non-monetary terms are clear -- or they will be clear with definitive certainty if Google, despite criticism from Mr. Phipps and others who will agree with him (or even go beyond his criticism), can't offer a license to those third-party patents on permissive terms. The non-monetary terms demonstrate that Google took those infringement allegations seriously. Otherwise it wouldn't have drafted a license that threatens to divide the Web and FOSS communities, which in turn would have major impact on Google's own open source reputation. The non-monetary price Google is willing to pay here is so substantial that I believe it would have chosen to defend itself in court against any infringement claims (which it could have done proactively through declaratory judgment actions) if it had truly thought that all those infringement allegations were bogus, as it would have had all of us believe.

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Thursday, April 11, 2013

Appeals court likely to give German iCloud users push email back on 24th, lift Google's injunction

Due to an injunction Google's Motorola Mobility won against Apple over a dubious patent in Germany in February 2012 and started to enforce that same month, Apple was forced to deactivate push notifications for users accessing the iCloud (or its predecessor, MobileMe) from Germany. This relates primarily to push email but also includes contact and calendar updates, and it's not about whether users can access their email and other data but only about whether it is automatically sent to them or whether they have to configure their devices to check periodically for updates. Still, a hassle is a hassle, and this hassle has been caused for well over a year. But there's light at the end of the tunnel: the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court will announce a decision on Apple's appeal on April 24, and based on how yesterday's hearing went, my prediction is that the enforcement of this injunction will come to an end:

The most likely outcome is a stay pending a parallel nullity (invalidation) action before Germany's Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court). In fact, there are two nullity actions that will be heard together: one brought by Apple and another one brought by Microsoft. Over the last eight days the Federal Patent Court has already invalidated two other patents asserted in high-profile wireless disputes: Apple's slide-to-unlock patent and -- making yesterday a doubly successful day for Apple's defensive litigation in Germany -- a Samsung 3G (UMTS) declared-essential patent. I can't imagine that Motorola's push patent, which a UK court found invalid last year for multiple independent reasons, will survive the nullity proceeding unless its claims are amended to the extent that its scope is narrowed to what the claimed invention originally related to: ensuring the delivery of messages to pagers attached to different garments. Such a narrowing amendment would, of course, render the patent commercially valueless in today's market.

I wasn't able to attend yesterday's hearing in person (I fully intended to, but for reasons beyond my control I couldn't). But I've been able to obtain information on how it went, and I learned from a reliable source that the court expressed doubts about the validity of the patent in light of at least one of the prior art references underlying Microsoft's resounding victory in the UK. I published the UK ruling in February. Its paragraphs 89-97 discuss the prior art reference the Karlsruhe-based court is mostly interested in, Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) version 4, described in RFC 1730 dated December 1994 and published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Look at it this way: Google, which claims to be all for open Internet standards and against proprietary technologies, has been enforcing an injunction for more than a year against Apple, and has been (unsuccessfully) pursuing one against Microsoft since 2011, over a feature that an open and universal Internet standard already described before the priority date of the relevant patent. This is like filing a patent on hyperlinks and suing Apple and Microsoft over it.

The court even suggested to Google's counsel to stipulate to a stay pending the nullity action, but Google declined. The fact that the court encouraged a stipulated stay is yet another indication that Google doesn't have much of a chance to continue its enforcement of this injunction come April 24. Also, it's not common for a decision to be scheduled so soon after the appellate hearing, suggesting that the appeals court wants to put an end to illegitimate enforcement.

It's also possible that the court will clear Apple of infringement. The court spent a considerable amount of time discussing Apple's non-infringement defense, but did not indicate an inclination, and certainly not as clearly as in connection with the obvious (in)validity of the patent-in-suit.

If Google ultimately loses this case, as I believe it will, then it will owe Apple damages for enforcement of an improperly-granted injunction.

A few months after suing Apple over this patent, Motorola also asserted it against Microsoft. Not only was the case against Microsoft filed later but it also took much more time as it involves some additional defenses Apple did not and could not raise (Exchange-specific prior user rights and grant-back obligation under ActiveSync license). The Mannheim Regional Court will announce a decision on that one in a week from tomorrow (April 19), and the way I see it, Google's case will be stayed or dismissed right away. The Mannheim court is presumably in close contact with its appeals court and well aware of it position now following yesterday's hearing.

Google's German push email injunction against Apple is presently the only injunction any "Android company" is presently enforcing anywhere in the world against Apple (and nothing is being enforced against Microsoft). In two weeks' time, even this one will likely be history. There are people out there saying that there are wins and losses on both sides, but the fact of the matter is that the only "wins" the Android camp scores are non-defeats, not true wins in terms of offensive achievements. That's why licensing -- not litigation -- is the only pragmatic solution for Android device makers to address their platform's infringement problems.

Google's Motorola is represented by Quinn Emanuel. Both Apple (in the appellate proceedings) and Microsoft are represented by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, and Bird & Bird scored a strategic victory over this patent for Microsoft in the UK.

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Saturday, March 23, 2013

Nokia comments on VP8 patent infringement assertions filed with IETF, criticizes Google

After discovering and blogging about Nokia's declaration of intellectual property rights (IPRs) allegedly infringed by Google's VP8 video codec I asked Nokia for comment. The declaration itself just listed 64 granted patents and 22 pending patent applications, and stated that Nokia would not commit to royalty-free or even just FRAND licensing with respect to VP8. Meanwhile a Nokia spokesman has sent me the following response:

"Nokia believes that open and collaborative efforts for standardization are in the best interests of consumers, innovators and the industry as a whole. We are now witnessing one company attempting to force the adoption of its proprietary technology, which offers no advantages over existing, widely deployed standards such as H.264 and infringes Nokia's intellectual property. As a result, we have taken the unusual step of declaring to the Internet Engineering Task Force that we are not prepared to license any Nokia patents which may be needed to implement its RFC6386 specification for VP8, or for derivative codecs."

A few observations:

  • Nokia describes H.264, which resulted from the consensus of dozens of leading industry players and patent holders, as "open and collaborative", while criticizing Google's push to elevate VP8 to an Internet standard as "one company attempting to force the adoption of its proprietary technology".

    Different companies mean different things when talking about "open" versus "proprietary" technology. The way H.264 was defined definitely meets all the criteria for an open standard. The process was inclusive, collaborative, and consensus-based. By contrast, VP8 was created by a single company, which Google acquired. That's the very opposite of inclusion.

    VP8 is sometimes also described as an "open source" codec. But even H.264 has been implemented in open source software, and it's fully documented, so anyone can implement it. There's nothing "closed source" about H.264. There are closed-source H.264 codecs just like anyone can create, and some have created, closed-source VP8 implementations. It's not like VP8 comes with a GPL-like copyleft mechanism.

    So in which ways would some argue VP8 is "open" and H.264 is not? All that you ultimately hear from VP8 supporters comes down to patent royalties. But I don't know any dictionary definition of "open" that corresponds to "free of charge". You can find millions of closed-source programs on the Internet that you can download for free (like Chrome, the browser with which I wrote this post), just like you can pay millions of dollars for program code that is actually provided to you for inspection. Wholly apart from true and twisted meanings of the word "open", even if one wanted to define "open" as "royalty-free", Nokia's IPR declaration and its ongoing VP8-related patent lawsuits (one trial has already taken place this month, another one will be held in June) suggest that implementing VP8 may ultimately prove even more costly than implementing H.264. For H.264 all the essential patent holders have made a FRAND licensing commitment, and Google itself, as a suspected FRAND abuser under antitrust scrutiny, has already experienced that U.S. courts, including Judge Posner (who ruled against Google on FRAND) and the highly influential Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (who supported Microsoft against Google), consider such FRAND pledges to be enforceable contracts. No promise, thus no contract, exists in Nokia's case with respect to VP8. Nokia can demand anything or simply withhold licenses altogether.

    It's not even clear how serious Google is about VP8 being royalty-free. Instead of linking to the W3C's royalty-free patent policy an email a Google employee sent to a mailing list referred to a FRAND standard.

  • I can relate to Nokia's objections to Google's quest for world domination. Google owns the largest video website, YouTube. It owns the market-leading smartphone and tablet computer operating system, Android. And above all, the leading search engine and online advertising business. A video codec standard of Google's choosing -- driven by a desire not to pay royalties to those who invested heavily over the years in technological progress in this area -- is not a good idea.

    It's not just Nokia's concern. A famous app developer who dislikes software patents, Instapaper author Marco Arment, has also pointed out in a recent blog post that "'open' has very little to do with anything they [Google] do":

    "What they're really doing most of the time is trying to gain control of the web for themselves and their products."

    Google is so aggressive and its agenda poses so much of a threat to competition that even software patent critics at some point believe that some reasonable patent enforcement may be necessary to thwart the most problematic ones of Google's initiatives.

  • Nokia's statement describes its VP8 IPR declaration as an "unusual step". Unusual, but not unprecedented. I sided with Apple against Nokia in the nano-SIM context. At some point Nokia declared itself unwilling to make its patents available to implementations of Apple's proposal. So did Google's Motorola. After some of its concerns were addressed, Nokia ultimately agreed to make its related patents available on FRAND terms. But I don't expect such a solution here. Nokia is a member of ETSI, but not of the VP8 consortium, and I don't think it will partner with Google on VP8 anytime soon. ETSI needed a way forward for a new SIM card standard, while no one (besides Google) really needs VP8 given that H.264 works fine for the industry at large and for consumers (and it already has a successor, H.265). Even if Nokia -- contrary to what I believe will happen -- agreed to the same kind of solution, a FRAND licensing commitment would be antithetical to Google's claims that VP8 is royalty-free and unencumbered, and irreconcilable with the W3C's royalty-free patent policy.

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Setback for Google's VP8: Nokia refuses to commit patents to royalty-free or FRAND licensing

Not only does Nokia own a patent on tethering (and has already defeated Google on claim construction in an ITC investigation) but its strong intellectual property position is also of growing concern to Google in connection with its initiative to make the allegedly royalty-free VP8 codec (part of the WebM Project) an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) video standard. I reported on a German VP8 patent infringement trial held two weeks ago and found out about another one coming up in mid-June. The latest news is that Nokia has made an official IPR (intellectual property rights) declaration to the IETF with respect to the VP8 Data Format and Decoding Guide listing 64 granted patents and 22 pending patent applications (I've reformatted the list further below).

Obviously those 86 declared IPRs aren't 86 different inventions: these are a few patent families with multiple international registrations per patent. Still, the number is significant, especially because a patent that is, for example, declared invalid in one jurisdiction may still be enforced successfully in another. Or a judge in one country may find it not to be infringed, while a judge in another country will.

This declaration would be just perfect for Google's purposes if Nokia had committed to royalty-free licensing. And if Nokia had not been that generous but had at least made a FRAND licensing commitment, VP8 still wouldn't be "free", but at least there would be a guarantee that licenses to Nokia's relevant patents are available at all (and that they are available on prices that won't be excessive). But in Section IV, Licensing Declaration, Nokia bluntly says the following:

Unwilling to Commit to the Provisions of a), b), or c) Above

This couldn't be clearer. The precise meaning of a), b) and c) can be found in Section 6.5 of the relevant IETF document, RFC 3979:

Specifically, it is helpful to indicate whether, upon approval by the IESG for publication as RFCs of the relevant IETF specification(s), all persons will be able to obtain the right to implement, use, distribute and exercise other rights with respect to an Implementing Technology

  • a) under a royalty-free and otherwise reasonable and non-discriminatory license, or

  • b) under a license that contains reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, including a reasonable royalty or other payment, or

  • c) without the need to obtain a license from the IPR holder.

  • (emphasis and bullet points added)

So option a) is what is called "RAND-0" ("RAND-ZERO"), meaning it's a royalty-free license and any non-monetary terms (such as grant-back obligations) must be FRAND, option b) is FRAND with royalties, and option c) is so permissive that a right holder doesn't even require the conclusion of a license agreement. Nokia rejects all three. And given that it's already seeking injunctions against HTC in Germany over two VP8 patents, there can be no doubt that it means business and that a no is a no. They're not just saying they have patents that read on VP8; they're actually suing.

Nokia doesn't have an obligation to make a FRAND promise with respect to VP8. It wasn't involved in VP8 standard-setting. VP8 was and in practical terms (even if not in formal terms) still is a single-company project (when Google says "open", it usually means "control"), and that's why no one can be forced to support it. By contrast, H.264 was an industry-wide initiative and everyone sitting at the standard-setting table agreed to FRAND licensing from the beginning.

What Nokia is doing here is simply the normal course of business if a patent holder (Nokia) does not share the vision of another company (Google) with respect to a proposed standard and reserves all rights. What motivation could Nokia possibly have to donate something to a Google initiative? None. No motivation, no obligation, no license. Simple as that.

This doesn't mean that Nokia will categorically rule out granting licenses to someone like HTC. If the price is right, it can always do so. But there won't be any freebies, and in licensing negotiations it can ask for any amount of money because there's no FRAND promise that it could possibly breach by making a blatantly non-FRAND demand, while Google (Motorola) does have a FRAND licensing obligation with respect to H.264.

Again, it's the normal course of business, and if Google had not acquired Motorola Mobility, then (apart from saving Google $12.5 billion for a patent portfolio that consistently fails to give its acquirer any leverage) Motorola would certainly have done the same thing. Motorola never joined the VP8 initiative before Google decided to buy it. Motorola, too, reserved the right to enforce any VP8-related patents it might own: to seek injunctions or to demand any royalty it wants.

It would be interesting to know where AT&T stands. AT&T was involved in H.264 standard-setting but didn't contribute its patents to the MPEG LA AVC/H.264 pool. If any AT&T video codec patents read on VP8, then AT&T, like Nokia, doesn't have a FRAND licensing obligation.

IPRs listed in Nokia's VP8-related declaration to the IETF

I took the list published by the IETF and reformatted it:

  1. Country:DE:Filing date:22.05.1998, Filing number:98660050.0, Pub.number:0884911, Grant number:69825220
  2. Country:FR:Filing date:22.05.1998, Filing number:98660050.0, Pub.number:0884911, Grant number:0884911
  3. Country:GB:Filing date:22.05.1998, Filing number:98660050.0, Pub.number:0884911, Grant number:0884911
  4. Country:NL:Filing date:22.05.1998, Filing number:98660050.0, Pub.number:0884911, Grant number:0884911
  5. Country:US:Filing date:09.06.1998, Filing number:09/094177, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:6504873
  6. Country:CN:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00814037.5, Pub.number:1378750, Grant number:ZL00814037.5
  7. Country:DE:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:60015566.8
  8. Country:FI:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:1206881
  9. Country:FR:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:1206881
  10. Country:GB:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:1206881
  11. Country:IT:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:1206881
  12. Country:NL:Filing date:10.08.2000, Filing number:00957359.3, Pub.number:1206881, Grant number:1206881
  13. Country:US:Filing date:11.08.1999, Filing number:09/371641, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:6735249
  14. Country:US:Filing date:13.02.2004, Filing number:10/778449, Pub.number:20040165664, Grant number:7149251
  15. Country:US:Filing date:12.12.2006, Filing number:11/609873, Pub.number:20070140342, Grant number:NA
  16. Country:JP:Filing date:09.04.2008, Filing number:2008-101068, Pub.number:2008-178149, Grant number:NA
  17. Country:AU:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:30275/01, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:778990
  18. Country:CA:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2374523, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2374523
  19. Country:CN:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01800565.9, Pub.number:1365575, Grant number:ZL01800565.9
  20. Country:CN:Filing date:06.10.2005, Filing number:200510113767.6, Pub.number:1756362, Grant number:NA
  21. Country:FI:Filing date:20.01.2000, Filing number:20000120, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:117533
  22. Country:HK:Filing date:10.01.2003, Filing number:03100263.7, Pub.number:1048411, Grant number:1048411
  23. Country:HK:Filing date:17.08.2006, Filing number:06109148.6, Pub.number:1089030, Grant number:NA
  24. Country:RU:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2002100648, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2295203
  25. Country:RU:Filing date:10.11.2006, Filing number:2006139951, Pub.number:2006139951, Grant number:2358410
  26. Country:SG:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:200107086.1, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:84926
  27. Country:SG:Filing date:17.09.2004, Filing number:200405663.6, Pub.number:128476, Grant number:128476
  28. Country:US:Filing date:19.01.2001, Filing number:09/766035, Pub.number:20010017944, Grant number:NA
  29. Country:AT:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  30. Country:FR:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  31. Country:DE:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:60145194.5
  32. Country:IE:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  33. Country:IT:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  34. Country:NL:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  35. Country:ES:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  36. Country:SE:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  37. Country:TR:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  38. Country:GB:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902442.1, Pub.number:1186177, Grant number:1186177
  39. Country:BR:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:PI0107706.6, Pub.number:0107706, Grant number:NA
  40. Country:CA:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2397090, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2397090
  41. Country:CA:Filing date:15.01.2007, Filing number:2572566, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2572566
  42. Country:CN:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01806682.8, Pub.number:1418436, Grant number:ZL01806682.8
  43. Country:CN:Filing date:11.03.2005, Filing number:200510056330.3, Pub.number:1658677, Grant number:200510056330.3
  44. Country:FI:Filing date:21.01.2000, Filing number:20000131, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:116819
  45. Country:HK:Filing date:10.09.2003, Filing number:03106477.6, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:1054288
  46. Country:HK:Filing date:04.01.2006, Filing number:06100170.6, Pub.number:1080653, Grant number:1080653
  47. Country:JP:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2001-553307, Pub.number:2003-520531, Grant number:NA
  48. Country:KR:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2002-7009307, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:714355
  49. Country:SG:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:200204136.6, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:90389
  50. Country:US:Filing date:19.01.2001, Filing number:09/766193, Pub.number:20010017942, Grant number:6907142
  51. Country:US:Filing date:06.06.2005, Filing number:11/146196, Pub.number:20050254717, Grant number:7295713
  52. Country:ZA:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:2002/5506, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2002/5506
  53. Country:JP:Filing date:20.09.2007, Filing number:2007-244456, Pub.number:2008-054335, Grant number:NA
  54. Country:CA:Filing date:17.12.2007, Filing number:2614571, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:NA
  55. Country:US:Filing date:09.10.2007, Filing number:11/869445, Pub.number:20080247657, Grant number:7567719
  56. Country:DE:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902443.9, Pub.number:1249132, Grant number:60144513.9
  57. Country:NL:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902443.9, Pub.number:1249132, Grant number:1249132
  58. Country:GB:Filing date:22.01.2001, Filing number:01902443.9, Pub.number:1249132, Grant number:1249132
  59. Country:JP:Filing date:20.04.2012, Filing number:2012-096255, Pub.number:2012-170122, Grant number:NA
  60. Country:BR:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:PI0110627.9, Pub.number:0110627, Grant number:NA
  61. Country:CA:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:2408364, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2408364
  62. Country:CN:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:01812464.X, Pub.number:1457606, Grant number:01812464.X
  63. Country:EE:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:P200200627, Pub.number:P200200627, Grant number:5487
  64. Country:EP:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:01931769.2, Pub.number:1282982, Grant number:NA
  65. Country:HU:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:P0302617, Pub.number:P0302617, Grant number:NA
  66. Country:JP:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:2001-583055, Pub.number:2003-533142, Grant number:4369090
  67. Country:KR:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:2002-7014937, Pub.number:2003-11325, Grant number:772576
  68. Country:MX:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:PA/A/2002/010964, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:229275
  69. Country:MX:Filing date:02.06.2005, Filing number:PA/A/05/005901, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:259781
  70. Country:SG:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:200206648.8, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:92888
  71. Country:US:Filing date:08.05.2000, Filing number:09/566020, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:6711211
  72. Country:US:Filing date:03.02.2004, Filing number:10/770986, Pub.number:20040156437, Grant number:6954502
  73. Country:US:Filing date:07.09.2005, Filing number:11/219917, Pub.number:20060013317, Grant number:NA
  74. Country:ZA:Filing date:08.05.2001, Filing number:2002/8767, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2002/8767
  75. Country:US:Filing date:17.04.2007, Filing number:11/736454, Pub.number:20080095228, Grant number:NA
  76. Country:AU:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:2007311526, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:2007311526
  77. Country:BR:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:PI0718205.8, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:NA
  78. Country:CN:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:200780044601.0, Pub.number:101548548, Grant number:200780044601.0
  79. Country:EP:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:07826205.2, Pub.number:2080375, Grant number:NA
  80. Country:IN:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:2656/DELNP/2009, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:NA
  81. Country:JP:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:2009-532920, Pub.number:2010-507310, Grant number:4903877
  82. Country:MX:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:MX/a/2009/004123 , Pub.number:MX/a/2009/004123 , Grant number:NA
  83. Country:PH:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:1-2009-500724, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:NA
  84. Country:RU:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:2009117688, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:NA
  85. Country:SG:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:200902620-4, Pub.number:NA, Grant number:151785
  86. Country:VN:Filing date:29.08.2007, Filing number:1-2009-00996, Pub.number:22209, Grant number:NA

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Monday, February 14, 2011

Royalty-free MPEG video coding standard ups the ante for Google's WebM/VP8

Amid all the debate about whether Google's WebM video codec VP8 is truly patent-unencumbered and a valid alternative to the market-leading video codec (AVC/H.264), a very interesting project nearly went unnoticed: the development of a royalty-free MPEG video coding standard.

At a recent meeting of the Motion Picture Experts Group (MPEG), the decision was taken to issue a call for proposals (which will formally happen in March 2011) on video compression technology "that is expected to lead to a standard falling under ISO/IEC 'Type-1' licensing, i.e. intended to be 'royalty free'." The announcement also states the following:

"In recognition of the growing importance that the Internet plays in the generation and consumption of video content, MPEG intends to develop a new video compression standard in line with the expected usage models of the Internet. The new standard is intended to achieve substantially better compression performance than that offered by MPEG-2 and possibly comparable to that offered by the AVC Baseline Profile."

It's important to note the difference between MPEG, the standardization body, and MPEG LA, the licensing agency. MPEG defines standards, and those can be royalty-free or royalty-bearing, depending on what the owners of the essential patents agree upon in each case. MPEG LA manages patent pools related to royalty-bearing standards, serving right holders and licensees as a one-stop solution by way of aggregation.

Rob Glidden, a former Sun executive and digital TV expert, made me aware of MPEG's royalty-free codec plans via Twitter (thanks for that!). I found several interesting posts on his blog, such as this recent one arguing for a royalty-free video codec standard. Just like me, Rob appears to be somewhat skeptical of claims that WebM/VP8 is truly patent-free.

Three formidable hurdles for WebM/VP8

Google and its WebM allies (primarily Mozilla, Opera and the Free Software Foundation) wanted to pose a direct challenge to AVC/H.264, the incumbent and ubiquitous video codec. Their strategy was to seek adoption of WebM/VP8 as an Internet standard, claiming that it was the only format of its kind to be available on royalty-free, open-source-like terms. They thought they were already challenging the champion in the final match, but not so fast: MPEG LA may soon start collect royalties from VP8 adopters, and if MPEG's own royalty-free codec initiative succeeds, VP8 will have to beat it -- or be forgotten.

Using that tournament analogy again, VP8 is only in the quarter finals. MPEG LA's formation of a VP8 patent pool and MPEG's call for proposals on a royalty-free video codec are such important developments that the results they produce will have to be awaited before standardization on VP8 will even be seriously considered by the W3C or IETF. There is no rush because everyone can demonstrably watch Internet videos for the time being even though HTML 5's video tag is currently codec-agnostic.

I have drawn up a simple graphic that shows the three hurdles VP8 is facing:

If MPEG LA's patent pool for VP8 disproves claims that Google's codec is truly free of charge, it loses its intended unique characteristic and is out of the game. At that stage, even the Free Software Foundation may feel forced to withdraw its support. It wouldn't be possible for the FSF to advocate a royalty-bearing format.

Should VP8 overcome that hurdle, it would play a semifinal match against MPEG's royalty-free standard. I'll explain further below why this one is also going to be a tough challenge.

Only if VP8 survives that round as well, it will get to challenge AVC/H.264. To dethrone the reasonably-priced market leader, VP8 would have to deliver high quality, not just royalty-free availability.

The odds are long against WebM/VP8

Surmounting three significant hurdles in a row -- since failure at any of them means "game over" -- is really difficult. Even if one assumed a 60% chance in each case, the aggregate likelihood of success would just be slightly above 20%. In my opinion, VP8's chances are less than that. Let me explain my view on each of the three challenges.

1. MPEG LA patent pool for VP8

MPEG LA requests submissions of patents essential to VP8 until March 18, 2011. That's less than six weeks from the announcement. I presume MPEG LA already knows of a variety of relevant patents, and has discussed this with its membership. The first time MPEG LA CEO Larry Horn mentioned the possibility of such a pool was in an interview with AllThingsD in May 2010.

After the submissions deadline, MPEG LA's patent evaluators will make a determination as to which patents are truly essential to VP8. Obviously, whatever they conclude isn't the same as a judicial declaration of infringement. But MPEG LA is trusted by industry, and the moment it specifies the patents it believes read on VP8, Google and its allies will either have to invalidate those patents (which is unlikely to work for a reasonably long list) or prove that there isn't an infringement.

There could also be patents which VP8 infringes but which aren't submitted to MPEG LA in that process. I didn't mention that before, just to keep things simple at the time. When assessing the likelihood of VP8 truly being patent-unencumbered, this additional risk must, however, be taken into account.

2. Royalty-free MPEG video coding standard

It's plausible that MPEG can pull off a royalty-free coding standard. It will be able to draw from three types of patents for that purpose:

  • patents that have already expired

  • patents approaching expiration (which limits their commercial value)

  • patents whose owners are willing to forgo short-term revenue opportunities in favor of longer-term objectives, or who consider it a prudent strategy to support a royalty-free standard for web purposes and monetize related (but other) patents in other fields of use such as digital cameras and digital television

Codec development was already reasonably advanced in the early to mid 1990s, and US patents of that kind have a maximum term of validity of 20 years. Therefore, the first two groups of patents may already be sufficient to produce a codec at a level with, or even significantly superior over, VP8.

In order to compete successfully with a royalty-free MPEG standard, VP8 would have to be clearly better just to be considered. That's because MPEG has the backing of many vendors and offers an open and inclusive process. Under MPEG's stewardship, such a standard can continue to be developed (as new patents expire, approach expiration or are made available by their owners for other reasons) in a balanced, consensus-based way, while WebM is dependent upon Google, a company with specific strategic interests.

The argument that the availability of a WebM reference implementation on open source terms ensures vendor independence isn't sufficent. Theoretically, it's true that anyone could take it in a different direction. Practically, such forking would result in fragmentation, and it's doubtful that anyone would ever put significant resources behind such an effort.

3. Incumbent AVC/H.264 standard

Should VP8 really overcome the challenges previously described, it would still have to garner broadbased industry support. It wouldn't be in the interest of standardization bodies like the W3C and the IETF to formally declare a "standard" that fails to be adopted widely. Such failures can undermine the credibility and diminish the influence of those organizations.

AVC/H.264 isn't royalty-free, but its terms appear to be acceptable to a majority of industry players. In order to take any sizable part this incumbent's market share away, VP8 would have to be at least technically comparable. Degradations wouldn't be acceptable to consumers. However, my own impression and that of most of the opinions I read is that there's still a noticeable gap.

One of the challenges for VP8 is the limited number of hardware products supporting it. For hardware companies it's particularly important to be careful about patent-related risks. A software company may be able to just change its code. Hardware companies would be hit hard by injunctions or ITC import bans. VP8 faces a chicken-and-egg problem with the hardware industry, and the two new initiatives I described before will also have an effect in that area.

Google and its WebM allies won't give up. They are determined to turn this into a new edition of the "videotape format war" of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Looking at the drawing that shows the three hurdles and considering the facts, I have my doubts that they will get very far. However, even if the odds appear to be long against VP8, it may have a positive effect on the willingness of patent holders to support MPEG's royalty-free codec standard.

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